Anup Disalva and Anr Vs Union of India on 09 Dec 2022

Posted on September 25, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division Bench of Kerala High Court held as follows,

From Para 4,

4. A Division Bench of this Court in Saumya Ann Thomas v. The Union of India and others [MANU/KE/0255/2010] held that the stipulation of a period of two years as the minimum mandatory period under Section 10A is arbitrary and oppressive and the period of two years has to be read as one year. This was taking note of the one year period stipulated in Section 28(1) of the Special Marriage Act, Section 13B(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act and Section 32B(1) of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act.

From Paras 6-7,

6. Divorce by mutual consent reflects the will of the parties to separate and get rid of the marriage. The legislature has put safeguards against impulsive decisions that may permeate such a decision by stipulating a gestation period before presenting a petition for divorce on mutual consent. This period will insulate possible peril that may ensue for the parties as a follow-up of the decision for mutual separation. In the Indian social context, though marriages are solemnized by two individuals, it is seen more as a union for laying the foundation for a strong family and society. Many laws have been made and many rights have been created based on familial relationships. The legislature, therefore, decided that a minimum period of separation must precede before presentation of a petition for divorce on the ground of mutual consent.
7. The problem presented in this case is when the waiting period itself would cause hardship to the parties. Can the law command parties to sit at the
fence and suffer the agony? The legislature in its wisdom contemplated possible repercussions of such fixation of minimum period that would result in
hardships to spouses and accordingly allowed the Courts to entertain a petition within the minimum period in exceptional cases. This is how Section
29 of the Special Marriage Act and Section 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act, enabled the Courts to entertain the petition to be presented before one year had lapsed from the date of marriage. There is no corresponding provision in the Divorce Act for the Court to permit the dissolution of marriage by mutual consent until the mandatory period of one year has lapsed from the date of separation. The constitutional validity of the mandatory period is, therefore, questioned in the writ petition filed by the parties. This Court in Saumya’s case (supra) had no occasion to advert to the validity of the minimum mandatory period by which spouses are denied the remedy of approaching the Court before the lapse of one year from the date of marriage or from the date of separation.
The above reasoning of the Court would clearly show that the decision rendered and the conclusion arrived at was on a premise that the mandatory
minimum residence period of two years for Christians is discriminatory as there is no such prescription of two years under the Hindu Marriage Act and the Special Marriage Act etc. This Court, however, considers the question in these cases on a different ground; whether in the absence of any provisions allowing the parties to a marriage to move the Court before the lapse of one year from the date of marriage or the date of separation. Can the provisions stand the test of constitutional scrutiny? The plea of arbitrariness would arise in this context of denial of judicial remedy to approach the Court before the lapse of one year from the date of marriage or separation.

From Para 11,

11. We hold that the fixation of the minimum period of separation of one year as stipulated under Section 10A is violative of the fundamental right and accordingly, strike it down.

Anup Disalva and Anr Vs Union of India on 09 Dec 2022

Index of Divorce Judgments is here.

Shivkarthik G.S and Anr Vs Nil on 04 Sep 2025

Posted on September 25, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Madras High Court held that Family Courts do have power to waive the cooling of period in a divorce by mutual consent under Indian Divorce Act.

