Single-judge bench held that husband has to pay maintenance even if wife is earning salary and he does not have salary. Just 15 pages. Read yourself.
Tag: Reportable Judgement or Order
Sambhaji and Ors vs Gangabai and Ors on 20 Nov 2008
Supreme Court held that. ‘a Civil/Trial Court can accept the written statement even after statutory time limit of 90 days‘, as prescribed under Order 8 Rule 1.
15. In the instance case the trial court proceeded on the erroneous premises that there was no scope to accept the written statement after 90 days. The High Court by the impugned order held that though it had power, no case was made out to accept the prayer. We have considered the grounds indicated by the appellants seeking acceptance of the written statement filed belatedly. They cannot be considered to be trivial or without substance. In the case of this nature where close relatives are litigants a liberal approach is called for. In the circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the High Court affirming the order passed by the trial court refusing acceptance of the written statement. The matter is not very complex. We request the trial court to complete trial of the suit within the period of six months. The appeal is allowed without any order as to costs.
Citations : [2009 ELT SC 240 1612008 AIR SC SUPP 7672008 SUPREME 8 7142008 SCC 17 1172009 BOMCR SC 1 812008 JT 13 442008 SCALE 15 5222008 AIOL 13332008 SLT 9 2982009 ALLMR SC 1 9212008 SCR 16 4692009 ELT 240 161]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/90423/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae73e4b0149711413e98
K.C. Kanniyappa Vs K.C. Lalitha and Anr on 26 Sep 2005
Single-judge bench of Andhra Pradesh held that, cross-examination need not be confined to the facts to which the witness testified on his examination-in-chief.
From Para 3,
3. Since O.S. No. 1141 of 2000, later renumbered as O.S. No. 20 of 2003, was ordered to be tried along with O.S. No. 47 of 1998, obviously common evidence is being recorded in both the suits. When two suits are clubbed and tried together, all the parties to the suits have a right to cross-examine the witness examined by the adversary, because Section 138 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (‘the Act’) confers such right on them. As per that Section 138 of the Act the witness called by a party shall first be examined-in-chief and if the adverse party so desires he can cross-examine him and then if the party calling him so desires, can re-examine him. That section specifically lays down that Chief examination and cross-examination must relate to relevant facts, but cross-examination need not be confined to the facts to which the witness testified on his examination-in-chief.
Casemine copy:
Legal Crystal copy:
Citations : [2006 ALD 1 370], legalcrystal.com/442436
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1166172/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5608f85de4b01497111422e0
https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/442436/k-c-kanniyappa-vs-lalitha-anr
Sabina Sahdev and Ors Vs Vidur Sahdev on 9 Jul 2018
A Division bench of Delhi High Court held that, the law does not prescribe any precondition such that the arrears amount of maintenance has to be deposited before appeal or revision can be allowed.
From Para 22,
22. Neither the language used by the Legislature in Section 399 read with Section 401 of the Cr.P.C., nor the language used in Section 29 of the DV Act even remotely suggest that the Legislature intended to impose pre-conditions to the availment of the said remedies, of the kind evolved in Rajeev Preenja (supra).
And then from Para 25,
25. Laudable as the object of the learned Single Judge may have been, the question is, whether in the light of the settled law taken note of hereinabove, the learned Single Judge while deciding Rajeev Preenja (supra) could have issued a general direction barring entertainment of criminal revisions under Section 399 read with Section 401 Cr.P.C. against orders granting interim maintenance to the wife/ child under Section 125 Cr.P.C., unless the entire arrears of maintenance up to date were first deposited? In our view, with due respect to the learned Single Judge, the answer is clearly in the negative. As to what should be the policy of the law is a matter which squarely falls within the preserve of the Legislature, and it is not a matter which the Courts can dictate, or evolve. It is one thing to interpret an existing law and, while doing so, to adopt an interpretation which is purposive, i.e. one which advances the objective of the enactment. However, it is quite a different thing to evolve a statutory scheme which, even the Legislature did not provide for.
