State of Andhra Pradesh Vs Linde India Ltd on 13 April 2020

Posted on April 13, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court held that ‘Medical Oxygen IP‟ and „Nitrous Oxide IP‟ are taxable under Entry 88 of Schedule IV of the Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act 20051 and the rate of tax to be levied on them – 4%/5%2 under Entry 88. Govt of AP lost the appeal.

Citations: [

Badshah Vs Urmila Badshah Godse and Anr on 18 October 2013

Posted on April 9, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Justice A.K.Sikri in a 2-judge bench had held that, for the purpose of claiming maintenance under Section 125, Cr.P.C., such a woman (who is not a legally wedded wife), is to be treated as the legally wedded wife.

From Para 25,

25. Thus, while interpreting a statute the court may not only take into consideration the purpose for which the statute was enacted, but also the mischief it seeks to suppress. It is this mischief rule, first propounded in Heydon’s Case[11] which became the historical source of purposive interpretation. The court would also invoke the legal maxim construction ut res magis valeat guam pereat, in such cases i.e. where alternative constructions are possible the Court must give effect to that which will be responsible for the smooth working of the system for which the statute has been enacted rather than one which will put a road block in its way. If the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation should be avoided. We should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should accept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result. If this interpretation is not accepted, it would amount to giving a premium to the husband for defrauding the wife. Therefore, at least for the purpose of claiming maintenance under Section 125, Cr.P.C., such a woman is to be treated as the legally wedded wife.

Badshah Vs Urmila Badshah Godse and Anr on 18 October 2013

Citations: [2014 SCJ 2 779], [2014 CRILJ 1076], [2014 SCC 1 188], [2013 SCALE 12 681], [2014 CRLJ SC 1076], [2013 RCR CRIMINAL SC 4 764], [2013 CTC 6 86], [2014 AIR SC 256], [2014 NCC 1 238], [2013 RLW SC 4 3670], [2013 AIOL 3407], [2013 AD SC 11 9], [2013 RCR CIVIL SC 4 830], [2013 SCC ONLINE SC 946], [2014 JLJR SC 1 78], [2014 LW CRL 1 646], [2014 SCC CIV 1 51], [2013 JCC SC 4 2765], [2014 LW 2 936], [2013 ACR 3 3010], [2014 MPHT 2 499], [2014 GLH 1 273], [2013 KERLT 4 367], [2013 ALR 101 704], [2013 BOMCR CRI SC 4 616], [2013 SLT 9 543], [2013 DMC 3 518], [2014 ECRN 1 241], [2014 AIR SC 869], [2013 JT 13 570], [2013 AIC 132 108]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/15901386/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af37e4b0149711415daf

Earlier Chanmuniya judgment is here.

M.E. Shivalingamurthy Vs CBI Bengaluru on 7 January 2020

Posted on April 7, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Justice K.M.Joesph from a 2-judge bench, held the following principles while deciding a discharge petition file u/s 227 CrPC. Also Governing principles regarding permissibility of defence of accused or documents produced by him, summarized.

i. If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only as distinguished from grave suspicion, the Trial Judge would be empowered to discharge the accused.
ii. The Trial Judge is not a mere Post Office to frame the charge at the instance of the prosecution.
iii. The Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. Evidence would consist of the statements recorded by the Police or the documents produced before the Court.
iv. If the evidence, which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, “cannot show that the accused committed offence, then, there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial”.
v. It is open to the accused to explain away the materials giving rise to the grave suspicion.
vi. The court has to consider the broad probabilities, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This, however, would not entitle the court to make a roving inquiry into the pros and cons.
vii. At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the material brought on record by the prosecution, has to be accepted as true.
viii. There must exist some materials for entertaining the strong suspicion which can form the basis for drawing up a charge and refusing to discharge the accused.

M.E. Shivalingamurthy Vs CBI Bengaluru on 7 January 2020

Citations: [(2020) 2 SCC 768]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/151468802/ or

Index of Discharge Judgments u/s 227 Cr.P.C. is here.

