All India Judges’ Association and Ors Vs Union of India and Ors on 21 Mar 2002

Posted on December 31, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

A 3-judge bench of Supreme Court held that, Law graduates can be eligible for practicing law without having any experience but recommended that the newly hired judges under training for a period not less than 1 year and preferably two years.

In the All India Judges’s case [1993] 4 SCC 288 at p. 314; this Court has observed that in order to enter the Judicial Service, an applicant must be an Advocate of at least three year’s standing. Rules were amended accordingly. With the passage of time, experience has shown that the best talent which is available is not attracted to the Judicial Service. A bright young law graduate after 3 year of practice finds the Judicial Service not attractive enough. It has been recommended by the Shetty Commission after taking into consideration the views expressed before it by various authorities, that the need for an applicant to have been an Advocate for at least 3 years should be done away with. After taking all the circumstances into consideration, we accept this recommendation of the Shetty Commission and the argument of the learned Amicus Curiae that it should be no longer mandatory for an applicant desirous of entering the Judicial Service to be an Advocate of at least three years’ standing we accordingly, in the light of experience gained after the judgment in All India Judges’ cases direct to the High Courts and to the State Governments to amend their rules so as to enable a fresh law graduate who may not even have put in even three years of practice, to be eligible to compete and enter the Judicial Service. We, however, recommend that a fresh recruit into the Judicial Service should be imparted with training of not less than one years, preferably two years. The Shetty Commission has recommended Assured Career Progessive Scheme and Functional Scales. We have accepted the said recommendation and a suggestion was mooted to the effect that in order that a Judicial Officer does not feel that he is stagnated there should be a change in the nomenclature with the change of the pay scale.

Citations : [2002 CGLJ 3 361], [2002 SCALE 3 291], [2002 AIR SC 1752], [2002 ALD SC 3 39], [2002 ALT SC 4 41], [2002 AWC SC 2 395], [2002 BLJR 2 1144], [2002 FLR 93 628], [2002 GLR 3 2017], [2002 JCR SC 2 248], [2002 JT SC 3 503], [2001 SCALE 2 327], [2002 SCC 4 247], [2002 SCR 2 712], [2002 SCT SC 2 735], [2002 SLJ SC 2 480], [2002 UPLBEC 2 1246], [2001 LIC 34 2398], [2001 AIR SC 2543], [2002 SLR 3 271], [2002 KANTLJ 3 26], [2002 AIR SC 1706], [2002 SUPREME 3 180], [2002 SLT 3 4], [2002 SCJ 2 598], [2002 SRJ 5 246], [2002 LIC 1473], [2002 LLN 2 781], [2002 UPLBEC 2 480], [2003 ILR KAR 1 321], [2002 BLJ 2 586], [2002 PAT LJR 2 210], [2001 AIR SCW 2543], [2002 BOMCR SC 5 242], [2002 SCC LS 508], [2002 AIR SCW 1706]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/125557979/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609adb5e4b01497114120ad

Bhushan Kumar and Anr Vs State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 4 April 2012

Posted on December 29, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

A 2-judge Division Bench held that Quash petition is maintainable even though this instant matter is dismissed on merits.

From Para 5,

5) The questions which arise for consideration in these appeals are:
(a) Whether taking cognizance of an offence by the Magistrate is same as summoning an accused to appear?
(b) Whether the Magistrate, while considering the question of summoning an accused, is required to assign reasons for the same?

From Para 7,

7) In S.K. Sinha, Chief Enforcement Officer vs. Videocon International Ltd. & Ors., (2008) 2 SCC 492, the expression “cognizance” was explained by this Court as it merely means“become aware of” and when used with reference to a court or a Judge, it connotes “to take notice of judicially”. It indicates the point when a court or a Magistrate takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiating proceedings in respect of such offence said to have been committed by someone. It is entirely a different thing from initiation of proceedings; rather it is the condition precedent to the initiation of proceedings by the Magistrate or the Judge. Cognizance is taken of cases and not of persons.

From Para 8 (Very Imp)

8) Under Section 190 of the Code, it is the application of judicial mind to the averments in the complaint that constitutes cognizance. At this stage, the Magistrate has to be satisfied whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding and not whether there is sufficient ground for conviction. Whether the evidence is adequate for supporting the conviction can be determined only at the trial and not at the stage of enquiry. If there is sufficient ground for proceeding then the Magistrate is empowered for issuance of process under Section 204 of the Code.

