Swapan Kumar Das Vs State of West Bengal on 21 Aug 2023

Posted on August 22, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Calcutta High Court quash vengeful litigation, terming the same as ‘Legal Terrorism‘.

The basic allegation of offence punishable u/s 498A of IPC has some specific ingredients they are:-
1. Married woman was subjected to cruelty.
2. Such cruelty consisted in
a) in lawful conduct as was likely to drive such women to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to her life, limb or health whether mental or physical.
b) harm to such women with a view coercing her to me unlawful demand for property or valuable security or on account of failure of such woman or not of her relations to him the lawful demand.
c) the women was subjected to such cruelty by her husband or any relation of her husband.

And then…

The legislature has enacted the provision of Section 498A to strike out the dowry menace from the society. But it is observed in several cases that by misusing of said provision new legal terrorism is unleashed. Harassment and torture enumerated in the definition of security u/s 498A cannot be proved solely by the de-facto complainant. The criminal law is allowed, complainant to file a criminal complaint but the same has to be justified by adducing cogent evidences. The four corners of both the CDs recorded no such evidence by which prima facie offence against the present petitioners can be established. The direct allegation against the husband by the de-facto complainant is merely from the version of the de-facto complainant herself. It support no documentary or medical evidence. One neighbour has heard about the quarrel of Banashree her husband; the quarrel of two persons does not mean or prove who is in aggression or who is aggrieved.

Finally,

On perusing the observation of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ch. Bhajanlal, I am of a view that the instant criminal proceedings initiated by the de-facto complainant against the husband and in-laws does not disclose prima facie offence against them as alleged. The proceeding are instituted only to fulfil personal grudge.
Considering the circumstances I think it necessary to invoke the inherent power of this court to quash the proceedings otherwise the continuation of the criminal proceedings would be tantamount to the abuse of process of court.

Swapan Kumar Das Vs State of West Bengal on 21 Aug 2023

Rajan and Anr Vs The State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr on 17 Aug 2023

Posted on August 20, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge at Indore Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court highlighted the Legal terrorism aspect of 498A IPC cases.

From Paras 10 to 12,

10. Nowadays the very purpose of the insertion of Section 498-A in the Penal Code, 1860 with the object to punish the husband or his relatives, has been defined. In most of the cases, this section is beingmisused as observed by several High Courts and the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar: [(2014) 8 SCC 273] has observed that the relatives are unnecessarily being made accused under section 498-A of the I.P.C.
11. The cases are lodged under Section 498-A of the Penal Code,1860 only to settle the matrimonial dispute. some times the FIR wife lodges the FIR immediately after receipt of the summons from theFamily courts. Nowadays there is a package of 5 cases against the husband and family members in family court and the criminal courtunder I.P.C., the Hindu Marriage Act and the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
12. The Courts have experienced that on the general and omnibusallegations the family members and distant relatives are being roped in a case arising out of Section 498-A of the Penal Code, 1860, which wasconsidered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Geeta Mehrotra v. State of UP : [(2012) 10 SCC 741]. The cases related to distant relativeswere further considered and deprecated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in K. Subba Rao v. The State of Telangana : [(2018) 14 SCC 452]

Finally from Para 17,

17. At present, the husband and wife both have settled in Australia. The parents of the husband are being harassed by way of the criminal case in India. Applicant No.1 Rajan Mathur is aged about 67 years and his wife is also a senior citizen. General allegations have been levelled against ‘Jethani’ hence she has unnecessarily been dragged in the FIR. As per the contents of the FIR, the husband of respondent No.2 was not even in India at the time of so-called omission of crime. Respondent No.2 has given the Power of Attorney to her father to contest the case against these applicants. This is now a case of reverse cruelty upon them. There is no specific allegation that when her husband left India for Australia there was any demand for dowry, etc. Now a day it is very common for the husband and wife to reside or do jobs outside of India and their parents are made to suffer in India by way of criminal or matrimonial litigation.

Rajan and Anr Vs The State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr on 17 Aug 2023

Citations:

Other Sources:

The Index of Quash judgement is here.

Dhananjay Mohan Zombade Vs Prachi Dhananjay Zombade on 18 Jul 2023

Posted on August 4, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge at Aurangabad Bench of Bombay High Court held as follows,

From Para 9,

9. In the backdrop of aforesaid provisions, if the precedents are considered, then it is clear that the Hon’ble Apex Court no doubt, in the case of Kamatchi (supra) has held that the proceedings under the DV Act are essentially in the nature of civil proceedings. It is however, pertinent to note that the said judgment is passed in the context of challenge to the order passed by the Trial Court holding that the proceeding fled before it is barred by limitation. It is held in paragraph No. 20 of the judgment that :
“20. It is thus clear that the High Court wrongly equated fling of an application under Section 12 of the Act to lodging of a complaint or initiation of prosecution. In our considered view, the High Court was in error in observing that the application under Section 12 of the Act ought to have been fled within a period of one year of the alleged acts of domestic violence.”
Thus, by implication applicability of the provision of Section 468 of Code of Criminal Procedure is excluded. In respectful view of this Court, in the said judgment, the issue whether or not the provisions of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has application to DV Act, was not involved nor decided therein.

