Varshaben Himantlal Vejani Vs State of Gujarat on 15 Jul 2016

Posted on April 13, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Taking input from Kerala HC judgment here, Gujarat High Court held that, any agreement which has terms against to Public Policy, is void and not enforceable in law. Such agreements which prohibit right of maintenance are also void.

From Para 9,

9 In any case, all such issues are now well settled by few decisions of different Courts
[1] Rajesh R Nair v. Meera Babu reported in 2013 Cri. L.J. 3153, wherein Division Bench of Kerala High Court has held that waiver of right to maintenance by an agreement is not permissible because such agreement would be void agreement as against public policy. It would amount to ousting of jurisdiction of Magistrate and Family Court to entertain maintenance claim which cannot be permitted by law. Therefore, such agreement being void would be unenforceable and hence claim for maintenance cannot be rejected on the basis of such agreement of waiver of right to maintenance.
[2] In Rishikesh Singh alias T.R. Singh v. Kiran Gautam reported in 2015 Cri.L.J. 126, Chhattisgarh High Court has confirmed that decree of divorce obtained by mutual consent would be no ground to deny maintenance until wife has not remarried after divorce. It is further held that even if wife is junior advocate, it cannot be held that she is able to maintain herself and, therefore, she would be entitled for the maintenance.
[3] Smt. Vanamala v. H.M. Ranganatha Bhatta reported in [1995] 5 SCC 299, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also taken the same view that wife, who obtains divorce by mutual consent cannot be denied maintenance by virtue of section 125[4] and thereby restored the order of the Sessions Court, which has concluded that wife was entitled to maintenance notwithstanding divorce by mutual consent and remanded the matter to the trial Court for determining quantum of maintenance. Thereby, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has set aside the order of the High Court which held that wife is not entitled to maintenance once she has divorced her marriage by mutual consent. It would be appropriate to recollect here that for coming to such conclusion, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has relied upon as many as three other decisions of different High Courts, which are quoted in such reported case and approved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Therefore, as on date, there are at least as many as five judgments including judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which confirm that a wife who obtains divorce by mutual consent cannot be denied maintenance by virtue of section 125 [4] of the Cr. P.C.

Varshaben Himantlal Vejani Vs State of Gujarat on 15 Jul 2016

Citations : [2016 SCC ONLINE GUJ 9136], [2017 AIC 172 524]

Other Sources:

https://mynation.net/docs/1095-2011/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5ac5e33e4a93261a1a744803

Rajesh R. Nair Vs Meera Babu on 5 Mar 2013

Posted on April 13, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A Division bench of Kerala High Court held that, a wife who is living separately by mutual consent, is not entitled to receive maintenance or Interim maintenance.

From Para 10,

Now, the question arises for consideration is whether the respondent is entitled to receive maintenance or interim maintenance from the petitioner after they have been living separately by mutual consent i.e., from 30.4.2011 onwards.
Going by the above sub-section, no wife is entitled to receive maintenance from her husband if they are living separately by mutual consent. Here, the petitioner and the respondent have been living separately since 30.4.2011. Therefore, Exts.P1 and P2 claims for maintenance and interim maintenance respectively filed by the respondent are hit by sub-section (4) of Section 125 of Cr.P.C. In other words, Exts.P1 and P2 claims are not maintainable. Hence, Ext.P11 common order passed by the Family Court is liable to be set aside. Ext.P1 claim for maintenance is liable to be quashed.

Rajesh R. Nair Vs Meera Babu on 5 Mar 2013

Citations : [2013 SCC ONLINE KER 24120], [2013 CRI LJ 3153], [2013 AIC 125 705], [2013 KLT 1 899], [2014 RCR CRI 1 411], [2014 CCC 1 99]

Other Sources:

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5ac5e4694a93261aa7929df4

https://www.legitquest.com/case/rajesh-r-nair-v-meera-babu/197C65

Bhima Razu Prasad Vs State of Tamil Nadu on 12 Mar 2021

Posted on April 6, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Referring to a catena of case laws, Division bench of SC said the following:

From Para 5,

It is well settled that Section 195(1)(b) creates a bar against taking cognizance of offences against the administration of justice for the purpose of guarding against baseless or vindictive prosecutions by private parties. The provisions of this Section imply that the Court is the only appropriate authority which is entitled to raise grievance in relation to perjury, forgery of documents produced before the Court, and other offences which interfere with the effective dispensation of justice by the Court. Hence, it for the Court to exercise its discretion and consider the suitability of making a complaint for such offences. However, there is a pertinent difference in the wording of Section 195(1)(b) (i) and Section 195(1)(b)(ii) inasmuch as Section 195(1)(b)(ii) is restricted to offences which are committed in respect of a document which is “produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court”. Whereas Section 195(1)(b)(i) applies to offences against public justice which are committed not only in any proceeding in any court, but also “in relation to” such proceeding. Whether such semantical difference bars the analogous application of precedents relating to Section 195(1)(b)(ii) for interpreting Section 195(1)(b)(i) will be discussed by us later.

