Swaran Singh and Ors Vs State NCT Delhi and Anr on 18 Aug 2008

Posted on November 6, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Justice Katju held that offending words to a member of SC/ST, are liable under the Act, only if made in any place in public view, but not otherwise. A big relief for those facing false cases.

From Paras 27 and 28,

27. Learned counsel then contended that the alleged act was not committed in a public place and hence does not come within the purview of section 3(1)(x) of the Act. In this connection it may be noted that the aforesaid provision does not use the expression ‘public place’, but instead the expression used is ‘in any place within public view’. In our opinion there is a clear distinction between the two expressions.
28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a ‘Chamar’) when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression ‘place within public view’ with the expression ‘public place’. A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies.

And relating to American cuss word Nigger,

30. In this connection it may be mentioned that in America to use the word ‘Nigger’ today for an African-American is regarded as highly offensive and is totally unacceptable, even if it was acceptable 50 years ago. In our opinion, even if the word ‘Chamar’ was not regarded offensive at one time in our country, today it is certainly a highly offensive word when used in a derogatory sense to insult and humiliate a person. Hence, it should never be used with that intent. The use of the word ‘Chamar’ will certainly attract section 3(1)(x) of the Act, if from the context it appears that it was used in a derogatory sense to insult or humiliate a member of the SC/ST.

And then Husband was held to have NOT insulted the respondent in public view,

34. However, a perusal of the F.I.R. shows that Swaran Singh did not use these offensive words in the public view. There is nothing in the F.I.R. to show that any member of the public was present when Swaran Singh uttered these words, or that the place where he uttered them was a place which ordinarily could be seen by the public. Hence in our opinion no prima facie offence is made out against appellant no.1.

Swaran Singh and Ors Vs State NCT Delhi and Anr on 18 Aug 2008

Citations : [2008 SCC 8 435], [2008 SCC CRI 3 527], [2008 AIC SC 69 25], [2008 AIOL 938], [2008 AIR SC SUPP 441], [2009 BOMCR CRI SC 2 431], [2008 CRLJ SC 4369], [2008 JT 9 60], [2009 MPLJ SC 1 503], [2008 SCALE 11 346], [2008 SCR 12 132]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/531612/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/575fd270607dba63d7e69106

Hitesh Verma Vs State of Uttarakhand and Anr on 05 Nov 2020

Posted on November 6, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Wonderful judgment from 3-judge bench to arresting the misuse of SC/ST Act 1989.

From Para 13, the insult must be targeted as the member belonged to SC/ST

13. The offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act would indicate the ingredient of intentional insult and intimidation with an intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. All insults or intimidations to a person will not be an offence under the Act unless such insult or intimidation is on account of victim belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The object of the Act is to improve the socio-economic conditions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes as they are denied number of civil rights. Thus, an offence under the Act would be made out when a member of the vulnerable section of the Society is subjected to indignities, humiliations and harassment. The assertion of title over the land by either of the parties is not due to either the indignities, humiliations or harassment. Every citizen has a right to avail their remedies in accordance with law. Therefore, if the appellant or his family members have invoked jurisdiction of the civil court, or that respondent No.2 has invoked the jurisdiction of the civil court, then the parties are availing their remedies in accordance with the procedure established by law. Such action is not for the reason that respondent No.2 is member of Scheduled Caste.

From Para 14, the insult must be in any place within public view

14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in “any place within public view”. What is to be regarded as “place in public view” had come up for consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as Swaran Singh & Ors. v. State through Standing Counsel & Ors.5. The Court had drawn distinction between the expression “public place” and “in any place within public view”. It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view.

From Para 18, Offence will NOT be made out just because the member is from SC/ST

18. Therefore, offence under the Act is not established merely on the fact that the informant is a member of Scheduled Caste unless there is an intention to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe for the reason that the victim belongs to such caste. In the present case, the parties are litigating over possession of the land. The allegation of hurling of abuses is against a person who claims title over the property. If such person happens to be a Scheduled Caste, the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act is not made out.