From Paras 8-10,

8.The only point that arises for consideration is whether the mandatory waiting period of one year from the date of separation has to be compulsorily
sat through by the parties, who have already decided to part ways, by filing a mutual consent divorce petition. The Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Anup Disalva’s case, took note of an earlier decision of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Saumya Ann Thomas vs Union of India reported in 2010 SCC Online Kerala 5197 and held that the stipulation of a period of two years being a minimum mandatory period under Section 10A is arbitrary and oppressive and that the said two year period has to be read as one year, taking into account the one year period stipulated in similar legislations namely the Special Marriage Act ( Section 28(1) ) Hindu Marriage Act ( Section 13B(1)) and Parsi Marriage Act (Section 32B(1)).
9.The Honourable Division Bench further took note of the fact that an application for divorce by mutual consent presented by both the husband and
wife reflects the will of the parties to separate and get rid of the marriage. The Honourable Division Bench taking note of the entitlement of a spouse to file a petition for divorce under Section 10 on other available grounds, without any waiting period and the entitlement and power of the Court to grant a divorce, even before the period of one year, subject to being satisfied with the ground seeking divorce being made out, held that, while that is the position even for a contested proceeding before the Court, there can be no spokes put, impeding the parties from seeking divorce by mutual consent. The Honourable Division Bench, in fact, declared the stipulation of one year period or more, for the purposes of filing a divorce by mutual consent under Section 10A, as violative of fundamental rights and declared it to be unconstitutional.
10.Though said judgment of the Kerala High Court may not have a binding precedentiary value before this Court, the judgment will definitely have persuasive value, for this Court to take note of the ratio laid down by the Honourable Division Bench.
11.Even otherwise, the Honourable Supreme Court, in Shilpa Sailesh’s case, has clarified the ratio laid down in Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur,
reported in 2017 (8) SCC 746, and held that the Courts can always waive the cooling period of six months under the Hindu Marriage Act to enable the parties to obtain a divorce by mutual consent, earlier.
12.However, the Family Court has relied on Amardeep Singh’s case, to hold that the one year separation period is mandatory under section 13B(1) of
the Hindu Marriage Act and therefore similarly even under the Divorce Act the cooling period cannot be condoned or waived.

From Paras 16-18,

16.Even though there is no decision of this Court toeing the same lines of the Kerala High Court, striking down the provisions of Section 10A regarding the mandatory waiting period, considering the import of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shilpa Sailesh’s case as well as the Hon’ble Division Bench in the Kerala High Court, the Family Court is certainly entitled to waive the mandatory waiting period and cannot compel the parties to sit through the same before presenting a petition for divorce in the form of mutual consent, under Section 10A of the Divorce Act.
17.Independently, I also find that both the petitioners have filed separate affidavits even in this revision, affirming their decision to go separate ways. The interest of any children is also not involved in the present case, since the parties were not blessed with any issues and both the petitioners have categorically asserted that the relationship has become irreconcilable and distressing. In such circumstances, compelling the petitioners to wait for the mandatory period to expire would only further increase their agony. The petitioners have also stated that their decision is voluntary and only based on their free will and there is no fraud, collusion or undue influence brought upon them to file the mutual consent divorce petition.
18.In the light of the above, I am inclined to set aside the docket order of the Family Court, Coimbatore, and I direct the Family Court, Coimbatore, to
number DOP CFR.No.3726 of 2025, if it is otherwise in order. The Family Court, Coimbatore, shall not return / reject the petition on the ground that the parties have to wait for the mandatory period of one year from separation to pass off, before they are entitled to file an application for divorce by mutual consent.

Shivkarthik G.S and Anr Vs Nil on 04 Sep 2025

Index of Divorce judgments is here.

K Sreekanth Naik Vs P Nalini and Anr on 27 Mar 2025

Posted on September 21, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court held that a non-cooperating wife with the Criminal trail who has been evading appearance before the Court,.

From Paras 3-6,

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the 1st respondent is not cooperating with the trail and has been evading appearance before the Court, even though bailable warrants were issued against the 1st respondent. It is also submitted that the bailable warrants were cancelled soon after the 1st respondent filed a memo undertaking to appear.
4. Today, when the matter was taken up for hearing, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent submits that even the petitioner was also absent on the last date of hearing, when the matter was listed for trial.
5. It is further submitted that the matter is now fixed for trial on 22.04.2017, and the 1st respondent would appear in Court and adduce the evidence.
6. Considering the submission, the Criminal Petition is disposed off with an observation that the learned Magistrate should endeavor to complete the trial as expeditiously as possible, preferable within a period of six (06) months from the date of the receipt of this order.

2025-03-27 K Sreekanth Naik Vs P Nalini and Anr on 27 Mar 2025

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/79857987/

Thanks to Adv Ram G for the below copy. He practiced law (all subjects) at Anantapur Courts and reachable on +91-90000-32896

2025-03-27 K.Sreekanth_Naik_vs_P_Nalini_-_2025_Supreme(Online)(AP)_3987_-_Supreme

Disclaimer: This is a case that I handled myself for the husband. This is my second reportable judgment.

