R.P. Kapur Vs State of Punjab on 25 March, 1960

Posted on July 28, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down three categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction could and should be exercised to quash proceedings:

(i) where there was a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the proceedings;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint did not make out the offence alleged; and
(iii)where either there was no legal evidence adduced in support of the charge or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly failed to prove the charge.

Conclusion:

It is not a case where the appellant can justly contend that on the face of the record the charge levelled against him is unsustainable.

R.P. Kapur Vs State of Punjab 25 March, 1960

Citation: [1960 AIR 862], [1960 SCR (3) 311], [(1960) 3 SCR 388], [1960 CRLJ SC 1239], [1960 CRILJ 239], [1961 AWR 31 49], [1960 AIR SC 866]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1033301/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ab10e4b014971140b8c1

Reproduced in accordance with Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from judis.nic.in, lobis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court and District Court Websites such as ecourts.gov.in

U.Suvetha Vs State By Insp.Of Police & Anr on 6 May, 2009

Posted on July 23, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that, a concubine is not a relative to the husband of the knife, with regards to IPC 498A.

The word ‘cruelty” having been defined in terms of the aforesaid explanation, no other meaning can be attributed thereto. Living with another woman may be an act of cruelty on the part of the husband for the purpose of judicial separation or dissolution of marriage but the same, in our opinion, would not attract the wrath of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code.

Meaning or definition of “relative”:

In the absence of any statutory definition, the term ‘relative’ must be assigned a meaning as is commonly understood. Ordinarily it would include father, mother, husband or wife, son, daughter, brother, sister, nephew or niece, grandson or grand-daughter of an individual or the spouse of any person. The meaning of the word ‘relative’ would depend upon the nature of the statute. It principally includes a person related by blood, marriage or
adoption.
The word ‘relative’ has been defined in P. Ramanatha Aiyar Advanced Law Lexicon – Volume 4, 3rd Edition as under :-
“Relative, “RELATIVE” includes any person related by blood, marriage or adoption. [Lunacy Act ].
The expression “RELATIVE” means a husband wife, ancestor, lineal descendant, brother or sister. [Estate Duty Act].
“RELATIVE” means in relation to the deceased,
a) the wife or husband of the deceased;
b) the father, mother, children, uncles and aunts of the deceased, and
c) any issue of any person falling, within either of the preceding sub-clauses and the other party to a marriage with any such person or issue [Estate Duty Act].
A person shall be deemed to be a relative of another if, and only if, –
a) they are the members of a Hindu undivided family, or
b) they are husband and wife; or
c) the one is related to the other in the manner indicated in Schedule I-A [Companies Act, 1956].
“RELATIVE” in relation to an individual means –
a) The mother, father, husband or wife of the individual, or
b) a son, daughter, brother, sister, nephew or niece of the individual, or
c) a grandson or grand-daughter of the individual, or
d) the spouse of any person referred to in subclause (b) [Income tax Act].
“RELATIVE” means –
1) spouse of the person ;
2) brother or sister of the person ;
3) brother or sister of the spouse of the person;
4) any lineal ascendant or descendant of the person;
5) any lineal ascendant or descendant of the spouse of the person; [Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act].”

From Para 18,

By no stretch of imagination a girl friend or even a concubine in an etymological sense would be a ‘relative’. The word ‘relative’ brings within its purview a status. Such a status must be conferred either by blood or marriage or adoption. If no marriage has taken place, the question of one being relative of another would not arise.

