Thota Venkateswarlu Vs State Of Andhra Pradesh And Another on 2 September, 2011

Posted on September 28, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in this judgment that,

Having regard to the above, while we see no reason to interfere with the High Court’s decision to reject the petitioner’s prayer for quashing of the proceedings in Complaint Case No.307 of 2007, we also make it clear that the learned Magistrate may proceed with the trial relating to the offences alleged to have been committed in India. However, in respect of offences alleged to have been committed outside India, the learned Magistrate shall not proceed with the trial without the sanction of the Central Government as envisaged in the proviso to Section 188 Cr.P.C.

K.D. Sharma Vs Steel Authority Of India Ltd. and Ors. on July 09, 2008

Posted on September 19, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Another authority from a division bench of the Supreme Court wherein it was held that,

From Para 24 and 26,

24. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 and of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary. Prerogative writs mentioned therein are issued for doing substantial justice. It is, therefore, of utmost necessity that the petitioner approaching the Writ Court must come with clean hands, put forward all the facts before the Court without concealing or suppressing anything and seek an appropriate relief. If there is no candid disclosure of relevant and material facts or the petitioner is guilty of misleading the Court, his petition may be dismissed at the threshold without considering the merits of the claim.
26. A prerogative remedy is not a matter of course. While exercising extraordinary power a Writ Court would certainly bear in mind the conduct of the party who invokes the jurisdiction of the Court. If the applicant makes a false statement or suppresses material fact or attempts to mislead the Court, the Court may dismiss the action on that ground alone and may refuse to enter into the merits of the case by stating “We will not listen to your application because of what you have done”. The rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of Court by deceiving it.

From Paras 28 and 29,

28. The above principles have been accepted in our legal system also. As per settled law, the party who invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 or of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is supposed to be truthful, frank and open. He must disclose all material facts without any reservation even if they are against him. He cannot be allowed to play `hide and seek’ or to `pick and choose’ the facts he likes to disclose and to suppress (keep back) or not to disclose (conceal) other facts. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true and complete (correct) facts. If material facts are suppressed or distorted, the very functioning of Writ Courts and exercise would become impossible. The petitioner must disclose all the facts having a bearing on the relief sought without any qualification. This is because, “the Court knows law but not facts”.
29. If the primary object as highlighted in Kensington Income Tax Commissioners is kept in mind, an applicant who does not come with candid facts and `clean breast’ cannot hold a writ of the Court with `soiled hands’. Suppression or concealment of material facts is not an advocacy. It is a jugglery, manipulation, maneuvering or misrepresentation, which has no place in equitable and prerogative jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose all the material facts fairly and truly but states them in a distorted manner and misleads the Court, the Court has inherent power in order to protect itself and to prevent an abuse of its process to discharge the rule nisi and refuse to proceed further with the examination of the case on merits. If the Court does not reject the petition on that ground, the Court would be failing in its duty. In fact, such an applicant requires to be dealt with for contempt of Court for abusing the process of the Court.

From final para,

the appellant has not come forward with all the facts. He has chosen to state facts in the manner suited to him by giving an impression to the Writ Court that an instrumentality of State (SAIL) has not followed doctrine of natural justice and fundamental principles of fair procedure. This is not proper. Hence, on that ground alone, the appellant cannot claim equitable relief.

K.D. Sharma Vs Steel Authority Of India Ltd. and Ors. on July 09, 2008

Citations : [2008 SUPREME 5 287], [2008 AIOL 783], [2008 SCC 12 481], [2008 JT SC 8 57]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1007946/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae87e4b01497114140b2

Inder Mohan Goswami & Another Vs State Of Uttaranchal & Others on 9 October, 2007

Posted on September 18, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

This is the landmark judgment regarding the inherent powers of High Court

Powers of Court under CrPC 482

Inherent power under section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised:
(i) to give effect to an order under the Code;
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and
(iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice.

Reference made to available here R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866.

In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866, this court summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings:
(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the proceedings;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly

Reference made to Perjury

The court noticed that the tendency of perjury is very much on the increase. Unless the courts come down heavily upon such persons, the whole judicial process would come to ridicule. The court also observed that chagrined and frustrated litigants should not be permitted to give vent to their frustration by cheaply invoking jurisdiction of the criminal court.