From Para 8,

Curiously, though the facts of Iqbal Singh Marwah also required a determination as to the applicability of Section 195(1)(b)(i), the Constitution Bench did not express any specific finding on this point. This was perhaps because the limited point for consideration before the Bench was the apparent conflict between Sachida Nand Singh and Surjit Singh (supra). However, it can nevertheless be seen that the Constitution Bench did not interpret Section 195(1)(b)(ii) in isolation, but linked its construction with the overall scheme under Sections 195(1)(b) and 340, CrPC. The Court reiterated the test laid down in Sachida Nand Singh, i.e., that the offence in respect of which only the Court can make a complaint must be one which has a direct correlation to, or a direct impact on, proceedings before a court of justice. It is for this reason that only the relevant Court is vested with the right to consider the desirability of complaining against the guilty party.

From Para 17 (Very important)

17. It is possible that Courts may be more proactive in making complaints under Section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC upon application made by the concerned investigative agencies, than in those preferred by private parties. The former being public authorities would enjoy more credence in seeking inquiry into their claims.Therefore, the aforementioned reasons assigned by the Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah for adopting a narrow construction of Section 195(1)(b)(ii), CrPC may not be strictly applicable in the present case. However, the general principles of statutory interpretation laid down by the Constitution Bench should not be disregarded. This is especially given that the Court did not consider Section 195(1)(b)(ii) separately but provided a holistic view of the scheme under Section 195(1)(b).
17.1 Just like a private party who has been a victim of forgery committed outside the precincts of the Court, the investigative agency should not be left remediless against persons who have producing false evidence for the purpose of interfering with the investigation process. Moreover, the present case concerns offences alleged to have been committed under the PC Act. Public interest and the reputation of the State will suffer significant harm if corrupt public servants are facilitated by third parties in hiding their assets from scrutiny. Hence any interpretation which negates against the speedy and effective trial of such persons must be avoided.
17.2 The application of the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC to situations such as the present case can lead to two scenarios. The first is one in which the investigative agency, on the basis of false/fabricated material drops the case. Subsequently, it is brought to their notice that the evidence was falsified. Second, the investigative agency at that very stage suspects that the material produced before them is bogus or forged in nature. In both scenarios, the Court has not had an opportunity to consider the allegedly fabricated evidence, as trial has not yet commenced in respect of the offence. Hence it would not be possible for the Court to independently ascertain the need for lodging a complaint under Section 195(1)(b)(i) read with Section 340, CrPC when the evidence alleged to have been falsified is not even present on its records. Rather, it is the investigating agency which is best placed to verify and prove whether such falsification has taken place, through what means and for what purpose.
17.3 In case the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(i) is applied to offences committed during the course of investigation, the Court may think it fit to wait till the completion of trial to evaluate whether a complaint should be made or not. Subsequently, the Court may be of the opinion that in the larger scheme of things the alleged fabrication of evidence during investigation has not had any material impact on the trial, and decline to initiate prosecution for the same. The investigation agency cannot be compelled to take a chance and wait for the trial court to form its opinion in each and every case. This may give the offender under Section 193, IPC sufficient time to fabricate more falsehoods to hide the original crime. Further, irrespective of the potential impact that such false evidence may have on the opinion formed by the trial court, the investigating agency has a separate right to proceed against the accused for attempting to obstruct fair and transparent probe into a criminal offence. Thus, we are of the view that it would be impracticable to insist upon lodging of written complaint by the Court under Section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC in such a situation.

Bhima Razu Prasad Vs State of Tamil Nadu on 12 Mar 2021

Latha.P.C and Ors Vs State of Kerala and Ors on 15 Sep 2020

Posted on April 3, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A single-judge bench of Kerala High Court, while denying to invoke 482 CrPC to quash a DV case based on the landmark judgment here, held as follows. But Supreme Court had taken a different view in the landmark judgment here just a month later.