U.Suvetha Vs State By Insp.Of Police & Anr on 6 May, 2009

Citations: [2009 ACC 67 903], [2009 SCC 6 787], [2009 SCC CRI 3 36], [2009 AIR SC 0 3491], [2009 SUPREME 3 797], [2009 RCR CRI 2 923], [2009 SCC 6 757], [2009 KERLT 2 686], [2009 MLJ CRI 2 1079], [2009 DMC 1 887], [2009 SLT 4 462], [2009 CUTLT SUPPL 1126], [2009 AIOL 675], [2009 AIR SC 1451], [2009 ANJ SC 2 16], [2009 BOMCR CRI SC 3 845], [2009 CRIMES SC 2 357], [2009 JT 7 222], [2009 SCALE 7 149], [2009 SCR 7 902], [2009 AIR SCW 3491], [2009 CRLJ SC 2974]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/953117/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609aec9e4b0149711414c47

Suresh Nanda vs C.B.I. on 24 January, 2008

Posted on July 22, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

In this landmark judgment, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that, no one, except Passport Authority, can impound a passport; nor police nor Courts. Period.

The Apex Court held that

there is a difference between seizing a document and impounding a document. A seizure is made at a particular moment when a person or authority takes into his possession some property which was earlier not in his possession. Thus, the seizure is done at a particular moment of time. However, if after seizing of a property or document, said property or document is retained for some period of time, then such retention amounts impounding of property/or document.

And also

Maintaining that, the Passport Act, 1967 is a special act and thereby prevails over the Cr.P.C. which is a general law, vide G.P. Singh’s Principles of Statutory Interpretation (9th Edition pg. 133). This principle is expressed in the maxim \023Generalia specialibus non derogant\024. Hence, impounding of a passport cannot be done by the Court under Section 104 Cr.P.C. though it can impound any other document or thing.

This judgment has lead to lot of other judgments wherein the various High Courts in India had ordered lower courts to return back the passports of accused, that were either confiscated by the police as part of their search operations or crime investigation or had been surrendered to Courts, as a condition to obtaining Anticipatory Bail. They are listed here.

Suresh Nanda vs C.B.I on 24 January, 2008

Citations : [2008 AIR SC 1414], [2008 AIR SC 0 898], [2008 SCC 3 674], [2008 LW CRL 1 503], [2008 SCALE 2 46], [2008 JT 2 174], [2008 ALL MR CRI 1189], [2008 ALT CRI 2 344], [2008 DLT 147 397], [2008 CCR 1 318], [2008 SLT 2 245], [2008 AIOL 107], [2008 BOMCR CRI SC 2 514], [2008 SCC CRI 2 121], [2008 AIR SCW 898], [2008 CRLJ SC 1599], [2008 MLJ CRL 1 1195]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/572504/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae74e4b0149711413efc

Reema Aggarwal Vs Anupam And Ors on 8 January, 2004

Posted on July 21, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Defense of Accused:

Before the trial Court the accused persons put the plea that charge under Section 498-A was thoroughly misconceived as both Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC pre-suppose valid marriage of the alleged victim-woman with the offender-husband. It was required to be shown that the victim-woman was the legally married wife of the accused. Since it was admitted that the appellant had married during the lifetime of the wife of respondent no.1, what happened to his first marriage remained a mystery. Prosecution has failed to establish that it stood dissolved legally. Prosecution having failed to bring any material record in that regard, Section 498-A had no application.

From Para 18,

It would be appropriate to construe the expression ‘husband’ to cover a person who enters into marital relationship and under the colour of such proclaimed or feigned status of husband subjects the woman concerned to cruelty or coerce her in any manner or for any of the purposes enumerated in the relevant provisions Sections 304B/498A, whatever be the legitimacy of the marriage itself for the limited purpose of Sections 498A and 304B IPC. Such an interpretation, known and recognized as purposive construction has to come into play in a case of this nature. The absence of a definition of ‘husband’ to specifically include such persons who contract marriages ostensibly and cohabitate with such woman, in the purported exercise of his role and status as ‘husband’ is no ground to exclude them from the purview of Section 304B or 498A IPC, viewed in the context of the very object and aim of the legislations introducing those provisions.