And law is explained in regards to IPC 415 and 420 Cheating case.

On a reading of the aforesaid section, it is manifest that in the definition there are two separate classes of acts which the person deceived may be induced to do. In the first class of acts he may be induced fraudulently or dishonestly to deliver property to any person. The second class of acts is the doing or omitting to do anything which the person deceived would not do or omit to do if he were not so deceived. In the first class of cases, the inducing must be fraudulent or dishonest. In the second class of acts, the inducing must be intentional but need not be fraudulent or dishonest. Therefore, it is the intention which is the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that he had a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. From his mere failure to subsequently keep a promise, one cannot presume that he all along had a culpable intention to break the promise from the beginning.

And the forgery

The following ingredients are essential for commission of the offence under section 467 IPC:
1. the document in question so forged;
2. the accused who forged it.
3. the document is one of the kinds enumerated in the aforementioned section.

when to issue non-bailable warrants for arresting an individual.

Before parting with this appeal, we would like to discuss an issue which is of great public importance, i.e., how and when warrants should be issued by the Court? It has come to our notice that in many cases that bailable and non-bailable warrants are issued casually and mechanically. In the instant case, the court without properly comprehending the nature of controversy involved and without exhausting the available remedies issued non-bailable warrants.

And… When non-bailable warrants should be issued,

Non-bailable warrant should be issued to bring a person to court when summons of bailable warrants would be unlikely to have the desired result. This could be when:
* it is reasonable to believe that the person will not voluntarily appear in court; or
* the police authorities are unable to find the person to serve him with a summon; or
* it is considered that the person could harm someone if not placed into custody immediately.
As far as possible, if the court is of the opinion that a summon will suffice in getting the appearance of the accused in the court, the summon or the bailable warrants should be preferred. The warrants either bailable or non-bailable should never be issued without proper scrutiny of facts and complete application of mind, due to the extremely serious consequences and ramifications which ensue on issuance of warrants. The court must very carefully examine whether the Criminal Complaint or FIR has not been filed with an oblique motive.
In complaint cases, at the first instance, the court should direct serving of the summons along with the copy of the complaint. If the accused seem to be avoiding the summons, the court, in the second instance should issue bailable warrant. In the third instance, when the court is fully satisfied that the accused is avoiding the court\022s proceeding intentionally, the process of issuance of the non-bailable warrant should be resorted to. Personal liberty is paramount, therefore, we caution courts at the first and second instance to refrain from issuing non-bailable warrants.

Inder Mohan Goswami & Another Vs State Of Uttaranchal & Others on 9 October, 2007

Indiakanoon.org link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/855018/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae56e4b01497114137d5

Citation: [2008 AIR 251], [2007 (10) SCR 847], [2007 (11) JT 499], [2007 (12) SCALE 15], [2007 JT 11 499], [2008 SCC CRI 1 259], [2007 AIOL 1021], [2007 SCR 10 847], [2007 SCC 12 1], [2008 AIR SC 251], [2007 DLT 144 257], [2007 AIC SC 59 30], [2008 ALLLJ 1 40]

Index here.

Anurag Mittal Vs Shaily Mishra Mittal on 24 Aug 2018

Posted on August 29, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

In this judgment from Hon’ble Apex Court, it was held that a pending appeal in a divorce decree does not make second marriage null and void, if it was withdrawn before second marriage.