Hitesh Verma Vs State of Uttarakhand and Anr on 05 Nov 2020

Citations : [2020 SCC ONLINE SC 907]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/111507500/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5fb6aa47b128b6ff2528fcf1

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/hitesh-verma-versus-the-state-of-uttarakhand-anr

Arun Sharma Vs State of M.P. on 02 Dec 2020

Posted on November 6, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

In this wonderful Order from 1-judge Gwalior bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court, it was held that parading suspects in the media/public is violative of Article 21 and the concerned officers are liable for the violation of fundamental rights including compensation.

Arun Sharma Vs State of M.P. on 02 Nov 2020

Here is the Final Judgment… Some snippets follow…

From Paras 21, 22 and 23,

21. The Counsel for the State also could not point out as to how, the respondent no. 3 could have taken cognizance of the complaint made by the landlady. From the plain reading of the application, it is clear that She had prayed for recovery of arrears of rent as well as for eviction of the petitioner. By no stretch of imagination, the complaint filed made by the landlady can be said to have disclosed cognizable offence. Even a non-cognizable offence was not disclosed in the complaint. The entire complaint was beyond the jurisdiction of the police authorities but still cognizance of the same was taken.
22. When a specific question was put to Shri Amit Sanghi, Superintendent of Police, Gwalior, that whether it is the official duty of the police to get the shops vacated without there being any orders of the Court, then it was rightly admitted by Shri Amit Sanghi, Superintendent of Police, Gwalior, that the police has no authority whatsoever under any law, to evict the tenants from the tenanted premises and the eviction can take place only under the decree of eviction issued by the Court of competent jurisdiction. However, it is submitted by Shri Sanghi, that the incident of 25-7-2020 took place
prior to his posting in Gwalior. Even the respondent no.3, in his return has categorically stated that the matter of eviction is a civil matter and police has no jurisdiction.
23. Although the Counsel for the respondent no. 4 relied upon Section 23 of Police Act, but as a departmental enquiry is pending against the respondents no. 3 to 5, therefore, only undisputed facts and the stand taken by the respondents as well as the preliminary enquiry reports are being considered for deciding this petition. However, it is not out of place to mention here, that now the respondents no. 3 to 5 are involved in mud-sledging on each other, thereby placing certain documents on record, which were suppressed by the respondents no. 1 and 2.

From Para 24,

24. It is the case of the respondent no. 4 that it was the respondent no. 3, who had directed her to enquire the complaint made by the landlady, whereas it is the case of the respondent no. 3, that the copy of the complaint was given to him by respondent no. 4, only when he returned back to the police station at 16:00 and the endorsement made on the application thereby, directing the respondent no. 4 to enquire, does not bear his signatures. However, the return of the respondent no. 3 is beautifully silent as to whether such endorsement is in his handwriting or not? In para 8 of the return, the respondent no. 3 has pleaded that as per routine procedure when any complaint is submitted in Police Station, it is registered in Complaint register and is placed by the Police Station Munshi before the respondent no.3. Although it is the contention of the respondent no. 3 that he was
given the said application by the respondent no.4, only after he came back to the police station at 16:00, but his return is completely silent as to why he did not ask the respondent no. 4, that under whose authority, the endorsement of entrusting enquiry to the respondent no. 4 was written. In absence of such pleadings, an adverse inference has to be drawn against the respondent no.3, and it is held that endorsement made on the application dated 25-7-2020 made by the landlady is in the handwriting of the respondent no.3 and it was the respondent no.3 who had entrusted the enquiry to the respondent no.

Arun Sharma Vs State of M.P. on 02 Dec 2020

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/19697017/

Rajnesh Pal Naidu Vs Neha Naidu Joshi and Anr on 04 Nov 2020

Posted on November 4, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Rajnesh saar tried to hide his true financial status and got caught. Supreme Court became hyper and is jumping to “framing guidelines on payment of maintenance in matrimonial matters“. One bad apple, screws other good apples too… And this was passed on Sep 11th, 2019…!!!

