Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P, Hyd Vs Nese Jilakara Sreeramulu on 29 Aug 2003

Posted on August 1, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A Full Bench gave this decision upon a reference from a Division bench of AP High Court on the question as to whether the law laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in Ayyala Rambabu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1993 (1) Andh LT (Cri) 73 and by a learned single Judge of this Court in Nunna Venkateswarlu v. State of A. P., 1996 Cri LJ 108 is good law.

The answer was a NO.

From Paras 17-19,

17. The definition of “dowry”, the object of the Act and the above decisions of the Apex Court clearly show that any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given comes within the purview of “dowry” on three occasions in which any property or valuable security comes within its purview. They are — (i) before the marriage, (ii) at the time of marriage, and (iii) “at any time” after the marriage. The third occasion may appear to be an unending period, but the crucial words are “in connection with the marriage of the parties”. This means, giving or agreeing to give any property or valuable security on any of the above three stages should have been in connection with the marriage of the parties.
18. The Legislature in its wisdom while providing for the definition of “dowry” has emphasized that any money, property or valuable security given as consideration for marriage “before, at or any time after” the marriage would be covered by the expression “dowry”, and this definition as contained in Section 2 of the Act has to be read whenever the expression “dowry” occurs in the Act, The meaning of expression “dowry” as commonly used and understood is different from the peculiar definition thereof under the Act.
19. Under Section 3 of the Act, if a person gives or takes are abets the giving or taking dowry shall be punished. Under Section 4 of the Act mere demand of dowry is sufficient to bring home the offence to an accused. Thus, any demand of money, property or valuable security, made from the bride or her parents or other relatives, or the bridegroom or his parents or other relatives, or vice versa, would fall within the mischief of “dowry” under the Act, where such demand is not properly referable to legally recognized claim and relatable only to the consideration of the marriage.

Indiankanoon version:

Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P, Hyd Vs Nese Jilakara Sreeramulu on 29 Aug 2003 (IK Ver)

Casemine version:

Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P, Hyd Vs Nese Jilakara Sreeramulu on 29 Aug 2003 (CM Ver)

Citations : [2004 EASTCRIC 3 48], [2004 ALT 2 504], [2004 ALD CRI 1 519], [2003 SCC ONLINE AP 830], [2003 SUPP ACC 875], [2004 CRI LJ 1629], [2004 HLR 2 144]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1945624/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5608f835e4b0149711141c0f

Adv KG Suresh Vs UOI and Ors on 30 Mar 2021

Posted on July 23, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Kerala High Court struck down Sec 17 of Senior Citizens Act 2007 as it was ultravires with Sec 30 of Advocates Act 1961.

From Para 57,

57. As Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961 has been brought into force from 15.06.2011, Advocates enrolled under the said Act have been conferred with an absolute right thereof, to practice before all the Courts and Tribunals. By virtue of Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961, coming into force, from 15.06.2011, the restriction imposed is taken away and in such circumstances, Article 19 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees the freedom to practice any profession, enables the Advocates to appear before all the Courts and the Tribunals, subject to Section 34 of the Advocates Act, 1961.
In the light of the above discussion and decisions, Section 17 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, is declared as ultra vires of Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961 and thus, the petitioner is entitled for a declaration that he has a right to represent the parties before the Tribunal/ Appellate Tribunal/Court, constituted under Act 56 of 2007. Accordingly, this writ petition is allowed.

Adv KG Suresh Vs UOI and Ors on 30 Mar 2021

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://thedailyguardian.com/advocates-entitled-to-appear-in-maintenance-tribunals-bar-on-legal-representation-unconstitutional-kerala-high-court/

https://www.legalservicesindia.com/law/article/1924/39/Advocates-Entitled-To-Appear-In-Maintenance-Tribunals;-Bar-On-Legal-Representation-Unconstitutional-Kerala-HC

Virsa Singh Vs State of Punjab on 11 Mar 1958

Posted on July 21, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A Full bench of Apex Court held in a murder case as follow…

To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following before it can bring a case under s. 300 Indian Penal Code third clause.
(1) It must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present.
(2) The nature of the injury must be proved; these are purely objective investigations.
(3) It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended.
(4) It must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.
This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender. Once these four elements are established by the prosecution (and, of course, the burden is on the prosecution throughout) the offence is murder under s. 300, 3rdly. It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death. It does not matter that there was Do intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature (not that there is any real distinction between the two). It does not even matter that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is proved, the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. No one has a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder. If they inflict injuries of that kind, they must face the consequences; and they can only
escape if it can be shown, or reasonably deduced that the injury was accidental or otherwise unintentional.