From Paras 18-20,

18. Section 15 of the Act provides that it shall be lawful for either party to marry again after dissolution of a marriage if there is no right of appeal against the decree. A second marriage by either party shall be lawful only after dismissal of an appeal against the decree of divorce, if filed. If there is no right of appeal, the decree of divorce remains final and that either party to the marriage is free to marry again. In case an appeal is presented, any marriage before dismissal of the appeal shall not be lawful. The object of the provision is to provide protection to the person who has filed an appeal against the decree of dissolution of marriage and to ensure that the said appeal is not frustrated. The purpose of Section 15 of the Act is to avert complications that would arise due to a second marriage during the pendency of the appeal, in case the decree of dissolution of marriage is reversed. The protection that is afforded by Section 15 is primarily to a person who is contesting the decree of divorce.
19. Aggrieved by the decree of divorce, the Appellant filed an appeal and obtained a stay of the decree. During the pendency of the appeal, there was a settlement between him and his former spouse. After entering into a settlement, he did not intend to contest the decree of divorce. His intention was made clear by filing of the application for withdrawal. It cannot be said that he has to wait till a formal order is passed in the appeal, or otherwise his marriage dated 06.12.2011 shall be unlawful. Following the principles of purposive construction, we are of the opinion that the restriction placed on a second marriage in Section 15 of the Act till the dismissal of an appeal would not apply to a case where parties have settled and decided not to pursue the appeal.
20. It is not the case of the Appellant that the marriage dated 06.12.2011 is lawful because of the interim order that was passed in the appeals filed by him against the decree of divorce. He rested his case on the petition filed for withdrawal of the appeal. The upshot of the above discussion would be that the denouement of the Family Court is correct and upheld, albeit for different reasons. The conclusion of the High Court that the marriage dated 06.12.2011 is void is erroneous. Hence, the judgment of the High Court is set aside.

Anurag Mittal Vs Shaily Mishra Mittal on 24 August, 2018

Citations: [AIR 2018 SUPREME COURT 3983], [2018 (9) SCC 691], [AIR 2018 SC (CIV) 2946], [(2018) 5 MAD LW 582], [(2018) 4 RAJ LW 2917], [(2018) 4 RECCIVR 103], [(2018) 8 MAD LJ 394], [(2018) 4 MPLJ 11], [(2018) 5 MAH LJ 714], [(2019) 1 PUN LR 189], [(2018) 2 WLC(SC)CVL 439], [(2018) 10 SCALE 202], [(2018) 3 KER LT 980], [(2019) 1 CIVLJ 734], [(2018) 3 DMC 1], [(2018) 4 PAT LJR 99], [(2019) 1 CAL LJ 41], [(2018) 4 CIVILCOURTC 314], [(2019) 132 ALL LR 725], [(2018) 6 ANDHLD 79], [(2018) 5 BOM CR 505], [(2019) 2 CALLT 56], [(2019) 193 ALLINDCAS 193 (SC)], [(2018) 3 HINDULR 343], [(2018) 5 CAL HN 252], [(2018) 126 CUT LT 1001], [(2018) 4 JCR 179 (SC)], [(2018) 251 DLT 552], [(2019) 1 GUJ LH 197], [(2018) 4 JLJR 61], [AIRONLINE 2018 SC 215]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/124571211/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5b87b4c018a681333960cea8

https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2018/08/25/marriage-solemnized-before-dismissal-of-appeal-against-decree-of-divorce-held-valid-on-purposive-construction-sc/

Narendra Vs K.Meena on 6 October, 2016

Posted on August 28, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Hon’ble Apex Court has in this judgment, held that giving repeated threats of suicide to husband and making suicide attempts for no reason, or even one such event was sufficient for the Appellant husband to get a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty. It is needless to add that such threats or acts constitute cruelty. And the knife also wanted the Appellant to get separated from his family.

The division bench of the Supreme Court destroyed the arguments of respondent, piece-by-piece.

From Para 10, attempts/threats to commit suicide

10. With regard to the allegations of cruelty levelled by the Appellant, we are in agreement with the findings of the trial Court. First of all, let us look at the incident with regard to an attempt to commit suicide by the Respondent. Upon perusal of the evidence of the witnesses, the findings arrived at by the trial Court to the effect that the Respondent wife had locked herself in the bathroom and had poured kerosene on herself so as to commit suicide, are not in dispute. Fortunately for the Appellant, because of the noise and disturbance, even the neighbours of the Appellant rushed to help and the door of the bathroom was broken open and the Respondent was saved. Had she been successful in her attempt to commit suicide, then one can foresee the consequences and the plight of the Appellant because in that event the Appellant would have been put to immense difficulties because of the legal provisions. We feel that there was no fault on the part of the Appellant nor was there any reason for the Respondent wife to make an attempt to commit suicide. No husband would ever be comfortable with or tolerate such an act by his wife and if the wife succeeds in committing suicide, then one can imagine how a poor husband would get entangled into the clutches of law, which would virtually ruin his sanity, peace of mind, career and probably his entire life. The mere idea with regard to facing legal consequences would put a husband under tremendous stress. The thought itself is distressing. Such a mental cruelty could not have been taken lightly by the High Court. In our opinion, only this one event was sufficient for the Appellant husband to get a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty. It is needless to add that such threats or acts constitute cruelty. Our aforesaid view is fortified by a decision of this Court in the case of Pankaj Mahajan v. Dimple @ Kajal (2011) 12 SCC 1, wherein it has been held that giving repeated threats to commit suicide amounts to cruelty.mental

