Srinivasa D Vs Asha on 20 Mar 2025

Posted on October 20, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A wonderful judgment from a single judge of Karnataka High Court, Bengaluru bench, acknowledging that litigants lie in their income affidavit and directing the Family Courts to initiate perjury proceedings in accordance with law.

From Paras 10 to 13,

10. Time and again, it is seen by this Court that in several matters, the parties deliberately do not disclose their correct income, avocation, details of assets and liabilities with an intent to portray lesser income and secure favourable order by misleading and misguiding the Court, which is highly deplorable. In the present case, the respondent has deliberately suppressed the materials, which was well within her knowledge and played mischief and mislead the Court to get a favourable order. The sanctity of the Court and its orders would necessarily have to be respected by all the parties to the proceedings and so also by the learned counsel representing the parties.
11. This Court hopes and trusts that the learned counsels representing the parties advise their respective parties with regard to seriousness and sanctity of the Court orders and also be aware themselves of the sanctity of the Court orders and warn their clients/parties with regard to legal consequences of misleading, misrepresenting, filing false affidavit and adducing false statements on oath by way of oral and documentary evidence.
12. In view of several instances where parties are careless and deliberately making false statements on oath and filing false affidavits, this Court deems it appropriate to direct the Family Court/Trial Court dealing with such matters to initiate suitable action in accordance with law so that careless filing of affidavits and casual approach before the Court while filing assets and liabilities in the form of affidavits and adducing evidence before the Court is curbed and the person at fault is penalized by appropriate action of the Court.
13. At this stage, this Court deems it appropriate to issue following guidelines and directions to Family Courts and trial Courts dealing in maintenance applications:
a) Family Courts/Trial Courts dealing in maintenance applications shall insist on filing assets and liabilities and expenses as per the judgment in the case of Rajnesh -vs- Neha and another reported in (2021)2 SCC 324.
b) If an application is filed to summon salary details or other source of income by either spouse, the same shall be considered favourably, in the interest of justice.
c) If the Family Courts/Trial Courts are of the opinion that the salary certificates/details and particulars of other source of income are required to decide the maintenance application, it shall do so by passing suo motu orders for the same from either or both spouses.
d) In case of false Affidavits filed on oath and false information given deliberately to mislead and secure favourable orders by such information, the defaulting party shall be liable to face legal consequences in accordance to law.
e) Any such maintenance secured by way of such misleading and false/wrong information, shall be ordered to be refunded to the aggrieved party.
f) Maintenance applications both interim and main shall be decided expeditiously.
g) These Guidelines shall be strictly followed and adhered.

Srinivasa D Vs Asha on 20 Mar 2025

Citations: [2025:KHC:11787]

Other Sources:

Index of Maintenance Judgments u/s 144 BNSS is here. Index of DV Judgments is here.

Jagdamba Trivedi Vs Neha Trivedi on 18 Jan 2021

Posted on October 19, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A good judgment from a single judge of High Court of Chhattisgarh Judgment explaining how important it is to follow the mandate u/s 421 Cr.P.C. while executing maintenance orders u/s 125(1) Cr.P.C.

From Paras 10, 11 and 12,

10.A careful perusal of the aforesaid provision would show that for recovery of the amount of maintenance, procedure under Section 421(1) has to be followed by either issuing warrant for levying the amount due by attachment and sale of movable property belonging to the offender or by issuing a warrant to the Collector of the district, for authorising him to realise the amount as arrears of land revenue from the movable or immovable property, or both, of the defaulter. Section 421(3) provides that where the Court issues a warrant to the Collector under clause (b) of Subsection (1), the Collector shall realise the amount in accordance with the law relating to recovery of arrears of land revenue, as if such warrant were a certificate issued under such law.
11.A conjoint reading of the provisions contained under Section 125(3) read with Section 421 of CrPC would show that by virtue of Section 125(3) of CrPC, the Magistrate has been empowered to recover the amount of arrears of maintenance by following the procedure prescribed for levy of fine under Section 421 of CrPC. Two modes are prescribed under Section 421 of CrPC for recovery of the arrears of maintenance due as if it were a fine levied. The Court can either issue a warrant for the levy of the amount by attachment and sale of any movable property belonging to the defaulter or issue a warrant to the Collector of the District, authorising him to realise the amount as arrears of land revenue from the movable or immovable property, or both, of the defaulter under Section 421(1)(a) and 421(1)(b) of CrPC. It is only after the Magistrate has exhausted the two modes prescribed under Section 421 of CrPC and still fails to recover the arrears of maintenance due that he can sentence the person who committed the default to imprisonment as enjoined under Section 125(3) of CrPC for the period prescribed in the above-stated provision and if in the execution of sentence of imprisonment so awarded, the defaulter does not appear to suffer, the sentence so awarded, the Court should at the first instance issue summons/notice for his appearance and if the defaulter seems to be avoiding the summons, the Court in the second instance should issue bailable warrant for his appearance to undergo sentence. The Courts, at first and second instance, shall refrain from issuing non-bailable warrant.
12.It is quite vivid that the provisions contained under Section 125(3) of CrPC itself provide that the Court may sentence such a person for whole or
any part of each month’s allowance after the execution of the warrant, as such, Section 125(3) CrPC speaks only of issue of a warrant for levying the amount in the manner provided for levying fines and does not speak of a warrant of arrest. The issue of a warrant for levy of the amount due by way of attachment and sale is a condition precedent to the sentencing of the defaulter to imprisonment. As such, without following the procedure prescribed under Section 421(1)(a) and 421(1)(b) of CrPC and without issuance of warrant of attachment and sale, no warrant can be issued and no order for imprisonment can be passed under Section 125(3) of CrPC.

