People’s Union for Civil Liberties and Anr Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 23 September, 2014
Tag: Reportable Judgement or Order
Hooghly Mills Company Ltd Vs State of West Bengal on 17 October, 2019
Apex Court held that, a High Court can quash even an interlocutory order under section 482 CrPC.
From Para 11,
11. Coming to the final issue, Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. provides that the High Court’s powers of revision shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. Whereas Section 482 of the Cr.P.C provides that nothing in the Cr.P.C will limit the High Court’s inherent powers to prevent abuse of process or to secure the ends of justice. Hence the High Court may exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 to set aside an interlocutory order, notwithstanding the bar under Section 397(2). However it is settled law that this can only be done in exceptional cases. This is, for example, where a criminal proceeding has been initiated illegally, vexatiously or without jurisdiction (See Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551).
Citations:
Indiankanoon.org link:
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Commissioner of Income-Tax Vs Thana Electricity Supply Ltd. on 22 April, 1993
This a very good judgment from High Court of Bombay talking about binding nature of judgments, specifically termed as stare decisis.
Citation: [(1994) 206 ITR 727 (Bom)]
Indiankanoon.org Link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/583752/
Seema Vs Ashwani Kumar case
This Transfer Petition at Supreme Court led to the directions to States and Union Territories to make registration of marriages compulsory in India. The following are the key Orders.
On 14 February 2006, Directions given to States and Union Territories to make registration of marriages compulsory in India
On 25 October 2007, further directions were issued.
“The directions given by the order dated 24.2.2006 have not been fully complied with. We, therefore, direct that the States and Union Territories who have not acted in line with the directions given on 14.2.2006 shall forthwith do it and in no case later than three months from today.“
On 9 July 2008, again Apex Court gave 4 months time to comply with directions.
“Let all the States and Union Territories who have not given specific details, file affidavits within four months from today.“
On 1 May 2019, Office Report was put up and the same is here.
On 1 May 2019, Transfer petition is disposed off.
The transfer petition has not been answered and the matrimonial suit in question has remained stayed since 15.4.2005. The fate of the said matrimonial suit as on date and the interest of the parties in pursuing the matter is not known to us, as none has appeared on behalf of the original contesting parties. The judicial exercise after 14.2.2006 has been to monitor implementation of the directions of the said date, as extracted above. The materials on record would indicate that most of the States barring a few have framed suitable legislations. In any event, in terms of the order dated 15.4.2005, such of the States that have not framed legislations, will be governed by the directions contained in the order dated 14.2.2006.
Taking into account the above facts, we are of the view that no worthwhile purpose will be served by keeping these proceedings pending before this Court. We accordingly close the said proceedings and vacate the interim order dated 15.4.2005, so far as the stay of Matrimonial Suit No. 104/2004 is concerned.
Citations: [2006 ALLMR SC 2 11], [2006 AIR BOMR 2 783], [2006 AIOL 84], [2006 SCR 2 220], [2006 AIR SC 1158], [2006 BOMCR SC 2 497], [2006 AIR SC 858], [2006 SCALE 2 333], [2006 ANJ SC 2 144], [2006 SUPREME 2 66], [2006 JT 2 378], [2006 SCC 2 578], [2006 CUTLT 101 639], [2006 DLT 127 282], [2006 KERLT 1 791]
Other Source links: https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae30e4b01497114131d8 or https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1037437/
Manish Jain Vs Akanksha Jain on 30 March, 2017
In this Judgment from Supreme Court, it was held that education of knife is not a consideration to decide interim maintenance. What the fcuk?? Whatever happened to Nari_MyFoot_Shakti?
From Para 15,
An order for maintenance pendente lite or for costs of the proceedings is conditional on the circumstance that the wife or husband who makes a claim for the same has no independent income sufficient for her or his support or to meet the necessary expenses of the proceeding. It is no answer to a claim of maintenance that the wife is educated and could support herself. Likewise, the financial position of the wife’s parents is also immaterial. The Court must take into consideration the status of the parties and the capacity of the spouse to pay maintenance and whether the applicant has any independent income sufficient for her or his support. Maintenance is always dependent upon factual situation; the Court should, therefore, mould the claim for maintenance determining the quantum based on various factors brought before the Court.
Haha, the threats of SC Judge… LOLwa
In case the appellant-husband does not comply with the order, as above, including for payment of arrears, he would be visited with all consequences including action for contempt of Court.
Ashok Chaturvedi and Ors Vs Shitul H Chanchani and Anr on 13 August, 1998
Similar to M/S Pepsi Foods Ltd judgment here, here also Supreme Court held that where that are baseless and vague allegations, High Courts can invoke their inherent powers u/s 482 CrPC to quash appropriate proceedings.
Indiankanoon.org link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1770765/
Citation: JT 1998 (5) 452, (1998) 7 SCC 698
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MS Pepsi Foods Ltd and Anr Vs Spl JM and Ors on 4 November, 1997
Landmark judgment from Hon’ble Supreme Court which held that, where appropriate High Courts should exercise its power available under Article 227 of Constitution of India to quash baseless proceedings.
The Supreme Court had held that,
“Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning the accused. Magistrate had to carefully scrutinize the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused.”
Indiankanoon.org link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/574884/
Citation: 1998 (5) SCC 749, AIR 1998 SC 128
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Ganapathi and Anr Vs The State of Tamil Nadu on 27 March, 2018
Based on State of Rajasthan Vs Smt. Kalki and Anr judgment here, Justice N.V. Ramana gave this judgment differentiating the related witness and interested witness.