Union of India Vs R Thiyagarajan on 3 April 2020

Posted on April 6, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

This Judgment by Justice Deepak Gupta from a 2-judge bench held in Para 18 that,

18. We also are of the view that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in matters like this. The High Court exercise its jurisdiction only over State(s) of which it is the High Court. It has no jurisdiction for the rest of the country. Matters like the present may be pending in various parts of the country. In the present case, matter had been decided by the Delhi High Court but some other High Court may or may not have taken different view. The High Court of Madras could not have passed such order. It has virtually usurped the jurisdiction of other High Courts in the country. It is true that sometimes this Court has ordered that all similarly situated employees may be granted similar relief but the High Court does not have the benefit of exercising the power under Article 142 of the Constitution. In any event, this Court exercises jurisdiction over the entire country whereas the jurisdiction of the High Court is limited to the territorial jurisdiction of the State(s) of which it is the High Court. The High Court may be justified in passing such an order when it only affects the employees of the State falling within its jurisdiction but, in our opinion, it could not have passed such an order in the case of employees where pan India repercussions would be involved.

This effectively means that, to challenge a Central Act such as Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 which has ramifications to entire country, one can not invoke the Writ jurisdiction of a High Court. This implies that, one has to go to Supreme Court only. This is quite contrary to the obiter dicta from Kusum Ingots judgement here given by a 3-judge bench.

Union of India Vs R Thiyagarajan on 3 April 2020

Citations: [

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/95720998/ or

Syed Wasif Husain Rizvi Vs Hasan Raza Khan and Ors on 22 January 2016

Posted on April 3, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

3-Judge Full Bench comprising Chief Justice DY Chandrachud (as he was at Lucknow Bench of Allahabad High Court) declared the following reference in affirmative,

“Whether writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution can be filed by Power of Attorney holder?”

Safeguards

Having held so, we must, at the same time, emphasize the necessity of observing adequate safeguards where a writ petition is filed through the holder of a power of attorney. These safeguards should necessarily include the following:
(1) The power of attorney by which the donor authorises the donee, must be brought on the record and must be filed together with the petition/application;
(2) The affidavit which is executed by the holder of a power of attorney must contain a statement that the donor is alive and specify the reasons for the inability of the donor to remain present before the Court to swear the affidavit; and
(3) The donee must be confined to those acts which he is authorised by the power of attorney to discharge.

Syed Wasif Husain Rizvi Vs Hasan Raza Khan and Ors on 22 January 2016

Earlier Reference Order

Syed Wasif Husain Rizvi Vs Hasan Raza Khan and Ors on 02 December 2015

Citations: [2016 AWC 2 1525], [2016 LCD 34 373], [2016 AIR ALL 52]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/114640689/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5811a4a5e691cb26fc4d9447

The Oriental Insurance Company Ltd Vs Meena Variyal and Ors on 2 April 2007

Posted on March 21, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court held that,

An obiter dictum of this Court may be binding only on the High Courts in the absence of a direct pronouncement on that question elsewhere by this Court. But as far as this Court is concerned, though not binding, it does have clear persuasive authority.

The Oriental Insurance Company Ltd Vs Meena Variyal and Ors on 2 April 2007

Citations: [2007 KLT SUPP 3 18], [2007 SCR 4 641], [2007 JCC 2 1280], [2007 WBLR 3 264], [2007 TNMAC 2 9], [2007 SCJ 3 498], [2007 GLR 3 2356], [2007 SCC CR 2 527], [2007 ILR KER 3 569], [2007 AIR SC 0 2362], [2007 MPHT 3 1], [2007 COMPCAS 137 116], [2007 SCC 5 428], [2007 ALLLJ 3 596], [2007 ALLSCR 0 1697], [2007 MLJ 2 1230], [2007 ALD 3 99], [2007 SUPREME 3 136], [2007 AIR KAR R 3 437], [2007 ACC 4 335], [2007 AIOL 359], [2007 SCALE 5 269], [2007 TAC 2 417], [2007 SCC CRI 2 527], [2007 SLT 9 251], [2007 AIR SC 1609], [2007 ACJ 0 1284], [2007 JT 5 65], [2008 LW 1 838], [2007 ANWR 1 545]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1964308/ and https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae62e4b0149711413b05

Landmark Judgment of Kusum Ingots is here.

Sarwan Singh Lamba and Ors Vs Union of India and Ors on 12 May 1995

Posted on March 21, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court held that,

Para 17,

Normally even an obiter dictum is expected to be obeyed and followed.