From Para 17,

17. Reverting to the facts of the instant case in light of the aforesaid legal analysis, it is quite vivid that learned Family Court, finding that the arrears of maintenance is due from the petitioner, straightway issued warrant of arrest without following the procedure laid down in Section 421(1)(a) and 421(1)(b) of CrPC, whereas learned Magistrate ought to have followed the procedure laid down in Section 421 of CrPC for recovering the arrears of the amount of maintenance, and if after following the procedure as envisaged in Section 421 of CrPC by issuance of warrant of attachment of movable and immovable property of the defaulter and sale thereof; still arrears of amount of maintenance remains due, then order of imprisonment can be passed, as such, the order directing issuance of non-bailable warrant of arrest against the petitioner is contrary to Section 125(3) read with Sections 421(1)(a) and 421(1)(b) of the CrPC. Accordingly, the order dated 09/05/2019 (Annexure A/1) passed in MJC No. 43/2019 is hereby set aside and learned Family Court is directed to follow the procedure laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of Rajnesh (supra) strictly for recovery of the amount of maintenance.

Jagdamba Trivedi Vs Neha Trivedi on 18 Jan 2021

Citations: [LAWS(CHH)-2021-1-96]

Other Sources:

https://www.courtkutchehry.com/judgements/1070468/jagdamba-trivedi-vs-neha-trivedi/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/6050d0e69fca195f67640edb

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/jagdamba-trivedi-versus-neha-trivedi

https://www.the-laws.com/encyclopedia/browse/case?caseId=021202701000&title=jagdamba-trivedi-vs-neha-trivedi#:~:text=He%20would%20also%20submit%20that%20if%20the,(Annexure%20A/2)%20deserve%20to%20be%20set%20aside.

Index of Maintenance Orders u/s 144 BNSS is here.

Himanshu Kumar and Ors Vs State of Chhattisgarh and Ors on 14 Jul 2022

Posted on October 18, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Supreme Court held as follows,

From Para 79,

79. It is true that an affidavit is ‘evidence’ within the meaning of Section 191 of the IPC and a person swearing to a false affidavit is guilty of perjury. But the matter does not rest here. Before initiating the proceedings for perjury, the court concerned has to consider whether it would be expedient in the interest of justice to sanction such prosecution. What the courts have to see at this stage is whether there is evidence in support of the allegations made by the Union of India (respondent herein) to justify the initiation of proceedings against the writ petitioners, more particularly, the writ petitioner no. 1 herein who had filed the affidavit on behalf of himself and the other writ petitioners and not whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant his conviction. However, this does not mean that the court should not prima facie be of the opinion that there are sufficient and reasonable grounds for setting the machinery of criminal law in motion against the accused. As noted above, the Court has further to see that the false statement was deliberate and conscious and the conviction is reasonably probable or likely. In other words, before sanctioning the prosecution there must be a prima facie case of a falsehood on a matter of substance and the court should be satisfied that there is reasonable foundation for the charge. (see S.P. Kohli v. High Court of Punjab & Haryana, (1979) 1 SCC 212 : AIR 1978 SC 1753)