Finally,

Whether the offences are made out is a matter of trial. The High Court was not justified in summarily rejecting the application for grant of leave. It has a duty to indicate reasons when it refuses to grant leave. Any casual or summary disposal would not be proper. (See State of Punjab v. Bhag Singh (2003 (8) Supreme 611). In the circumstances, we set aside the impugned order of the High Court and remit the matter back to the High Court for hearing the matter on merits as according to us points involved require adjudication by the High Court. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated.

Reema Aggarwal Vs Anupam And Ors on 8 January, 2004

The acquittal of the accused happened at sessions court and a revision on this acquittal at High Court of Punjab and Haryana was dismissed. Read it here.

Citations : [2004 AIR SC 1418], [2004 ALD CRI 1 452], [2004 CALLT SC 3 16], [2004 DMC SC 1 201], [2004 JT SC 1 177], [2004 KLJ 1 825], [2004 KLT SC 2 822], [2004 PLJR 2 64], [2004 SCALE 1 264], [2004 SCC 3 199], [2004 CRIMES SC 1 276], [2004 SCC CRI 699], [2004 SCR 1 378], [2004 SUPREME 1 355], [2004 KHC 0 668], [2004 RCR CRI 1 776], [2004 ACC 48 442], [2004 AIR SC 344], [2004 SRJ 2 49], [2004 CCR 1 163], [2004 JCRIC 1 209], [2004 CRJ 2 432], [2004 SLT 1 466], [2004 AIR SCW 344], [2004 CRLJ SC 892]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1180389/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae01e4b0149711412ad7

https://vlex.in/vid/crl-no-000025-000025-852345777

Kunapareddy @ Nookala Shanka Balaji Vs Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari On 18 April, 2016

Posted on July 19, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Legal point explained: Court (Civil and Criminal) can allow amendments to the complaint/petition, before cognizance of same is taken by Court, either to a curable infirmity or the same cannot be corrected by a formal amendment or if there is likelihood of prejudice to the other side, then the Court shall not allow such amendment in the complaint

This is a judgment from Hon’ble Supreme Court where in the issue that arises is whether a court dealing with the petition/complaint filed under the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the DV Act’) has power to allow amendment to the petition/complaint originally filed.

Original reliefs requested in DV Case

“a) to provide protection to the life and limb of the complainant in the hands of the respondents;
b) to grant monthly maintenance of Rs. 5,000/- to the complainant and her children each towards her maintenance, medicines etc. and her children education and maintenance;
c) to grant such other relief or reliefs if the Hon’ble Court deems fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.”

These are the dole outs the begging knife requested Court to allow in this instant amendment petition

a) To provide protection to life and limb of the complainant in the hands of the respondent.
b) To grant monthly maintenance of Rs. 15,000/- to the complainant and her 2nd child to their maintenance instead of Rs.5000/-
c) Direct the respondent to return the Sridhana amount of Rs.3,00,000/- and 15 sovereigns of gold ornaments and other sari samanas and marriage batuvu presented to the respondent worth about 2 sovereigns wrist watch, 7 sovereign gold chain presented by the complainant and her parents.
d) Direct the respondent to pay the compensation of Rs.15 lakhs to the complaint for subjecting the compliant to physical and mental harassments besides including acts of Domestic Violence.
e) Direct the respondent to return the sari samans and other goods like worth more than Rs.10,00,000/- as per the list annexed herewith.
f) Direct the respondent to pay the cost of, litigation to the tune of Rs.25,000/- so far spent by the complainant persuing her litigation.
g) Direct the 1st respondent to provide separate residence by taking rent portion with monthly rent of Rs.10,000/-
h) Directing the respondent to return the original study certificates, medical certificates, deposits certificates and receipts etc. in the prayer portion paragraphs the following amendment by deleting the prayer original para
b) to grant monthly maintenance of Rs.5,000/- to the complainant and her children each towards her maintenance, medicines etc. and her children education and maintenance.”