Virsa Singh Vs State of Punjab on 11 Mar 1958

Citations : [1958 AWR 28 572], [1958 MYSLJ SC 36 723], [1958 SCR 1 1495], [1958 SCR 0 1495], [1958 SCJ 0 772], [1958 AIR SC 458], [1958 AIR SC 463], [1958 SCR 0 1945], [1958 AIR SC 365], [1958 SCR 0 1450], [1958 CRLJ SC 818], [1958 AIR SC 465]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1296255/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609aafee4b014971140b6ea

Sethi P V and Shansa Ramesh Vs Nil on 26 Feb 2021

Posted on July 20, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Citing various caselaws, Division bench of Kerala High Court held that a General Power of Attorney Holder can ask as an agent of the witness in a Court and depose on his behalf.

Sethi P V and Shansa Ramesh Vs Nil on 26 Feb 2021

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/143432928/

Dhariwal Tobaco Products Ltd and Ors Vs State of Maharastra and Anr on 17 Dec 2008

Posted on July 19, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A wonderful decision by Supreme Court of India around High Court’s inherent power under section 482 CrPC against the Revisional Powers u/s 401 CrPC.

From Para 8,

8. Indisputably issuance of summons is not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397 of the Code. This Court in a large number of decisions beginning from R .P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 to Som Mittal v. Govt. of Karnataka , [ (2008) 3 SCC 574 ] has laid down the criterion for entertaining an application under Section 482. Only because a revision petition is maintainable, the same by itself, in our considered opinion, would not constitute a bar for entertaining an application under Section 482 of the Code.
Even where a revision application is barred, as for example the remedy by way of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 this Court has held that the remedies under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India would be available. (See Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and others, [ (2003) 6 SCC 675 ] ).
Even in cases where a second revision before the High Court after dismissal of the first one by the Court of Sessions is barred under Section 397 (2) of the Code, the inherent power of the Court has been held to be available.

Dhariwal Tobaco Products Ltd and Ors Vs State of Maharastra and Anr on 17 Dec 2008

Citations : [2009 SCC 2 370], [2009 CRLJ SC 974], [2008 SCALE 16 240], [2009 SCC CRI 1 806], [2009 BOMCR CRI SC 1 802], [2008 AIOL 1468], [2008 SCR 17 844], [2009 AIR SC 1032], [2009 AIC SC 75 265], [2009 ECRN SC 2 284]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1891955/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae9ee4b0149711414586

K Santhosha Vs The Karnataka Power Transmission on 24 Jun 2021

Posted on July 16, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Karnataka High Court held that a Son is a son, irrespective of if he is a legitimate son or illegitimate, with regards to compassionate appointments.

K Santhosha Vs The Karnataka Power Transmission on 24 Jun 2021

Citations :

Other Sources :

Earlier Writ Petition here; Review Petition here.

P.K. Shaji Vs State of Kerala on 27 Oct 2005

Posted on July 15, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held that a superior court always has power to give directions to lower court to pass appropriate orders. In this case, to check if the bail conditions are violated and cancel the bail.

The order of the Sessions Court shows that the learned Magistrate has been empowered to consider the question of violation of any of the conditions imposed by the Sessions Court and was given powers to pass appropriate orders. The plea raised by the appellant’s learned Counsel is that when the learned Magistrate had no such power, the Sessions Court was not empowered to invest that power in the Magistrate. We do not find any force in this contention. The superior court can always give directions of this nature and authorise the subordinate court to pass appropriate orders and the trial Magistrate would be the competent authority to decide whether any condition had been violated by the person who had been released on bail. When there is a specific direction to pass appropriate orders as if the conditions for granting bail had been imposed by the learned Magistrate himself, the impugned Order is legal and valid.

P.K. Shaji Vs State of Kerala on 27 Oct 2005

Citations : [2005 JT 9 481], [2006 AIR SC 100], [2005 SCC 13 283], [2005 SCALE 8 724], [2005 CRLJ SC 5063], [2005 SCR SUPP 4 840], [2005 CRIMES SC 4 184], [2005 SUPREME 7 2652005 AIOL 534], [2005 AIR SC 5560], [2006 SCC CRI 2 174], [2005 KERLT 4 856], [2005 CRILJ 5063], [2005 ALD CRI 2 517], [2005 JT SC 7 282], [2005 SCC 12 461], [2005 UJ 2 1136], [2006 SCC CRI 174], [2005 CRI LJ 5063], [2005 KLT 4 856], [2005 AIR SCW 5560]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/440533/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae1ee4b0149711413041

Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs West Bengal Vs Mohan Singh and Ors on 08 Oct 1974

Posted on July 10, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench consisting the legendary Justice P.N. Bhagvati, held that a subsequent petition under 482 CrPC is maintainable if the facts and circumstances are different from earlier application. Here Section 561-A is current Section 482 CrPC.