From Para 9,

9) A summon is a process issued by a Court calling upon a person to appear before a Magistrate. It is used for the purpose of notifying an individual of his legal obligation to appear before the Magistrate as a response to violation of law. In other words, the summons will announce to the person to whom it is directed that a legal proceeding has been started against that person and the date and time on which the person must appear in Court. A person who is summoned is legally bound to appear before the Court on the given date and time. Willful disobedience is liable to be punished under Section 174 IPC. It is a ground for contempt of court.

From Paras 10 and 11, (Very IMP)

10) Section 204 of the Code does not mandate the Magistrate to explicitly state the reasons for issuance of summons. It clearly states that if in the opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence, there is sufficient ground for proceeding, then the summons may be issued. This section mandates the Magistrate to form an opinion as to whether there exists a sufficient ground for summons to be issued but it is nowhere mentioned in the section that the explicit narration of the same is mandatory, meaning thereby that it is not a pre-requisite for deciding the validity of the summons issued.
11) Time and again it has been stated by this Court that the summoning order under Section 204 of the Code requires no explicit reasons to be stated because it is imperative that the Magistrate must have taken notice of the accusations and applied his mind to the allegations made in the police report and the materials filed therewith.

Bhushan Kumar and Anr Vs State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 4 April 2012

Citations : [2012 RCR CRIMINAL SC 2 794], [2012 SUPREME 2 699], [2012 BOMCR CRI SC 4 138], [2012 SLT 3 221], [2012 AIR SC 1747], [2012 SCALE 3 191], [2012 AIOL 161], [2012 CRIMES SC 2 101], [2012 CRLJ SC 2286], [2012 AIR SC 2476], [2012 SCALE 4 191], [2012 SCC 5 424], [2012 SCC CRI 2 872], [2012 JT 4 127], [2012 SCC ONLINE SC 325], [2012 AIC 113 116], [2012 UC 2 1121], [2012 JCR SC 2 269], [2012 ACR SC 2 1514], [2012 LW CRL 2 33], [2012 PLJR 2 422], [2012 JLJR 2 307], [2012 RLW SC 3 2467], [2012 SCC 5 422], [2012 DRJ 130 225], [2012 ALT CRI SC 3 223], [2012 AIR SCW 2476], [2012 DLT SC 189 252]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/71570434/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af1de4b0149711415a6b

Jalendra Padhiary Vs Pragati Chhotray on 17 April 2018

Posted on December 24, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

The Division bench of Apex Court delivered this judgment, emphasizing the need for reasoned judgments and the damage caused by cryptic orders.

From Para 8,

8. The short question, which arises for consideration in this appeal, is whether the Division Bench of the High Court was justified in dismissing the appellant’s appeal in limine and thereby upholding the order of the Family Judge insofar as it related to awarding permanent alimony of Rs.15,00,000/- to the wife(respondent).

From Para 13,

13. The only question involved in the appeal before the High Court, which was carried to this Court in this appeal by the appellant (husband), was whether the award of permanent alimony of Rs.15,00,000/- by the Family Court to the respondent(wife) was legally and factually sustainable.

Obiter Dicta:

15. In our view, mere perusal of the order of the Family Court and the High Court quoted supra, would go to show that both the Courts failed to apply their judicial mind to the factual and legal controversy insofar as award of permanent alimony to the respondent(wife) is concerned. Both the Courts did not even mention the factual narration of the case set up by the parties on the question of award of permanent alimony and without there being any discussion, appreciation, reasoning and categorical findings on the material issues such as, financial earning capacity of husband to pay the alimony and also the financial earning capacity of wife, a direction to pay Rs.15,00,000/- by way of permanent alimony to the wife was given. In our opinion, such direction is wholly unsustainable in law.

Hehehe…

16. Time and again, this Court has emphasized on the Courts the need to pass reasoned order in every case, which must contain the narration of the bare facts of the case of the parties to the lis, the issues arising in the case, the submissions urged by the parties, the legal principles applicable to the issues involved and the reasons in support of the findings recorded based on appreciation of evidence on all the material issues arising in the case.
17. It is really unfortunate that neither the Family Court nor the High Court kept in mind these legal principles and passed cryptic and unreasoned orders. Such orders undoubtedly cause prejudice to the parties and in this case, it caused prejudice to the appellant(husband) because the orders of the High Court and Family Court deprived him to know the reasons for fixing the permanent alimony amount of Rs.15,00,000/- payable to his wife.
18. We cannot countenance the manner in which both the Courts passed the order which has compelled us to remand the matter to the Family Court for deciding the issue afresh on merits.

