Vishnu Kumar Tiwari Vs State of Uttar Pradesh on 09 Jul 2019

Posted on June 27, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held as follows:

From Paras 41 and 42,

41. In the facts of this case, having regard to the nature of the allegations contained in the protest petition and the annexures which essentially consisted of affidavits, if the Magistrate was convinced on the basis of the consideration of the final report, the statements under Section 161 of the Code that no prima facie case is made out, certainly the Magistrate could not be compelled to take cognizance by treating the protest petition as a complaint. The fact that he may have jurisdiction in a case to treat the protest petition as a complaint, is a different matter. Undoubtedly, if he treats the protest petition as a complaint, he would have to follow the procedure prescribed under Section 200 and 202 of the Code if the latter Section also commends itself to the Magistrate. In other words, necessarily, the complainant and his witnesses would have to be examined. No doubt, depending upon the material which is made available to a Magistrate by the complainant in the protest petition, it may be capable of being relied on in a particular case having regard to its inherent nature and impact on the conclusions in the final report. That is, if the material is such that it persuades the court to disagree with the conclusions arrived at by the Investigating Officer, cognizance could be taken under Section 190(1)(b) of the Code for which there is no necessity to examine the witnesses under Section 200 of the Code. But as the Magistrate could not be compelled to treat the protest petition as a complaint, the remedy of the complainant would be to file a fresh complaint and invite the Magistrate to follow the procedure under Section 200 of the Code or Section 200 read with Section 202 of the Code. Therefore, we are of the view that in the facts of this case, we cannot support the decision of the High Court.
42. It is true that law mandates notice to the informant/complainant where the Magistrate contemplates accepting the final report. On receipt of notice, the informant may address the court ventilating his objections to the final report. This he usually does in the form of the protest petition.

From Para 45,

45. If a protest petition fulfills the requirements of a complaint, the Magistrate may treat the protest petition as a complaint and deal with the same as required under Section 200 read with Section 202 of the Code. In this case, in fact, there is no list of witnesses as such in the protest petition. The prayer in the protest petition is to set aside the final report and to allow the application against the final report. While we are not suggesting that the form must entirely be decisive of the question whether it amounts to a complaint or liable to be treated as a complaint, we would think that essentially, the protest petition in this case, is summing up of the objections the second respondent against the final report.

Vishnu Kumar Tiwari Vs State of Uttar Pradesh on 09 Jul 2019

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/80081494/

https://www.lawyerservices.in/Vishnu-Kumar-Tiwari-Versus-State-of-Uttar-Pradesh-and-Others-2019-07-09

Madras High Court Advocates Association Vs Dr.A.S.Anand, Honble The C.J.I. on 12 May 2001

Posted on June 26, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A full bench of Apex Court passed scathing remarks regards litigants who lie with impunity in their affidavits filed into the Court.

This case is also called as Re: Suo Moto Proceedings Against MR. R, KARUPPAN, ADVOCATE Vs Unknown.

From Para 15,

15. Court are entrusted with the powers of dispensation and adjudication of justice of the rival claims of the parties besides determining the criminal liability of the offenders for offences committed against the society. The courts are further expected to do justice quickly and impartially not being biased by any extraneous considerations. Justice dispensation system would be wrecked if statutory restrictions are not imposed upon the litigants, who attempt to mislead the court by filing and relying upon the false evidence particularly in cases, the adjudication of which is depended upon the statement of facts. if the result of the proceedings are to be respected, these issues before the courts must be resolved to the extent possible in accordance with the truth. The purity of proceedings of the court cannot be permitted to be sullied by a party on frivolous, vexatious or insufficient grounds or relying upon false evidence inspired by extraneous considerations or revengeful desire to harass or spite his opponent. Sanctity of the affidavits has to be preserved and protected discouraging the filing of irresponsible statements, without any regard to accuracy.
17. In India, law relating to the offence of perjury is given a statutory definition under Section 191 and Chapter XI of the Indian Penal Code, incorporated to deal with the offences relating to giving false evidence against public justice. The offences incorporated under this Chapter are based upon recognition of the decline of moral values and erosion of sanctity of oath. Unscrupulous litigants are found daily resorting to utter blatant falsehood in the courts which has, to some extent, resulted in polluting the judicial system. It is a fact, though unfortunate, that a general impression is created that most of the witnesses coming in the courts despite taking oath make false statements to suit the interests of the parties calling them. Effective and stern action is required to be taken for preventing the evil of perjury, concededly let lose by vested interest and professional litigants. The mere existence of the penal provisions to deal with perjury would be a cruel joke with the society unless the courts stop to take an evasive recourse despite proof of the commission of the offence under Chapter XI of the Indian Penal Code. If the system is to service, effective action is the need of the time. The present case is no exception to the general practice being followed by many of the litigants in the country.
18. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of this case, the record of proceedings in Suo Motu Contempt Petition (Criminal) No.5 of 2000 and Writ Petition No.77 of 2001, we are prima facie satisfied that the respondent herein, in his affidavit filed in support of the writ petition (for the purposes of being used in the judicial proceedings, i.e. writ petition), has wrongly made a statement that the age of Dr. Justice A.S. Anand has not been determined by the President of India in terms of-Article 217 of the constitution. We are satisfied that such a statement supported by an affricative of the respondent was known to him to be false which he believed to be false and/or atleast did not believe to be true. It is not disputed that an affidavit is evidence within the meaning of Section 191 of the Indian Penal Code and a person swearing to a false affidavit is guilty of perjury punishable under Section 193 IPC. The respondent herein, being legally bound by an oath to state the truth in his affidavit accompanying the petition is prima facie held to have made a false statement which constitutes an offence of giving false evidence as defined under Section 191 IPC, punishable under Section 193 IPC.
19. With the object of eradicating the evil of perjury, we empower the Registrar General of this Court to depute an officer of the rank of Deputy Registrar or above of the Court to file a complaint under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code against the respondent herein, before a Magistrate of competent jurisdiction at Delhi. Such officer is directed to file such complaint and take all steps necessary for prosecuting the complaint.