From Para 8,

8. The Act is a welfare legislation enacted to provide a remedy in civil law for protection of women from domestic violence. The proceedings under the Act are, therefore, essentially civil in nature except in so far as it relate to Section 31 dealing with the breach of protection order issued under the Act
and Section 33 dealing with failure or refusal by Protection Offices in discharging their duties in terms of the orders issued by the Court. As such, in Vijayalekshmi Amma v. Bindu, 2010 (1) KLT 79, this Court held that a party against whom a proceedings is initiated under Section 12 of the Act cannot approach this court for quashing the proceedings, invoking the power of this Court under Section 482 of the Code, and that the power of this Court under Section 482 can be exercised only in appropriate cases either to give effect to any order passed under the Act or to prevent abuse of the process of the court or to secure the ends of justice, when cognizance is taken by the Magistrate for an offence under subsection (1) of Section 31 or Section 33 of the Act.
…
As evident from the extracted paragraphs of the judgement, this Court has held in the said case that a person to whom notice is issued by the Magistrate in an application under Section 12 of the Act can appear before the Magistrate and contend that the proceedings is not maintainable against him, on the ground either that the person who filed the application is not an ‘aggrieved person’ as defined in Section 2(a) of the Act, or that he would not fall within the definition of the ‘respondent’ in Section 2(q) of the Act, or that the allegations do not make out a case of ‘domestic violence’ as defined in Section 2(g) of the Act or that the reliefs sought are not reliefs provided for in the Act. It was also held by this Court in the said case that such contentions as regards the maintainability of the application, if raised, shall be decided by the Magistrate. It was further held by this Court in the said case that so long as the respondent is not an accused in a proceedings initiated under the Act, he is not even obliged to apply for bail in respect of such proceedings and his personal presence is not mandatory for hearing and disposing of an application under Section 12. In the light of the decision of this Court in Vijayalekshmi, according to me, the Criminal M.C. is not maintainable.

Misuse of Social Welfare (Gender-biased) Laws in India:

From Para 9,

9. Despite the findings aforesaid, it is necessary to mention that in so far as the proceedings under the Act are to be dealt with by criminal courts in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Code, it has become a common practice now to rope in the relatives, at times even distant relatives of the person from whom relief is essentially intended, as respondents in the applications instituted under the Act without any bonafides and with oblique motives, on omnibus and vague allegations, despite various judgements of the Apex Court deprecating that practice. In Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand (2010) 7 SCC 667, the Apex Court has taken note of the said fact and observed that majority of such complaints are filed either on the advice of the lawyers or with their concurrence. Be that as it may. It is also observed that notice is invariably issued to all the respondents in such applications without application of mind as to whether the aggrieved person has made out a case of domestic violence against all of them, as a result of which, it is noticed that some of the proceedings under the Act, where parties are arrayed as respondents without making out a case of domestic violence against them, have become a tool of harassment at the hands of the aggrieved persons to obtain reliefs which they are not entitled to. The statute being a remedial one to protect the women from domestic violence, it has to be enforced having regard to the realities of life. As such, even while taking all endeavours possible to protect the aggrieved persons from domestic violence, the courts have to be extremely cautious and careful to ensure that its powers are not being abused. One of the important steps to be taken towards that direction is to scrutinize the applications meticulously and satisfy that a case of domestic violence as defined in the Act is made out against all the respondents and no one is arrayed as a party to the proceedings on omnibus and vague allegations, so that the court can refrain from issuing notice to them. The provisions in the statute especially Section 28, conferring power on the Magistrate to lay down its own procedure for disposal of an application under Section 12 or under subsection (2) of Section 23 would indicate that the scheme of the statute is that the approach of the courts shall be to enforce the provisions of the Act, keeping in mind the fact that the parties who are close relatives in most of the cases, would at some point of time reconcile their differences and lead a life in harmony and the opportunity for the parties to bring about a settlement of their differences is not lost on account of the steps taken in the proceedings. If proceedings under the Act are permitted to be used as tools of harassment, I have no doubt that the possibility of the parties settling their disputes amicably and leading a life in harmony would be bleak.

Latha.P.C and Ors Vs State of Kerala and Ors on 15 Sep 2020

Citations: [2020 SCC ONLINE KER 4238]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/126633191/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5f80abd89fca190ae54bcb50

Index to DV Judgements is here.

Bhagya and Ors Vs Jayalakshmi and Ors on 13 Feb 2019

Posted on April 3, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

The Division Bench clarified the legal position on obtaining NOC from an advocate before engaging the services of another advocate while perusing an earlier case law here.