From Paras 86 and 87,

86. The conflict between the two decisions of this Court of equal strength, i.e. Pritish (supra) and Sharad Pawar (supra), was taken notice of by this Court in the case of the State of Punjab v. Jasbir Singh, (2020) 12 SCC 96. A Bench of two Judges of this Court ultimately thought fit to refer the question to a Larger Bench. The Court observed as under :
“14. In any event, given that the decision of the three-Judge Bench in Sharad Pawar (supra) did not assign any reason as to why it was departing from the opinion expressed by a Coordinate Bench in Pritish (supra) regarding the necessity of a preliminary inquiry under Section 340 of the CrPC, as also the observations made by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah (supra), we find it necessary that the present matter be placed before a larger Bench for its consideration, particularly to answer the following questions:
14.1 (i) Whether Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 mandates a preliminary inquiry and an opportunity of hearing to the would-be accused before a complaint is made under Section 195 of the Code by a Court ?
14.2 (ii) What is the scope and ambit of such preliminary inquiry ?”
87. It appears that the reference on the aforesaid two questions to a larger Bench is still pending.

From Paras 90 and 91,

90. The essential ingredients for invoking Section 211, I.P.C. are that the complaint must have falsely charged a person with having committed an offence. The complainant, at the time of giving the complaint must have known that there is no just or lawful ground for making a charge against the person. This complaint must have been given with an intention to cause injury to a person.
91. The CrPC does not define what constitutes the making of a “charge” of an offence or what amounts to the “institution of criminal proceedings”. But, in our opinion, a false “charge” in this Section must not be understood in any restricted or technical sense, but in its ordinary meaning, of a false accusation made to any authority bound by law to investigate it or to take any steps in regard to it, such as giving information of it to the superior authorities with a view to investigation or other proceedings, and the institution of criminal proceedings includes the setting of the criminal law in motion. The nature of both expressions, and the difference between them has been explained in lucid terms in the decision of the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Karim Buksh v. Queen Emp, 17 C. 574. It points out that there may be a charge which does not amount to the institution of criminal proceedings “and there may be criminal proceedings which do not necessarily involve a charge” of any offence. As an illustration of the former it points out that a charge made to the Judge of a Civil Court or to public officers of other kinds, in order to obtain sanction to prosecute may well be a charge “but is not the institution of criminal proceedings”. It further points out that an aggrieved person may seek to put the criminal law in motion either by making a charge or in the language of the Code giving information to the Police (Section 154 CrPC) “or he may” lay a charge, or as the Code calls it, a complaint (Section 190 CrPC) before a Magistrate”.

From Para 94,

94. Thus, as explained by this Court in Santokh Singh v. Izhar Hussain (supra), the essential ingredient of an offence under Section 211 IPC is to institute or cause, to be instituted any criminal proceeding against a person with intent to cause him injury or with similar intent to falsely charge any person with having committed an offence, knowing that there is no just or lawful ground for such proceeding or charge. Instituting or causing to institute false criminal proceedings assume false charge but false charge may be preferred even when no criminal proceedings result. Now, the expression “falsely charges” in this section, in our opinion, cannot mean giving false evidence as a prosecution witness against an accused person during the course of a criminal trial. “To falsely charge” must refer to the original or initial accusation putting or seeking to put in motion the machinery of criminal investigation and not when seeking to prove the false charge by making deposition in support of the charge framed in that trial. The words “falsely charges” have to be, read along with the expression “institution of criminal proceeding”. Both these expressions, being susceptible of analogous meaning should be understood to have been used in their cognate sense. They get as it were their colour and content from each other. They seem to have been used in a technical sense as commonly understood in our criminal law. The false charge must, therefore, be made initially to a person in authority or to someone who is in a position to get the offender punished by appropriate proceedings. In other words, it must be’ embodied either in a complaint or in a report of a cognizable offence to the police officer or to an officer having authority over the person against whom the allegations are made. The statement in order to constitute the “charges” should be made with the intention and object of setting criminal law in motion.

Himanshu Kumar and Ors Vs State of Chhattisgarh and Ors on 14 Jul 2022

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/62d7ae969fca1923f0b04184

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/himanshu-kumar-and-others-versus-state-of-chhattisgarh-and-others

Index of Perjury Judgment is here.

Prabhu Chawla Vs State of Rajasthan and Anr on 05 Sep 2016

Posted on October 8, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

Re-affirming Dhariwal Tobaco Products Ltd judgment here, Full bench of Supreme Court held that, A Petition under section 482 CrPC is maintainable even when a Revision is available under 397/401 CrPC.