The next hearing is scheduled on 14th October, 2019

Rajnesh Vs Neha and Anr on 11 September, 2019

Here is the earlier Bombay High Court Judgment.

Rajnesh Vs Neha and Anr on 14 August, 2018

Find the Earlier SC reportable judgment here.

Then, Supreme Court passed General Directions in regard to the menace of multiple maintenance litigation between spouses as follows.

Some crucial procedural guidelines with respect to interim maintenance proceedings…

(xi) Keeping in mind the need for a uniform format of Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities to be filed in maintenance proceedings, this Court considers it necessary to frame guidelines in exercise of our powers under Article 136 read with Article 142 of the Constitution of India :
(a) The Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities annexed at Enclosures I, II and III of this judgment, as may be applicable, shall be filed by the parties in all maintenance proceedings, including pending proceedings before the concerned Family Court / District Court / Magistrate’s Court, as the case may be, throughout the country;
(b) The applicant making the claim for maintenance will be required to file a concise application accompanied with the Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets;
(c) The respondent must submit the reply along with the Affidavit of Disclosure within a maximum period of four weeks. The Courts may not grant more than two opportunities for submission of the Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities to the respondent.
If the respondent delays in filing the reply with the Affidavit, and seeks more than two adjournments for this purpose, the Court may consider exercising the power to strike off the defence of the respondent, if the conduct is found to be wilful and contumacious in delaying the proceedings.32
On the failure to file the Affidavit within the prescribed time, the Family Court may proceed to decide the application for maintenance on basis of the Affidavit filed by the applicant and the pleadings on record;
(d) The above format may be modified by the concerned Court, if the exigencies of a case require the same. It would be left to the judicial discretion of the concerned Court, to issue necessary directions in this regard.
(e) If apart from the information contained in the Affidavits of Disclosure, any further information is required, the concerned Court may pass appropriate orders in respect thereof.
(f) If there is any dispute with respect to the declaration made in the Affidavit of Disclosure, the aggrieved party may seek permission of the Court to serve interrogatories, and seek production of relevant documents from the opposite party under Order XI of the CPC;
On filing of the Affidavit, the Court may invoke the provisions of Order X of the C.P.C or Section 165 of the Evidence Act 1872, if it considers it necessary to do so;
The income of one party is often not within the knowledge of the other spouse. The Court may invoke Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 if necessary, since the income, assets and liabilities of the spouse are within the personal knowledge of the party concerned.
(g) If during the course of proceedings, there is a change in the financial status of any party, or there is a change of any relevant circumstances, or if some new information comes to light, the party may submit an amended / supplementary affidavit, which would be considered by the court at the time of final determination.
(h) The pleadings made in the applications for maintenance and replies filed should be responsible pleadings; if false statements and misrepresentations are made, the Court may consider initiation of proceeding u/S. 340 Cr.P.C., and for contempt of Court.
(i) In case the parties belong to the Economically Weaker Sections (“EWS”), or are living Below the Poverty Line (“BPL”), or are casual labourers, the requirement of filing the Affidavit would be dispensed with.
(j) The concerned Family Court / District Court / Magistrate’s Court must make an endeavour to decide the I.A. for Interim Maintenance by a reasoned order, within a period of four to six months at the latest, after the Affidavits of Disclosure have been filed before the court.
(k) A professional Marriage Counsellor must be made available in every Family Court.