TruePrint Version

TP_1995_4_scc_546_561_sandeeppamarati_gmailcom_20200320_233725

Citations: [1995 JT 5 386], [1995 AIR SC 1729], [1995 SCALE 3 457], [1995 SCC 4 546], [1995 SCC L&S 1064], [1995 ATC 30 585], [1995 BLJR 2 1295], [1995 SUPP SCR 1 427], [1995 SLJ SC 3 72], [1995 UPLBEC 2 1215]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/538878/ and https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609acc5e4b014971140fb0f

Landmark Judgment of Kusum Ingots is here.

MS. Bhaskar Industries Ltd Vs MS. Bhiwani Denim and Apparels Ltd and Ors on 27 August 2001

Posted on March 7, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court held the scope of 205 CrPC in this judgment as,

Second is that it is difficult, in the absence of other materials, to decide positively whether the order dated 28.4.2000 is an interlocutory order only.
The interdict contained in Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short the Code) is that the powers of revision shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order. Whether an order is interlocutory or not, cannot be decided by merely looking at the order or merely because the order was passed at the interlocutory stage. The safe test laid down by this Court through a series of decisions is this: If the contention of the petitioner who moves the superior court in revision, as against the order under challenge is upheld, would the criminal proceedings as a whole culminate? If it would,then the order is not interlocutory in spite of the fact that it was passed during any interlocutory stage.

And

Section 251 is the commencing provision in Chapter XX of the Code which deals with trial of summons cases by magistrates. It enjoins on the court to ask the accused whether he pleads guilty when the accused appears or is brought before the magistrate. The appearance envisaged therein can either be by personal attendance of the accused or through his advocate. This can be understood from Section 205(1) of the Code which says that whenever a magistrate issues a summons, he may, if he sees reason so to do, dispense with the personal attendance of the accused and permit him to appear by his pleader.
17. Thus, in appropriate cases the magistrate can allow an accused to make even the first appearance through a counsel. The magistrate is empowered to record the plea of the accused even when his counsel makes such plea on behalf of the accused in a case where the personal appearance of the accused is dispensed with. Section 317 of the Code has to be viewed in the above perspective as it empowers the court to dispense with the personal attendance of the accused (provided he is represented by a counsel in that case) even for proceeding with the further steps in the case. However, one precaution which the court should take in such a situation is that the said benefit need be granted only to an accused who gives an undertaking to the satisfaction of the court that he would not dispute his identity as the particular accused in the case, and that a counsel on his behalf would be present in court and that he has no objection in taking evidence in his absence. This precaution is necessary for the further progress of the proceedings including examination of the witnesses.

“18. A question could legitimately be asked – what might happen if the counsel engaged by the accused (whose personal appearance is dispensed with) does not appear or that the counsel does not co-operate in proceeding with the case? We may point out that the legislature has taken care for such eventualities. Section 205(2) says that the magistrate can in his discretion direct the personal attendance of the accused at any stage of the proceedings. The last limb of Section 317(1) confers a discretion on the magistrate to direct the personal attendance of the accused at any subsequent stage of the proceedings. He can even resort to other steps for enforcing such attendance.
“19. The position, therefore, bogs down to this: It is within the powers of a magistrate and in his judicial discretion to dispense with the personal appearance of an accused either throughout or at any particular stage of such proceedings in a summons case, if the magistrate finds that insistence of his personal presence would itself inflict enormous suffering or tribulations to him, and the comparative advantage would be less. Such discretion need be exercised only in rare instances where due to the far distance at which the accused resides or carries on business or on account of any physical or other good reasons the magistrate feels that dispensing with the personal attendance of the accused would only be in the interests of justice. However, the magistrate who grants such benefit to the accused must take the precautions enumerated above, as a matter of course. We may reiterate that when an accused makes an application to a magistrate through his duly authorised counsel praying for affording the benefit of his personal presence being dispensed with the magistrate can consider all aspects and pass appropriate orders thereon before proceeding further.”

Ms Bhaskar Industries Ltd Vs Ms Bhiwani Denim and Apparels Ltd and Ors on 27 August 2001

