Citations:
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/19292/
Tag: Reportable Judgement or Order
Om Prakash Sharma Vs State of MP on 25 Mar 2021
A single judge bench at Gwalior of Madhra Pradesh High Court held as follows,
From Para 5,
5. The aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court in Suresh Chand Jain & Sakiri Vasu (supra) have held the field till date which is evident from perusal of following subsequent verdict of Apex Court rendered after relying upon Sakiri Vasu with approval.
6. In the instant case, as informed by learned counsel for petitioner, no offence has yet been registered by the police. It is also informed that the concerned police station has not yet given any report to the learned Magistrate despite repeated reminders. It is also not denied that the learned Magistrate has not proceeded to record statement of the complainant u/S.200 Cr.P.C. Therefore, in sum and substance, the entire matter hangs fire and is in a state of suspended animation leaving the petitioner-complainant high and dry with no hope of justice coming his way.
From Para 9.1
9.1 Thus, it is incumbent upon the Magistrate u/S.156(3) Cr.P.C. to not only direct for registration of cognizable offence wherever it is found to be not registered by the Police but also to ensure that theinvestigation conducted by the police is fair, expeditious and without any element of prejudice towards anyone, with the sole object ofreaching the truth. The role of the Magistrate u/S.156(3) Cr.P.C. is thus of great significance. Prompt and appropriate exercise of poweru/S.156(3) Cr.P.C. can, not only bring succor to the victim but also to the society at large by bringing the delinquent to the book and in theprocess instilling enough fear in the mind of the miscreant so as to dissuade him from indulging in delinquency again.
From Paras 15-20
Law laid down:
(1) The guidelines laid down for the Magistrates for adjudication of application u/S.156(3) Cr.P.C. complaining about delayed/improper investigation filed along with complaint u/S.200 Cr.P.C.
(2) The complaint u/S.200 Cr.P.C. filed along with 156(3) application need not be kept pending owing to bar contained in Sec.210 Cr.P.C. for more than 60/90 days or any other longer period statutorily provided on expiry of which the police fails to file the final report u/S.173(1) Cr.P.C.
(3) On failure of police to file final report u/S.173(1) Cr.P.C. within 60/90 days or any other longer period statutorily provided, the Magistrate to prevent the complaint u/S.200 Cr.P.C. from suffering a state of stalemate, should proceed by invoking powers contained in Chapter XV and XVI Cr.P.C.
If during pendency of proceedings under Chapter XV and XVI Cr.P.C., invoked as above, Police files the final report then the final report and the complaint case both should proceed as if both have arisen out of police report.
Citations:
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/55499395/
https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/om-prakash-sharma-vs-state-of-m-p-and-another
Hazi Abdul Khaleque Vs Mustt Samsun Nehar on 20 Aug 1990
A single judge from Gauhati High Court held as follows,
From Paras 11, 12 and 13,
11. Under Chapter XXXII, Section 401 of the Code provides that. “Any money (other than a fine) payable by virtue of any order made under this Code, and the method of recovery of which is not otherwise expressly provided for, shall be recoverable as if it were a fine.” The proviso to section 431 is not relevant here. The order for payment of maintenance was an order under the code for payment of money, for the recovery of which no method had been expressly provided. Accordingly, under section 431 of the code, I think the maintenance; money could be recovered, as if it were fine.
12. Section 421 of the Code provides for recovery of fine and the procedure laid down for the purpose was by issue of warrant for attachment and sale of any movable property belonging to offender in this case the present petitioner (opposite party in the maintenance proceeding) or issue of warrant to the Collector of the District, authorising him to realise the amount as arrears of land revenue from the movable or immovable property, or both, of the defaulter: The provision to Section 421 clearly stipulates that “no such warrant shall be executed by the arrest or detention in prison of the offender.”
13. On consideration of the above provisions, there should be no doubt that for recovery of money as maintenance which has to be in accordance with the procedure for recovery of fine no warrant of arrest or detention of the petitioner could have been ordered. I, therefore think that the impugned order dated 1.9.89 was clearly erroneous and has to be set aside.
Citations: [1990 GAULR 2 328], [1991 CRLJ 1843], [1990 SCC ONLINE GAU 36], [1990 GAU LR 2 328], [1991 CRI LJ 1843]
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1507653/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56eaaa49607dba3c8ce3ef96
https://legaldata.in/court/read/2541018
N Rajeev Vs C Deepa on 26 July 2023
A single judge from Bengaluru bench of Karnataka High Court held as follows,
From Paras 2 and 3,
2. Notice to respondent spouse is dispensed with since no order adverse to her interest is being made and further she will have full opportunity of participation in the trial of the subject case at the hands of the court below. Added, she too will have the advantage of early disposal.
3. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and having perused the Petition Papers, this Court is broadly in agreement with the proposition that the matrimonial causes should be tried & disposed off on a war footing, at least as a concession to the shortness of human life. It was Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881), a British historian of great repute who had said: “Life is too short to be little”. When a matrimonial case involves the prayer for the dissolution/nullity of marriage, courts should make all efforts to try & dispose off the same within an outer limit of one year, so that in the event of granting such a decree, the parties may restructure their lives. It hardly needs to be stated ‘life is lost in living’. Delay in disposal of such cases very badly affects the parties thereto, needs no deliberation.
In the above circumstances, learned Family Court Judge is requested to accomplish the trial & disposal of the subject seven year old case preferably within an outer limit of three months, all contentions having been kept open.
The Registrar General of this court is instructed to circulate this judgment in all the concerned circles so that other similarly circumstanced litigants may not unnecessarily knock at the doors of this court seeking a direction for the expeditious disposal of their cases.
Registry to send a copy of this judgment to the respondent-wife by Speed Post, immediately.
Citations:
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/102000202/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/64c14eeb843b5e67363850e6
https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/high-courts/karnataka-hc-courts-should-make-all-efforts-to-try-dispose-of-cases-involving-dissolution-of-marriage-within-one-year-1486930
Moina Khosla Vs Amardeep Singh Khosla on 31 Jan 1986
A single judge of Delhi High Court held as follows,
From Paras 18 to 26,
18. Under Section 12 (1) (a), therefore, the requisite is that ordinary and complete sexual intercourse has not taken place between the parties owing to the impotence of the respondent. The words ‘impotence of the respondent’ would, to my mind, mean incapacity of the respondent to have sexual intercourse. The Supreme Court has said in Digvijay Singh v. Pratap Kumari, AIR 1970 SC 137, that “A party is impotent if his or her mental or physical condition makes consummation of the marriage a practical impossibility”.
19. As stated above, consummation means capacity to have ‘ordinary and complete sexual intercourse’. The above stated observation of the Supreme Court in AIR 1970 SC 137, therefore, must mean that a party is impotent if his or her mental or physical condition is such, that practically speaking, it is impossible for him or her to have ordinary and complete sexual intercourse. In the instant case it is instant case it is stated by the appellant in her deposition that the respondent was unable to have any, even a partial or incipient, sexual intercourse with the appellant.
20. Respondent has himself written in his diary Ex. PW1/2, that the is a Homosexual. The appellant has stated in her deposition that the respondent told her that he was a homosexual, that he was unable “to perform sexual intercourse with me and with females in general”. In other words, the respondent was incapable of having Hetrosexual intercourse with any woman.
21. As sexual intercourse essentially has two participants, it must be ordinary and complete for both the participants, individually, and together as a marital unit. For the man participant sexual intercourse is complete when he has an orgasm and for a woman participant sexual intercourse is complete when she has an orgasm (See Encyclopaedia Brittanica: 15th Ed: 1968; Macropaedia, Vol. 16, p. 594: Sexual Response).
22. No sexual intercourse has been taken place between the parties, there is no question is this case whether sexual intercourse was ordinary any complete.
23. In this case there is unrebutted evidence of the petitioner that no sexual intercourse has taken place between the parties. As no sexual intercourse has taken place between the parties, in this case, the requirements of Section 12(1) (a) of the Act are satisfied.
24. In the above view of the matter no purpose would be served by remitting the case back to the District Judge, as in my view, there is no reason why the statement given by the wife ought not to be accepted.
25. I am of the view that in view of her statement recorded in the court, the wife is entitled to a decree of nullity of marriage on the ground mentioned under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act and the judgment of the Additional District Judge needs to be set aside which is hereby set aside.
26. A decree of nullity of marriage is granted to the wife under section 12(1)(a) of the Hindu Marriage Act.
Indian Kanoon Version:
Casemine Version:
Supreme Today Version:
Legal Data Version:
Citations: [1986 DMC 2 65], [1986 DRJ 10 286], [1986 SCC ONLINE DEL 42], [1987 PLR DEL 91 12], [1986 AIR DELHI 399], [1986 ILR DELHI 2 659]
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/913344/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/560909b5e4b01497111707b8
https://legaldata.in/court/read/6288
Deoki Panjhiyara Vs Shashi Bhushan Narayan Azad and Anr on 12 Dec 2012
A division bench of Apex Court held that, Unless there is a declaration of nullity by a competent Court or authority, a aggrieved person can take advantage of benefits under DV Act.