From Para 11, wanted/attempting to get her husband separated from his family

11. The Respondent wife wanted the Appellant to get separated from his family. The evidence shows that the family was virtually maintained from the income of the Appellant husband. It is not a common practice or desirable culture for a Hindu son in India to get separated from the parents upon getting married at the instance of the wife, especially when the son is the only earning member in the family. A son, brought up and given education by his parents, has a moral and legal obligation to take care and maintain the parents, when they become old and when they have either no income or have a meagre income. In India, generally people do not subscribe to the western thought, where, upon getting married or attaining majority, the son gets separated from the family. In normal circumstances, a wife is expected to be with the family of the husband after the marriage. She becomes integral to and forms part of the family of the husband and normally without any justifiable strong reason, she would never insist that her husband should get separated from the family and live only with her. In the instant case, upon appreciation of the evidence, the trial Court came to the conclusion that merely for monetary considerations, the Respondent wife wanted to get her husband separated from his family. The averment of the Respondent was to the effect that the income of the Appellant was also spent for maintaining his family. The said grievance of the Respondent is absolutely unjustified. A son maintaining his parents is absolutely normal in Indian culture and ethos. There is no other reason for which the Respondent wanted the Appellant to be separated from the family – the sole reason was to enjoy the income of the Appellant. Unfortunately, the High Court considered this to be a justifiable reason. In the opinion of the High Court, the wife had a legitimate expectation to see that the income of her husband is used for her and not for the family members of the Respondent husband. We do not see any reason to justify the said view of the High Court. As stated hereinabove, in a Hindu society, it is a pious obligation of the son to maintain the parents. If a wife makes an attempt to deviate from the normal practice and normal custom of the society, she must have some justifiable reason for that and in this case, we do not find any justifiable reason, except monetary consideration of the Respondent wife. In our opinion, normally, no husband would tolerate this and no son would like to be separated from his old parents and other family members, who are also dependent upon his income. The persistent effort of the Respondent wife to constrain the Appellant to be separated from the family would be torturous for the husband and in our opinion, the trial Court was right when it came to the conclusion that this constitutes an act of ‘cruelty’.

From Para 12, allegations of extra-marital affair with maid Kamla

12. With regard to the allegations about an extra-marital affair with maid named Kamla, the re-appreciation of the evidence by the High Court does not appear to be correct. There is sufficient evidence to the effect that there was no maid named Kamla working at the residence of the Appellant. Some averment with regard to some relative has been relied upon by the High Court to come to a conclusion that there was a lady named Kamla but the High Court has ignored the fact that the Respondent wife had levelled allegations with regard to an extra-marital affair of the Appellant with the maid and not with someone else. Even if there was some relative named Kamla, who might have visited the Appellant, there is nothing to substantiate the allegations levelled by the Respondent with regard to an extra-marital affair. True, it is very difficult to establish such allegations but at the same time, it is equally true that to suffer an allegation pertaining to one’s character of having an extra-marital affair is quite torturous for any person – be it a husband or a wife.

Finally from Para 15, desertion of husband for over 20 years

15. Taking an overall view of the entire evidence and the judgment delivered by the trial Court, we firmly believe that there was no need to take a different view than the one taken by the trial Court. The behaviour of the Respondent wife appears to be terrifying and horrible. One would find it difficult to live with such a person with tranquility and peace of mind. Such torture would adversely affect the life of the husband. It is also not in dispute that the Respondent wife had left the matrimonial house on 12th July, 1995 i.e. more than 20 years back. Though not on record, the learned counsel submitted that till today, the Respondent wife is not staying with the Appellant. The daughter of the Appellant and Respondent has also grown up and according to the learned counsel, she is working in an IT company. We have no reason to disbelieve the aforestated facts because with the passage of time, the daughter must have grown up and the separation of the Appellant and the wife must have also become normal for her and therefore, at this juncture it would not be proper to bring them together, especially when the Appellant husband was treated so cruelly by the Respondent wife.