Citations: [2001 INSC 399], [2001 KHC 0 714], [2001 AIR SC 3625], [2001 UC 2 370], [2001 AD SC 6 612], [2001 SCC 6 339], [2001 AWC SC 4 2981], [2001 CRI LJ 4250], [2001 JIC 2 685], [2001 MPLJ 3 664], [2001 SUPREME 6 339], [2001 AIR SC 0 3413], [2001 JCC 2 127], [2001 ACR SC 3 2297], [2001 KERLT 3 307], [2001 JT SC 7 127], [2001 SCC 7 401], [2001 CRIMES SC 4 199], [2002 PLJR 4 95], [2002 MAHLJ 1 81], [2002 BOMCR CRI SC 190], [2002 BOMCR SC 2 265], [2002 ALT CRI 1 13], [2001 RCR CRI 4 137], [2003 JLJ SC 1 56], [2001 SCALE 5 503], [2001 CRLJ 0 4250], [2001 S SCR 2 219], [2001 SCC CR 0 1254], [2001 RCR CRIMINAL 4 137], [2001 DCR SC 602], [2001 OLR 2 613], [2002 LJ 1 161], [2001 CCR 0 208], [2001 SRJ 8 415], [2001 CRLR SC 0 481], [2001 SCC CRI 0 1254], [2001 CALCRILR 0 481], [2001 SLT 6 120], [2001 CCR 3 208], [2001 ALLMR CRI 0 1961], [2001 SCJ 3 176], [2002 BCR 2 265], [2002 MHLJ SC 1 81], [2001 ALD CRI 2 530], [2002 BCR CRI 0 190]

Puneet Dalmia Vs CBI Hyderabad on 16 December 2019

Posted on March 7, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court relying on Bhaskar Industries and Rameshwar Yadav, held as follows,

From Para 7,

7. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the present appeal is allowed. The impugned Judgment and order passed by the High Court as well as that of the learned Trial Court rejecting the application submitted by the appellant under Section 205 Cr.P.C. are hereby quashed and set aside and consequently the application submitted by the appellant to dispense with his appearance before the learned Trial Court on all dates of adjournments and permitting his counsel Sri Bharadwaj Reddy to appear on his behalf is here by allowed on the following conditions:
(1) That the appellant shall give an undertaking to the learned Trial Court that he would not dispute his identity in the case and that Sri Bharadwaj Reddy advocate who is permitted to represent the appellant, would appear before the learned Trial Court on his behalf on each and every date of hearing and that he shall not object recording of the evidence in his absence and that no adjournment shall be asked for on behalf of the appellant and/or his advocate Sri Bharadwaj Reddy;
(2) That the appellant shall appear before the learned Trial Court for the purpose of framing of the charges and also on other hearing dates whenever the learned Trial Curt insists for his appearance;
(3) If there is any failure on the part of the advocate Sri Bharadwaj Reddy, who is to represent the appellant, either to appear before the learned Trial Court on each adjournment and/or any adjournment is sought on behalf of the appellant and/or if the learned Trial Court is of the opinion that the appellant and/or his advocate is trying to delay the trial, in that case, it would be open for the learned Trial Court to exercise its powers under Section 205 (2) Cr.P.C. and direct the appearance of the appellant on each and every date of adjournment.

Puneet Dalmia Vs CBI Hyderabad on 16 December 2019

Citations: [2019 SCC ONLINE SC 1622], [2019 INSC 1379]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/15759089/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5dfbc5f53321bc3818f97bd7

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/puneet-dalmia-versus-central-bureau-of-investigation-hyderabad

Index is here.

Ankit Bharti Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 02 March 2020

Posted on March 4, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

A landmark judgment, where in Full-bench (5-Judge) of Allahabad High Court held that, Sessions Court and High Court have concurrent jurisdiction in matters of 438 CrPC (Anticipatory Bail) and that there is no rule that first option at Sessions Court ought to be exhausted before seeking audience at High Court, but can be done so under Special circumstances only.

Ankit Bharti Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 02 March 2020

Citations: [

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Reportable Judgement or Order

State of Andhra Pradesh Vs Linde India Ltd on 13 April 2020

Badshah Vs Urmila Badshah Godse and Anr on 18 October 2013

M.E. Shivalingamurthy Vs CBI Bengaluru on 7 January 2020

Union of India Vs R Thiyagarajan on 3 April 2020

Syed Wasif Husain Rizvi Vs Hasan Raza Khan and Ors on 22 January 2016

The Oriental Insurance Company Ltd Vs Meena Variyal and Ors on 2 April 2007

Sarwan Singh Lamba and Ors Vs Union of India and Ors on 12 May 1995

MS. Bhaskar Industries Ltd Vs MS. Bhiwani Denim and Apparels Ltd and Ors on 27 August 2001

Puneet Dalmia Vs CBI Hyderabad on 16 December 2019

Ankit Bharti Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 02 March 2020