Deoki Panjhiyara Vs Shashi Bhushan Narayan Azad and Anr on 12 Dec 2012

Posted on July 24, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held that, Unless there is a declaration of nullity by a competent Court or authority, a aggrieved person can take advantage of benefits under DV Act.

From Para 19,

19. In the present case, if according to the respondent, the marriage between him and the appellant was void on account of the previous marriage between the appellant and Rohit Kumar Mishra the respondent ought to have obtained the necessary declaration from the competent court in view of the highly contentious questions raised by the appellant on the aforesaid score. It is only upon a declaration of nullity or annulment of the marriage between the parties by a competent court that any consideration of the question whether the parties had lived in a “relationship in the nature of marriage” would be justified. In the absence of any valid decree of nullity or the necessary declaration the court will have to proceed on the footing
that the relationship between the parties is one of marriage and not in the nature of marriage. We would also like to emphasise that any determination of the validity of the marriage between the parties could have been made only by a competent court in an appropriate proceeding by and between the parties and in compliance with all other requirements of law. Mere production of a marriage certificate issued under Section 13 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 in support of the claimed first marriage of the appellant with Rohit Kumar Mishra was not sufficient for any of the courts, including the High Court, to render a complete and effective decision with regard to the marital status of the parties and that too in a collateral proceeding for maintenance. Consequently, we hold that in the present case until the invalidation of the marriage between the appellant and the respondent is made by a competent court it would only be correct to proceed on the basis that the appellant continues to be the wife of the respondent so as to entitle her to claim all benefits and protection available under the DV Act, 2005.

Deoki Panjhiyara Vs Shashi Bhushan Narayan Azad and Anr on 12 Dec 2012

Citations: [2013 ALLMR CRI SC 1099], [2013 AIR SC 168], [2013 RCR CIVIL SC 2 400], [2013 AIR SC 346], [2013 SCC 2 137], [2013 RCR CRIMINAL SC 1 338], [2012 SCALE 12 282], [2013 CRLJ SC 684], [2012 AIOL 584], [2013 BOMCR CRI SC 1 333], [2012 SLT 9 266], [2013 SCC CIV 1 1019], [2012 SCC ONLINE SC 1035], [2013 GUJ LH 1 208], [2013 CTC 2 232], [2013 ECRN 1 913], [2013 ACR 1 1089], [2013 AD SC 3 59], [2013 AJR 2 133], [2013 AKR 1 615], [2013 ALD CRI 1 469], [2013 ALT CRI 3 70], [2013 ALT CRI 1 472], [2013 DMC SC 1 18], [2013 JLJR 1 198], [2012 JCC 1 502], [2013 JCC 1 508], [2012 JT SC 12 575], [2013 LW 2 60], [2013 LW CRL 1 330], [2013 NCC 1 322], [2013 OLR 1 891], [2013 PLJR 1 172], [2013 MLJ CRL 1 137]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/154350889/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af10e4b0149711415804

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/deoki-panjhiyara-vs-shashi-bhushan-narayan-azad-anr

Kantharaju Vs State of Karnataka on 17 Jul 2023

Posted on July 22, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single Judge of Karnataka High Court, after relying on Shivcharan and Sivakumar, held as follows,

From Para 14 and 15,

14. The ratio of these two judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court clearly indicates that, if the marriage between the husband and wife ended as null and void, the offence under Section 498-A of IPC cannot be sustained.
15. Admittedly, in the present case, the complainant in her evidence, PW.2 being the mother of PW.1 both have consistently deposed and admitted that, PW.1 is the second wife of the petitioner. Accordingly, the concurrent findings of the Courts below in recording the conviction requires to be set aside.

Kantharaju Vs State of Karnataka on 17 Jul 2023

Citations:

Other Sources:

Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by LRs Vs State of AP and Ors on 24 Feb 2011

Posted on July 22, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held as follows,

From Para 26,

26. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which could have impelled the High Court to condone the delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such as “liberal approach”, “justice oriented approach”, “substantial justice” can not be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. Especially, in cases where the Court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance and restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain whilst adjudicating any lis between the
parties. We are rather pained to notice that in this case, not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate language, the High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms. The use of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant language in a judgment has been repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a number of cases. Whilst considering applications for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers. All discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections can not and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers.