Addl DG Adjudication DRI Vs Suresh Kumar and Co Impex Pvt Ltd and Ors on 20 Aug 2025

Posted on September 10, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held as follows,

From Para 40-43,

40. Applying the two maxims referred to above, this Court proceeded to take the view that though Section 65B4 is mandatory, yet it would all depend on the facts of each case, how the same could be said to have been duly complied with.
41. In the facts of the said case, this Court said that the respondents had done everything possible to obtain the necessary certificate which was to be given by a third party over whom the respondents therein had no control and, in such circumstances, must be relieved of the mandatory obligation contained in the said subsection.
42. We have already reproduced paras 51 and 52 respectively of Arjun Panditrao Khotkar (supra) above.
43. Keeping the aforesaid in mind, we are of the view and, more particularly, considering the Record of Proceedings duly signed by the respondents, including the various statements of the respondents recorded under Section 108 of the Act, 1962, that there was due compliance of Section 138C(4) of the Act, 1962. When we say due compliance, the same should not mean that a particular certificate stricto senso in accordance with Section 138C(4) must necessarily be on record. The various documents on record in the form of record of proceedings and the statements recorded under Section 108 of the Act, 1962 could be said to be due compliance of Section 138C(4)of the Act, 1962.

From Para 46,

46. At this stage, we must also look into the observations made by this Court in the case of “Kum. Shubha @ Shubhashankar vs. State of Karnataka and Another,” reported in 2025 SSC online SC 1426 relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the revenue. We quote:-
“A certificate not given in the prescribed format per se will not make it invalid, especially when the authenticity of these marked documents is not in dispute.”

Addl DG DRI Vs Suresh Kumar and Co Impex Pvt Ltd and Ors on 20 Aug 2025

Citations: [2025 INSC 1050]

Other Sources:

https://www.livelaw.in/sc-judgments/2025-livelaw-sc-860-additional-director-general-adjudication-directorate-of-revenue-intelligence-v-suresh-kumar-and-co-impex-pvt-ltd-ors-302591

https://www.supremecourtcases.com/additional-director-general-adjudication-directorate-of-revenue-intelligence-v-suresh-kumar-and-co-impex-pvt-ltd-and-others/

Kundan Singh Vs State of (NCT) of Delhi on 24 Nov 2015

Posted on August 30, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Delhi High Court held as follows,

From Para 37,

37. Sub-clause (b) to sub-section (5) is rather ambiguously uses the expression “any official” without explaining what is meant by the said term. However, when we read sub-section (4) to Section 65B, the meaning to be given to the expression “any official” emerges. Subclause (b) applies when information is supplied to “any official” in the course of activities carried on by him, i.e., in the course of “official” activities with a view that the said information shall be stored and processed for the purpose of the activities carried on by that officer or official. It is also elucidated that the information could be beyond or otherwise in the course of the said activities. Even in such cases the information is treated as supplied in the course of the activities of the official. We clarify that the word “official”, as used in clause (b) of sub-section (5) of Section 65B, is not intended to mean or be restricted to a person holding an office or employed in public capacity. It connotes, as exemplified by the use of the same expression (albeit in its adjective form) in sub-section (4), a person primarily responsible for the management or the use, upkeep or operations of such device. It would, thus, cover a computer device containing electronic records in the hands or control of a private individual or entity.

Kundan Singh Vs State of (NCT) of Delhi on 24 Nov 2015

Citations: [2015:DHC:9600-DB], [(2015) 11 DEL CK 0089], [2015 SCC Online Del 13647], [MANU/DE/3674/2015]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/10902800/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5728e3ede56109277ee476fe

https://vlex.in/vid/kundan-singh-vs-the-654461357

https://www.courtkutchehry.com/Judgement/Search/AdvancedV2?docid=998850

Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi Vs Vidhi Rawal on 19 May 2025

Posted on August 23, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held that, ‘High Court can exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash proceedings of an application under Section 12(1) or orders passed in accordance with Sections 18 to 23 of the DV Act, 2005.‘.

From Para 32,

32. The second part of Section 482 saves the inherent power of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Therefore, in a given case where a learned Magistrate is dealing with an application under Section 12(1), the High Court can exercise the power under the second part of Section 482 to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or to secure the ends of justice. Hence, the High Court can exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash proceedings of an application under Section 12(1) or orders passed in accordance with Sections 18 to 23 of the DV Act, 2005.