Kunapareddy @ Nookala Shanka Balaji Vs Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari On 18 April, 2016

Citations: [2016 SCC ONLINE SC 531]

Krishna Veni Nagam Vs Harish Nagam on 9 March, 2017

Posted on July 13, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

In just judgment, Hon’ble Apex Court held that

in matrimonial or custody matters or in proceedings between parties to a marriage or arising out of disputes between parties to a marriage, wherever the defendants/respondents are located outside the jurisdiction of the court, the court where proceedings are instituted, may examine whether it is in the interest of justice to incorporate any safeguards for ensuring that summoning of defendant/respondent does not result in denial of justice. Order incorporating such safeguards may be sent along with the summons.
The safeguards can be:-
i) Availability of video conferencing facility.
ii) Availability of legal aid service.
iii) Deposit of cost for travel, lodging and boarding in terms of Order XXV CPC.
iv) E-mail address/phone number,

Krishna Veni Nagam Vs. Harish Nagam on 9 March, 2017

Citations : [2017 SCC 4 150], [2017 SCC ONLINE SC 236], [2017 AIR SC 1345], [2017 CTC 2 457], [2017 CDR SC 2 202], [2017 AJR 2 462], [2017 ALR 122 905], [2017 ALT 5 4], [2017 ALD 3 151], [2017 BOMCR 3 62], [2017 CLT 123 1054], [2017 DMCSC 2 173], [2017 GLT 2 29], [2017 JKJ SC 2 35], [2017 KHC 2 380], [2017 KLJ 2 549], [2017 KLT 2 593], [2017 LW 3 721], [2017 MPLJ 3 344], [2017 MHLJ 4 764], [2017 OLR 1 1033], [2017 RCR CIVIL 2 358], [2017 SCALE 3 471], [2017 SCJ 6 392], [2017 WBLR SC 3 622], [2017 WLN SC 2 26], [2017 SCC CIV 2 394]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/43287493/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/58ca392a2713e10674449271

This judgment is overruled in Santhini Vs Vijaya Venketesh here.

Dasam Vijay Rama Rao Vs M.Sai Sri on 17 June, 2015

Posted on June 25, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Hon’ble of Andhra Pradesh High Court has allowed permission for a GPA of a petitioner, to represent the petitioner and depose on his behalf in the court of law.

In view of the above clear cut pronouncement, it is evident that a GPA holder can depose and also lead evidence on behalf of his principal.
Learned Family Court Judge also appears to have entertained an apprehension as to whether the Family Court can entertain an application presented by a legal practitioner in view of the provision contained in Section 13 of the Family Courts Act, 1984.
From the very preamble of the Family Courts Act, 1984, one would gather that every endeavour is required to be made by the Family Court to assist the parties in arriving at a speedy settlement of disputes relating to the marriage and/or family affairs. That explains the reason Section 9 of the said Act provided for an appropriate legal environment for settlement of the disputes in an amicable manner. The parties are not only required to be assisted, but also required to be persuaded by the Judge in arriving at a settlement while keeping in view the importance of protecting and preserving the institution of the marriage between the parties. To the extent possible, the Family Court is required to utilize its skills and wisdom gained over long period of time by careful study of the ills of the society and then finding suitable cure for them and hence, the Family court must try to bring about a reconciliation of the disagreements persisting between the parties. However, when two parties to a marriage come before a Family Court and ask for dissolution of their marriage by mutual consent under Section 13-B of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the Court is required to adjourn the motion moved by both parties by a period not earlier than six months, as per sub Section 2 of Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act. Further, Sub Section 2 requires that the Court shall, on being satisfied, after hearing the parties and after making such enquiry as it thinks fit with regard to the averments in the petition are true, pass a decree of divorce declaring the marriage to be dissolved with effect from the date of such decree. Therefore, there may have been a genuine apprehension in the mind of the Family Court Judge as to whether there is any possibility of reconciliation between the parties or change of mind with regard to consent expressed earlier for such dissolution, when the petition is returned by it.
Keeping the very object behind the Family Courts Act, 1984, read with the spirit behind Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, the Family Court could have entertained the interlocutory application in as much as legal practitioners are not totally forbidden from rendering assistance to the Family Court. One of the reasons why Section 13 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, declared that no party to a suit or proceeding shall be entitled as of right to be represented by a legal practitioner sans technicalities or legal necessities, the parties must be helped by the Court to reconcile the disputes persisting between them. Unlike a traditional setup of the Court, where the Presiding Judge has to maintain not only an equiy distance between the parties to a lis, but also maintain a sense of impartiality towards the cause of both sides and essentially was required to maintain an arms length distance from the parties, in a Family Court, the Judge is donning the robes of a facilitator, a mentor and an expert counselor. A slight tilt in the approach to one of the parties in a Family Court, depending upon the facts and circumstances prevailing in the case and if the ends of justice would be better served by dosing so, is allowable. The emphasis being laid upon essentially preserving the institution and interest of the marriage and the welfare and well-being of the parties etc. Hence, the Family Court is entitled to receive, examine and act upon an affidavit filed by one of the parties before it, acting through a GPA. A petition moved in that regard is maintainable.