Jalendra Padhiary Vs Pragati Chhotray on 17 April 2018

Citations : [2018 SCC 16 773], [2019 SCC CIV 1 703], [2018 SCC ONLINE SC 391], [2018 AIR SC 2091], [2018 ALD 4 130], [2018 ALR 130 51], [2018 AIC 188 178], [2018 CHN 3 144], [2018 CTC 6 813]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/112299382/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5ad8c5f99eff431c1103ed06

Bhagirath Vs Delhi Administration on 16 April, 1985

Posted on December 20, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

A highly technical issue is resolved in affirmative, by the 5-judge Constitutional Bench by interpreting a term, ‘TERM‘.

Whether persons sentenced to imprisonment for life entitled to set-off their under trial period of detention against their sentence?

The Bench said,

Life is uncertain. In more ways than one. Who knows what good may come tomorrow and how many good tomorrows there are still to go ? But , philosophical digressions apart , especially optimistic , the fact that the term of life is of an uncertain duration does not justify the conclusion that the sentence of imprisonment for life is not for a term. The relevant question and , the only one , to ask under section 428 is: Has this person been sentenced to imprisonment for a term ? For the sake of convenience , the question may be split into two parts. One, has this person been sentenced to imprisonment ? And, two, is the imprisonment to which he has been sentenced an imprisonment for a term ? There can possibly be no dispute that a person sentenced to life imprisonment is sentenced to imprisonment. Then , what is the term to which he is sentenced ? The obvious answer to that question is that term to which he has been sentenced is the term of his life. Therefore , a person who is sentenced to life imprisonment is sentenced to imprisonment for term.

In conclusion,

We have considered with great care the reasoning upon which the decision in Kartar Singh proceeds. With respect, we are unable to agree with the decision. We have already discussed why ’imprisonment for life is imprisonment for a term , within the meaning of section 428. We would like to
add that we find it difficult to agree that the expressions ’imprisonment for life’ and imprisonment for a term’ are used either in the Penal Code or in the Criminal Procedure Code in contra-distinction with each other. Sections 304 , 305 , 307 and 391 of the penal Code undoubtedly provide that persons quilty of the respective offences shall be punished with imprisonment for life or with imprisonment for a term not exceeding a certain number of years. But , that is the only manner in which the Legislature could have expressed its intention that persons who are guilty of those offences shall be punished with either of the sentences mentioned in the respective sections. The circumstance on which the learned judges have placed reliance in Kartar Singh , do not afford any evidence , intrinsic or otherwise’ of the use of the two expressions in contra-distinction with each other. Two or more expressions are often used in the same section in order to exhaust the alternatives which are available to the Legislature. That does not mean that there is , necessarily , an antithesis between those expressions.
The reasoning in Kartar Singh that an order of remission does not interfere with the sentence recorded by the court but merely affects the execution of the sentence, stands answered by the interpretation which we have put upon the language of section 428 that persons sentenced to imprisonment for life are sentenced to imprisonment for a term. It is not because of remission that a sentence of life imprisonment becomes an imprisonment for a term.
We have also already answered the last of the reasons given in Kartar Singh that the question is not whether the beneficent provision contained in section 428 should be extended to life convicts on equitable considerations. We enter a most respectful caveat. Equity sustains law and the twain must meet. They cannot run in parallel streams. Equitable considerations must have an important place in the construction of beneficent provisions, particularly in the field of criminal law. To exclude such considerations is to denude law’s benevolence Or its true and lasting content. Lastly , the view expressed by the Joint Committee in its Report does not yield to the inference that the “mischief sought to be remedied has no relevance where gravity of offence requires the imposition of imprisonment for life”. As we have indicated earlier , graver the crime , longer the sentence and , longer the
sentence , greater the need for set-offs and remissions. Punishments are no longer retributory. They are reformative.
The order passed by this Court in Sukhlal Hansda related to the cases of 24 prisoners who were sentenced to life imprisonment. Most of those prisoners had undergone imprisonment for a period which , after taking account the remissions earned by them , exceeded fourteen years. It was
held by this Court that , for the purpose of considering whether the cases of those prisoners should be examined for premature release under the relevant provisions of the West Bengal Jail Manual , there was no reason why the period of imprisonment undergone by them as undertrial prisoners
should not be taken into account. The Court directed that the cases of the prisoners should be considered by the State Government , both for the purpose of setting off the period of detention undergone by them as undertrial prisoners and for taking into account the remissions earned by them. The order passed by the Court does not discuss the point which arises before us though , the observations made therein are consistent more with the view which we have taken than with the view taken in Kartar Singh.