From Para 13,

13. No doubt, the provisions of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be invoked as a matter of course. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303, has held that if the High Court finds that any proceedings is abuse of process of Court then in that case, non-invocation of provisions of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would not be justified. It needs to be recorded that merely because the enactment of DV Act is to provide for more effective protection of the right of woman, it would not mean that a proceedings which is palpably not tenable shall be allowed to be continued. If it is allowed so, then it will be nothing less than sheer abuse of process of Court. Thus, in the considered view of this Court, the present application for quashment of proceeding under DV Act is maintainable.

From Paras 16, 17 and 18,

16. Learned counsel for the respondent opposed the said submission by stating that the said issue cannot be decided at this stage as the same would be subject matter of trial after leading evidence.
17. In order to decide this controversy, it would be relevant to take note of provisions which define “aggrieved person” and “domestic relationship”. Section 2(a) of DV Act defines “aggrieved person” which reads thus :-
2(a) “aggrieved person” means any woman who is, or has been, in domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent.
Section 2(f) states “domestic relationship” to be “a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared
household when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family”.
According to these definitions, domestic relationship between aggrieved person and respondent is sine qua non to maintain any proceeding under DV Act. In order to constitute relationship between two persons as domestic relationship, they must live or at any point of time lived together in a shared household when they are related by consanguinity, marriage or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family. Admittedly, the relationship of respondent with applicants No. 4 to 6 is as a family member. Thus, in order to constitute domestic relationship, the family members of the aggrieved person must be living together with aggrieved person as joint family. It is, therefore, essential that the applicant pleads that there is domestic relationship between her and respondent and that the other family members have lived or are living together as a joint family, to maintain any such complaint/application under the provisions of the DV Act.
18. In the instant case, applicants No. 4 to 6 have come out with a specific case that they never lived as joint family with the respondent. In order to substantiate the said contention,documentary evidence such as Aadhar Card etc. is placed on record. Genuineness thereof is not challenged. On the other hand perusal of the complaint/application to the Magistrate does not show pleadings that these applicants have lived or living with the respondent together as members of joint family. Thus, for want of specific pleadings, and in view of unimpeachable evidence placed on record by these applicants showing their separate place of residence, the application/complaint against such applicants could not have been entertained as these applicants do not come within the definition of domestic relationship with the respondent.

From Para 21,

21. Unfortunately, similar trend seems to have been adopted and proceedings under DV Act are filed at even distant place i.e. place where aggrieved person resides as per Section 2(s) of Act and not only husband and joint family members residing under one roof are made respondents but distant relatives those who have no domestic relationship are also roped in order to cause harassment and to build pressure on husband. In considered view of this Court the observations made by Hon’ble Apex Court, while dealing with offence under Section 498-A of Indian Penal Code, apply to the cases under DV Act, which are filed in clear abuse of process of Court. The present case is squarely covered by illustrations (1), (3) and (7) in case of Bhajanlal (supra) and hence such proceeding cannot be permitted to be continued.

Dhananjay Mohan Zombade Vs Prachi Dhananjay Zombade on 18 Jul 2023

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://www.barandbench.com/news/bombay-high-court-concern-rise-trend-women-misusing-domestic-violence-act

https://www.lawinsider.in/news/bombay-high-court-raises-concern-over-misuse-of-domestic-violence-act-by-estranged-wives

State of AP Vs Mannem Trivikram Reddy on 28 Jun 2017

Posted on May 3, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

The JMFC at Kadapa held that Legal Terrorism must be stopped.

From Para 16,

From the evidence of prosecution it is clear that except filing of Maintenance case and a case under Domestic Violence Act seeking monetary relief of one crore rupees, the court cannot come to a safe conclusion that there were cruelty on the part of accused for the want of additional dowry as was also observed by Apex court in the same Judgment at paragraph No.20, as these salutary provisions cannot be allowed to be misused by relatives, parents, etc., the glaring reality cannot be ignored that the early trend of false implication with a view to harass and black mail and innocent spouse and his relatives, is fast emerging. It is time to stop this unhealthy trend which results in unnecessary misery and torture to numerous affected persons. Even with regard to the omissions to make reference of demand in 161 Cr.P.C., statement the observations made in para No.21 can be considered. Apart from all that the investigating officer had not examined the relative of accused also as was specifically contemplated under police standing order 537 more specifically in clause (3) (d) and (g).