From Para 35,

35. When it comes to exercise of power under Section 482 of the CrPC in relation to application under Section 12(1), the High Court has to keep in mind the fact that the DV Act, 2005 is a welfare legislation specially enacted to give justice to those women who suffer from domestic violence and for preventing acts of domestic violence. Therefore, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC for quashing proceedings under Section 12(1), the High Court should be very slow and circumspect. Interference can be made only when the case is clearly of gross illegality or gross abuse of the process of law. Generally, the High Court must adopt a hands-off approach while dealing with proceedings under Section 482 for quashing an application under Section 12(1). Unless the High Courts show restraint in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC while dealing with a prayer for quashing the proceedings under the DV Act, 2005, the very object of enacting the DV Act, 2005, will be defeated.

From Para 38, (Introspection!)

38. Before we part with this Judgment, we must mention here that one of us (Abhay S. Oka, J) is a party to a Judgment dated 27nd October, 2016 of the Bombay High Court in Writ Petition 2473 of 2016 in which the view taken is that remedy under Section 482 of the CrPC is not available for quashing the proceedings under Section 12(1) of the DV Act,2005. This view was found to be incorrect by a full Bench of the same High Court. As judges, we are duty-bound to correct our mistakes in properly constituted proceedings. Even for Judges, the learning process always continues.

From Para 39,

39. To conclude, the view taken in the impugned order of the High Court that a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC for challenging the proceedings emanating from Section 12(1) of the DV Act, 2005 is not maintainable, is not the correct view. We hold that High Courts can exercise power under Section 482 of CrPC (Section 528 of the BNSS) for quashing the proceedings emanating from the application under Section 12(1) of the DV Act, 2005, pending before the Court of the learned Magistrate. However, considering the object of the DV Act, 2005, the High Courts should exercise caution and circumspection when dealing with an application under Section 12(1). Normally, interference under Section 482 is warranted only in the case of gross illegality or injustice.

Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi Vs Vidhi Rawal on 19 May 2025

Citations: [2025 INSC 734]

Other sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/110752030/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/682bfd4dcb7d8775a7b83f4e

https://testbook.com/recent-judgements/shaurabh-kumar-tripathi-vs-vidhi-rawal

Index of DV Judgments here.

Vishnu Vardhan Vs State of UP and Ors on 23 Jul 2025

Posted on August 15, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A full bench of Supreme Court passed this reportable Judgment on ‘Fraud vitiating everything‘.

From Para 50,

50. Moving ahead, it is equally well settled that suppression of even a single material fact can be fatal before writ courts. In this context, one may usefully refer to the decision of this Court in S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar42 where the law has succinctly been stated as follows:
13. As a general rule, suppression of a material fact by a litigant disqualifies such litigant from obtaining any relief. This rule has been evolved out of the need of the courts to deter a litigant from abusing the process of court by deceiving it. But the suppressed fact must be a material one in the sense that had it not been suppressed it would have had an effect on the merits of the case. It must be a matter which was material for the consideration of the court, whatever view the court may have taken …

From Para 60,

60. Be that as it may, obtaining of the impugned order by Reddy in his favour by playing fraud on the High Court is conspicuous by its presence. Thus, we find Vishnu’s core argument to be creditworthy and compelling for us to hold that judicial orders procured by Reddy by subverting the judicial process through fraud and concealment of material facts cannot be permitted to stand.

From Para 107,

107. Yet again, the two-Judge Bench in A.V. Papayya Sastry (supra) laid down fraud as an exception to the doctrine of merger while observing thus:
38. The matter can be looked at from a different angle as well. Suppose, a case is decided by a competent court of law after hearing the parties and an order is passed in favour of the plaintiff applicant which is upheld by all the courts including the final court. Let us also think of a case where this Court does not dismiss special leave petition but after granting leave decides the appeal finally by recording reasons. Such order can truly be said to be a judgment to which Article 141 of the Constitution applies. Likewise, the doctrine of merger also gets attracted. All orders passed by the courts/authorities below, therefore, merge in the judgment of this Court and after such judgment, it is not open to any party to the judgment to approach any court or authority to review, recall or reconsider the order.
39. The above principle, however, is subject to exception of fraud. Once it is established that the order was obtained by a successful party by practising or playing fraud, it is vitiated. Such order cannot be held legal, valid or in consonance with law. It is non-existent and non est and cannot be allowed to stand.