Citations: [2011 SCALE 2 703], [2011 AIR SC 1199], [2011 AIR SC 1459], [2011 SUPREME 2 174], [2011 AIOL 144], [2011 SLT 2 378], [2011 BOMCR SC 5 857], [2011 JT 2 540], [2011 SCC 4 363], [2011 MHLJ SC 4 104], [2011 RCR CIVIL SC 2 880], [2011 ALR 86 59], [2011 AWC SC 3 2295], [2011 SCSUPPL CHN 2 130], [2011 CLT SC 112 152], [2011 KCCR SN 2 124], [2011 LW 3 26], [2011 SCR 3 2172909 CIVIL APPEAL NO OF 2913 2005], [2011 BOMCR 5 857], [2011 KCCRSN 2 124], [2011 RCR CIVIL 2 880], [2011 AIR SCW 1459]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/912526/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af08e4b0149711415652

https://vlex.in/vid/c-no-002909-002913-852352762

Dr. Ramkeshwar Singh Vs Sheela Singh on 13 Jul 2022

Posted on July 18, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of High Court of Chhattisgarh held that the wife committed mental cruelty upon husband and therefore granted divorce to husband. But Court also ordered payment Rs.15,000/- per month to wife as alimony.

From Para 24,

24. The appellant is a Doctor and as stated during the course of hearing, the respondent wife is a private teacher. Therefore, facing a criminal case would always castigate a stigma in the Society. The report u/s 498-A of the IPC cannot be used as a tool to teach a lesson to the family members of the husband as it may adversely affect the future prospects of a young professional and it may take long time to fill up the gap. Therefore, we are of the opinion that false accusations made by the wife against the entire family members under section 498-A would amount to mental cruelty and such conduct of respondent wife which inflicts upon the appellant husband such mental pain and suffering would make it not possible for her to live with the appellant husband.
Dr. Ramkeshwar Singh Vs Sheela Singh on 13 Jul 2022

Dr. Ramkeshwar Singh Vs Sheela Singh on 13 Jul 2022

State of U.P Vs Santosh Kumar and Ors on 3 Sep 2009

Posted on June 18, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A decision from the erudite pen of Justice Dalveer Bhandari ji… clearly says, if demand for dowry is satisfied, such act of dowry giver constitutes an offence under section 3 of DP Act.

From Para 40,

40. Section 4 of the Dowry Act deals with penalty for demanding dowry, directly or indirectly, from the parents or other relatives or guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the case may be. The object of section 4 is to discourage the very demand for property or valuable security as consideration for a
marriage between the parties thereto. Section 4 prohibits the demand for ‘giving’ property or valuable security which demand, if satisfied, would constitute an offence under section 3 read with section 2 of the Act.

State of U.P Vs Santosh Kumar and Ors on 3 Sep 2009

Citations: [2009 AIR SC 2687], [2009 SCC 9 626], [2010 MWN CR 1 39], [2009 AIOL 1115], [2009 ANJ SC 2 350], [2009 JT 11 592], [2009 SCALE 12 269], [2010 SCC CRI 1 88], [2009 SCR 14 106], [2009 SUPREME 6 448], [2010 ECRN SC 1 196], [2010 MLJ CRL 1 679], [2010 ALL LJ 1 180]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/521213/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609aecee4b0149711414da5

Sharanappa S. Kallur Vs State of Karnataka on 07 Jun 2011

Posted on June 18, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Karnataka HC, relying on case law here, held as follows,

From Para 10,

10. Unless it is shown from reliable evidence that there was demand made directly or indirectly from the parents of the complainant, Section 4 of the D.P. Act does not get attracted. In the decision cited by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner in the case of Sankar Prosad Shaw v. The State, reported in 1991 Cri.L.J. 639, it has been held that, even mere demand is not sufficient but, it should be given or agreed to be given and at the most, mere demand may come under section 498a of the i.p.c. but not under Section 4 of the D.P. Act. For the above reason, conviction under Section 4 of the D.P. Act cannot be sustained in law.