Narendra Vs K.Meena on 6 October, 2016

Citations : [2016 SCC ONLINE SC 1114], [2016 SCC 9 455], [2016 SCC CIV 4 519], [2016 DLT 233 149], [2016 KLJ 4 287], [AIR 2016 SUPREME COURT 4599], [2016 (6) ADR 421], [2016 (4) AKR 822], [AIR 2017 SC (CIVIL) 379], [(2016) 4 CIVILCOURTC 414], [(2016) 7 MAD LJ 726], [(2016) 4 JCR 213 (SC)], [(2017) 1 CIVLJ 748], [(2016) 9 SCALE 681], [(2017) 2 MAD LW 610], [(2016) 6 ALL WC 5441], [(2016) 3 HINDULR 604], [(2016) 3 DMC 429], [(2016) 119 ALL LR 494], [(2016) 4 ICC 746], [(2016) 4 PAT LJR 317], [(2017) 1 MAH LJ 754], [(2017) 1 MPLJ 306], [(2016) 4 JLJR 194], [(2017) 1 CGLJ 425], [(2016) 3 ALL RENTCAS 876], [(2016) 5 CAL HN 1], [(2016) 167 ALLINDCAS 217 (SC)], [(2016) 2 CLR 947 (SC)], [(2016) 10 ADJ 275 (SC)], [(2016) 4 CURCC 157], [(2017) 1 RAJ LW 624], [(2017) 1 MARRILJ 453], [(2016) 2 ORISSA LR 928], [(2017) 1 MARRILJ 475], [(2016) 3 CAL LJ 135], [(2016) 2 WLC(SC)CVL 762], [(2016) 3 GUJ LH 441], [(2016) 4 RECCIVR 706], [(2016) 6 BOM CR 553]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/130314186/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/57f6804ebc41680a2ba53b77

https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2016/10/06/forcing-the-husband-to-leave-his-parents-who-are-dependent-on-his-income-amounts-to-cruelty/

Case Summary: Narendra vs. K. Meena on 6 October, 2016

Index of all Divorce Judgments is here.

Pankaj Mahajan vs Dimple @ Kajal on 30 September, 2011

Posted on August 27, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Hon’ble Supreme Court granted divorce to husband on the grounds of cruelty (constantly giving threats of suicide) and desertion by knife who is a patient of Bipolar Affective Disorder (A.K.A Chronic Paramoid Schizophrenia). Permanent alimony is granted in this case, God knows why.

Pankaj Mahajan Vs Dimple @ Kajal on 30 September, 2011

Citations : [2012 SCC CRI 1 345], [2011 SCC 12 1], [2011 AIOL 731], [2011 SLT 7 317], [2011 RCR CIVIL SC 4 534], [2011 SCALE 11 278], [2012 ALLMR SC 1 473], [2012 SCC CIV 1 685], [2011 GUJ LH 3 513], [2012 CTC 3 75], [2011 ULJ 4 85], [2011 LW 5 690], [2012 CHN 1 34], [2011 KLJ 4 528]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/55665/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5767b12ae691cb22da6d5570

Index of Divorce judgments is here.

Sri Rameshwar Yadav Vs The State Of Bihar on 16 March, 2018

Posted on August 20, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

This judgment from Hon’ble Apex Court allowed Exemption from Personal Appearance under CrPC 205 to parents and family of Arnesh Kumar.

Sri Rameshwar Yadav Vs The State Of Bihar on 16 March, 2018

Prashant Bharti Vs State of Nct Of Delhi on 23 January, 2013

Posted on August 3, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

The Hon’ble Apex Court has shown her right place for this liar who tried to frame an innocent in a false rape case. The liar was royally concluded to have falsified more than one instance as listed below.