Finally,

I am, therefore, of the opinion that the Family Courts are entitled to ascertain the views of the parties and for that purpose adjourning a case by a reasonable period is not to be frowned upon. But, however, if one of the parties, like in the present case, appears before the Family court and expresses no objection for an affidavit of the other party to be taken on record and is not desirous of cross examining the deponent of the affidavit, the Family Court cam entertain, unhesitatingly any such move/application.
Increasingly Family Courts have been noticing that one of the parties is stationed abroad. It may not be always possible for such parties to undertake trip to India, for variety of good reasons. On the intended day of examination of a particular party, the proceedings may not go on, or even get completed possibly, sometimes due to preoccupation with any other more pressing work in the Court. But, however, technology, particularly, in the Information sector has improved by leaps and bounds. Courts in India are also making efforts to put to use the technologies available. ‘Skype’ is one such facility, which is easily available. Therefore, the Family Courts are justified in seeking the assistance of any practicing lawyer to provide the necessary skype facility in any particular case. For that purpose, the parties can be permitted to be represented by a legal practitioner, who can bring a mobile device. By using the skype technology, parties who are staying abroad can not only be identified by the Family Court, but also enquired
about the free will and consent of such party. This will enable the litigation costs to be reduced greatly and will also save precious time of the Court. Further, the other party available in the Court can also help the Court in not only identifying the other party, but would be able to ascertain the required information.

Dasam Vijay Rama Rao Vs M.Sai Sri on 17 June, 2015

Citations : [2015 ALD 4 757], [2015 ALT 5 150], [2015 AIR AP 191]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/123683887/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5608f8e1e4b01497111439d9

R.D. Saxena Vs Balram Prasad Sharma on 22 August, 2000

Posted on June 25, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

This is a wonderful judgment from Hon’ble Supreme Court of India on two aspects

(a) Has the advocate a lien for his fees on the litigation papers entrusted to him by his client?

(b) Does the client has freedom to choose and engage a advocate and change the advocate?

Thus, even after providing a right for an advocate to deduct the fees out of any money of the client remaining in his hand at the termination of the proceeding for which the advocate was engaged, it is important to notice that no lien is provided on the litigation files kept with him. In the conditions prevailing in India with lots of illiterate people among the litigant public it may not be advisable also to permit the counsel to retain the case bundle for the fees claimed by him. Any such lien if permitted would become susceptible to great abuses and exploitation.