Some crucial procedural guidelines with respect to Permanent alimony

(i) Parties may lead oral and documentary evidence with respect to income, expenditure, standard of living, etc. before the concerned Court, for fixing the permanent alimony payable to the spouse.
(ii) In contemporary society, where several marriages do not last for a reasonable length of time, it may be inequitable to direct the contesting spouse to pay permanent alimony to the applicant for the rest of her life. The duration of the marriage would be a relevant factor to be taken into consideration for determining the permanent alimony to be paid.
(iii) Provision for grant of reasonable expenses for the marriage of children must be made at the time of determining permanent alimony, where the custody is with the wife. The expenses would be determined by taking into account the financial position of the husband and the customs of the family.
(iv) If there are any trust funds / investments created by any spouse / grandparents in favour of the children, this would also be taken into consideration while deciding the final child support.

Final Directions
In view of the foregoing discussion as contained in Part B – I to V of this judgment, we deem it appropriate to pass the following directions in exercise of our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India :
(a) Issue of overlapping jurisdiction
To overcome the issue of overlapping jurisdiction, and avoid conflicting orders being passed in different proceedings, it has become necessary to issue directions in this regard, so that there is uniformity in the practice followed by the Family Courts/District Courts/Magistrate Courts throughout the country. We direct that:
(i) where successive claims for maintenance are made by a party under different statutes, the Court would consider an adjustment or set-off, of the amount awarded in the previous proceeding/s, while determining whether any further amount is to be awarded in the subsequent proceeding;
(ii) it is made mandatory for the applicant to disclose the previous proceeding and the orders passed therein, in the subsequent proceeding;
(iii) if the order passed in the previous proceeding/s requires any modification or variation, it would be required to be done in the same proceeding.
(b) Payment of Interim Maintenance
The Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities annexed as Enclosures I, II and III of this judgment, as may be applicable, shall be filed by both parties in all maintenance proceedings, including pending proceedings before the concerned Family Court / District Court / Magistrates Court, as the case may be, throughout the country.
(c) Criteria for determining the quantum of maintenance
For determining the quantum of maintenance payable to an applicant, the Court shall take into account the criteria enumerated in Part B – III of the judgment. he aforesaid factors are however not exhaustive, and the concerned Court may exercise its discretion to consider any other factor/s which may be necessary or of relevance in the facts and circumstances of a case.
(d) Date from which maintenance is to be awarded
We make it clear that maintenance in all cases will be awarded from the date of filing the application for maintenance, as held in Part B – IV above.
(e) Enforcement / Execution of orders of maintenance
For enforcement / execution of orders of maintenance, it is directed that an order or decree of maintenance may be enforced under Section 28A of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956; Section 20(6) of the D.V. Act; and Section 128 of Cr.P.C., as may be applicable. The order of maintenance may be enforced as a money decree of a civil court as per the provisions of the CPC, more particularly Sections 51, 55, 58, 60 r.w. Order XXI.

Note: In my opinion, since all these proceedings are Civil in nature (no criminal liability at all meaning No jail), no one has to bother much about the same, as no care of concern is shown to address root causes:

Why do these proceedings take years together?
- Allowance of endless adjournments
- No strict demand for filling up of vacant Judge or magistrate posts/constituting additional Courts.
- No Case calendar approach (passed by one of the judges in this case here), despite the name-sake tag of summary proceedings.
Which husband in his sane mind, will want to live with a woman who drags him (and his family, in most cases!) to Court correctly/maliciously? Such relationship is dead for all practical purposes.
If there was such neglect by husband/male person, why no legal termination of marriage is NOT invoked suo moto/automatically?

Action Item:

This shall be addressed in one of my future PILs here.

Rajnesh Pal Naidu Vs Neha Naidu Joshi and Anr on 04 Nov 2020

Citations: [2020 SCC ONLINE SC 903], [(2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 749], [(2021) 2 SCC 324], [(2021) 2 SCC (Civ) 220], [(2020) 11JT 558], [2020 (6) KHC 1]

Other Sources : https://indiankanoon.org/doc/117541087/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5fa2f5f68e5f67910ddaf6ce

The HC dismissed the Crl Writ Petition challenging the Family Court Order in the 125 CrPC case.