From Para 4,

4. The facts of these appeals need not detain us because in our considered opinion the view taken by the Rajasthan High Court in the impugned order is contrary to law and therefore matters will have to be remanded back to the High Court for fresh consideration on merits within the scope of inherent powers available to the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It would suffice to note that in both these appeals, the miscellaneous petitions before the High Court arose out of an order dated 30.11.2006 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate No. 3, Jodhpur in the complaint no. 1669 of 2006, whereby it took cognizance against the appellants under Section 228A of the Indian Penal Code and summoned them through bailable warrants to face further proceedings in the case.

From Paras 6-8,

6. In our considered view any attempt to explain the law further as regards the issue relating to inherent power of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is unwarranted. We would simply reiterate that Section 482 begins with a non-obstante clause to state: “Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.” A fortiori, there can be no total ban on the exercise of such wholesome jurisdiction where, in the words of Krishna Iyer, J. “abuse of the process of the Court or other extraordinary situation excites the court’s jurisdiction. The limitation is self-restraint, nothing more.” We venture to add a further reason in support. Since Section 397 Cr.P.C. is attracted against all orders other than interlocutory, a contrary view would limit the availability of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. only to petty interlocutory orders! A situation wholly unwarranted and undesirable.
7. As a sequel, we are constrained to hold that the Division Bench, particularly in paragraph 28, in the case of Mohit alias Sonu and another (supra) in respect of inherent power of the High Court in Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. does not state the law correctly. We record our respectful disagreement.
8. In our considered opinion the learned Single Judge of the High Court should have followed the law laid down by this Court in the case of Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. (supra) and other earlier cases which were cited but wrongly ignored them in preference to a judgment of that Court in the case of Sanjay Bhandari (supra) passed by another learned Single Judge on 05.02.2009 in S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 289 of 2006 which is impugned in the connected Criminal Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition No. 4744 of 2009. As a result, both the appeals, one preferred by Prabhu Chawla and the other by Jagdish Upasane & Ors. are allowed. The impugned common order dated 02.04.2009 passed by the High Court of Rajasthan is set aside and the matters are remitted back to the High Court for fresh hearing of the petitions under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. in the light of law explained above and for disposal in accordance with law. Since the matters have remained pending for long, the High Court is requested to hear and decide the matters expeditiously, preferably within six months.

Prabhu Chawla Vs State of Rajasthan and Anr on 05 Sep 2016

Index of Quash Judgments is here.

Rina Kumari Vs Dinesh Kumar Mahto and Anr on 10 Jan 2025

Posted on October 5, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held that mere passing of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights at the husband’s behest and non-compliance therewith by the wife would not, by itself, be sufficient to attract the disqualification under Section 125(4) Cr.P.C.

Solution is to use same evidence in maintenance case also, that was used in RCR proceedings and win the maintenance case. Simple…
The judiciary (could!) just delayed the inevitable. That’s all.

From Paras 29 and 30,

29. Thus, the preponderance of judicial thought weighs in favour of upholding the wife’s right to maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and the mere passing of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights at the husband’s behest and non-compliance therewith by the wife would not, by itself, be sufficient to attract the disqualification under Section 125(4) Cr.P.C. It would depend on the facts of the individual case and it would have to be decided, on the strength of the material and evidence available, whether the wife still had valid and sufficient reason to refuse to live with her husband, despite such a decree. There can be no hard and fast rule in this regard and it must invariably depend on the distinctive facts and circumstances obtaining in each particular case. In any event, a decree for restitution of conjugal rights secured by a husband coupled with non-compliance therewith by the wife would not be determinative straightaway either of her right to maintenance or the applicability of the disqualification under Section 125(4) Cr.P.C.
30. Another contention that was urged before us is that the findings in the judgment for restitution of conjugal rights by the Family Court, being a Civil Court, would be binding on the Court seized of the petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C, as they are to be treated as criminal proceedings. This specious argument needs mention only to be rejected outright. No doubt, in Shanti Kumar Panda vs. Shakuntala Devi20, this Court held that a decision by a Criminal Court would not bind the Civil Court while a decision by the Civil Court would bind the Criminal Court. However, maintenance proceedings are essentially civil in nature and the reason for inclusion of the provisions dealing therewith in the Code of Criminal Procedure was clarified by the Law Commission of India in September, 1969. Significantly, as long back as in the year 1963, in Mst. Jagir Kaur and another vs. Jaswant Singh21, a 3-Judge Bench of this Court held that proceedings under Section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, the precursor to Section 125 Cr.P.C., are in the nature of civil proceedings; the remedy, being a summary one; and the person seeking that remedy, ordinarily being a helpless person. Therefore, even if non-compliance with an order for payment of maintenance entails penal consequences, as may other decrees of a Civil Court, such proceedings would not qualify as or become criminal proceedings. Nomenclature of maintenance proceedings initiated under the Code of Criminal Procedure, as those provisions find place therein, cannot be held to be conclusive as to the nature of such proceedings.