From Para 19,
19. In the present case, if according to the respondent, the marriage between him and the appellant was void on account of the previous marriage between the appellant and Rohit Kumar Mishra the respondent ought to have obtained the necessary declaration from the competent court in view of the highly contentious questions raised by the appellant on the aforesaid score. It is only upon a declaration of nullity or annulment of the marriage between the parties by a competent court that any consideration of the question whether the parties had lived in a “relationship in the nature of marriage” would be justified. In the absence of any valid decree of nullity or the necessary declaration the court will have to proceed on the footing
that the relationship between the parties is one of marriage and not in the nature of marriage. We would also like to emphasise that any determination of the validity of the marriage between the parties could have been made only by a competent court in an appropriate proceeding by and between the parties and in compliance with all other requirements of law. Mere production of a marriage certificate issued under Section 13 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 in support of the claimed first marriage of the appellant with Rohit Kumar Mishra was not sufficient for any of the courts, including the High Court, to render a complete and effective decision with regard to the marital status of the parties and that too in a collateral proceeding for maintenance. Consequently, we hold that in the present case until the invalidation of the marriage between the appellant and the respondent is made by a competent court it would only be correct to proceed on the basis that the appellant continues to be the wife of the respondent so as to entitle her to claim all benefits and protection available under the DV Act, 2005.
Citations: [2013 ALLMR CRI SC 1099], [2013 AIR SC 168], [2013 RCR CIVIL SC 2 400], [2013 AIR SC 346], [2013 SCC 2 137], [2013 RCR CRIMINAL SC 1 338], [2012 SCALE 12 282], [2013 CRLJ SC 684], [2012 AIOL 584], [2013 BOMCR CRI SC 1 333], [2012 SLT 9 266], [2013 SCC CIV 1 1019], [2012 SCC ONLINE SC 1035], [2013 GUJ LH 1 208], [2013 CTC 2 232], [2013 ECRN 1 913], [2013 ACR 1 1089], [2013 AD SC 3 59], [2013 AJR 2 133], [2013 AKR 1 615], [2013 ALD CRI 1 469], [2013 ALT CRI 3 70], [2013 ALT CRI 1 472], [2013 DMC SC 1 18], [2013 JLJR 1 198], [2012 JCC 1 502], [2013 JCC 1 508], [2012 JT SC 12 575], [2013 LW 2 60], [2013 LW CRL 1 330], [2013 NCC 1 322], [2013 OLR 1 891], [2013 PLJR 1 172], [2013 MLJ CRL 1 137]
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/154350889/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af10e4b0149711415804
https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/deoki-panjhiyara-vs-shashi-bhushan-narayan-azad-anr
Kantharaju Vs State of Karnataka on 17 Jul 2023
A single Judge of Karnataka High Court, after relying on Shivcharan and Sivakumar, held as follows,
From Para 14 and 15,
14. The ratio of these two judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court clearly indicates that, if the marriage between the husband and wife ended as null and void, the offence under Section 498-A of IPC cannot be sustained.
15. Admittedly, in the present case, the complainant in her evidence, PW.2 being the mother of PW.1 both have consistently deposed and admitted that, PW.1 is the second wife of the petitioner. Accordingly, the concurrent findings of the Courts below in recording the conviction requires to be set aside.
Citations:
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Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by LRs Vs State of AP and Ors on 24 Feb 2011
A division bench of Supreme Court held as follows,
From Para 26,
26. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which could have impelled the High Court to condone the delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such as “liberal approach”, “justice oriented approach”, “substantial justice” can not be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. Especially, in cases where the Court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance and restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain whilst adjudicating any lis between the
parties. We are rather pained to notice that in this case, not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate language, the High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms. The use of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant language in a judgment has been repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a number of cases. Whilst considering applications for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers. All discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections can not and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers.
Citations: [2011 SCALE 2 703], [2011 AIR SC 1199], [2011 AIR SC 1459], [2011 SUPREME 2 174], [2011 AIOL 144], [2011 SLT 2 378], [2011 BOMCR SC 5 857], [2011 JT 2 540], [2011 SCC 4 363], [2011 MHLJ SC 4 104], [2011 RCR CIVIL SC 2 880], [2011 ALR 86 59], [2011 AWC SC 3 2295], [2011 SCSUPPL CHN 2 130], [2011 CLT SC 112 152], [2011 KCCR SN 2 124], [2011 LW 3 26], [2011 SCR 3 2172909 CIVIL APPEAL NO OF 2913 2005], [2011 BOMCR 5 857], [2011 KCCRSN 2 124], [2011 RCR CIVIL 2 880], [2011 AIR SCW 1459]
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/912526/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af08e4b0149711415652
https://vlex.in/vid/c-no-002909-002913-852352762