Madras High Court Advocates Association Vs Dr.A.S.Anand, Honble The C.J.I. on 12 May 2001

Citations : [2001 OLR 2 188], [2001 SCC 5 289], [2001 SCALE 4 199], [2001 SUPREME 4 108], [2001 JT SUPP 1 332], [2001 CGLJ 2 499], [2001 CRLJ SC 2611], [2001 SCR 3 750], [2001 AIR SC 2204], [2001 LW 3 61], [2001 SCC CRI 876], [2001 AIR SCW 2104]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1356442/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad9be4b0149711411d8a

In Re Enforcement And Implementation of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 on 02 May 2005

Posted on June 14, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A full bench of Apex Court held as follows and passed directions to take steps to implement specific sections of DP Act 1961:

From Para 2,

2. Possibly, a social revolution is needed to put an end to the menace. Refusal by the bride’s father to pay dowry, refusal of the girls to get married if dowry is insisted upon and the attaching of a social stigma to those who demand dowry, can alone ultimately put an end to this system or at least reduce its prevalence. Obviously, the enactment of a law prohibiting this evil should go a long way in tackling the menace.

From Para 4,

4. There was a further amendment to the Act by Act 43 of 1986 making the provisions more stringent and enhancing the punishment for taking or abetting the taking of dowry. In spite of all this, it was seen that the enforcement of the provisions of the Act was thoroughly unsatisfactory and this is reflected by the filing of this Writ Petition in this Court, in public interest.

From Para 8,

8. In the context of the developments that have taken place, it is submitted by the amicus curiae appointed by this Court that no serious effort has been made to implement the provisions of the Act and the Rules and unless directions are issued by this Court it is highly unlikely that the provisions of the Act and the Rules will be effectively implemented. It is, therefore, submitted that this Court may direct the Central Government and the State Governments to give wide publicity to the relevant provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and Rules 2 and 3 of the Dowry Prohibition (Maintenance of Lists of presents to the Bride and Bridegroom) Rules, 1985 by appropriate means including educating the student community about the relevant provisions and the mandatory requirements of the Act and the Rules. It is further submitted that the State Governments may be directed to appoint sufficient number of Dowry Prohibition Officers with independent charge in each district of the concerned State, commensurate with the population of the District and to ensure that only dedicated and sincere officers are so appointed. It is submitted that directions may be issued to the Dowry Prohibition Officers to take immediate steps for strict enforcement and implementation of the provisions of Section 3, 4, 4A and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and Rules 2 and 3 of the Dowry Prohibition (Maintenance of Lists of presents to the Bride and Bridegroom) Rules, 1985.

From Para 10,

10. When there is failure on the part of the Executive to strictly implement a law like the one in question, enacted to tackle a social problem which has assumed menacing proportions, the Court has a duty to step in with a mandamus to direct its implementation rigorously and effectively. In that context, we find that it is necessary to step in and issue some more directions to the respondents in addition to incorporating the directions already issued by this Court by way of interim measure as part of this final judgment.

From Para 11,

11. Therefore, in addition to directing the respondents to implement all the interim directions which were issued in this case thus far, we further direct the Union of India and the States to take more effective steps to implement the provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 with particular reference to Sections 3 and 4 thereof and the various rules framed thereunder. In that process, they are also directed to activate the Dowry Prohibition Officers.