Memo for withdrawal of the appeal is filed on 31-1-2019 signed by the three appellants. The memo filed by the new counsel does not have a ‘No Objection Certificate’ from the earlier counsel. On questioning, he places reliance on the Judgment of this Court passed in MFA No.6526 of 2013 on 2-12-2016 (KARNATAKA POWER TRANSMISSION CORPORATION LIMITED., vs. M.RAJASHEKAR AND OTHERS) and submits that it is not necessary to obtain a No Objection Certificate to file a vakalath. We are unable to accept the submission. Reliance placed by the counsel on para-8 of the Judgment is misconceived. The Division Bench held therein that ‘No Objection Certificate’ is not required only in a situation where the Advocate is discharged by his client in a manner known to law, only then a new counsel can enter vakalath without a ‘No Objection Certificate’. When the earlier counsel still holds a valid vakalath, the question of a new Advocate entering the case cannot be accepted. Therefore, the counsel has misread the aforesaid Judgment.

Bhagya and Ors Vs Jayalakshmi and Ors on 13 Feb 2019

Citations : [2019 SCC ONLINE KAR 1974], [2019 KCCR 2 1453], [2019 AIR KAR 133], [2019 AIR KANT R 3 50], [2019 ICC 4 31]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/26814810/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5c8d0f119eff430a1ad75a63

https://www.lawyerservices.in/Bhagya-andamp-Others-Versus-Jayalakshmi-andamp-Others-2019-02-13

Other Judgements on this subject here.

Tata Consultancy Services Limited Vs Cyrus Investments Pvt Ltd and Ors on 26 Mar 2021

Posted on March 29, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Tata Consultancy Services Limited Vs Cyrus Investments Pvt Ltd and Ors on 26 Mar 2021

Cyrus Investments Pvt. Ltd. Vs Tata Sons Ltd. Ors on 06 Jan 2020

Cyrus Investments Pvt. Ltd. Vs Tata Sons Ltd. Ors on 18 Dec 2019

Aparna Bhat and Ors Vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr on 18 Mar 2021

Posted on March 23, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A 2-judge bench of Supreme Court passed the following directions in regards to bail proceedings in sexual offences (only applicable to women survivors).

From Para 45 and 46,

44. Having regard to the foregoing discussion, it is hereby directed that henceforth:
(a) Bail conditions should not mandate, require or permit contact between the accused and the victim. Such conditions should seek to protect the complainant from any further harassment by the accused;
(b) Where circumstances exist for the court to believe that there might be a potential threat of harassment of the victim, or upon apprehension expressed, after calling for reports from the police, the nature of protection shall be separately considered and appropriate order made, in addition to a direction to the accused not to make any contact with the victim;
(c) In all cases where bail is granted, the complainant should immediately be informed that the accused has been granted bail and copy of the bail order made over to him/her within two days;
(d) Bail conditions and orders should avoid reflecting stereotypical or patriarchal notions about women and their place in society, and must strictly be in accordance with the requirements of the Cr. PC. In other words, discussion about the dress, behavior, or past “conduct” or “morals” of the prosecutrix, should not enter the verdict granting bail;
(e) The courts while adjudicating cases involving gender related crimes, should not suggest or entertain any notions (or encourage any steps) towards compromises between the prosecutrix and the accused to get married, suggest or mandate mediation between the accused and the survivor, or any form of compromise as it is beyond their powers and jurisdiction;
(f) Sensitivity should be displayed at all times by judges, who should ensure that there is no traumatization of the prosecutrix, during the proceedings, or anything said during the arguments, and
(g) Judges especially should not use any words, spoken or written, that would undermine or shake the confidence of the survivor in the fairness or impartiality of the court.
45. Further, courts should desist from expressing any stereotype opinion, in words spoken during proceedings, or in the course of a judicial order, to the effect that (i) women are physically weak and need protection; (ii) women are incapable of or cannot take decisions on their own; (iii) men are the “head” of the household and should take all the decisions relating to family; (iv) women should be submissive and obedient according to our culture; (v) “good” women are sexually chaste; (vi) motherhood is the duty and role of every woman, and assumptions to the effect that she wants to be a mother; (vii) women should be the ones in charge of their children, their upbringing and care; (viii) being alone at night or wearing certain clothes make women responsible for being attacked; (ix) a woman consuming alcohol, smoking, etc. may justify unwelcome advances by men or “has asked for it”; (x) women are emotional and often overreact or dramatize events, hence it is necessary to corroborate their testimony; (xi) testimonial evidence provided by women who are sexually active may be suspected when assessing “consent” in sexual offence cases; and (xii) lack of evidence of physical harm in sexual offence case leads to an inference of consent by the woman.