High Court’s observations

“This Court cannot quash the FIR on the ground that FIR was false FIR. In case of a false FIR, it must be brought to its logical conclusion and Investigating Officer must give a report to that effect. In this case, if it is found that the petitioner has been falsely implicated and the complaint was false, it would be obligatory on the part of the Investigating Officer to register a case and book the prosecuterix for falsely implicating the person in an offence under Section 376 IPC. It is a very serious matter that a prosecuterix just by making a false statement can book somebody in offence under Section 376 IPC, which is serious in nature and invites a minimum punishment of 07 years. I consider that Investigating Officer shall submit a detailed report and in case, it is that the petitioner was falsely implicated, he would take steps for booking the complainant for falsely implicating the petitioner.”

Falsifications by liar caught by Hon’ble Court

It is apparent from irrefutable evidence, that during the dates under reference and for a period of more than one year and eight months thereafter, she had remained married to Lalji Porwal. In such a fact situation, the assertion made by the complainant/ prosecuterix, that the appellant-accused had physical relations with her, on the assurance that he would marry her, is per se false and as such, unacceptable. She, more than anybody else, was clearly aware of the fact that she had a subsisting valid marriage with Lalji Porwal. Accordingly, there was no question of anyone being in a position to induce her into a physical relationship under an assurance of marriage. it would clearly emerge, that the complainant/prosecuterix was in a relationship of adultery on 23.12.2006, 25.12.2006 and 1.1.2007 with the appellant-accused, while she was validly married to her previous husband Lalji Porwal.
In her aforesaid complaint, Priya, the complainant/prosecuterix had alleged, that the appellant-accused had called her on her phone at 8.45 pm and asked her to meet him at Lodhi Colony, New Delhi. When she reached there, he drove her around in his car. He also offered her a cold drink (Pepsi) containing a poisonous/intoxicating substance. Having consumed the cold drink, she is stated to have felt inebriated, whereupon, he took advantage of her and started misbehaving with her, and also touched her breasts. Insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, the presence of the complainant/prosecuterix, as well as the appellant-accused, at the alleged place of occurrence (Lodhi Colony, New Delhi), on the night of 15.2.2007 after 8.45 pm, has been established to be false on the basis of mobile phone call details of the parties concerned. Once it is concluded, that the complainant/prosecuterix and the appellant-accused were at different places, far away from one another, and certainly not in Lodhi Colony, New Delhi on the night of 15.2.2007, it is obvious that the allegation made by Priya, the complainant/ prosecuterix against Prashant Bharti, the appellant-accused of having outraged her modesty, was false.
Insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, medical evidence discussed above reveals, that the complaint made by the complainant/prosecuterix alleging a sexual relationship with her by Prashant Bharti, the appellant-accused, was made more than one month after the alleged occurrences. It was, therefore, that during the course of her medical examination at the AIIMS, a vaginal smear was not taken. Her clothes were also not sent for forensic examination by the AIIMS, because she had allegedly changed the clothes which she had worn at the time of occurrence. In the absence of any such scientific evidence, the proof of sexual intercourse between the complainant/prosecuterix and the appellant-accused would be based on an assertion made by the complainant/prosecuterix. And an unequivocal denial thereof, by the appellant-accused. One’s word against the other. Based on the falsity of the statement made by the complainant/prosecuterix noticed above (and other such like falsities, to be narrated hereafter), it is unlikely, that a factual assertion made by the complainant/prosecuterix, would be acceptable over that of the appellant-accused.

Gem of the entire judgment

Even in the charge sheet dated 28.6.2007, (extracted above) the investigating officer has acknowledged, that he could not find any proof to substantiate the charges. The charge-sheet had been filed only on the basis of the statement of the complainant/prosecutrix under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C.

Prashant Bharti Vs State Of Nct Of Delhi on 23 January, 2013

Citations: [2013 ACR 2 1461], [2013 AIC 123 44], [2013 SCALE 1 652], [2013 CRIMES SC 1 195], [2013 RLW SC 4 3155], [2013 ALLCC 81 414], [2013 AJR 4 469], [2013 SCR 1 504], [2013 AD SC 2 89], [2013 ALLMR CRI 1123], [2013 JT SC 2 240], [2013 SCC ONLINE SC 85], [2013 AIR SC 2753], [2013 DRJ 135 26], [2013 RCR CRIMINAL 3 399], [2013 SCC CRI 3 920], [2013 CRILJ 3839], [2013 SCC 9 293]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/89372902/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af39e4b0149711415df1

Savitri Vs Shri Govind Singh Rawat on 9 October, 1985

Posted on August 2, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Read for yourself. This is the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court which held that interim maintenance can be given in a Sec 125 CrPC case.