Bhagirath Vs Delhi Administration on 16 April, 1985

Citations : [1985 SCC CRI 280], [1985 SCALE 1 719], [1985 AIR SC 1050], [1985 SCC 2 580], [1985 CRIMES SC 1 832], [1985 SCR 3 743], [1985 CRILJ 1179], [1985 AWC 11 510], [1985 BOMLR 85 400], [1985 ACR 340]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/733492/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac19e4b014971140e060

Md. Ali @ Guddu Vs State of U.P. on 10 Mar 2015

Posted on December 15, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Justice Dipak Misra sitting in a Division Bench of Supreme Court held that, the story of prosecutrix did not inspire confidence so the sole evidence of prosecutrix unsupported by medical evidence led to the acquittal of the appellants.

Md. Ali @ Guddu Vs State of U.P. on 10 Mar 2015

Citations : [2016 NCC 1 99], [2015 ACR SC 1 972], [2015 AD SC 3 181], [2015 ALD CRL SC 2 43], [2015 CCR SC 2 404], [2015 CCR SC 1 543], [2015 CLT SC 120 418], [2015 CRIMES SC 2 84], [2015 JCC SC 2 1327], [2015 OLR SC 1 856], [2015 RCR CRIMINAL 2 206], [2015 SCC 7 272], [2015 SCJ 4 178], [2015 WLN SC 3 18], [2015 SCC ONLINE SC 192], [2015 SCR 3 416], [2015 ALL LJ 3 489], [2015 CRI LJ 1967], [2015 ALT CRL SC 2 432]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/51474008/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5790b240e561097e45a4e228

https://www.indianbarassociation.org/supreme-court-judgment-md-aliguddu-vs-state-of-uttar-pradesh/

Ganga Kumar Srivastava Vs The State of Bihar on 20 Jul 2005

Posted on December 15, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

The following are the principles that emerge in regards to the exercise of power of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution:

“(i) The powers of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution are very wide but in criminal appeals this Court does not interfere with the
concurrent findings of fact save in exceptional circumstances.
(ii) It is open to this Court to interfere with the findings of fact given by the High Court, if the High Court has acted perversely or otherwise improperly.
(iii) It is open to this Court to invoke the power under Article 136 only in very exceptional circumstances as and when a question of law of general public importance arises or a decision shocks the conscience of the Court.
(iv) When the evidence adduced by the prosecution fell short of the test of reliability and acceptability and as such it is highly unsafe to act upon it.
(v) Where the appreciation of evidence and finding is vitiated by any error of law of procedure or found contrary to the principles of natural justice, errors of record and misreading of the evidence, or where the conclusions of the High Court are manifestly perverse and unsupportable from the evidence on record.”

Ganga Kumar Srivastava Vs The State of Bihar on 20 Jul 2005

Citations : [2005 SCC 6 211], [2005 JT 6 356], [2005 RCR CRI 3 707], [2005 AIR SC 3123], [2005 CRI 5 95], [2005 SAR CRI 0 640], [2005 SCJ 5 364], [2005 CALCRILR 419], [2005 CRLR 650], [2005 BLJ 1630], [2005 ALD CRI 1 485], [2005 ALD CRI 2 485], [2005 ALL MR CRI 2540], [2005 MAHLR 3 542], [2005 SUPREME 5 123], [2005 SCALE 5 535], [2005 AIR SC 3617], [2005 CCR 3 35], [2005 JCRIC 2 1182], [2005 SRJ 7 47], [2005 SLT 5 393], [2005 SCC CRI 1424], [2005 CRLJ SC 3454], [2005 MADLJ CRI 1 864], [2005 AIR SCW 3617]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1238385/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae1ce4b0149711412fe4

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/ganga-kumar-srivastava-versus-the-state-of-bihar

Girish Kumar Suneja Vs CBI on 13 Jul 2017

Posted on December 13, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court held that all those Order of a Trial Court which terminate the proceedings are not interlocutory Order but are intermediate orders in nature so such Orders are not prohibited in Revision at Session or High Courts.