Rajnesh Vs Neha and Anr on 14 Aug 2018

Family Court case no: Petition No. E-443/ 2013

A clarification was sought in this WP here. Order passed is given below.

Amarjeet Singh Vs Union of India on 14 Oct 2022

Another 2-judge bench of Apex Court has to Order re-circulation of above judgment in Aditi Sharma Vs Jitesh Sharma, because the Trial Court Judges stopped following Supreme Court judgement here. Exactly after 3 long years!!!

Index of all maintenance judgment is here.

Dr. Haniraj L. Chulani Vs Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa on 8 Apr 1996

Posted on November 4, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court held that,

A short but an interesting question falls for determination in the present case. It runs as under :
“Whether the respondent-State Bar Council of Maharashtra & Goa was justified in refusing enrollment of the appellant as an advocate under the Advocates Act, 1961 as he is a medical practitioner who does not want to give up his medical practice but wants simultaneously to practice law.

The Court also made the following points for consideration:

1. Whether impugned Rule (l) framed by the State Bar Council of Maharashtra & Goa suffers from the vice of excessive delegation of legislative power and hence is void and inoperative at law.
2. Whether the said rule is violative of Article 19(1)(9) and is not saved by sub-article (6) thereof.
3. Whether the aforesaid rule is violative of Articles 14 and 21 of The Constitution.

It is held as follows,

Point No.2.
It is no doubt true that under Article 19, sub-Article (1)(g) all citizens have a right to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business and any profession may include even plurality of professions. However, this is not an absolute right. It is subject to sub-Article (6) of Article 19 which lays down that nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause. It cannot be gainsaid that litigants are also embers of general public and if in their interest any rule imposes a restriction on the entry to the legal profession and if such restriction is found to be reasonable Article 19(1)(g) would not get stultified. It is true that the appellant as a citizen of India having obtained the qualification required for being enrolled as an advocate can legitimately aspire to be enrolled as an advocate but his aforesaid right is fettered by the impugned rule framed by the State Bar Council. We have to consider whether the said restriction imposed by the rule is in any way unreasonable. We have to keep in view the fact that the impugned rule restricts entry of a person who is otherwise qualified for being enrolled as an advocate if he is already carrying on any other profession. Question is whether such a person carrying on other profession can be validly told off the gates by the State Bar Council by resorting to the impugned rule. In our view looking to the nature of the legal profession to which we have made detailed reference earlier the State Bar Council would be justified in framing such a rule prohibiting the entry of a professional who insists on carrying on other profession simultaneously with the legal profession. As we have seen earlier legal profession requires full time attention and would not countenance an advocate riding two horses or more at a time. He has to be full time advocate or not at all. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that, even though the appellant is a practising surgeon he undertaking, if given entry to the legal profession, not to practice medicine during the court hours. This is neither here nor there. It is obvious that even though medical profession also may be a dignified profession a person cannot insist that he will be a practising doctor as well as a practising advocate simultaneously. Such an insistence on his part itself would create an awkward situation not only for him but for his own clients as well as patients. It is easy to visualize that a practising surgeon like the appellant may be required to attend emergency operation, even beyond court hours either in the morning or in the evening. On the other hand the dictates of his legal profession May require him to study the cases for being argued the next day in the court. Under these circumstances his attention would be divided. We would naturally be. in a dilemma as to whether to attend to his patient on the operation table in the evening or to attend to his legal profession and work for preparing cases fur the next day and to take instructions from his clients for efficient conduct of the cases next day in the court. If he is an original side advocate he may be required to spend his evenings and even late nights for making witnesses ready for examination in the court next day. Under these circumstances as a practising advocate if he gives attention to his clients in his chamber after court hours and if he is also required to attend an emergency operation at that very time, it would be very difficult for him to choose whether to leave his clients and go to attend his patient in the operation theater or to refuse to attend to his patients. If he selects the first alternative his clients would clamour, his preparation as advocate would suffer and naturally it would reflect upon his performance in the court next day. If on the other hand he chooses to cater to the needs of his clients and his legal work, his patients may suffer and may in given contingency even stand to lose their lives without the aid of his expert hand as a surgeon. Thus he would be torn between two conflicting loyalties, loyalty to his clients on the one hand and loyalty to his patients on the other. In a way he will instead of having the best of both the worlds, have worst of both the worlds. Such a person aspiring to have simultaneous enrollment both as a lawyer and as a medical practitioner will thus be like ’trishanku’ of yore who will neither be in heaven nor on earth. It is axiomatic that an advocates has to burn midnight oil for preparing his cases for being argued in the court next day. Advocate face examination every day when they appear in courts. It is not as if that after court hours advocate has not to put in hard work on his study table in his chamber with or without the presence of his clients who may be available for consultation. To put forward his best performance as an advocate he is required to give wholehearted and full time attention to his profession. Any flinching from such unstinted attention to his legal profession would certainly have an impact on his professional ability and expertise. If he is permitted to simultaneously practise as a doctor then the requirement of his full time attention to the legal profession is bound to be adversely affected. Consequently however equally dignified may be the profession of a doctor he cannot simultaneously be permitted to practise law which is a full time occupation. It is for ensuring the full time attention of legal practitioners towards their profession and with a view to bringing out their best so that they can fulfill their role as an officer of the court and can give their best in the administration, of justice, that the impugned rule has been enacted by the State legislature. It, therefore, cannot be said that it is in any way arbitrary or that it imposes an unreasonable restriction on the new entrant to the profession who is told not to practise, simultaneously any other profession and if he does so to deny to him entry to the legal profession. It is true as submitted by learned senior counsel for the appellant that the rule of Central Bar Council does not countenance an advocate simultaneously carrying on any business and it does not expressly frawn upon any simultaneous profession. But these are general rules of professional conduct. So far as regulating enrollment, to the profession is concerned it is the task entrusted solely to the State Bar Council by the Legislature as seen earlier while considering the scheme of the Act. While carrying on that task if the entry to the profession is restricted by the State Bar Council by enacting the impugned rule for not allowing any other professional to enter the Bar. When he does not want to give up the other profession but wants to carry on the same simultaneously with legal practice, it cannot be said that the Bar Council has by enacting such a rule imposed any unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the prospective practitioner who wants to enter the legal profession.