Rina Kumari Vs Dinesh Kumar Mahto and Anr on 10 Jan 2025

Index of HMA judgments is here. Index of Maintenance Judgments is here.

Parvin Kumar Jain Vs Anju Jain on 10 Dec 2024

Posted on October 1, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court did settlement between parties at around 6 Crore rupees, but at least acknowledged and reproduced Delhi High Court observations. Thanks

From Paras 14 and 15,

14. In this case, the High Court observed that the appellant’s income, primarily from employment and investments, demonstrated his ability to provide for the wife and child’s maintenance adequately. The evidence revealed that the appellant earned over ₹4,00,000 (Rupees four lakhs only) per month
between 2007 and 2016. Although he claimed higher living expenses due to his residence in Mauritius, the High Court found his arguments to be unsubstantiated, as his financial resources allowed him to meet maintenance obligations without undue hardship. The High Court further noted several instances of the appellant’s deliberate attempts to mislead the judicial process. He withheld critical financial documents and selectively disclosed information to conceal the full extent of his wealth. The inquiry into the statutory forms of the appellant revealed that he had investments in mutual funds valued at ₹5.10 crores as early as 2009-2010, significant sums deposited in bank accounts, and other financial transactions that were not initially disclosed.
15. The High Court also identified false representations by the appellant regarding his property and income. He denied ownership of a property located at F-146, Richmond Park, Gurgaon, despite evidence of its ownership and rental income accruing to him. Additionally, the appellant misrepresented his association with Prasham Consultants LLP, wherein he continued to receive financial benefits until his father replaced him in 2016. These findings demonstrated a pattern of deliberate suppression of material facts and assets by the appellant, aimed at minimizing his maintenance liability. Such conduct warranted judicial intervention to ensure justice and provide adequate financial support to the wife and child, reflecting principles of fairness, transparency, and equity. Consequently, the High Court directed the appellant to pay interim maintenance that adequately addressed the needs of the wife and child, proportionate to his financial capacity and consistent with the obligations of a responsible spouse and parent.

From Paras 29

29. The main issue between the parties all these years, since separation, is the quantum of maintenance to be paid by the appellant to the respondent. The issue of maintenance pendente lite is now infructuous with the dissolution of marriage, but the financial interest of the wife still needs to be protected through grant of permanent alimony. The learned senior counsels for the parties have made submissions at length regarding the financial condition of both the parties. In order to establish the correct financial position of both the parties, they have filed their respective affidavits of income and assets as ordered by this Court.

From Para 34,

34. In the present case, it is a matter of record and an admitted fact that the respondent is unemployed while the appellant is a well accomplished banker who has worked in multiple senior roles at various banks over the years. We have perused the records of finances produced before us. Even though the records of the DEMAT accounts and the employment letters produced by the appellant are almost ten years ago or earlier, his financial position can be suitably ascertained from them.

Parvin Kumar Jain Vs Anju Jain on 10 Dec 2024

Citations: [2024 INSC 961], [2024 LiveLaw (SC) 969]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/102090299/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/6759168762941119016e16ef

https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/permanent-alimony-shouldnt-penalize-husband-but-should-ensure-decent-living-for-wife-supreme-court-lists-out-factors-277959

Parvin Kumar Jain vs Anju Jain Divorce Case

https://testbook.com/recent-judgements/parvin-kumar-jain-vs-anju-jain

https://lawbeat.in/supreme-court-judgments/marriage-be-dissolved-if-succumbed-due-long-standing-differences-supreme-court

PARVIN KUMAR JAIN vs. ANJU JAIN

https://www.lawtext.in/judgement.php?bid=1281

Supreme Court Upholds Financial Security in Marriage Breakdown: A Case Study

Alimony Decoded: 8 Critical Guidelines to Ensure Fair Settlements in Divorce Cases

The impugned Order from the Delhi High Court is below. Few relevant Paras from the said Order follow.