State of AP Vs Mannem Trivikram Reddy on 28 Jun 2017

Vijaya Mahantesh Mulemane Vs State of Karnataka and Ors on 03 Mar 2022

Posted on March 10, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

This is such an atrocious case whereby the so-called mother flouts the orders passed by Canadian Courts regd Custody of a minor child and reaches India only to file a 498A IPC case. Crooks!

Vijaya Mahantesh Mulemane Vs State of Karnataka and Ors on 03 Mar 2022

The Earlier decision from Karnataka High Court’s Division Bench, where a parenting plan was devised by the judges.

Vijaya Mahantesh Mulemane Vs State of Karnataka and Ors on 22 Nov 2020

Kahkashan Kausar @ Sonam Vs State of Bihar on 08 Feb 2022

Posted on February 18, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

Apex Court quashed the FIR against relatives, which was riddled with vague allegations.

From Para 12,
12. Before we delve into greater detail on the nature and content of allegations made, it becomes pertinent to mention that incorporation of section 498A of IPC was aimed at preventing cruelty committed upon a woman by her husband and her in-laws, by facilitating rapid state intervention. However, it is equally true, that in recent times, matrimoniallitigation in the country has also increased significantly and there is a greater disaffection and friction surrounding the institution of marriage,now, more than ever. This has resulted in an increased tendency to employ provisions such as 498A IPC as instruments to settle personalscores against the husband and his relatives.

From Para 18,

18. The above-mentioned decisions clearly demonstrate that this court has at numerous instances expressed concern over the misuse of section 498A IPC and the increased tendency of implicating relatives of thehusband in matrimonial disputes, without analysing the long term ramifications of a trial on the complainant as well as the accused. It is further manifest from the said judgments that false implication by way of general omnibus allegations made in the course of matrimonial dispute, ifleft unchecked would result in misuse of the process of law. Therefore, this court by way of its judgments has warned the courts from proceedingagainst the relatives and in-laws of the husband when no prima facie case is made out against them.

From Para 21 and 22,

21. Here it must be borne in mind that although the two FIRs may constitute two independent instances, based on separate transactions, the present complaint fails to establish specific allegations against the in-laws of the Respondent wife. Allowing prosecution in the absence of clear allegations against the in-laws Appellants would simply result in an abuse of the process of law.
22. Therefore, upon consideration of the relevant circumstances and in the absence of any specific role attributed to the accused appellants, it would be unjust if the Appellants are forced to go through the tribulations of a trial, i.e., general and omnibus allegations cannot manifest in a situation where the relatives of the complainant’s husband are forced to undergo trial. It has been highlighted by this court in varied instances, that a criminal trial leading to an eventual acquittal also inflicts severe scars upon the accused, and such an exercise must therefore be discouraged.

Kahkashan Kausar @ Sonam Vs State of Bihar on 08 Feb 2022

Citations :

Other Sources :

Rajendra Bhagat Vs State of Jharkhand on 03 Jan 2022

Posted on February 18, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

Apex Court held that when there is a genuine settlement between the parties and they are living happily together, such settlement has to be upheld by High Court and quash the 498A IPC case. This cites B.S. Joshi & Ors Vs State Of Haryana & Anr on 13 March, 2003

From Para 5, (The bozos who file false matrimonial cases do NOT realize what they are unleashing; in this case Armyman lost his job!)

5. The appeal preferred by the appellant, being Criminal Appeal No. 10 of 2019, was dismissed by Sessions Judge, Gumla on 30.05.2019. Thereafter, the appellant preferred a revision petition before the High Court, being Criminal Revision No. 910 of 2019. While the said revision petition was pending, two significant events took place. The firsthad been sanction of competent authority for dismissal of the appellant from his military service w.e.f. 14.07.2020for having been convicted of the offence under Section 498-A IPC. In the second relevant event, on 24.11.2020, the appellant and the respondent No. 2 submitted a jointapplication before the High Court, inter alia, stating that with the intervention and advice of family members, common relatives and friends, they had entered intosettlement and resolved all their disputes. It was submitted that upon the appellant approaching his wife forsettlement with assurance to keep her with full honour and dignity, the proposal was accepted by the wife (respondent No. 2) with some conditions, while also undertaking todischarge her matrimonial duties. It was submitted that the parties were residing together with love and affectionand with no dispute between them. It was, therefore jointly prayed that since the dispute was a family dispute that arose due to miscommunication and misunderstanding, now the revision petition may be disposed of in view of the changed circumstances and the family status of the parties. This application was registered as I.A. No. 6052 of 2020.