Sharanappa S. Kallur Vs State of Karnataka on 07 Jun 2011

Citations: [2012 DMC 1 22]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1430200/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56e0ee77607dba38965ed263

Sankar Prasad Shaw and Ors Vs The State and Anr on 27 Jul 1990

Posted on June 18, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Calcutta High Court held as follows,

From Paras 5 and 6,

5. So, as per the definition, dowry means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage or by the parents of either party to the marriage or to any other person, at or before or after the carriage in connection with the marriage of the said parties. Sri Mukherjee has laid emphasis on the words ‘given’ or ‘agreed to be given’ at or before or after the marriage in connection with the marriage. Judged in terms of the definition, the learned counsel has submitted that in the case in hand, neither party to the marriage nor their relations had ever given or agreed to give any property or valuable security to the other party at or before or after the marriage, and, therefore, the learned counsel argues, s. 4 of the Act is not attracted to the case in hand.
6. I find much substance in the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners. The complaint petition does not disclose that the complainant had given any property or valuable security or that he had agreed to give such things to the accused petitioner No. 1, either at or before or after the marriage between Usha Shaw and petitioner No. 1 or to his parents or other relations. Although in common parlance we very often use the term “dowry demand” in the cases where the husband or his relations demand valuable security from the parents and other relations of the wife after the marriage, yet, in my opinion this will not amount to demand for dowry under the Act in view of the definition of dowry contained in s. 2 the Act. Demand for dowry under the Act and in the legal sense will mean the demand for dowry only when it refers to property or valuable security given or agreed to be given at or before or after the marriage. The alleged offence as made out in the complaint petition may attract the penal provisions as contained in s. 498A of the Indian Penal Code. The Parliament in its wisdom appended the explanation as to what “cruelty” means and has constructed sub clause (b) of s. 498A in the following words, “Harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand”. In my opinion, if the cases of this nature are to be brought within the ambit of s. 4 of the Act, then the word ‘dowry’ under s. 2 of the Act shall have to be redefined in the light of sub-clause (b) under s. 498A of the Indian Penal Code. The term “extortion demand” popularised by the media may also find a place in the definition of dowry.

Sankar Prasad Shaw and Ors Vs The State and Anr on 27 Jul 1990 (CM Ver)

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/946303/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56095f9ee4b01497112cab8b

Captain Manjit Singh Virdi (Retd.) Vs Hussain Mohammed Shattaf and Ors on 18 May 2023

Posted on May 30, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court passed this reportable judgment relying on a earlier decision.

From Para 11,

11. The law on issue as to what is to be considered at the time of discharge of an accused is well settled. It is a case in which the Trial Court had not yet framed the charges. Immediately after filing of chargesheet, application for discharge was filed. The settled proposition of law is that at the stage of hearing on the charges entire evidence produced by the prosecution is to be believed. In case no offence is made out then only an accused can be discharged. Truthfulness, sufficiency and acceptability of the material produced can be done only at the stage of trial. At the stage of charge, the Court has to satisfy that a prima facie case is made out against the accused persons. Interference of the Court at that stage is required only if there is strong reasons to hold that in case the trial is allowed to proceed, the same would amount to abuse of process of the Court.
12. The law on the point has been summarised in a recent judgment of this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Ashok Kumar Kashyap2.

Captain Manjit Singh Virdi (Retd.) Vs Hussain Mohammed Shattaf and Ors on 18 May 2023

Rajendra Kumar Vs Rukhmani Bisen on 02 Feb 2023

Posted on May 16, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single bench judge of MP High Court at Jabalpur held as follows,

From Paras 5 and 6, (What is an interlocutory order?)

5. Now question remains for consideration is whether the order of interim maintenance passed under Section 125 of Cr.P.C is an interlocutory order? Consequently, whether criminal revision petition is lie against that order?
6. Term ‘Interlocutory Order’ has not been defined in the Cr.P.C. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of V.C. Shukla vs State, reported in AIR 1980 (SC) 962, has given following observation in para No.23 regarding the nature of interlocutory order:-
“Thus, summing up the natural and logical meaning of an interlocutory order, the conclusion is inescapable that an order which does not terminate the proceedings or finally decides the rights of the parties is only an interlocutory order. In other words, in the ordinary sense of the term, an interlocutory order is one which only decides a particular aspect or a particular issue or a particular matter in a proceeding, suit or trial but which does not however conclude the trial at all. This would be the result if the term interlocutory order is interpreted in its natural and logical sense without having to resort to Criminal Procedure Code or any other statute. ‘That is to say, if we construe interlocutory order in ordinary parlance it would indicate the attributes, mentioned above, and this is what the term interlocutory order means when used in s. 11(1) of the Act.”