From Para 6,

6. In view of the foregoing it is the duty of the court to interpret the provisions in Chapter IX of the Code in such a way that the construction placed on them would not defeat the very object of the legislation. In the absence of any express prohibition, it is appropriate to construe the provisions in Chapter IX as conferring an implied power on the Magistrate to direct the person against whom an application is made under section 125 of the code to pay some reasonable sum by way of maintenance to the applicant pending final disposal of the application. It is quite common that applications made under section 125 of the code also take several months for being disposed of finally. In order to enjoy the fruits of the proceedings under Section 125, the applicant should be alive till the date of the final order and that the applicant can do in a large number of cases only if an order for payment of interim maintenance is passed by the court. Every court must be deemed to possess by necessary intendment all such powers as are necessary to make its orders effective. This principle is embodied in the maxim “ubi aliquid conceditur, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest” (Where anything is conceded, there is conceded also anything without which the thing itself cannot exist). [Vide Earl Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law, 1959 Edn., p. 1797.] Whenever anything is required to be done by law and it is found impossible to do that thing unless something not authorised in express terms be also done then that something else will be supplied by necessary intendment. Such a construction though it may not always be admissible in the present case however would advance the object of the legislation under consideration. A contrary view is likely to result in grave hardship to the applicant, who may have no means to subsist until the final order is passed. There is no room for the apprehension that the recognition of such implied power would lead to the passing of interim orders in a large number of cases where the liability to pay maintenance may not exist. It is quite possible that such contingency may arise in a few cases but the prejudice caused thereby to the person against whom it is made is minimal as it can be set right quickly after hearing both the parties. The Magistrate may, however, insist upon an affidavit being filed by or on behalf of the applicant concerned stating the grounds in support of the claim for interim maintenance to satisfy himself that there is a prima facie case for making such an order. Such an order may also be made in an appropriate case ex parte pending service of notice of the application subject to any modification or even an order of cancellation that may be passed after the respondent is heard. If a civil court can pass such interim orders on affidavits, there is no reason why a Magistrate should not rely on them for the purpose of issuing directions regarding payment of interim maintenance. The affidavit may be treated as supplying prima facie proof of the case of the applicant. If the allegations in the application or the affidavit are not true, it is always open to the person against whom such an order is made to show that the order is unsustainable. Having regard to the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by a Magistrate under section 125 of the code, we feel that the said provision should be interpreted as conferring power by necessary implication on the Magistrate to pass an order directing a person against whom an application is made under it to pay a reasonable sum by way of interim maintenance subject to the other conditions referred to therein pending final disposal of the application. In taking this view we have also taken note of the provisions of Section 7(2)(a) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 (Act 66 of 1984) passed recently by Parliament proposing to transfer the jurisdiction exercisable by Magistrates under section 125 of the code to the Family Courts constituted under the said Act.

Note: By way on an amendment to Cr.P.C. 1973 in 2001, the Parliament brought the following two Provisos.

Provided further that the Magistrate may, during the pendency of the proceeding regarding monthly allowance for the maintenance under this sub-section, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the interim maintenance of his wife or such child, father or mother, and the expenses of such proceeding which the Magistrate considers reasonable, and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate may from time to time direct:
Provided also that an application for the monthly allowance for the interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding under the second proviso shall, as far as possible, be disposed of within sixty days from the date of the service of notice of the application to such person.

Savitri Vs Shri Govind Singh Rawat on 9 October, 1985

Citations: [1986 AIR SC 984], [1985 AWC SC 11 906], [1986 BOMLR 88 223], [1985 GLH 1184], [1985 MHLJ 976], [1986 PLJR 6], [1985 SCALE 2 697], [1985 SCC 4 337], [1985 SUPP SCR 3 615], [1985 SCC CRI 556], [1985 CRIMES SC 2 872], [1986 CRIMES SC 1 148], [1986 CRLJ SC 41], [1986 CAR 1], [1986 CRLR 1], [1985 BBCJ 160], [1986 MLJ CRI 1 12], [1985 DLT 28 437], [1985 MPLJ SC 662]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1194071/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac1fe4b014971140e17e

https://vlex.in/vid/special-leave-petition-civil-852326810

Chaturbhuj Vs Sita Bai on 27 November, 2007

Posted on August 1, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court explained who is eligible to claim maintenance u/s 125 Cr.P.C. and under what conditions.