41. The Husband disputes the aforesaid finding on concealment. On behalf of the Husband, it has been strenuously urged that the Family Court though takes note of the affidavit dated 11thMay, 2018 filed by the Husband however, it does not deal with the same. We have carefully gone through the said affidavit. In our view, the said affidavit was yet another attempt on the part of the Husband to mislead the Family Court and conceal particulars of his income as well as assets.
47. On behalf of the Husband, it has been vehemently argued that it is the Wife who has filed false affidavits before this Court to the effect that she lives in a rented house and is paying rent on a regular basis. It is further alleged that the Wife has filed a forged Rent Agreement to claim that she is paying monthly rent to one Ms Sudesh Bansal. It is submitted that the Wife has failed to disclose that the house in which she lives has been transferred by Ms Sudesh Bansal in favour of the Wife’s mother vide registered General Power of Attorney and Agreement to Sell dated 25th June, 2009. On the basis of the aforesaid averments, an application has been filed by the Husband under Section 340 of the Cr.P.C before the Family Court, which is yet to be decided.
49. In our view, the explanation offered by the Wife is plausible. A perusal of the Rent Agreement dated 13th December, 2011 shows that the Wife was paying rent of Rs.11,000/- per month. It is not the case of the Husband that the Wife owns the said property or that she has paid any amount towards the purchase of the said property. There is nothing placed on record which would have us believe that what was apparent was not real. The Husband, in our opinion, is seeking to muddy the waters. The Husband’s concealments have been alluded to above. The Husband’s contentions on this count are, therefore, rejected. In our opinion, this cannot be a ground to deny the lawful maintenance to the Wife.
50. It must be emphasized that the discussion above leaves no doubt in our minds that the Husband has grossly concealed the real income as well as his movable and immovable assets in order to avoid paying the rightful amount of maintenance to the wife. The Family Court has correctly returned findings with regard to the earnings of the husband as well as attempts on the part of the Husband to conceal his real income.

Parvin Kumar Jain Vs Anju Jain on 01 Aug 2024

Index of Maintenance and Alimony cases under HMA is here.

Sanjay D Jain and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 26 Sep 2025

Posted on September 28, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A full bench of Apex Court ruled that none of the offences in the FIR were made out against the Petitioners.

From Paras 8-12,

8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having perused the FIR dated 06.02.2022 as well as the final report, we are of the considered opinion that the criminal proceedings initiated against the appellants pursuant to the registration of offence punishable under Sections 498-A, 377 and 506 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code deserve to be quashed.
9. Before examining the FIR along with the complaint of the complainant, we may refer to the parameters that are to be borne in mind while entertaining the prayer for quashing of the FIR. If the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint, even when taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out any case against the accused, quashing of the proceedings would be justified. Vague and general allegations cannot lead to forming of a prima facie case. As regards the ingredients for making out an offence punishable under Section 498-A of the Penal Code is concerned, the requirement is that there has to be cruelty inflicted against the victim which either drives her to commit suicide or cause grave injury to herself or lead to such conduct that would cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health. The latter part of the provision refers to harassment with a view to satisfy an unlawful demand for any property or valuable security raised by the husband or his relatives. These aspects have been considered in detail in a recent decision in Digambar and Another (supra) (to which one of us, B.R. Gavai, J, as he then was, was a party).
10. A perusal of the FIR and its consideration in entirety indicates that statements of a general nature have been made therein as against the present appellants. The complainant states that on 07.08.2021 when she had gone to her parental house, she had received a call from her mother-in-law raising a demand for clothes and jewellery. When she returned to her matrimonial house on 30.08.2021, she had taken few clothes for the family members. Except this statement, all other statements are of a general nature as well as vague without any particulars. There are other omnibus statements made in the complaint without any particulars whatsoever. It is also to be noted that for the purpose of constituting an offence punishable under Section 498-A of the Penal Code, cruelty as indicated in the Explanation to the said provision must be stated to be inflicted. The cruelty caused by the husband and his family members should be of such nature that it is inflicted with the intention to cause grave injury or drive the victim to commit suicide or inflict grave injury to herself. Such allegations are absent in the present case. We do not find that on a complete reading of the complaint, a prima facie case for proceeding under Section 498-A of the Penal Code has been made out against the appellants.
11. As regards the offence punishable under Sections 377 and 506 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code is concerned, it is seen that the allegations in this regard have been made only against the complainant’s husband and not against the present appellants. The entire tenor of the complaint in that regard seeks to implicate the complainant’s husband and all incidents stated therein relate to him. There is no allegation whatsoever in that context against the appellants that would require them to face trial on that count. The proceedings insofar as the present appellants are concerned, thus, deserve to be quashed in their entirety. In our view, the High Court failed to notice this aspect of the matter while declining to quash the proceedings against the appellants.
12. For the aforesaid reasons, we are satisfied that on the touchstone of the law laid down in State of Haryana and Others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others2, a case has been made out by the appellants for quashing of the criminal proceedings lodged against them under Sections 498-A, 377 and 506 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code. Continuation of these proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law and, hence, the appellants are entitled to relief.