Dr. Haniraj L. Chulani Vs Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa on 8 April 1996

Citations : [1996 SUPREME 3 443], [1996 SCC 3 342], [1996 AIR SC 1708], [1996 SCALE 3 354], [1996 ALT SC 2 31], [1996 GLH 1 734], [1996 SCC 3 343], [1996 SUPP SCR 1 51], [1996 TAXMAN SC 86 70], [1996 JT SC 4 162]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/77295/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609acdbe4b014971140fd9a

Index of Bar Council Antics is here.

Amardeep Singh Vs Harveen Kaur on 12 Sep 2017

Posted on November 4, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held that the 6 months of cooling period prescribed in Mutual-Consent divorce proceedings under Hindu Marriage Act are directional in nature and not mandatory.

18. Applying the above to the present situation, we are of the view that where the Court dealing with a matter is satisfied that a case is made out to waive the statutory period under Section 13B(2), it can do so after considering the following :
i) the statutory period of six months specified in Section 13B(2), in addition to the statutory period of one year under Section 13B(1) of separation of parties is already over before the first motion itself;
ii) all efforts for mediation/conciliation including efforts in terms of Order XXXIIA Rule 3 CPC/Section 23(2) of the Act/Section 9 of the Family Courts Act to reunite the parties have failed and there is no likelihood of success in that direction by any further efforts;
iii) the parties have genuinely settled their differences including alimony, custody of child or any other pending issues between the parties;
iv) the waiting period will only prolong their agony.
19. The waiver application can be filed one week after the first motion giving reasons for the prayer for waiver.
20. If the above conditions are satisfied, the waiver of the waiting period for the second motion will be in the discretion of the concerned Court.
21. Since we are of the view that the period mentioned in Section 13B(2) is not mandatory but directory, it will be open to the Court to exercise its discretion in the facts and circumstances of each case where there is no possibility of parties resuming cohabitation and there are chances of alternative rehabilitation.
22. Needless to say that in conducting such proceedings the Court can also use the medium of video conferencing and also permit genuine representation of the parties through close relations such as parents or siblings where the parties are unable to appear in person for any just and valid reason as may satisfy the Court, to advance the interest of justice.