Section 561-A preserves the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as it deems fit to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or to secure the ends of justice and the High Court must, therefore, exercise its inherent powers having regard to the situation prevailing at the particular point of time when its inherent jurisdiction is sought to be invoked. The High Court was in the circumstances entitled to entertain the subsequent application of Respondents 1 and 2 and consider whether on the facts and circumstances then obtaining the continuance of the proceeding against the respondents constituted an abuse of the process of the Court or its quashing was necessary to secure the ends of justice.

Indiankanoon version:

Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs West Bengal Vs Mohan Singh and Ors

Casemine version:

Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs West Bengal Vs Mohan Singh and Ors (Casemine)

Citations : [1975 AIR SC 1002], [1975 PLR 77 147], [1975 SCC 3 706], [1974 CRLR 0 691], [1975 AIR SC 100], [1975 SCJ 11 478], [1976 MLJ CRL 1 1], [1975 SCC CRI 156], [1975 CRLJ SC 812]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1993916/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609aba3e4b014971140cf5f

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Gullipilli Sowria Raj Vs Bandaru Pavani on 4 Dec 2008

Posted on July 10, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Going through the Preamble of the HMA 1955, the division bench of the Supreme Court held that the marriage of a Hindu with a Christian is void ab initio.

From Para 18,

18. Although, an attempt has been made to establish that the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, did not prohibit a valid Hindu marriage of a Hindu and another professing a different faith, we are unable to agree with such submission in view of the definite scheme of the 1955 Act.

From Para 20,

20.As submitted by Mr. Rao, the Preamble itself indicates that the Act was enacted to codify the law relating to marriage amongst Hindus. Section 2 of the Act which deals with application of the Act, and has been reproduced hereinabove, reinforces the said proposition.

From Para 21, Use of ‘may’ in section 5 of HMA

21.Section 5 of the Act thereafter also makes it clear that a marriage may be solemnized between any two Hindus if the conditions contained in the said Section were fulfilled. The usage of the expression ‘may’ in the opening line of the Section, in our view, does not make the provision of Section 5 optional. On the other hand, it in positive terms, indicates that a marriage can be solemnized between two Hindus if the conditions indicated were fulfilled. In other words, in the event the conditions remain unfulfilled, a marriage between two Hindus could not be solemnized. The expression ‘may’ used in the opening words of Section 5 is not directory, as has been sought to be argued, but mandatory and non-fulfilment thereof would not permit a marriage under the Act between two Hindus. Section 7 of the 1955 Act is to be read along with Section 5 in that a Hindu marriage, as understood under Section 5, could be solemnized according to the ceremonies indicated therein.

And finally in Para 22,

22.In the facts pleaded by the respondent in her application under Section 12(1)(c) of the 1955 Act and the admission of the appellant that he was and still is a Christian belonging to the Roman Catholic denomination, the marriage solemnized in accordance with Hindu customs was a nullity and its registration under Section 8 of the Act could not and/or did not validate the same. In our view, the High Court rightly allowed the appeal preferred by the respondent herein and the judgment and order of the High Court does not warrant any interference.

Gullipilli Sowria Raj Vs Bandaru Pavani on 4 Dec 2008

Citations : [2009 MPLJ SC 2 48], [2008 SCALE 16 109], [2008 AIOL 1405], [2009 MHLJ SC 2 850], [2008 SCR 17 35], [2009 ALLMR SC 1 488], [2009 BOMCR SC 5 906], [2009 SCC 1 714], [2009 AIR SC 244], [2008 JT 13 450], [2009 SUPREME 1 145], [2009 SCC CIV 1 326], [2009 AIR SC 1085], [2009 AIC SC 74 33], [2009 CHN SC 1 158], [2009 AIR SCW 244]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/421764/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae6ae4b0149711413cbe

Udai Shankar Awasthi Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 09 Jan 2013

Posted on July 9, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A Division Bench of the Apex Court quash the complaint case filed against the appellants and while doing to enunciated and reiterated lot of legal principles supported by case laws.

From Para 6,

LIMITATION IN CRIMINAL CASES- Section 468 Cr.P.C.:
6. Section 468 Cr.P.C. places an embargo upon court from taking cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the limitation period provided therein. Section 469 prescribes when the period of limitation begins. Section 473 enables the court to condone delay, provided that the court is satisfied with the explanation furnished by the prosecution/complainant, and where, in the interests of justice, extension of the period of limitation is called for. The principle of condonation of delay is based on the general rule of the criminal justice system which states that a crime never dies, as has been
explained by way of the legal maxim, nullum tempus aut locus occurrit regi (lapse of time is no bar to the Crown for the purpose of it initiating proceeding against offenders). A criminal offence is considered as a wrong against the State and also the society as a whole, even though the same has been committed against an individual.