From Paras 138 and 139,

138. As already discussed above, due to fraud having been played by Reddy, the doctrine of merger does not apply and, thus, the impugned order is open to interference notwithstanding the decision of this Court in Reddy Veerana (supra). For reasons already discussed, the civil appeal has to be allowed and the impugned order set aside.
139. As a logical corollary of the impugned order being set aside, it would follow that the decision of this Court in Reddy Veerana (supra), upholding the same, which too was obtained by playing fraud, will also be a nullity, and thus stand recalled in exercise of our inherent powers.

Vishnu Vardhan Vs State of UP on 23 Jul 2025

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/26257438/

‘Fraud is an exception to doctrine of merger’: Supreme Court recalls its own judgment obtained by fraud

https://www.livelaw.in/sc-judgments/2025-livelaw-sc-736-vishnu-vardhan-vishnu-pradhan-v-the-state-of-uttar-pradesh-ors-298600

Orders Obtained by Fraud Not Protected by Doctrine of Merger

Index to Perjury Judgments here.

Anurag Bhatnagar Vs State (NCT of Delhi) on 25 Jul 2025

Posted on July 29, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court reiterated the procedure to be followed to report a cognizable crime.

From Paras 26-29,

26. On a conspicuous reading of the provisions of Sections 154, 156 and 190 of the CrPC together, it is crystal clear that an informant who wants to report about a commission of a cognizable offence has to, in the first instance, approach the officer-in-charge of the police station for setting the criminal law into motion by lodging an FIR. However, if such an information is not accepted by the officer-in-charge of the police station and he refuses to record it, the remedy of the informant is to approach the Superintendent of Police concerned. It is only subsequent to availing the above opportunities if he is not successful, he may approach the Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC for necessary action or of taking cognizance in accordance with Section 190 of the CrPC.
27. In the instant case, a bare perusal of the application filed under Section 156(3) of the CrPC dated 01.07.2005 would reveal that the informant therein had simply stated that an offence under Sections 420, 120-B and 34 of the IPC have been committed and that the informant had approached the “police officials” several times but in vain, but the application is completely silent as to when did the informant approach the Police or the Superintendent of Police. The application nowhere states that the informant has ever approached the officer-in-charge of the police station for lodging the FIR in accordance with Section 154 of the CrPC or that on refusal to record such information he has availed the remedy of approaching the Superintendent of Police concerned. The mere bald allegation without any details or proof thereof, that the police authorities were approached several times is not acceptable.
28. In Sakiri Vasu vs. State of U.P.7 it had been observed that if a person has a grievance that the police station is not registering the FIR under Section 154 CrPC, then he can approach the Superintendent of Police under Section 154(3) CrPC by an application in writing. Even if that does not yield any satisfactory result in the sense that either the FIR is still not registered, or that even after registering it no proper investigation is held, it is open to the person aggrieved to file an application under Section 156(3) CrPC before the Magistrate concerned. In other words, the court reiterated that the proper procedure has to be availed of and followed before moving the Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC.
29. It is well recognized in law that the person aggrieved must first exhaust the alternative remedies available to him in law before approaching the court of law. In other words, he cannot ordinarily approach the court directly.

Anurag Bhatnagar Vs State (NCT of Delhi) on 25 Jul 2025

Index of Judgments under Sec 156(3) Cr.P.C. are here.

Bansal Milk Chilling Centre Vs Rana Milk Food Private Ltd and Anr on 25 Jul 2025

Posted on July 27, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows,

From Para 4,

4. By order dated 02.09.2023, the Trial Court held that since the complainant was yet to be cross-examined, no prejudice would be caused to the accused/respondents. It was also held that the amendment was in the nature of a typographical error, moved at an initial stage of the case. So holding the amendment was allowed.

From Para 9,

9. The learned counsel for the respondents sought to distinguish the judgement in S.R. Sukumar’s case (supra) by contending that in the said case amendment was sought and allowed at the pre-cognizance stage and as such the said case can have no application here. We are unable to countenance the said submission.