Aparna Bhat and Ors Vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr on 18 Mar 2021

Tarlochan Dev Sharma Vs State of Punjab and Ors on 25 July 2001

Posted on March 22, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

(The popular meaning also must not be resorted to)

Tarlochan Dev Sharma Vs State of Punjab and Ors on 25 July, 2001

Citations : [2001 AIR SC 2524], [2001 JT SC 5 645], [2002 LW 1 19], [2001 SCALE 4 472], [2001 SCC 6 260], [2001 SCR 3 1146], [2001 AIR SC 2689], [2001 AIR SCW 2689], [2001 JT 5 645]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1389589/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ada0e4b0149711411e78

Paramjit Kumar Saroya Vs Union of India and Anr on 28 May 2014

Posted on March 21, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Sitting on a Division bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court, Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul held that, Appeals under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act 2007 can be filed by any of the affected parties.

We may add at this stage that in order to have assistance to this Court in view of the complexity in the matter involved, we considered it appropriate not only for the counsels to assist us, but to appoint Amicus Curiae to have dispassionate view of the matter. We, thus, appointed Mr. Puneet Bali, Senior Advocate as the Amicus Curiae to be assisted by Ms. Divya Sharma, Advocate. They have done a comprehensive research on various aspects of the matter and this includes the Parliamentary debates when the Bill for enactment of the said Act was introduced. A perusal of these debates reflect that therehas been no debate qua Section 16(1) of the said Act, nor has any intent been reflected to exclude the right of appeal to persons other than thesenior citizens or parents, unlike the debate on Section 17 of the said Act where the right of legal representation has been excluded.

And here is the conclusion.

We are thus of the view that Section 16(1) of the said Act is valid, but must be read to provide for the right of appeal to any of the affected parties.

Paramjit Kumar Saroya Vs Union of India and Anr on 28 May 2014

Citations : [2014 AIR P&H 121], [2014 SCC ONLINE P&H 10864]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/156882703/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609a051e4b01497113e6023

Rakesh Kumar Paul Vs State of Assam on 16 Aug 2017

Posted on March 18, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A 3-judge bench of Apex Court held as follows regards to default bail u/s 167 CrPC,

From Para 4,

Therefore, the question before us is whether, pending investigation, the petitioner could be kept in custody for a maximum period of 60 days in terms of clause (ii) of proviso (a) to Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. or for 90 days in terms of clause (i) of proviso (a) to Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. without a charge sheet being filed.

From Para 25,

25. While it is true that merely because a minimum sentence is provided for in the statute it does not mean that only the minimum sentence is imposable. Equally, there is also nothing to suggest that only the maximum sentence is imposable. Either punishment can be imposed and even something in between. Where does one strike a balance? It was held that it is eventually for the court to decide what sentence should be imposed given the range available. Undoubtedly, the Legislature can bind the sentencing court by laying down the minimum sentence (not less than) and it can also lay down the maximum sentence. If the minimum is laid down, the sentencing judge has no option but to give a sentence “not less than” that sentence provided for. Therefore, thewords “not less than” occurring in Clause (i) to proviso (a) of Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. (and in other provisions) must be given their natural and obvious meaning which is to say, not below a minimum threshold and in the case of Section 167 of the Cr.P.C. these words must relate to an offence punishable witha minimum of 10 years imprisonment.

From Para 31,

31. In the 154th Report, the Law Commission noted that the unanimous opinion of members of the Bench and the Bar, prosecuting agencies and senior police officers during legal workshops held at various places was that the investigation of serious offences punishable with a sentence of 7 years or more should invariably be undertaken by senior officers. The Law Commission concluded, as a result of these extensive discussions, that it was desirable toseparate the investigating police from the law and order police and as many as seven reasons were given for arriving at this conclusion in Chapter II of the Report.