Finally, in Paras 29 and 30,
29. As rightly pointed out by Mr. Bahl, imposition of a limitation on the statutory remedy of revision/ appeal under Section 399 of the Cr.P.C. or Section 29 of the DV Act- as the case may be, also falls foul of Article 14 of the Constitution of India for the reasons noticed by the Division Bench in Gagan Makkar (supra).Even if the condition in question – of the nature directed by the learned Single Judge in Rajeev Preenja (supra), were to exist in the statutory framework, the same may fail the test of reasonableness under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This is for the reason that, in a given case, the order granting interim maintenance passed by the Ld. Magistrate either under Section 125 Cr.P.C or under Section 29 of the DV Act, may be so harsh and so unreasonable, as to make it impossible for the opposite party/ husband to comply with the same. Experience shows that in a large number of cases, the arrears of interim maintenance- which may be granted from the date of moving of the application before the Ld. Magistrate, may accumulate to a very large amount running into lakhs of rupees. The arrears of interim maintenance may not necessarily be a meager amount in all cases. It would be most unjust and unreasonable to bar his statutory remedy of revision/ appeal as the case may be, merely because he may not be in a position to deposit the entire arrears of interim maintenance.
From Para 30 (Corum cleverly clubbed 125 Cr.P.C. cases also along with DV cases!)
30. Thus, we answer the reference by holding that the general direction issued in Rajeev Preenja (supra) in paragraphs 15, 16 and 20 are not sustainable. The said directions could not have been issued by the learned Single Judge as they seek to curtail the statutory remedy of revision available under Section 399 read with Section 401 of the Cr.P.C, and of appeal under Section 29 of the DV Act, against orders granting interim maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and Section 23 of the DV Act respectively. The direction in question over steps into the legislative field, which was impermissible for the Court to do. We agree with the view taken by the learned Single Judge in Brijesh Kumar Gupta (supra), that there cannot be an absolute rider that the entire maintenance amount, as granted by the Trial Court, should be deposited prior to the entertainment of the statutory remedy, because it would leave the remedy of statutory revision/ appeal illusory. Accordingly, we hold that a revision under Section 399 read with Section 401 Cr.P.C. and an appeal under Section 29 of the DV Act, against the order granting maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and under Section 23 of the DV Act respectively, would be maintainable, and would be entertained and heard without any pre-condition of deposit of the arrears of maintenance as ordered by the Ld. MM. We further hold that the pendency of such a Revision or Appeal- as the case may be, shall not operate as a stay of the operation of the order granting interim maintenance. The reference is answered accordingly.
Citations : [2018 DLT 251 245], [2018 HLR 3 413], [2019 CRI LJ 218],[2018 (4) RCR (Criminal) 30], [2018 SCC OnLine Del 9747],
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/80568294/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5b44dfac9eff431bb54655a9
Index of PWDV Act cases here. Index of Maintenance cases u/s 144 BNSS (125 Cr.P.C.) here.
Bikramjit Singh Vs State of Punjab on 12 Oct 2020
Supreme Court held that, the default bail that is available to an accused person u/s 167(2)(a) of CrPC, is part of the fundamental rights available to him/her under Article 21 of Constitution of India.
From Para 28,
A conspectus of the aforesaid decisions would show that so long as an application for grant of default bail is made on expiry of the period of 90 days (which application need not even be in writing) before a charge sheet is filed, the right to default bail becomes complete. It is of no moment that the Criminal Court in question either does not dispose of such application before the charge sheet is filed or disposes of such application wrongly before such charge sheet is filed. So long as an application has been made for default bail on expiry of the stated period before time is further extended to the maximum period of 180 days, default bail, being an indefeasible right of the accused under the first proviso to Section 167(2), kicks in and must be granted.
But then from Para 29,
…
We must not forget that we are dealing with the personal liberty of an accused under a statute which imposes drastic punishments. The right to default bail, as has been correctly held by the judgments of this Court, are not mere statutory rights under the first proviso to Section 167(2) of the Code, but is part of the procedure established by law under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which is, therefore, a fundamental right granted to an accused person to be released on bail once the conditions of the first proviso to Section 167(2) are fulfilled.
…
Citations : [(2020) SCC Online SC 824]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/10807134/
https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/bikramjit-singh-versus-the-state-of-punjab
Dr Nallapareddy Sridhar Reddy Vs State of AP and Ors
AP High Court held that u/s 216, Trial Court well within it’s power to frame additional charges based on additional charge sheet filed by police, even when the case is pending pronouncement of judgment. But since the procedure contemplated was not followed by Magistrate, High Court set aside the second set of charges framed on accused and directed the Magistrate to follow the procedure contemplated u/s 217.