From Paras 15-19,

15. It will be appropriate to observe that amendments/alterations are not alien to the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 216 of the Cr.P.C. deals with the power of Court to alter any charge and the concept of prejudice to the accused. No doubt when a charge is altered, what is altered is the legal provision and its application to a certain set of facts. The facts per se may not be altered. However, the section does throw some light in considering the issue of amendments.
16. It will be noticed that when a charge is altered, if there is no prejudice to the accused, the trial can be proceeded with. Further, if it is likely to prejudice, the Court may either direct a new trial or adjourn the trial to such period. Section 217 of the Cr.P.C. grants liberty to the prosecutor and the accused to recall witnesses when charges are altered under the conditions prescribed therein. The test of ‘prejudice to the accused’ is the cardinal factor that needs to be borne in mind.
17. We have carefully perused the complaint and the application for amendment. The amendment was moved at a stage when after summons being issued to the respondents, the chief examination of the complainant had concluded and when cross-examination was awaited. The amendment made is also only with regard to the products supplied. According to the complainant, while what was supplied was “milk”, by an inadvertent error “Desi Ghee (milk products)” was mentioned. The error which occurred in the legal notice was carried in the complaint also.
18. On the facts of the present case and considering the stage of the trial, we find that absolutely no prejudice would be caused to the accused/respondents. The actual facts will have to be thrashed out at the trial. As to what impact the amendment will have on the existence of debt or other liability is for the Trial Court to decide based on the evidence. It was a curable irregularity which the Trial Court rightly addressed by allowing the amendment. It could not be said that by allowing the amendment at a stage when the evidence of the complainant was incomplete, failure of justice would occasion.
19. The High Court completely mis-directed itself in delving into the aspects of leviability of GST which would be the concern of the appropriate authorities under the relevant statute. It could also not be said that the amendment altered the nature and character of the complaint.

Bansal Milk Chilling Centre Vs Rana Milk Food Private Ltd and Anr on 25 Jul 2025

Dara Lakshmi Narayana and 6 Ors Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 10 Dec 2024

Posted on June 27, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court hung the false 498A IPC case high and dry and reminded the High Courts of their solemn duty to stop the misuse of matrimonial laws as weapons.

From Para 8,

8. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the appellants never demanded any dowry from respondent No.2. Respondent No.2 in fact used to leave the matrimonial house uninformed. In fact, on one such occasion when she left the matrimonial house on 03.10.2021, appellant No.1 made a police complaint on 05.10.2021. When the police found her whereabouts, she was allegedly living with someone. Respondent No.2 after being counselled, returned to her matrimonial house. It was further submitted that respondent No.2 addressed a letter dated 11.11.2021 to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Thirupathur Sub Division requesting to close the complaint made by appellant No.1 wherein she admitted that she had left her matrimonial house after quarrelling with appellant No.1 because of one Govindan, with whom she was talking over the phone for the past ten days continuously. She also stated that she would not repeat such acts in future. Learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that respondent No.2 again left the matrimonial house leaving appellant No.1 and children behind….

From Para 18,

18. A bare perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations made by respondent No.2 are vague and omnibus. Other than claiming that appellant No.1 harassed her and that appellant Nos.2 to 6 instigated him to do so, respondent No.2 has not provided any specific details or described any particular instance of harassment. She has also not mentioned the time, date, place, or manner in which the alleged harassment occurred. Therefore, the FIR lacks concrete and precise allegations.

From Paras 19-21,

19. Further, the record reveals that respondent No.2 on 03.10.2021 left the matrimonial house leading appellant No.1 to file a police complaint on 05.10.2021. When the police officials traced her, respondent No.2 addressed a letter dated 11.11.2021 to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Thirupathur Sub Division requesting to close the complaint made by appellant No.1. In the said letter, respondent No.2 admitted that she left her matrimonial house after quarrelling with appellant No.1 as she was talking to a person by name Govindan over the phone for the past ten days continuously. She further admitted that appellant No.1 was taking good care of her. She also stated that she will not engage in such actions in future. Despite that, in 2021 itself, respondent No.2 once again left the matrimonial house leaving appellant No.1 and also her minor children.
20. Losing hope in the marriage, appellant No.1 issued a legal notice to respondent No.1 seeking divorce by mutual consent on 13.12.2021. Instead of responding to the said legal notice issued by appellant No.1, respondent No.2 lodged the present FIR 82 of 2022 on 01.02.2022 registered with Neredmet Police Station, Rachakonda under Section 498A of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act.
21. Given the facts of this case and in view of the timing and context of the FIR, we find that respondent No.2 left the matrimonial house on 03.10.2021 after quarrelling with appellant No.1 with respect to her interactions with a third person in their marriage. Later she came back to her matrimonial house assuring to have a cordial relationship with appellant No.1. However, she again left the matrimonial house. When appellant No.1 issued a legal notice seeking divorce on 13.12.2021, the present FIR came to be lodged on 01.02.2022 by respondent No.2. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the FIR filed by respondent No. 2 is not a genuine complaint rather it is a retaliatory measure intended to settle scores with appellant No. 1 and his family members.