… and more…

A litigant must have the freedom to change his advocate when he feels that the advocate engaged by him is not capable of espousing his cause efficiently or that his conduct is prejudicial to the interest involved in the lis, or for any other reason. For whatever reason, if a client does not want to continue the engagement of a particular advocate it would be a professional requirement consistent with the dignity of the profession that he should return the brief to the client. It is time to hold that such obligation is not only a legal duty but a moral imperative.
In criminal cases, every person accused of an offence has the right to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice which is now made a fundamental right under Article 22(1) of the Constitution. The said right is absolute in itself and it does not depend on other laws. In this context reference can be made to the decision of this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Shobharam and ors. (AIR 1966 SC 1910). The words of his choice in Article 22(1) indicate that the right of the accused to change an advocate whom he once engaged in the same case, cannot be whittled down by that advocate by withholding the case bundle on the premise that he has to get the fees for the services already rendered to the client.
If a party terminates the engagement of an advocate before the culmination of the proceedings that party must have the entire file with him to engage another advocate.

R.D. Saxena Vs Balram Prasad Sharma on 22 August, 2000

Citations : [2000 AIR SC 3049], [2001 ALLMR CRI SC 375], [2000 ALT SC 5 1], [2001 BLJR 1 174], [2000 CTC 3 757], [2001 GLH 3 624], [2000 JT SC 9 432], [2000 KLT SC 3 438], [2001 LW 1 284], [2001 MHLJ SC 1 23], [2000 MPLJ SC 613], [2000 PLJR 4 161], [2000 RD 91 692], [2000 SCALE 6 42], [2000 SCC 7 264], [2000 SUPP SCR 2 598], [2001 UJ 1 27], [2000 UPLBEC 3 2404], [2000 AIR SC 2912], [2000 CTR 163 32]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/151656/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad8de4b0149711411a9d

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/r-d-saxena-vs-balram-prasad-sharma

http://www.briefcased.in/r-d-saxena-vs-balram-prasad-sharma/

https://www.legalauthority.in/judgement/r-d-saxena-vs-balram-prasad-sharma-22160

Karnataka High Court Judgments:

NOC not required

Karnataka Power Distribution Vs M RajaShekar on 2 Dec 2016

NOC required:

Bhagya Vs Jayalakshmi on 13 Feb 2019

Other Judgements on this subject here.

Goa Antibiotics and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. Vs R.K. Chawla on 4 July, 2011

Posted on June 25, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Hon’ble Apex Court in this judgment, had rejected the application of a Deputy Manager of a Company to appear and argue on behalf of the petitioner-Company.

A natural person can, of course, appear in person and argue his own case personally but he cannot give a power of attorney to anyone other than a person who is enrolled as an advocate to appear on his behalf. To hold otherwise would be to defeat the provisions of the Advocates Act.

Who can be Party in Person?

Section 32 of the Act, however, vests discretion in the court, authority or person to permit any person who is not enrolled as an advocate to appear before the court and argue a particular case. Section 32 of the Act is not the right of a person (other than an enrolled advocate) to appear and argue before the court but it is the discretion conferred by the Act on the court to permit any one to appear in a particular case even though he is not enrolled as an advocate.

… and more…

We make it clear that as regards artificial persons like a company registered under the Indian Companies Act, or a registered co-operative society, or a trust, neither the Director of the Company nor member of the Managing Committee or office bearer of the registered society or a trustee has a right to appear and argue on behalf of that entity, since that entity is distinct from its shareholders or office bearers or directors. However, it is the discretion of the court under Section 32 of the Act to permit such person to appear on behalf of that entity.

From Para 7,

7. There is a distinction between the right to appear on behalf of someone, which is only given to enrolled lawyers, and the discretion in the court to permit a non-lawyer to appear before it. Under Sections 29 and 33 of the Act only those persons have a right to appear and argue before the court who are enrolled as an advocate while under Section 32 of the Act, a power is vested in the court to permit, in a particular case, a person other than an advocate to appear before it and argue the case. A power-of-attorney holder cannot, unless he is an enrolled lawyer, appear in court on behalf of anyone, unless, permitted by the court under Section 32 of the Act, though of course he may sign sale deeds, agreements, etc. and do other acts on behalf of someone else, unless prohibited by law.