Closing comments:

12. The conscience of the society needs to be fully awakened to the evils of the dowry system so that the demand for dowry itself should lead to loss of face in the society for those who demand it. We have no doubt that our young and enlightened women would rise to the occasion to fight the evil which tends to make them articles of commerce. We also hope that our educated young males would refuse to be sold in the marriage market and come forward to choose their partners in life in a fair manner.
13. The establishment of a committed and sincere machinery to implement the Act and the Rules can hasten the eradication of the evil. The Union of India and the State Governments are directed to devise means to create honest, efficient and committed machinery for the purpose of implementation of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and the various Rules framed thereunder.

In Re Enforcement And Implementation Of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 on 02 May 2005

Citations : [2005 BOMCR 5 198], [2005 SUPREME 3 739], [2005 DLT SC 119 452], [2005 DMC SC 1 805], [2005 CRILJ 2598], [2005 CRLJ SC 2598], [2005 AIR SC 2375], [2005 JCR SC 3 170], [2005 JT SC 5 71], [2005 UJ SC 2 880], [2005 AIOL 241], [2005 SCC 4 565], [2005 SCALE 4 535], [2005 ALLMR SC 5 570], [2005 SCR 3 1020], [2005 BLJR 2 1285], [2005 SCC CRI 1163], [2005 CRI LJ 2598]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/899749/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae12e4b0149711412dda

https://www.legitquest.com/case/in-re-enforcement-and-implementation-of-dowry-prohibition-act-1961/18C

Rohitash Kumar and Ors Vs Om Prakash Sharma and Ors on 6 Nov 2012

Posted on June 13, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

Apex Court talks about Interpretation of Statutes:

Addition and Subtraction of words:
22. The Court has to keep in mind the fact that, while interpreting the provisions of a Statute, it can neither add, nor subtract even a single word. The legal maxim “A Verbis Legis Non Est Recedendum” means, “From the words of law, there must be no departure”. A section is to be interpreted by reading all of its parts together, and it is not permissible, to omit any part thereof. The Court cannot proceed with the assumption that the legislature, while enacting the Statute has committed a mistake; it must proceed on the footing that the legislature intended what it has said; even if there is some defect in the phraseology used by it in framing the statute, and it is not open to the court to add and amend, or by construction, make up for the deficiencies, which have been left in the Act. The Court can only iron out the creases but while doing so, it must not alter the fabric, of which an Act is woven. The Court, while interpreting statutory provisions, cannot add words to a Statute, or read words into it which are not part of it, especially when a literal reading of the same, produces an intelligible result. (Vide: Nalinakhya Bysack v. Shyam Sunder Haldar & Ors., AIR 1953 SC 148; Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1959 SC 459; M. Pentiah & Ors. v. Muddala Veeramallappa & Ors., AIR 1961 SC 1107; The Balasinor Nagrik Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Babubhai Shankerlal Pandya & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 849; and Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu & Ors., (2001) 7 SCC 71).
23. The Statute is not to be construed in light of certain notions that the legislature might have had in mind, or what the legislature is expected to have said, or what the legislature might have done, or what the duty of the legislature to have said or done was. The Courts have to administer the law as they find it, and it is not permissible for the Court to twist the clear language of the enactment, in order to avoid any real, or imaginary hardship which such literal interpretation may cause.
24. In view of the above, it becomes crystal clear that, under the garb of interpreting the provision, the Court does not have the power to add or subtract even a single word, as it would not amount to interpretation, but legislation.

Citations : [2013 AIR SC 30], [2013 ALD SC 1 135], [2013 ALR 96 825], [2013 AWC SC 2 1245], [2013 FLR 136 92], [2012 JT SC 11 219], [2012 SCALE 11 30], [2013 SCC 11 451], [2012 SCR 13 47], [2013 SCT SC 1 537], [2013 SLJ SC 1 27], [2013 SLJ SC 2 16], [2013 SCC L&S 3 368], [2012 SCC ONLINE SC 922], [2013 AIC 121 163], [2012 AIOL 508], [2012 SLT 8 316], [2012 SUPREME 7 696], [2012 LLN 5 83], [2012 SCJ 8 534], [2012 AIR SC 6157], [2012 CLT 4 325], [2013 KCCR SN 1 19], [2012 AIR SCW 6157]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/58524857/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af20e4b0149711415afe

State of Jharkhand and Anr Vs Govind Singh on 3 Dec 2004

Posted on June 13, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows:

10. When the words of a statute are clear, plain or unambiguous i.e they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences. The intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. (See J.P Bansal v. State of Rajasthan 2003 5 SCC 134.)
11. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. As was noted by the Privy Council in Crawford v. Spooner 1846 6 Moo PC 1:
“We cannot aid the legislature’s defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend and, by construction make up deficiencies which are left there.”
The view was reiterated by this Court in State of M.P v. G.S Dall and Flour Mills AIR 1991 SC 772 and State of Gujarat v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel JT 1998 2 SC 253. Speaking briefly, the court cannot reframe the legislation, as noted in J.P Bansal case for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate.
12. It is said that a statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting or construing a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature.
13. Interpretation postulates the search for the true meaning of the words used in the statute as a medium of expression to communicate a particular thought. The task is not easy as the “language” is often misunderstood even in ordinary conversation or correspondence. The tragedy is that although in the matter of correspondence or conversation the person who has spoken the words or used the language can be approached for clarification, the legislature cannot be approached as the legislature, after enacting a law or Act, becomes functus officio so far as that particular Act is concerned and it cannot itself interpret it. No doubt, the legislature retains the power to amend or repeal the law so made and can also declare its meaning, but that can be done only by making another law or statute after undertaking the whole process of law-making.