From Paras 24 and 25,

24. Insofar as appellant Nos.2 to 6 are concerned, we find that they have no connection to the matter at hand and have been dragged into the web of crime without any rhyme or reason. A perusal of the FIR would indicate that no substantial and specific allegations have been made against appellant Nos.2 to 6 other than stating that they used to instigate appellant No.1 for demanding more dowry. It is also an admitted fact that they never resided with the couple namely appellant No.1 and respondent No.2 and their children.Appellant Nos.2 and 3 resided together at Guntakal, Andhra Pradesh. Appellant Nos. 4 to 6 live in Nellore, Bengaluru and Guntur respectively.
25. A mere reference to the names of family members in a criminal case arising out of a matrimonial dispute, without specific allegations indicating their active involvement should be nipped in the bud. It is a well-recognised fact, borne out of judicial experience, that there is often a tendency to implicate all the members of the husband’s family when domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial discord. Such generalised and sweeping accusations unsupported by concrete evidence or particularised allegations cannot form the basis for criminal prosecution. Courts must exercise caution in such cases to prevent misuse of legal provisions and the legal process and avoid unnecessary harassment of innocent family members. In the present case, appellant Nos.2 to 6, who are the members of the family of appellant No.1 have been living in different cities and have not resided in the matrimonial house of appellant No.1 and respondent No.2 herein. Hence, they cannot be dragged into criminal prosecution and the same would be an abuse of the process of the law in the absence of specific allegations made against each of them.

From Para 28,

28. The inclusion of Section 498A of the IPC by way of an amendment was intended to curb cruelty inflicted on a woman by her husband and his family, ensuring swift intervention by the State. However, in recent years, as there have been a notable rise in matrimonial disputes across the country, accompanied by growing discord and tension within the institution of marriage, consequently, there has been a growing tendency to misuse provisions like Section 498A of the IPC as a tool for unleashing personal vendetta against the husband and his family by a wife. Making vague and generalised allegations during matrimonial conflicts, if not scrutinized, will lead to the misuse of legal processes and an encouragement for use of arm twisting tactics by a wife and/or her family. Sometimes, recourse is taken to invoke Section 498A of the IPC against the husband and his family in order to seek compliance with the unreasonable demands of a wife. Consequently, this Court has, time and again, cautioned against prosecuting the husband and his family in the absence of a clear prima facie case against them.

From Para 29, (Cover drive by Supreme Court!)

29. We are not, for a moment, stating that any woman who has suffered cruelty in terms of what has been contemplated under Section 498A of the IPC should remain silent and forbear herself from making a complaint or initiating any criminal proceeding. That is not the intention of our aforesaid observations but we should not encourage a case like as in the present one, where as a counterblast to the petition for dissolution of marriage sought by the first appellant-husband of the second respondent herein, a complaint under Section 498A of the IPC is lodged by the latter. In fact, the insertion of the said provision is meant mainly for the protection of a woman who is subjected to cruelty in the matrimonial home primarily due to an unlawful demand for any property or valuable security in the form of dowry. However, sometimes it is misused as in the present case.

Dara Lakshmi Narayana and 6 Ors Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 10 Dec 2024

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/93461652/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/6759166862941119016e1691

https://www.courtkutchehry.com/Judgement/Search/t/2370197-dara-lakshmi-narayana-others?s=Dara%20Lakshmi%20Narayana&refine_search=&s_acts=

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/supreme-court/dara-lakshmi-narayana-others-v-state-of-telangana-another-2024-insc-953-498a-ipc-fir-quashed-1560806

https://www.lawtext.in/judgement.php?bid=1285

https://advamritaverma.com/legal-updates/f/498-a-ipc-has-become-the-legal-weapon?blogcategory=CPC

The Order from Telangana High Court refusing to Quash the fake 498A IPC proceedings…

Dara Lakshmi Narayana and 6 Ors Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 16 Feb 2022

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Reportable Judgement or Order

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