From Para 7,

7. Having examined the matter in its totality, it appears that the High Court, while disposing of the revision petition with the application moved by the parties, did not pause to consider that maintaining of conviction of the appellant of the offence under Section 498-A IPC would not be securing the ends of justice and with such conviction being maintained and the appellant losing his job, the family would again land itself in financial distress which may ultimately operate adverse to the harmony and happy conjugal life of the parties. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the respondent No. 2 both have reiterated their stand that they have resolved their disputes and are living together while leading a happy conjugal life.

From Para 10,

10. In the aforesaid view of the matter, and taking note of the terms of settlement as stated in the application moved before the High Court which include the undertaking of the appellant that he would be nominating the respondent No. 2 as the nominee in his service record; and where the parties are said to be leading a happy conjugal life, we are clearly of the view that the High Court should have accepted the settlement and quashed all the proceedings with annulment of the orders against the appellant. The High Court having not done so, we are inclined to adopt this course so as to secure the ends of justice.

Rajendra Bhagat Vs State of Jharkhand on 03 Jan 2022

Citations :

Other Sources :

Faisal Ahmed Khan Vs State of Karnataka Mahila PS Bengaluru and Anr on 11 Oct 2019

Posted on January 27, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

Another false case filer bites the dust…

10. Undisputed facts of the case are, petitioner was married with complainant in July 2008. Even after her marriage with the petitioner, complainant was defending the petition for restitution of conjugal rights filed by her previous husband Asif Farooqi. Within about three years after marriage, her relation with petitioner came to an end in August 2011 as per her own admission recorded by the learned Sessions Judge in paragraph No. 14 of his order in Criminal Appeal No. 256/2016. There is yet another judicial finding that complainant had contracted into third marriage with one Asrar Ahmed and given birth to a child. The order also discloses that complainant initiated proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act (DV Act for short) in April 2012. The learned Sessions Judge has also recorded that it was proved by Ex.R7 that complainant had married for third time and ultimately, dismissed the petition. The Criminal Appeal filed thereon has also been dismissed with costs.
11. Not being satisfied, complainant initiated proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. in the year 2014. (C.Mis.No.526/2014) seeking maintenance for her and the child. The said petition has also been rejected so far as complainants claim was concerned.
12. Having thus suffered in the hands of complainant, petitioner also filed a private complaint in PCR No.1085/2016 alleging inter alia that complainant had suppressed her earlier marriage with Asif Ali Farooqi and when questioned about the same, she has filed the instant false complaint. Thereafter, she has married for the third time. With the said allegations, petitioner sought action against complainant and three others for commission of offences punishable under Sections 120A, 120B, 107, 108, 494, 496 read with Section 34 IPC. The learned Magistrate referred the case for investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. Accordingly, FIR No.149/2016 has been registered on 11th August 2016 in Narasimharaja Police Station, Mysuru City. Records further disclose that complainant and other accused unsuccessfully challenged the said FIR before this Court in Criminal Petition No.1182/2017.
13. Petitioners application under Section 239 Cr.P.C. seeking discharge has been dismissed by the learned trial Judge by recording that presence of accused as on the date of incident and whether marriage is void, cannot be considered at the stage of discharge.
14. A conspectus of facts narrated by the petitioner and the undisputed facts which can be gathered from the records lead to an irresistible inference that though complaint is filed alleging commission of offence under Section 498A IPC, it is, in fact the petitioner who has suffered an untold misery in the hands of the complainant.
15. It cannot be gainsaid that disclosure of a previous subsisting marriage causes immense mental pain and agony to a husband.
16. Complainant has, though unsuccessfully, driven the petitioner to various Courts unabatedly. It started with complainant initiating proceedings under the provisions of DV Act followed by proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. Judicial findings have been recorded by the learned Trial Magistrates in both proceedings with regard to complainants conduct. Learned Magistrate adjudicating proceedings under DV Act has recorded that as per Ex.R7, complainants marriage with her third husband was proved. This finding has been affirmed by the learned Sessions Judge while dismissing the appeal.
17. Suffice to note that records unequivocally disclose that complainant was respondent in a matrimonial case for restitution of conjugal rights initiated by her first husband when she got married with the petitioner. She has admitted this fact in proceedings before the learned Magistrate in proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C.
18. This is a classic case in which a complainant by initiating criminal proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C and Section 498A IPC against the petitioner has abused the said provisions.
****
20. It is relevant to note that though the complaint contains the allegations recorded above, there is interpolation with regard to the date 03.08.2011, on which date she was allegedly confined in a room and attempt was made to kill her by pouring kerosene. Further, it is stated that Faizal made an attempt to hang her to a Ceiling fan. In the following sentence, it is stated that Faizal made her fall from a motor cycle and tried to kill her. The two allegations that Faizal attempted to hang the complainant and thereafter made her fall from the motor cycle contradict each other. If Faizal had really attempted to hang her, how did she escape from his clutches? No details are forthcoming in this behalf. However, even if it is assumed that the said allegation were true, it is not understandable why she sat on Faisals motor cycle.
22. Thus, the Complaint is full of unbelievable and self contradicting allegations. The first allegation of demand for Rs.3,00,000/- is said to have been made jointly by petitioner and his family members. The second allegation regarding demand of money to purchase a car is alleged jointly against petitioner and his sisters. Thus all allegations in the complaint are omnibus in nature and in the least, made jointly with other accused and there are no specific against the petitioner.
23. After investigation, admittedly police have not filed charge-sheet against accused No.2 to 6 namely Shahjahan Begum, Afzal Ahmed Khan, Parveez Ahamed, Anjum Nazeer and Siddique. Neither the prosecution nor the complainant have placed any other material which may suggest commission of any of the alleged criminal act/s by the petitioner. Therefore, it can be safely concluded that allegations against petitioner are designed to harass him.