From Para 16, 17 and 18,

16. While the text of sub-section (1) of Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. appears to confer very wide powers on the court in the exercise of its revision jurisdiction, this power is equally severely curtailed by sub-section (2) thereof. There is a complete prohibition in a court exercising its revision jurisdiction in respect of interlocutory orders. Therefore, what is the nature of orders in respect of which a court can exercise its revision jurisdiction?
17. There are three categories of orders that a court can pass – final, intermediate and interlocutory. There is no doubt that in respect of a final order, a court can exercise its revision jurisdiction – that is in respect of a final order of acquittal or conviction. There is equally no doubt that in respect of an interlocutory order, the court cannot exercise its revision jurisdiction. As far as an intermediate order is concerned, the court can exercise its revision jurisdiction since it is not an interlocutory order.
18. The concept of an intermediate order first found mention in Amar Nath v. State of Haryana7 in which case the interpretation and impact of Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. came up for consideration. This decision is important for two reasons. Firstly it gives the historical reason for the enactment of Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. and secondly considering that historical background, it gives a justification for a restrictive meaning to Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

From Para 21,

21. The concept of an intermediate order was further elucidated in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra8 by contradistinguishing a final order and an interlocutory order. This decision lays down the principle that an intermediate order is one which is interlocutory in nature but when reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings and thereby resulting in a final order. Two such intermediate orders immediately come to mind – an order taking cognizance of an offence and summoning an accused and an order for framing charges. Prima facie these orders are interlocutory in nature, but when an order taking cognizance and summoning an accused is reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings against that person resulting in a final order in his or her favour. Similarly, an order for framing of charges if reversed has the effect of discharging the accused person and resulting in a final order in his or her favour. Therefore, an intermediate order is one which if passed in a certain way, the proceedings would terminate but if passed in another way, the proceedings would continue.

From Paras 23 and 24,

23. We may note that in different cases, different expressions are used for the same category of orders – sometimes it is called an intermediate order, sometimes a quasi-final order and sometimes it is called an order that is a matter of moment. Our preference is for the expression ‘intermediate order’ since that brings out the nature of the order more explicitly.
24. The second reason why Amar Nath is important is that it invokes the principle, in the context of criminal law, that what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. Therefore, when Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. prohibits interference in respect of interlocutory orders, Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. cannot be availed of to achieve the same objective. In other words, since Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. prohibits interference with interlocutory orders, it would not be permissible to resort to Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to set aside an interlocutory order.

Finally,

27. Our conclusion on this subject is that while the appellants might have an entitlement (not a right) to file a revision petition in the High Court but that entitlement can be taken away and in any event, the High Court is under no obligation to entertain a revision petition – such a petition can be rejected at the threshold. If the High Court is inclined to accept the revision petition it can do so only against a final order or an intermediate order, namely, an order which if set aside would result in the culmination of the proceedings. As we see it, there appear to be only two such eventualities of a revisable order and in any case only one such eventuality is before us. Consequently the result of paragraph 10 of the order passed by this Court is that the entitlement of the appellants to file a revision petition in the High Court is taken away and thereby the High Court is deprived of exercising its extraordinary discretionary power available under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C.
28. However, this does not mean that the appellants have no remedy available to them – paragraph 10 of the order does not prohibit the appellants from approaching this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. Therefore all that has happened is that the forum for ventilating the grievance of the appellants has shifted from the High Court to this Court. It was submitted by one of the learned counsel that this is not good enough for the appellants since this Court is not obliged to give reasons while dismissing such a petition unlike the High Court which would necessarily have to give reasons if it rejected a revision petition. In our opinion, the mere fact that this Court could dismiss the petition filed by the appellants under Article 136 of the Constitution without giving reasons does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that reasons will not be given or that some equitable order will not be passed. The submission of learned counsel has no basis and is only a presumption of what this Court might do. We cannot accept a submission that has its foundation on a hypothesis.