Amardeep Singh Vs Harveen Kaur on 12 Sep 2017

Citations : [2017 SCC 8 746], [2017 SCC ONLINE SC 1073], [2017 AIR SC 4417], [2017 ALT 5 23], [2017 BOMCR 6 773], [2017 CGLJ 4 157], [2017 CTC 5 665], [2017 DLT 242 264], [2017 DMCSC 3 277], [2017 ILR KER 4 1], [2017 ILR 4081], [2017 JLJR 4 21], [2017 JCC 3 2196], [2017 KHC 4 683], [2017 KLJ 4 179], [2017 KLT 4 367], [2017 MPLJ 4 41], [2017 MHLJ 5 804], [2017 PLJR 4 37], [2017 RLW SC 4 2910], [2017 RCR CIVIL 4 608], [2017 SCALE 11 258], [2017 WLN SC 3 145], [2017 SCC CRI 3 505], [2017 SCC CIV 4 804]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/79830357/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/59b82810ce686e45ff91e3ea

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/amardeep-singh-versus-harveen-kaur

Additional guidelines/factors were issued in Amit Kumar Vs Suman Beniwal here.

Index of Divorce cases is here.

Samta Naidu Vs The State of MP on 2 March 2020

Posted on November 2, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court held that, a second complaint is maintainable, if the first complaint was disposed without looking into merits of the case. But such second complaint must bring about new facts to the fore and the reasons for late introduction via second complaint have to be explained.

Samta Naidu Vs The State of MP on 2 March 2020

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/136092640/

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/samta-naidu-anr-versus-state-of-madhya-pradesh-and-anr

Samta Naidu & Anr. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr.

Lily Thomas and Ors Vs Union of India and Ors 05 May 2000

Posted on November 2, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

In this landmark precedent from Supreme Court, it was held that marriages performed after converting to Islam are not acceptable as valid marriages. This is popularly known as Love Jihad in India.

Casemine version:

Lily Thomas and Ors Vs Union of India and Ors 05 May 2000 Casemine

Indiakanoon version:

Lily Thomas and Ors Vs Union of India and Ors 05 May 2000

Citations : [2000 ALLMR SC 3 251], [2000 AIR SC 1650], [2000 UJ SC 2 1113], [2000 SCALE 4 176], [2000 SCC CRI 1056], [2000 SUPREME 3 601], [2000 AIR SC 1760], [2000 CRLJ SC 2433], [2000 JT 5 617], [2000 SCC 6 224], [2000 BOMCR SC SUPP 1 464], [2000 AIR SCW 1760]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/80351/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad87e4b0149711411995

Noor Jahan Begum @ Anjali Mishra and Anr Vs State of UP and 4 Ors on 16 Dec 2014

Posted on November 1, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Based on the landmark judgment from Supreme Court is here, Allahabad High Court held against the Love Jihad marriages in India.

Noor Jahan Begum @ Anjali Mishra and Anr Vs State of UP and 4 Ors on 16 Dec 2014

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/22354729/

Many such Love Jihad marriages are listed here, for awareness purpose, as nothing can be done to such legally major ladies.