Faisal Ahmed Khan Vs State of Karnataka Mahila PS Bengaluru and Anr on 11 Oct 2019

Citations: [2019 SCC ONLINE KAR 3113], [2020 ILR KAR 130], [2020 KCCR 1 236], [2020 AIC 205 770], [2020 AIR KANT R 1 306], [2020 KANT LJ 1 323]

Other Sources:

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5ded72464a932629f01c7297

Vimlesh Agnihotri and Ors Vs State and Anr on 16 Aug 2021

Posted on August 19, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Delhi High Court talks about the alarming increase of false cases of rape and offences under Section 354, 354A, 354B, 354C & 354D only to arm-twist the accused and make them succumb to the demands of the complainant.

From Para 6,

6. A perusal of the abovementioned facts would show that the parties have registered cross-cases against each other for offences under Section 376 IPC. It is tragic to note that practising advocates belonging to the legal fraternity are trivialising the offence of rape. Rape is not merely a physical assault; it is often destructive of the whole personality of the victim. The act of rape has the ability to scar the mental psyche of the victim and this trauma can persist for years.

From Para 8,

8. The issue as to whether the High Courts, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C, should quash an offence under Section 376 IPC has come for consideration before the Supreme Court in a number of cases. Rape is an offence against the society. The Supreme Court has, time and again, directed that the High Court should not exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C to quash an offence of rape on the ground that the parties have entered into a compromise.

From Paras 14-19,

14. Quashing FIR for offences like rape on the basis of compromise will encourage accused to put pressure on the victims to agree to a compromise and this will open doors for the accused to get away with a heinous crime which cannot be permitted.
15. In the present case it appears that both sides have resorted to file complaints of rape without having any sensitivity to the offence of rape. While the repercussions of the offence of rape on the victim have been mentioned above, on the other hand, false allegations of rape have the potential to destroy the life and career of the accused. The accused in a false case of rape loses his honour, cannot face his family and is stigmatized for life. Allegations regarding offences such as one under Section 376 IPC cannot be made at the drop of a hat – in order to settle personal scores.
16. Further, the time spent by the police in investigating false cases hinders them from spending time in investigation of serious offences. As a result, it leads to faulty investigations and the accused end up going scot-free. Valuable judicial time is also spent in hearing cases where false allegations are made and is consequently an abuse of the process of law. Therefore, people who make such false allegations of rape cannot be permitted to go scot-free. This Court is pained to note that there is an alarming increase of false cases of rape and offences under Section 354, 354A, 354B, 354C & 354D only to arm-twist the accused and make them succumb to the demands of the complainant.
17. This Court, at the moment, is not commenting as to whether the present case is a false case or not. However, if it is found that the cases which have been filed by the parties against each other are false and frivolous then action should be taken against the prosecutrix and others who were instrumental in levelling allegations of rape only to settle some personal scores. There is an urgent need to deter such frivolous litigations.
18. False claims and allegations pertaining to cases of molestation and rape need to be dealt with an iron hand due to the serious nature of the offences. Such litigations are instituted by the unscrupulous litigants in the hope that the other party will capitulate to their demands out of fear or shame. Unless wrongdoers are not made to face the consequences of their actions, it would be difficult to prevent such frivolous litigations. The Courts have to ensure that there is no incentive or motive for frivolous litigations which unnecessarily consumes the Court’s otherwise scare time. This Court is of the opinion that this problem can be solved, or at least minimized, to a certain extent, if exemplary cost is imposed on the litigants for instituting frivolous litigations.
19. In view of the mandate of the Supreme Court that High Courts must not exercise its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing an offence of rape only on the ground that the parties have entered into a compromise, this Court is not inclined to entertain this petition.