But then, Revision-Petitioner went to Supreme Court and there also he lost.
United India Insurance Co Ltd Vs Satwinder Kaur and Ors on 30 June 2020
3 judge bench granted compensation to the surviving members of a fatal-accident victim, while revisting a catena of a landmark SC judgments.
Citations :
Other Sources :
Balaji Baliram Mupade Vs State of Maharashtra on 29 Oct 2020
Supreme Court, again, highlighted the need of delivering judgments at the earliest, as the “problem is compounded where the result is known but not the reasons.”
From Para 3,
3. Further, much later but still almost two decades ago, this Court in Anil Rai v. State of Bihar – 2001 (7) SCC 318 deemed it appropriate to provide some guidelines regarding the pronouncement of judgments, expecting them to be followed by all concerned under the mandate of this Court. It is not necessary to reproduce the directions except to state that normally the judgment is expected within two months of the conclusion of the arguments, and on expiry of three months any of the parties can file an application in the High Court with prayer for early judgment. If, for any reason, no judgment is pronounced for six months, any of the parties is entitled to move an application before the then Chief Justice of the High Court with a prayer to re-assign the case before another Bench for fresh arguments.
From Para 10,
10. We must note with regret that the counsel extended through various judicial pronouncements including the one referred to aforesaid appear to have been ignored, more importantly where oral orders are pronounced. In case of such orders, it is expected that they are either dictated in the Court or at least must follow immediately thereafter, to facilitate any aggrieved party to seek redressal from the higher Court. The delay in delivery of judgments has been observed to be a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in Anil Rai’s case (supra) and as stated aforesaid, the problem gets aggravated when the operative portion is made available early and the reasons follow much later.
Citations :
Other Sources :
Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal Vs State of Gujarat on 9 Sep 2013
Division bench of Supreme Court held that,
From Para 306,
26. Section 306 refers to abetment of suicide. It says that if any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 10 years and shall also be liable to fine. The action for committing suicide is also on account of mental disturbance caused by mental and physical cruelty. To constitute an offence under Section 306, the prosecution has to establish that a person has committed suicide and the suicide was abetted by the accused. Prosecution has to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased committed suicide and the accused abetted the commission of suicide. But for the alleged extra marital relationship, which if proved, could be illegal and immoral, nothing has been brought out by the prosecution to show that the accused had provoked, incited or induced the wife to commit suicide.
From Para 28, exoneration of husband,
28. Suicide note completely exonerates A-1, which states that he was not responsible for death of the deceased. On the other hand, the deceased described herself as extremely selfish, egoist and, therefore, not a match for A-1. She entertained the belief that her husband A-1 was in love with A-2 and wanted to marry A-2. Note states it was for their happiness she had decided to end her life. She also wanted to have the marriage of A-1 and A-2 solemnized with pomp and gaiety. On reading the suicide note, one can infer that the deceased was so possessive of her husband, and was always under an emotional stress that she might lose her husband. Too much of possessiveness could also lead to serious emotional stress, over and above the fact that she had one abortion and her daughter died after few days of birth. No evidence is forthcoming in this case to show that A-2 ever evinced any interest to marry A-1. On the other hand, during the subsistence of the alleged relationship, A-2 herself got married.
Citations : [2013 CRLJ SC 44482013 AIOL 5932013 CRIMES SC 4 2952013 CRIMES SC 4 1102013 SCC 10 482013 AIR SC 52192013 RCR CRIMINAL SC 4 2712013 SLT 7 7062014 AIR SC 3312013 SCALE 11 1982013 JT 12 3572013 SUPREME 6 3662014 JLJR SC 1 3902013 SCC CRI 3 8012013 SCC CIV 4 6162013 SCC ONLINE SC 8142013 AIC 130 292013 CRILJ 44482014 PLJR 1 5112013 BOMCR CRI 4 5222013 UC 3 19352013 DMC 3 2452014 ALT CRL AP 1 2582013 ALD CRI 2 7552013 MLJ CRI 3 7002013 OLR 2 8672013 KHC 3 8102013 AD SC 10 452013 ABR 6 1792014 SCJ 1 5262013 RCR CRIMINAL 4 2712014 JLJR 1 3902013 CRI LJ 44482013 MLJ CRL 3 7002013 AIR SCW 5219
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/170814796/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af2de4b0149711415bb9
Husband’s extra- marital relationship does not amount to cruelty