Goa Antibiotics and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. Vs R.K. Chawla on 4 July, 2011

Citations : [2011 ACR SC 2 2269], [2011 JKJ SC 3 56], [2011 JT SC 7 559], [2011 KLT SC 3 498], [2011 RCR CIVIL 4 252], [2011 SCALE 7 413], [2011 SCC 15 449], [2011 SCR 7 846], [2014 SCC CIV 2 617], [2011 MWN CR 3 290], [2011 AIOL 469], [2011 RCR CIVIL SC 4 257], [2011 KLT 3 498], [2011 JT 7 559]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/170747848/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af02e4b0149711415575

Deb Narayan Halder Vs Anushree Halder on 26 August, 2003

Posted on June 18, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Hon’ble Apex Court has in this judgment denied maintenance to Knife who is errant and left matrimonial home on her own without any justifiable reasons.

Justice BP SINGH held that,

“the respondent had left her matrimonial home on her own and that she was not compelled by the appellant to leave her matrimonial home, nor had he threatened the respondent with dire consequences if she did not leave his house. There was no ground for the respondent to apprehend that if she lived with the appellant her life would be in danger and that she will be subjected to torture or cruelty. In sum and substance she had no justifiable reason to desert the appellant. The fact that the application for grant of maintenance was filed within four days of her leaving her matrimonial home without any effort for reconciliation, was also significant. The learned Magistrate therefore held that the respondent having left her matrimonial home without any justifiable ground was not entitled to the grant of maintenance.”

Deb Narayan Halder Vs Smt. Anushree Halder on 26 August, 2003

Citations: [AIR 2003 SUPREME COURT 3174], [2003 AIR SCW 4522], [2004 SCC(CRI) 164], [2003 (5) SLT 170], [(2003) 3 BANKCAS 86], [2003 (6) SCALE 742], [(2003) 7 JT 379 (SC)], [2003 (11) SCC 303], [2003 CRIAPPR(SC) 513], [2003 (9) SRJ 130], [(2003) 11 ALLINDCAS 129 (SC)], [(2004) 2 MARRILJ 488], [(2004) 1 DMC 25], [(2004) 1 BOMCR(CRI) 949], [(2003) 4 ALLCRILR 139], [(2003) 6 SUPREME 415], [(2004) 1 RAJ CRI C 201], [(2004) SC CR R 352], [(2004) 1 RAJ LW 14], [(2003) 2 RAJ LR 492], [2004 CHANDLR(CIV&CRI) 449], [(2003) 10 INDLD 580], [(2003) 4 CRIMES 74], [(2003) 2 UC 1388], [(2003) 2 HINDULR 523], [(2003) 26 OCR 606], [(2003) 4 RECCRIR 189], [(2003) 3 CURCRIR 242], [(2003) 3 ALLCRIR 2849], [(2003) 6 SCALE 742], [(2003) 47 ALLCRIC 897], [(2003) 3 BLJ 531], [2003 (2) ALD(CRL) 765], [(2003) 3 WLC (RAJ) 593]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1017614/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609adcce4b01497114124ee

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/deb-narayan-halder-vs-smt-anushree-halder

Index of Maintenance Judgments are here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Reportable Judgement or Order

R.P. Kapur Vs State of Punjab on 25 March, 1960

U.Suvetha Vs State By Insp.Of Police & Anr on 6 May, 2009

Suresh Nanda vs C.B.I. on 24 January, 2008

Reema Aggarwal Vs Anupam And Ors on 8 January, 2004

Kunapareddy @ Nookala Shanka Balaji Vs Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari On 18 April, 2016

Krishna Veni Nagam Vs Harish Nagam on 9 March, 2017

R.D. Saxena Vs Balram Prasad Sharma on 22 August, 2000

Goa Antibiotics and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. Vs R.K. Chawla on 4 July, 2011

Deb Narayan Halder Vs Anushree Halder on 26 August, 2003