Girish Kumar Suneja Vs CBI on 13 Jul 2017

Citations : [2017 SCC ONLINE SC 766], [2017 AIR SC 3620], [2017 CRIMES SC 3 96], [2017 CCR SC 3 409], [2017 MLJ CRL 3 616], [2017 RCR CRIMINAL 3 665], [2017 SCALE 7 661], [2017 SCC 14 809], [2018 SCC CRI 1 202], [2017 CRI LJ 4980], [2017 AIC 180 100]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/174336697/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/59786fa94a9326202d8a7817

Kamlesh Kumar Vs Girish Kapoor and Anr on 12 Apr 1984

Posted on December 13, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

One of the earliest judgments on Stay proceedings in a Revision at Sessions Court.

From Paras 6 and 7,

6. The above order was passed in revisional jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge. Obviously that jurisdiction was exercised Under Section 397, Cr.P.C. Under its provisions the Sessions Judge could pass an interlocutory order by directing “that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended….” It is, therefore, clear that in a revision, the Sessions Judge could, during the pendency of the revision, suspend either sentence or order against which the revision has been filed. In the present case there is no question of any sentence. There was only the order in question against which revision was filed. At best the said order could only be suspended during the pendency of the revision.
7. The question of suspending the order would only arise if it was still to be executed. If the order had already come into operation, there remained nothing to be suspended. In the present case it is undisputed fact that in pursuance of the order of the learned Magistrate, applicant Kamlesh Kumar had already executed the necessary bonds on the same date and had taken delivery of the said print of the film ‘Naseeb’. Accordingly there remained nothing which could be suspended.

Casemine Version:

Kamlesh Kumar Vs Girish Kapoor and Anr on 12 Apr 1984

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1179659/

https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/473801/kamlesh-kumar-vs-girish-kapoor-anr

Vipul Lakhanpal Vs Pooja Sharma on 01 June 2015

Posted on December 12, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Single-judge bench held that husband has to pay maintenance even if wife is earning salary and he does not have salary. Just 15 pages. Read yourself.

Vipul Lakhanpal Vs Pooja Sharma on 01 June 2015

Sambhaji and Ors vs Gangabai and Ors on 20 Nov 2008

Posted on December 4, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court held that. ‘a Civil/Trial Court can accept the written statement even after statutory time limit of 90 days‘, as prescribed under Order 8 Rule 1.

15. In the instance case the trial court proceeded on the erroneous premises that there was no scope to accept the written statement after 90 days. The High Court by the impugned order held that though it had power, no case was made out to accept the prayer. We have considered the grounds indicated by the appellants seeking acceptance of the written statement filed belatedly. They cannot be considered to be trivial or without substance. In the case of this nature where close relatives are litigants a liberal approach is called for. In the circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the High Court affirming the order passed by the trial court refusing acceptance of the written statement. The matter is not very complex. We request the trial court to complete trial of the suit within the period of six months. The appeal is allowed without any order as to costs.

Sambhaji and Ors Vs Gangabai and Ors on 20 Nov 2008

Citations : [2009 ELT SC 240 1612008 AIR SC SUPP 7672008 SUPREME 8 7142008 SCC 17 1172009 BOMCR SC 1 812008 JT 13 442008 SCALE 15 5222008 AIOL 13332008 SLT 9 2982009 ALLMR SC 1 9212008 SCR 16 4692009 ELT 240 161]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/90423/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae73e4b0149711413e98

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Reportable Judgement or Order

All India Judges’ Association and Ors Vs Union of India and Ors on 21 Mar 2002

Bhushan Kumar and Anr Vs State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 4 April 2012

Jalendra Padhiary Vs Pragati Chhotray on 17 April 2018

Bhagirath Vs Delhi Administration on 16 April, 1985

Md. Ali @ Guddu Vs State of U.P. on 10 Mar 2015

Ganga Kumar Srivastava Vs The State of Bihar on 20 Jul 2005

Girish Kumar Suneja Vs CBI on 13 Jul 2017

Kamlesh Kumar Vs Girish Kapoor and Anr on 12 Apr 1984

Vipul Lakhanpal Vs Pooja Sharma on 01 June 2015

Sambhaji and Ors vs Gangabai and Ors on 20 Nov 2008