From Para 7, regd delay in registering a complaint

7. The question of delay in launching a criminal prosecution may be a circumstance to be taken into consideration while arriving at a final decision, however, the same may not itself be a ground for dismissing the complaint at the threshold. Moreover, the issue of limitation must be examined in light of the gravity of the charge in question.

From Para 8, regd while condoning delay has to record the reasons

8. The court, while condoning delay has to record the reasons for its satisfaction, and the same must be manifest in the order of the court itself. The court is further required to state in its conclusion, while condoning such delay, that such condonation is required in the interest of justice.

From Para 10,

CONTINUING OFFENCE:
10. Section 472 Cr.P.C. provides that in case of a continuing offence, a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment of the time period during which the offence continues. The expression, ‘continuing offence’ has not been defined in the Cr.P.C. because it is one of those expressions which does not have a fixed connotation, and therefore, the formula of universal application cannot be formulated in this respect.

From Para 16,

16. Thus, in view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that, in the case of a continuing offence, the ingredients of the offence continue, i.e., endure even after the period of consummation, whereas in an instantaneous offence, the offence takes place once and for all i.e. when the same actually takes place. In such cases, there is no continuing offence, even though the damage resulting from the injury may itself continue.

From Para

SECOND COMPLAINT ON SAME FACTS-MAINTAINABILITY:
17. While considering the issue at hand in Shiv Shankar Singh v. State of Bihar & Anr., (2012) 1 SCC 130, this Court, after considering its earlier judgments in Pramatha Nath Talukdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar AIR 1962 SC 876; Jatinder Singh & Ors. v. Ranjit Kaur AIR 2001 SC 784; Mahesh Chand v. B. Janardhan Reddy & Anr., AIR 2003 SC 702; Poonam Chand Jain & Anr. v. Fazru AIR 2005 SC 38 held:
“It is evident that the law does not prohibit filing or entertaining of the second complaint even on the same facts provided the earlier complaint has been decided on the basis of insufficient material or the order has been passed without understanding the nature of the complaint or the complete facts could not be placed before the court or where the complainant came to know certain facts after disposal of the first complaint which could have tilted the balance in his favour. However, second complaint would not be maintainable wherein the earlier complaint has been disposed of on full consideration of the case of the complainant on merit.”

From Para 28,

28. Approaching the court at a belated stage for a rightful cause, or even for the violation of the fundamental rights, has always been considered as a good ground for its rejection at the threshold. The ground taken by the learned counsel for respondent No. 2 that the cause of action arose on 20.10.2009 and 5.11.2009, as the appellants refused to return money and other materials, articles and record, does not have substance worth consideration. In case a representation is made by the person aggrieved and the same is rejected by the competent statutory authority, and such an order is communicated to the person aggrieved, making repeated representations will not enable the party to explain the delay.

Citations : [2013 SCALE 1 212], [2013 JT 1 539], [2013 JCC SC 1 711], [2013 SCC 2 435], [2013 SUPREME 1 590], [2013 AIOL 18], [2013 SLT 1 249], [2013 CRIMES SC 1 231], [2013 SCC CIV 1 1121], [2013 SCC CRI 2 708], [2013 SCC ONLINE SC 41], [2013 AIC 123 137], [2013 UC 1 449], [2013 ACR 1 689], [2013 BLJ 3 28], [2013 NCC 1 549], [2013 AD SC 1 537], [2013 JLJR 1 235], [2013 RCR CRIMINAL 2 503], [2013 SCR 3 935], [2013 MLJ CRI 1 462], [2013 JCC 1 711], [2013 MLJ CRL 1 462], [2013 JT SC 1 539]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/39425468/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af3fe4b0149711415eef

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/udai-shankar-awasthi-vs-state-of-u-p-anr

The High Court judgment is here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Reportable Judgement or Order

Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P, Hyd Vs Nese Jilakara Sreeramulu on 29 Aug 2003

Adv KG Suresh Vs UOI and Ors on 30 Mar 2021

Virsa Singh Vs State of Punjab on 11 Mar 1958

Dhariwal Tobaco Products Ltd and Ors Vs State of Maharastra and Anr on 17 Dec 2008

K Santhosha Vs The Karnataka Power Transmission on 24 Jun 2021

P.K. Shaji Vs State of Kerala on 27 Oct 2005

Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs West Bengal Vs Mohan Singh and Ors on 08 Oct 1974

Gullipilli Sowria Raj Vs Bandaru Pavani on 4 Dec 2008

Udai Shankar Awasthi Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 09 Jan 2013