Sanjay D Jain and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 26 Sep 2025

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Anup Disalva and Anr Vs Union of India on 09 Dec 2022

Posted on September 25, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division Bench of Kerala High Court held as follows,

From Para 4,

4. A Division Bench of this Court in Saumya Ann Thomas v. The Union of India and others [MANU/KE/0255/2010] held that the stipulation of a period of two years as the minimum mandatory period under Section 10A is arbitrary and oppressive and the period of two years has to be read as one year. This was taking note of the one year period stipulated in Section 28(1) of the Special Marriage Act, Section 13B(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act and Section 32B(1) of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act.

From Paras 6-7,

6. Divorce by mutual consent reflects the will of the parties to separate and get rid of the marriage. The legislature has put safeguards against impulsive decisions that may permeate such a decision by stipulating a gestation period before presenting a petition for divorce on mutual consent. This period will insulate possible peril that may ensue for the parties as a follow-up of the decision for mutual separation. In the Indian social context, though marriages are solemnized by two individuals, it is seen more as a union for laying the foundation for a strong family and society. Many laws have been made and many rights have been created based on familial relationships. The legislature, therefore, decided that a minimum period of separation must precede before presentation of a petition for divorce on the ground of mutual consent.
7. The problem presented in this case is when the waiting period itself would cause hardship to the parties. Can the law command parties to sit at the
fence and suffer the agony? The legislature in its wisdom contemplated possible repercussions of such fixation of minimum period that would result in
hardships to spouses and accordingly allowed the Courts to entertain a petition within the minimum period in exceptional cases. This is how Section
29 of the Special Marriage Act and Section 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act, enabled the Courts to entertain the petition to be presented before one year had lapsed from the date of marriage. There is no corresponding provision in the Divorce Act for the Court to permit the dissolution of marriage by mutual consent until the mandatory period of one year has lapsed from the date of separation. The constitutional validity of the mandatory period is, therefore, questioned in the writ petition filed by the parties. This Court in Saumya’s case (supra) had no occasion to advert to the validity of the minimum mandatory period by which spouses are denied the remedy of approaching the Court before the lapse of one year from the date of marriage or from the date of separation.
The above reasoning of the Court would clearly show that the decision rendered and the conclusion arrived at was on a premise that the mandatory
minimum residence period of two years for Christians is discriminatory as there is no such prescription of two years under the Hindu Marriage Act and the Special Marriage Act etc. This Court, however, considers the question in these cases on a different ground; whether in the absence of any provisions allowing the parties to a marriage to move the Court before the lapse of one year from the date of marriage or the date of separation. Can the provisions stand the test of constitutional scrutiny? The plea of arbitrariness would arise in this context of denial of judicial remedy to approach the Court before the lapse of one year from the date of marriage or separation.

From Para 11,

11. We hold that the fixation of the minimum period of separation of one year as stipulated under Section 10A is violative of the fundamental right and accordingly, strike it down.

Anup Disalva and Anr Vs Union of India on 09 Dec 2022

Index of Divorce Judgments is here.

Shivkarthik G.S and Anr Vs Nil on 04 Sep 2025

Posted on September 25, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Madras High Court held that Family Courts do have power to waive the cooling of period in a divorce by mutual consent under Indian Divorce Act.