Lily Thomas Vs Union of India and Ors on 10 Jul 2013

Posted on November 1, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court has struck down the Section 8(4) as ultra vires to the Constitution which was in the following fashion,

(4) Notwithstanding anything in sub-section (1), sub-section (2) and sub-section (3) a disqualification under either sub-section shall not, in the case of a person who on the date of the conviction is a member of Parliament or the Legislature of a State, take effect until three months have elapsed from that date or, if within that period an appeal or application for revision is brought in respect of the conviction or the sentence, until that appeal or application is disposed of by the court.

From Paras 19 and 20,

19. The result of our aforesaid discussion is that the affirmative words used in Articles 102(1)(e) and 191(1)(e) confer power on Parliament to make one law laying down the same disqualifications for a person who is to be chosen as member of either House of Parliament or as a member of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State and for a person who is a sitting member of a House of Parliament or a House of the State Legislature and the words in Articles 101(3)(a) and 190(3)(a) of the Constitution put express limitations on such powers of the Parliament to defer the date on which the disqualifications would have effect. Accordingly, sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act which carves out a saving in the case of sitting members of Parliament or State Legislature fromthe disqualifications under sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 of the Act or which defers the date on which thedisqualification will take effect in the case of a sitting member of Parliament or a State Legislature is beyond the powers conferred on Parliament by the Constitution.
20. Looking at the affirmative terms of Articles 102(1)(e) and 191(1)(e) of the Constitution, we hold that Parliament has been vested with the powers to make law laying down the same disqualifications for person to be chosen as a member of Parliament or a State Legislature and for a sitting member of a House of Parliament or a House of a State Legislature. We also hold that the provisions of Article 101(3)(a) and 190(3)(a) of the Constitution expressly prohibitParliament to defer the date from which the disqualification will come into effect in case of a sitting member of Parliament or a State Legislature.Parliament, therefore, has exceeded its powers conferred by the Constitution in enacting sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act and accordingly subsection(4) of Section 8 of the Act is ultra vires the Constitution.

From Para 23,

…
Sitting members of Parliament and State Legislature who have already been convicted for any of the offences mentioned in sub-section (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 of the Act and who have filed appeals or revisions which are pending and are accordingly saved from the disqualifications by virtue of sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act should not, in our considered opinion, be affected by the declaration now made by us in this judgment.
…
However, if any sitting member of Parliament or a State Legislature is convicted of any of the offences mentioned in sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 of the Act and by virtue of such conviction and/or sentence suffers the disqualifications mentioned in sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 of the Act after the pronouncement of this judgment, his membership of Parliament or the State Legislature, as the case may be, will not be saved by subsection (4) of Section 8 of the Act which we have by this judgment declared as ultra vires the Constitution notwithstanding that he files the appeal or revision against the conviction and /or sentence.

Lily Thomas Vs Union of India and Ors on 10 Jul 2013

Citations : [2013 ABR 6 236], [2013 AD SC 10 655], [2013 AIR SC 2662], [2013 AWC SC 6 5458], [2013 BOMCR 5 261], [2013 CGLRW SC 2 339], [2014 CLT SC 117 284], [2013 JLJR 3 351], [2013 JT SC 9 419], [2013 KARLJ 5 1], [2013 KLJ 3 284], [2013 KERLT 3 296], [2013 LW 4 857], [2013 MLJ 5 463], [2013 OLR 2 941], [2013 PLJR 3 261], [2013 RCR CIVIL 3 713], [2013 SCALE 8 469], [2013 SCC 7 653], [2013 SCC L&S 7 811], [2014 WBLR SC 1 69], [2013 SCC CIV 3 678], [2013 SCC CRI 3 641], [2013 SCC L&S 2 811], [2013 SCC ONLINE SC 603], [2013 GUJ LH 2 408], [2013 GUJ LR 3 2209], [2013 ILR KERALA 3 203], [2014 CUT LT 117 284]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/63158859/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af2ee4b0149711415be4

Supreme Court Landmark Judgment- Lilly Thomas v. Union of India

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Reportable Judgement or Order

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