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Dalip Singh and Others Vs State of Punjab on 15 May, 1953
Supreme Court has held that a related witness would ordinarily speak the truth, but in the case of an enmity there may be a tendency to drag in an innocent person as an accused—each case has to be considered on its own facts.
From Paras 25 and 26,
“25. We are unable to agree with the learned Judges of the High Court that the testimony of the two eyewitnesses requires corroboration. If the foundation for such an observation is based on the fact that the witnesses are women and that the fate of seven men hangs on their testimony, we know of no such rule. If it is grounded on the reason that they are closely related to the deceased we are unable to concur. This is a fallacy common to many criminal cases and one which another Bench of this Court endeavoured to dispel in Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan.”
In the said case, it has also been further observed: (AIR p. 366, para 26)
“26. A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. It is true, when feelings run high and there is personal cause for enmity, that there is a tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty, but foundation must be laid for such a criticism
and the mere fact of relationship far from being a foundation is often a sure guarantee of
truth.”
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Arjun Panditrao Khotkar Vs Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal on 14 Jul 2020
This is the order which cited Shafhi judgment here, to larger bench for reconsideration, since there was a conflicting precedent, in Anvar P,V.
Here is the last Order, wherein Arguments have concluded and the Judgment was reserved.
Here is the final Judgment authored by Justice R.F.Nariman.
Relevant portions:
From Para 52: Accused must be given copy of all documents that prosecution relies upon.
52. It is pertinent to recollect that the stage of admitting documentary evidence in a criminal trial is the filing of the charge-sheet. When a criminal court summons the accused to stand trial, copies of all documents which are entered in the charge-sheet/final report have to be given to the accused. Section 207 of the CrPC, which reads as follows, is mandatory. Therefore, the electronic evidence, i.e. the computer output, has to be furnished at the latest before the trial begins. The reason is not far to seek; this gives the accused a fair chance to prepare and defend the charges levelled against him during the trial. The general principle in criminal proceedings therefore, is to supply to the accused all documents that the prosecution seeks to rely upon before the commencement of the trial. The requirement of such full disclosure is an extremely valuable right and an essential feature of the right to a fair trial as it enables the accused to prepare for the trial before its commencement.
From Para 54: When should the certificate u/s 65B be filed?
54. Therefore, in terms of general procedure, the prosecution is obligated to supply all documents upon which reliance may be placed to an accused before commencement of the trial. Thus, the exercise of power by the courts in criminal trials in permitting evidence to be filed at a later stage should not result in serious or irreversible prejudice to the accused. A balancing exercise in respect of the rights of parties has to be carried out by the court, in examining any application by the prosecution under Sections 91 or 311 of the CrPC or Section 165 of the Evidence Act.
Depending on the facts of each case, and the Court exercising discretion after seeing that the accused is not prejudiced by want of a fair trial, the Court may in appropriate cases allow the prosecution to produce such certificate at a later point in time. If it is the accused who desires to produce the requisite certificate as part of his defence, this again will depend upon the justice of the case – discretion to be exercised by the Court in accordance with law.
From Para 59,
59. We may reiterate, therefore, that the certificate required under Section 65B(4) is a condition precedent to the admissibility of evidence by way of electronic record, as correctly held in Anvar P.V. (supra), and incorrectly “clarified” in Shafhi Mohammed (supra). Oral evidence in the place of such certificate cannot possibly suffice as Section 65B(4) is a mandatory requirement of the law. Indeed, the hallowed principle in Taylor v. Taylor (1876) 1 Ch.D 426, which has been followed in a number of the judgments of this Court, can also be applied. Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act clearly states that secondary evidence is admissible only if lead in the manner stated and not otherwise. To hold otherwise would render Section 65B(4) otiose.
Para 17 of the separate concurring opinion penned by V. Ramasubramanian, J is as follows:
Following the above precedents, this Court also held in S. Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab (1964) 4 SCR 733, AIR 1964 SC 72, Yusufalli Esmail Nagree v. State Of Maharashtra . (1967) 3 SCR 720, AIR 1968 SC 147, 1968 Cri LJ 103, N. Sri Rama Reddy v. V.V. Giri (1970) 2 SCC 340, AIR 1971 SC 1162, R. M. Malkani v. State Of Maharashtra . (1973) 1 SCC 471, AIR 1973 SC 157, Ziyauddin Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdass Mehra (1976) 2 SCC 17, Ram Singh v. Ram Singh 1985 Supp SCC 611, AIR 1986 SC 3 and Tukaram S. Dighole v. Manikrao Shivaji Kokate . (2010) 4 SCC 32912, that tape records of conversations and speeches are admissible in evidence under the Evidence Act, subject to certain conditions. In Ziyauddin Burhanuddin Bukhari (1976) 2 SCC 17 and Tukaram S. Dighole (2010) 4 SCC 32912 this Court further held that tape records constitute “document” within the meaning of the expression under Section 3 of the Evidence Act. Thus, without looking up to the lawmakers to come up with necessary amendments from time to time, the courts themselves developed certain rules, over a period of time, to test the authenticity of these documents in analogue form and these rules have in fact, worked well.
Citations: [(2020) 3 SCC 216] [(2020) 7 SCC 1], [AIR 2020 SUPREME COURT 4908], [AIRONLINE 2020 SC 641]
Other Source links:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/172105947/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5f10bc933321bc1d0ef58d1d
https://lawfyi.io/arjun-panditrao-khotkar-vs-kailash-kushanrao-gorantyal-on-14-july-2020-case-summary/
The Bombay High Court judgment which was challenged at Supreme Court is here.