Vimlesh Agnihotri and Ors Vs State and Anr on 16 Aug 2021

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/53326449/

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/vimlesh-agnihotri-ors-versus-state-anr

Dr.P.Pathmanathan and Ors Vs V.Monica and Anr on 18 Jan 2021

Posted on January 19, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A very good judgment regarding PWDV Act 2005 (Act) and the procedure to be following, in detail. Snippets from the same follow along with the 14 directions issued for the Judicial Magistrate to be followed by them in disposing DV cases in Tamil Nadu.

UPDATE: This judgment is overruled by Supreme Court here.

From Paras 3 and 4,

3. Upon a close reading of the D.V Act, this Court found that the nature of rights that were protected and enforced under the Act were purely civil in nature. However, considering the forum which was dealing with such applications, and the procedure adopted, a criminal color has been unwittingly given to these proceedings. Like a chameleon changing its colour depending on the situation, the proceedings under the D.V Act were also camouflaged due to the nature of the forum provided under the Act.
4. On the flip side, this faulty understanding of the nature of the proceedings has also given rise to a tendency to misuse these proceedings as a weapon of harassment against parties who are unrelated to the proceedings by making them stand before a Magistrate like accused persons. It is mainly on account of this abuse of process that a deluge of petitions came to be filed for quashing the proceedings under Section 12 of the D.V. Act. This sorry state of affairs was a clear clarion call that impelled this Court to undertake this exercise to bring the situation under control by laying down certain guidelines for the disposal of the applications under Section 12 of the D.V Act.

Proceedings and Offences under the Act

18. Before examining this issue, it is necessary to notice the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the Magistrate under the D.V Act. The procedure to be followed by a Magistrate in dealing with an application for reliefs under Chapter IV is set out in Section 28 of the Act. A close reading of Section 28 would show that it draws a distinction between “proceedings” (Section 12, 18 to 23) and “offences” (Sections 31 & 33) and states that they will be governed by Cr.P.C. This general rule is subject to two exceptions. The first exception is contained in the opening words of Section 28(1) of the Act which begins with the expression “save as otherwise provided by this Act”, the effect of which is to exclude the application of the Code in areas where the procedure has been expressly set out in the D.V Act or the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Rules, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as “D.V Rules” or “the Rules”). The second exception is found in Section 28(2) of the Act which is in the nature of a non-obstante clause expressly authorizing the Court to deviate from the procedure set out in Section 28(1) and lay down its own procedure for disposal of an application under Section 12 or a proceeding under Section 23(2) of the Act.
19. In the first instance, it is, therefore, necessary to examine the areas where the D.V. Act or the D.V. Rules have specifically set out the procedure thereby excluding the operation of Cr.P.C as contemplated under Section 28(1) of the Act. This takes us to the D.V Rules. At the outset, it may be noticed that a “complaint” as contemplated under the D.V. Act and the D.V Rules is not the same as a “complaint” under Cr.P.C. A complaint under Rule 2(b) of the D.V Rules is defined as an allegation made orally or in writing by any person to a Protection Officer. On the other hand, a complaint, under Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C. is any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under the Code, that some person, whether known or unknown has committed an offence. However, the Magistrate dealing with an application under Section 12 of the Act is not called upon to take action for the commission of an offence. Hence, what is contemplated is not a Officer as contemplated under Rule 4(1) of the D.V Rules.
20. Rule 6(1) sets out that an application under Section 12 of the Act shall be as per Form II appended to the Act. Thus, an application under Section 12 not being a complaint as defined under Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C, the procedure for cognizance set out under Section 190(1)(a) of the Code followed by the procedure set out in Chapter XV of the Code for taking cognizance will have no application to a proceeding under the D.V. Act. To reiterate, Section 190(1)(a) of the Code and the procedure set out in the subsequent Chapter XV of the Code will apply only in cases of complaints, under Section 2(d) of Cr.P.C, given to a Magistrate and not to an application under Section 12 of the Act.
21. Consequently, the stage for issuance of process contemplated under Section 204, Cr.P.C has no application to a proceeding under the D.V Act as the Magistrate, in an application under Section 12 of the D.V Act, is not taking cognizance of any offence, but is only dealing with an application for civil reliefs. Furthermore, as has already been pointed out, the respondent before the Court in an application under Section 12 of the Act is not an accused. Hence, the requirement of framing a charge does not arise either. (See V. Palaniammal v. Thenmozhi (2010) 1 MWN Cri 217).
24. A close reading of the aforesaid provisions would show that the procedure set out in the D.V Act and the Rules makes a conscious deviation from the traditional modes of a criminal court taking cognizance, issuing process and then trying the accused under the provisions of the Cr.P.C. save in the case of offences under Section 31 & 33 of the Act. Thus, the application of the Cr.P.C. to an application under Section 12 is residuary in nature by virtue of the mandate of Section 28(1) of the D.V Act.