From Paras 40 and 41,

40. In the present case, it was also argued by learned counsel for the State that the petitioner did not apply for ‘default bail’ on or after 4th January, 2017 till 24th January, 2017 on which date his indefeasible right got extinguished on the filing of the charge sheet. Strictly speaking this is correct since the petitioner applied for regular bail on 11th January, 2017 in the Gauhati High Court – he made no specific application for grant of ‘default bail’. However, the application for regular bail filed by the accused on 11th January, 2017 did advert to the statutory period for filing a charge sheet having expired and that perhaps no charge sheet had in fact being filed. In any event, this issue was argued by learned counsel for the petitioner in the High Court and it was considered but not accepted by the High Court. The High Court did not reject the submission on the ground of maintainability but on merits. Therefore it is not as if the petitioner did not make any application for default bail – such an application was definitely made (if not in writing) then at least orally before the High Court. In our opinion, in matters of personal liberty, we cannot and should not be too technical and must lean in favour of personal liberty. Consequently, whether the accused makes a written application for ‘default bail’ or an oral application for ‘default bail’ is of no consequence. The concerned court must deal with such an application by considering the statutory requirements namely, whether the statutory period for filing a charge sheet or challan has expired, whether the charge sheet or challan has been filed and whether the accused is prepared to and does furnish bail.
41. We take this view keeping in mind that in matters of personal liberty and Article 21 of the Constitution, it is not always advisable to be formalistic or technical. The history of the personal liberty jurisprudence of this Court and other constitutional courts includes petitions for a writ of habeas corpus and for other writs being entertained even on the basis of a letter addressed to the Chief Justice or the Court.

Then finally in Paras 46 and 47,

46. It was submitted that as of today, a charge sheet having been filed against the petitioner, he is not entitled to ‘default bail’ but must apply for regular bail – the ‘default bail’ chapter being now closed. We cannot agree for the simple reason that we are concerned with the interregnum between 4th January, 2017 and 24th January, 2017 when no charge sheet had been filed, during which period he had availed of his indefeasible right of ‘default bail’. It would have been another matter altogether if the petitioner had not applied for ‘default bail’ for whatever reason during this interregnum. There could be a situation (however rare) where an accused is not prepared to be bailed out perhaps for his personal security since he or she might be facing some threat outside the correction home or for any other reason. But then in such an event, the accused voluntarily gives up the indefeasible right for default bail and having forfeited that right the accused cannot, after the charge sheet or challan has been filed, claim a resuscitation of the indefeasible right. But that is not the case insofar as the petitioner is concerned, since he did not give up his indefeasible right for ‘default bail’ during the interregnum between 4th January, 2017 and 24th January, 2017 as is evident from the decision of the High Court rendered on 11th January, 2017. On the contrary, he had availed of his right to ‘default bail’ which could not have been defeated on 11th January, 2017 and which we are today compelled to acknowledge and enforce.
47. Consequently, we are of opinion that the petitioner had satisfied all the requirements of obtaining ‘default bail’ which is that on 11th January, 2017 he had put in more than 60 days in custody pending investigations into an alleged offence not punishable with imprisonment for a minimum period of 10 years, no charge sheet had been filed against him and he was prepared to furnish bail for his release, as such, he ought to have been released by the High Court on reasonable terms and conditions of bail.

Rakesh Kumar Paul Vs State of Assam on 16 Aug 2017

Citations : [2017 SCC ONLINE SC 924], [2017 ALLCC 101 287], [2017 ACR 3 2474], [2017 ALT CRL AP 3 141], [2017 CCR SC 3 371], [2017 DLT 242 79], [2017 ILR KER 3 673], [2017 JLJR 4 37], [2017 KHC 4 470], [2017 KLT 4 284], [2017 MLJ CRL 4 62], [2017 PLJR 4 53], [2017 RCR CRIMINAL 3 996], [2017 SCALE 9 24], [2017 UC 3 1756], [2017 SCC 15 67], [2018 SCC CRI 1 401], [2017 AIR SC 3948], [2017 AIC 178 75], [2018 CRI LJ 155]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/194334432/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/599a9dfd4a93262f6c14fba6

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/rakesh-kumar-paul-versus-state-of-assam

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Reportable Judgement or Order

Varshaben Himantlal Vejani Vs State of Gujarat on 15 Jul 2016

Rajesh R. Nair Vs Meera Babu on 5 Mar 2013

Bhima Razu Prasad Vs State of Tamil Nadu on 12 Mar 2021

Latha.P.C and Ors Vs State of Kerala and Ors on 15 Sep 2020

Bhagya and Ors Vs Jayalakshmi and Ors on 13 Feb 2019

Tata Consultancy Services Limited Vs Cyrus Investments Pvt Ltd and Ors on 26 Mar 2021

Aparna Bhat and Ors Vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr on 18 Mar 2021

Tarlochan Dev Sharma Vs State of Punjab and Ors on 25 July 2001

Paramjit Kumar Saroya Vs Union of India and Anr on 28 May 2014

Rakesh Kumar Paul Vs State of Assam on 16 Aug 2017