From Paras 8-10,

8.The only point that arises for consideration is whether the mandatory waiting period of one year from the date of separation has to be compulsorily
sat through by the parties, who have already decided to part ways, by filing a mutual consent divorce petition. The Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Anup Disalva’s case, took note of an earlier decision of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Saumya Ann Thomas vs Union of India reported in 2010 SCC Online Kerala 5197 and held that the stipulation of a period of two years being a minimum mandatory period under Section 10A is arbitrary and oppressive and that the said two year period has to be read as one year, taking into account the one year period stipulated in similar legislations namely the Special Marriage Act ( Section 28(1) ) Hindu Marriage Act ( Section 13B(1)) and Parsi Marriage Act (Section 32B(1)).
9.The Honourable Division Bench further took note of the fact that an application for divorce by mutual consent presented by both the husband and
wife reflects the will of the parties to separate and get rid of the marriage. The Honourable Division Bench taking note of the entitlement of a spouse to file a petition for divorce under Section 10 on other available grounds, without any waiting period and the entitlement and power of the Court to grant a divorce, even before the period of one year, subject to being satisfied with the ground seeking divorce being made out, held that, while that is the position even for a contested proceeding before the Court, there can be no spokes put, impeding the parties from seeking divorce by mutual consent. The Honourable Division Bench, in fact, declared the stipulation of one year period or more, for the purposes of filing a divorce by mutual consent under Section 10A, as violative of fundamental rights and declared it to be unconstitutional.
10.Though said judgment of the Kerala High Court may not have a binding precedentiary value before this Court, the judgment will definitely have persuasive value, for this Court to take note of the ratio laid down by the Honourable Division Bench.
11.Even otherwise, the Honourable Supreme Court, in Shilpa Sailesh’s case, has clarified the ratio laid down in Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur,
reported in 2017 (8) SCC 746, and held that the Courts can always waive the cooling period of six months under the Hindu Marriage Act to enable the parties to obtain a divorce by mutual consent, earlier.
12.However, the Family Court has relied on Amardeep Singh’s case, to hold that the one year separation period is mandatory under section 13B(1) of
the Hindu Marriage Act and therefore similarly even under the Divorce Act the cooling period cannot be condoned or waived.

From Paras 16-18,

16.Even though there is no decision of this Court toeing the same lines of the Kerala High Court, striking down the provisions of Section 10A regarding the mandatory waiting period, considering the import of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shilpa Sailesh’s case as well as the Hon’ble Division Bench in the Kerala High Court, the Family Court is certainly entitled to waive the mandatory waiting period and cannot compel the parties to sit through the same before presenting a petition for divorce in the form of mutual consent, under Section 10A of the Divorce Act.
17.Independently, I also find that both the petitioners have filed separate affidavits even in this revision, affirming their decision to go separate ways. The interest of any children is also not involved in the present case, since the parties were not blessed with any issues and both the petitioners have categorically asserted that the relationship has become irreconcilable and distressing. In such circumstances, compelling the petitioners to wait for the mandatory period to expire would only further increase their agony. The petitioners have also stated that their decision is voluntary and only based on their free will and there is no fraud, collusion or undue influence brought upon them to file the mutual consent divorce petition.
18.In the light of the above, I am inclined to set aside the docket order of the Family Court, Coimbatore, and I direct the Family Court, Coimbatore, to
number DOP CFR.No.3726 of 2025, if it is otherwise in order. The Family Court, Coimbatore, shall not return / reject the petition on the ground that the parties have to wait for the mandatory period of one year from separation to pass off, before they are entitled to file an application for divorce by mutual consent.

Shivkarthik G.S and Anr Vs Nil on 04 Sep 2025

Index of Divorce judgments is here.

K Sreekanth Naik Vs P Nalini and Anr on 27 Mar 2025

Posted on September 21, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court held that a non-cooperating wife with the Criminal trail who has been evading appearance before the Court,.

From Paras 3-6,

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the 1st respondent is not cooperating with the trail and has been evading appearance before the Court, even though bailable warrants were issued against the 1st respondent. It is also submitted that the bailable warrants were cancelled soon after the 1st respondent filed a memo undertaking to appear.
4. Today, when the matter was taken up for hearing, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent submits that even the petitioner was also absent on the last date of hearing, when the matter was listed for trial.
5. It is further submitted that the matter is now fixed for trial on 22.04.2017, and the 1st respondent would appear in Court and adduce the evidence.
6. Considering the submission, the Criminal Petition is disposed off with an observation that the learned Magistrate should endeavor to complete the trial as expeditiously as possible, preferable within a period of six (06) months from the date of the receipt of this order.

2025-03-27 K Sreekanth Naik Vs P Nalini and Anr on 27 Mar 2025

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/79857987/

Thanks to Adv Ram G for the below copy. He practiced law (all subjects) at Anantapur Courts and reachable on +91-90000-32896

2025-03-27 K.Sreekanth_Naik_vs_P_Nalini_-_2025_Supreme(Online)(AP)_3987_-_Supreme

Disclaimer: This is a case that I handled myself for the husband. This is my second reportable judgment.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Reportable Judgement or Order

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