So, 482 CrPC does not apply to a DV proceeding, which is civil in nature…

40. As the proceedings before a Magistrate exercising jurisdiction under Chapter IV is not a criminal proceeding before a Criminal Court, the next question is whether a petition under Section 482 of the Code would lie to quash an application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act. It is settled law that a petition under Section 482, Cr.P.C would lie only against an order of a criminal court.
41. As pointed out by a Division Bench of this Court in Rajamanickam v State of Tamil Nadu, 2015 (3) MWN Cri 379, Section 482 Cr.P.C preserves only the inherent criminal jurisdiction of the High Court. Thus, a petition under Section 482, Cr.P.C would be maintainable only if the order complained of is passed by a criminal Court or by a Court in exercise of powers under the Cr.P.C. Quashing an application under Section 12 of the D.V Act does not fall in either category, as what the Court is called upon to do at that stage is to interdict the exercise of civil jurisdiction by the Magistrate at the threshold. As indicated supra, since the Magistrate is exercising only a civil jurisdiction in granting reliefs under Chapter IV of the Act, it follows that a Magistrate is not a criminal court for the purposes of proceedings under Chapter IV of the Act. It follows that an application under Section 482, Cr.P.C does not lie to quash an application under Section 12 of the D.V Act.

So, no remedy then…? (IMHO, apart from Article 227, a petition under sec 151 C.P.C. should also be available to quash the DV proceeding, if it is necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court.)

42. This does not, however, mean that an aggrieved respondent is remediless. The Magistrate exercising jurisdiction under Chapter IV of the D.V Act, is certainly a subordinate Court for the purposes of Article 227, and a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution would still be available challenging the proceedings under Chapter IV of the D.V Act, in an appropriate case.

Class for the lower trial Courts…

51. It has been brought to the notice of this Court that in several cases, Magistrates continue to mechanically follow the drill of the procedure set out in Sections 190(1)(a), 200 to 204, Cr.P.C and issue summons as if the respondents before it are accused of offences. To compound the confusion, in most of these cases all and sundry are roped in as respondents before the Magistrate. These respondents, upon being summoned, file petitions under Section 205, Cr.P.C to dispense with their personal attendance and thereafter file petitions under Section 482, Cr.P.C to obtain a stay of all further proceedings in the case, and in most cases their personal appearance before the Magistrate is also dispensed with, and the case is then thrown into the backburner. All of this, it appears, is on account a perceptible lack of clarity in the procedure followed by the Magistrates while deciding applications under the Act.

Directions follow:

52.While it is no doubt true that the Court of Magistrate is invested with a great deal of flexibility under Section 28(2) of the Act to devise its own procedure for disposal of an application under Section 12 of the Act, the twin principles of consistency and clarity dictate that this Court must now lay down some broad guidelines, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution & in respect of Judicial Magistrates under Section 483 of the Cr.P.C, for the proper disposal of applications under Section 12 of the D.V Act. A corrective mechanism is available in the D.V Act itself for aggrieved parties to agitate their grievances and obtain redress.

The following directions are, therefore, issued:

i. An application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act, is not a complaint under Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C. Consequently, the procedure set out in Section 190(1)(a) & 200 to 204, Cr.P.C as regards cases instituted on a complaint has no application to a proceeding under the D.V Act. The Magistrate cannot, therefore, treat an application under the D.V Act as though it is a complaint case under the Cr.P.C.
ii.An application under Section 12 of the Act shall be as set out in Form II of the D.V Rules, 2006, or as nearly as possible thereto. In case interim ex-parte orders are sought for by the aggrieved person under Section 23(2) of the Act, an affidavit, as contemplated under Form III, shall be sworn to.
iii. The Magistrate shall not issue a summon under Section 61, Cr.P.C to a respondent(s) in a proceeding under Chapter IV of the D.V Act. Instead, the Magistrate shall issue a notice for appearance which shall be as set out in Form VII appended to the D.V Rules, 2006. Service of such notice shallbe in the manner prescribed under Section 13 of the Act and Rule 12 (2) of the D.V Rules, and shall be accompanied by a copy of the petition and affidavit, if any.
iv. Personal appearance of the respondent(s) shall not be ordinarily insisted upon, if the parties are effectively represented through a counsel. Form VII of the D.V Rules, 2006, makes it clear that the parties can Magistrate either in person or through a duly authorized counsel. In all cases, the personal appearance of relatives and other third parties to the domestic relationship shall be insisted only upon compelling reasons being shown. (See Siladitya Basak v State of West Bengal (2009 SCC Online Cal 1903).
v. If the respondent(s) does not appear either in person or through a counsel in answer to a notice under Section 13, the Magistrate may proceed to determine the application ex-parte.
vi. It is not mandatory for the Magistrate to issue notices to all parties arrayed as respondents in an application under Section 12 of the Act. As pointed out by this Court in Vijaya Baskar (cited supra), there should be some application of mind on the part of the Magistrate in deciding the respondents upon whom notices should be issued. In all cases involving relatives and other third parties to the matrimonial relationship, the Magistrate must set out reasons that have impelled them to issue notice to such parties. To a large extent, this would curtail the pernicious practice of roping in all and sundry into the proceedings before the Magistrate.
vii. As there is no issuance of process as contemplated under Section 204, Cr.P.C in a proceeding under the D.V Act, the principle laid down in Adalat Prasad v Rooplal Jindal (2004 7 SCC 338) that a process, under Section 204, Cr.P.C, once issued cannot be reviewed or recalled, will not apply to a proceeding under the D.V Act. Consequently, it would be open to an aggrieved respondent(s) to approach the Magistrate and raise the issue of maintainability and other preliminary issues. Issues like the existence of a shared household/domestic relationship etc., which form the jurisdictional basis for entertaining an application under Section 12, can be determined as a preliminary issue, in appropriate cases. Any person aggrieved by such an order may also take recourse to an appeal under Section 29 of the D.V Act for effective redress (See V.K Vijayalekshmi Amma v Bindu. V, (2010) 87 AIC 367). This would stem the deluge of petitions challenging the maintainability of an application under Section 12 of the D.V Act, at the threshold before this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution.
viii. Similarly, any party aggrieved may also take recourse to Section 25 which expressly authorises the Magistrate to alter, modify or revoke any order under the Act upon showing change of circumstances.
ix. In Kunapareddy (cited supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court upheld the order of a Magistrate purportedly exercising powers under Order VI, Rule 17 of The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “C.P.C.”), to permit the amendment of an application under Section 12 of the D.V Act. Taking a cue therefrom, it would be open to any of the respondent(s), at any stage of the proceeding, to apply to the Magistrate to have their names deleted from the array of respondents if they have been improperly joined as parties. For this purpose, the Magistrate can draw sustenance from the power under Order I Rule 10(2) of the C.P.C. A judicious use of this power would ensure that the proceedings under the D.V Act do not generate into a weapon of harassment and would prevent the process of Court from being abused by joining all and sundry as parties to the lis.
x. The Magistrates must take note that the practice of mechanically issuing notices to the respondents named in the application has been deprecated by this Court nearly a decade ago in Vijaya Baskar (cited supra). Precedents are meant to be followed and not forgotten, and the Magistrates would,
therefore, do well to examine the applications at the threshold and confine the inquiry only to those persons whose presence before it is proper and necessary for the grant of reliefs under Chapter IV of the D.V Act.
xi. In Satish Chandra Ahuja (cited supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has pointed out the importance of the enabling provisions under Section 26 of the D.V Act to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. Hence, the reliefs under Chapter IV of the D.V can also be claimed in a pending proceeding before a civil, criminal or family court as a counter claim.
xii. While recording evidence, the Magistrate may resort to chief examination of the witnesses to be furnished by affidavit (See Lakshman v Sangeetha, 2009 3 MWN (Cri) 257. The Magistrate shall generally follow the procedure set out in Section 254, Cr.P.C while recording evidence.
xiii. Section 28(2) of the Act is an enabling provision permitting the Magistrate to deviate from the procedure prescribed under Section 28(1), if the facts and circumstances of the case warrants such a course, keeping in mind that in the realm of procedure, everything is taken to be permitted unless
prohibited (See Muhammad Sulaiman Khan v Muhammad Yar Khan, 1888 11 ILR All 267).
xiv. A petition under Article 227 of the Constitution may still be maintainable if it is shown that the proceedings before the Magistrate suffer from a patent lack of jurisdiction. The jurisdiction under Article 227 is one of superintendence and is visitorial in nature and will not be exercised unless there exists a clear jurisdictional error and that manifest or substantial injustice would be caused if the power is not exercised in favour of the petitioner. (See Abdul Razak v. Mangesh Rajaram Wagle (2010) 2 SCC 432, Virudhunagar Hindu Nadargal Dharma Paribalana Sabai v. Tuticorin Educational Society, (2019) 9 SCC 538.) In normal circumstances, the power under Article 227 will not be exercised, as a measure of self-imposed restriction, in view of the corrective mechanism available to the aggrieved parties before the Magistrate, and then by way of an appeal under Section 29 of the Act.

Dr.P.Pathmanathan and Ors Vs V.Monica and Anr on 18 Jan 2021

Citations :

Other Sources :

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

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