From Para 9,

9. In the case of Sumerchand vs Sandhuran Rani and Others, reported in 1987 Cr.L.J. 1396, Sunil Kumar Sabharwal vs Neelam Sabharwal, reported in 1991 Cr.L.J. 2056 High Court of Haryana and a order dated 15.11.18 passed by the High Court of Uttarakhand in the case of Ashu Dhiman vs Smt Jyoti Dhiman, Cr. Misc. Application (C-482) No.434/2018, it has been held that an order passed for interim maintenance under provisions of Section 125 of Cr.P.C is not an interlocutory order, hence, criminal revision petition is maintainable against such order.

Citations:

Other Sources:

Shilpa Sailesh Vs Varun Sreenivasan on 01 May 2023

Posted on May 6, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A Constitution Bench of 5 judges held as follows,

From Para 40,

40. In view of our findings recorded above, we are of the opinion that the decisions of this Court in Manish Goel (supra), Neelam Kumar (supra), Darshan Gupta (supra), Hitesh Bhatnagar (supra), Savitri Pandey (supra) and others have to be read down in the context of the power of this Court given by the Constitution of India to do ‘complete justice’ in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India. In consonance with our findings on the scope and ambit of the power under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India, in the context of matrimonial disputes arising out of the Hindu Marriage Act, we hold that the power to do‘complete justice’ is not fettered by the doctrine of fault and blame, applicable to petitions for divorce under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act. As held above, this Court’s power to dissolve marriage on settlement by passing a decree of divorce by mutual consent, as well as quash and set aside other proceedings, including criminal proceedings, remains and can be exercised.

From Para 41,

41. Lastly, we must express our opinion on whether a party can directly canvass before this Court the ground of irretrievable breakdown by filing a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. In Poonam v. Sumit Tanwar65, a two judges’ bench of this Court has rightly held that any such attempt must be spurned and not accepted, as the parties should not be permitted to file a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, or for that matter under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the High Court, and seek divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. The reason is that the remedy of a person aggrieved by the decision of the competent judicial forum is to approach the superior tribunal/forum for redressal of his/her grievance. The parties should not be permitted to circumvent the procedure by resorting to the writ jurisdiction under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution of India, as the case may be. Secondly, and more importantly, relief under Article 32 of the Constitution of India can be sought to enforce the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution of India, and on the proof of infringement thereof. Judicial orders passed by the court in, or in relation to, the proceedings pending before it, are not amenable to correction under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.66 Therefore, a party cannot file a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India and seek relief of dissolution of marriage directly from this Court. While we accept the said view, we also clarify that reference in Poonam (supra) to Manish Goel (supra) and the observation that it is questionable whether the period of six months for moving the second motion can be waived has not been approved by us.

Shilpa Sailesh Vs Varun Sreenivasan on 01 May 2023

Citations: [2023 SCC OnLine SC 544]

Other Sources:

Earlier Matter is here.

Index of Divorce judgments is here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Reportable Judgement or Order

Deoki Panjhiyara Vs Shashi Bhushan Narayan Azad and Anr on 12 Dec 2012

Kantharaju Vs State of Karnataka on 17 Jul 2023

Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by LRs Vs State of AP and Ors on 24 Feb 2011

Dr. Ramkeshwar Singh Vs Sheela Singh on 13 Jul 2022

State of U.P Vs Santosh Kumar and Ors on 3 Sep 2009

Sharanappa S. Kallur Vs State of Karnataka on 07 Jun 2011

Sankar Prasad Shaw and Ors Vs The State and Anr on 27 Jul 1990

Captain Manjit Singh Virdi (Retd.) Vs Hussain Mohammed Shattaf and Ors on 18 May 2023

Rajendra Kumar Vs Rukhmani Bisen on 02 Feb 2023

Shilpa Sailesh Vs Varun Sreenivasan on 01 May 2023