From Para 7,

7. Under the law the burden is placed in the first place upon the wife to show that the means of her husband are sufficient. In the instant case there is no dispute that the appellant has the requisite means. But there is an inseparable condition which has also to be satisfied that the wife was unable to maintain herself. These two conditions are in addition to the requirement that the husband must have neglected or refused to maintain his wife. It has to be established that the wife was unable to maintain herself. The appellant has placed material to show that the respondent wife was earning some income. That is not sufficient to rule out application of Section 125 CrPC. It has to be established that with the amount she earned the respondent wife was able to maintain herself.

Heart and soul of this judgment from Hon’ble Apex Court is in Para 8.

In an illustrative case where wife was surviving by begging, would not amount to her ability to maintain herself. It can also be not said that the wife has been capable of earning but she was not making an effort to earn. Whether the deserted wife was unable to maintain herself, has to be decided on the basis of the material placed on record. Where the personal income of the wife is insufficient she can claim maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. The test is whether the wife is in a position to maintain herself in the way she was used to in the place of her husband. In Bhagwan v. Kamla Devi (AIR 1975 SC 83) it was observed that the wife should be in a position to maintain standard of living which is neither luxurious nor penurious but what is consistent with status of a family. The expression “unable to maintain herself” does not mean that the wife must be absolutely destitute before she can apply for maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C.

Chaturbhuj Vs Sita Bai on 27 November, 2007

Citations: [AIR 2008 SUPREME COURT 530], [2007 AIR SCW 7416], [2008 CRI LJ (NOC) 186], [2008 CRI LJ (NOC) 2], [2008 (1) AIR JHAR R 664], [2008 (1) SRJ 29], [(2008) 1 MH LJ (CRI) 644], [(2008) 1 JCC 486 (SC)], [2008 (1) CALCRILR 416], [2008 (1) SCC(CRI) 356], [2008 (2) CRI RJ 401], [2008 ALL MR(CRI) 860], [2008 (2) SCC 316], [2007 (13) SCALE 402], [2007 (8) SUPREME 525], [(2008) 1 MPHT 13], [(2008) 64 ALLINDCAS 735 (CHH)], [(2008) 1 CGLJ 228], [(2008) 1 CHANDCRIC 27], [(2008) 1 DMC 22], [(2008) 1 CIVILCOURTC 233], [(2008) 2 GUJ LR 1159], [(2008) 1 HINDULR 130], [(2008) 2 JAB LJ 70], [(2008) 1 MADLW(CRI) 615], [(2008) 2 MAD LJ 481], [(2008) 1 MAD LJ(CRI) 1400], [(2008) 2 MARRILJ 605], [(2008) MATLR 775], [(2008) MATLR 165], [(2008) 39 OCR 383], [(2008) 1 PUN LR 263], [(2008) 1 RAJ LW 142], [(2008) 1 RECCRIR 163], [(2007) 4 CURCRIR 408], [(2008) 1 RECCIVR 136], [(2008) 2 ALLCRIR 1409], [(2008) 3 CGLJ 473], [(2008) 1 CAL LJ 166], [(2008) 1 ALLCRILR 342], [(2008) 105 CUT LT 729], [(2007) 3 JCC 2446 (DEL)], [(2008) 1 KER LT 41], [(2008) 1 RAJ CRI C 35], [2008 CRILR(SC&MP) 1], [(2008) 1 CRILR(RAJ) 1], [2008 CRILR(SC MAH GUJ) 1], [2008 (1) ALD(CRL) 97], [2008 (1) ANDHLT(CRI) 131 SC], [2007 INSC 1190]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1720873/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae55e4b01497114137ad

https://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/browse/Case?caseId=007002893100&title=chaturbhuj-vs-sita-bai

[Landmark Judgement] Chaturbhuj v/s Sita Bai (2008)

Index Maintenance Judgments under Section 125 Cr.P.C. is here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Reportable Judgement or Order

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