State of Jharkhand and Anr Vs Govind Singh on 3 Dec 2004

Citations : [2005 SCC CRI 1570], [2004 SCALE 10 174], [2005 CRIMES SC 1 49], [2005 AIR SC 294], [2005 SUPREME 1 477], [2005 SCC 10 437], [2004 JT SC 10 349]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1029488/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae07e4b0149711412c03

Nathi Devi Vs Radha Devi Gupta on 17 Dec 2004

Posted on June 13, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A 5-judge Constitutional Bench held as follows regarding when the need of interpreting a statute arises.

The interpretative function of the Court is to discover the true legislative intent. It is trite that in interpreting a statute the Court must, if the words are clear, plain, unambiguous and reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, give to the words that meaning, irrespective of the consequences. Those words must be expounded in their natural and ordinary sense. When a language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning no question of construction of statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself. Courts are not concerned with the policy involved or that the results are injurious or otherwise, which may follow from giving effect to the language used. If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the Courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. In considering whether there is ambiguity, the Court must look at the statute as a whole and consider the appropriateness of the meaning in a particular context avoiding absurdity and inconsistencies or unreasonableness which may render the statute unconstitutional.
It is equally well settled that in interpreting a statute, effort should be made to give effect to each and every word used by the Legislature. The Courts always presume that the Legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. A construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons such as obvious drafting errors. (See \026 State of U.P. and others vs. Vijay Anand Maharaj : AIR 1963 SC 946 ; Rananjaya Singh vs. Baijnath Singh and others : AIR 1954 SC 749 ; Kanai Lal Sur vs. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan : AIR 1957 SC 907; Nyadar Singh vs. Union of India and others : AIR 1988 SC 1979 ; J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of U.P. : AIR 1961 S.C. 1170 and Ghanshyam Das vs. Regional Assistant Commissioner, Sales Tax : AIR 1964 S.C. 766).
It is well settled that literal interpretation should be given to a statute if the same does not lead to an absurdity.

Nathi Devi Vs Radha Devi Gupta on 17 Dec 2004

Citations : [2005 AIR SC 648], [2005 DRJ SUPP 80 518], [2005 JCR SC 2 71], [2005 JT SC 1 1], [2005 KLT SC 1 443], [2005 SCC 2 271], [2005 DRJ SUPPL 80 518]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/641119/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609adf2e4b01497114129b9

Vikas Chaudhary Vs Union of India and Ors on 12 Jan 2022

Posted on May 31, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

Single Judge Bench of Delhi High Court held as follows,

What clearly emerges is that in the aforesaid case, the Court was dealing with a situation, where a FIR had already been lodged and a criminal investigation was ongoing against the person against whom the LOC had been issued. The same was the situation in S. Martin v. Deputy Commissioner of Police SCC OnLine Mad 426. In the present case, as has already been noted, no proceedings under any penal law have, in fact, been initiated against the petitioner. These decisions are therefore, clearly distinguishable and do not, in any manner forward the case of the respondents.

Vikas Chaudhary Vs Union of India and Ors on 12 Jan 2022

Citations : [2022 SCC ONLINE DEL 97]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/172206187/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/61e011eb9fca1952d4e03e62

Index of judgments about Look Out Circular Notices is here.

State of West Bengal and Ors Vs R.K.B.K. Ltd and Anr on 4 Sep 2015

Posted on May 31, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court held that, any adverse Order passed by an authority can not be taken cognizance of in the eye of law if it is not communicated to the person aggrieved.

From Para 24,

24. The aforesaid decision, as is evident, lays down that passing of the order and communication thereof must be within 30 days and on that basis has opined that the order passed on the file and not communicated to the person aggrieved is not an order that can be taken cognizance of. There can be no scintilla of doubt that unless an adverse order is communicated that does not come into effect. Passing of an order on the file does not become an order in the eye of law. But the core question would be, if an order is passed within 30 days and communicated thereafter, what would be the effect. In the instant case, as the factual matrix would unveil, the order was passed before expiration of 30 days, but the same was served on the first respondent beyond 30 days. The thrust of the matter is whether the order has to be passed and communicated within 30 days. Paragraph 9 of the Control Order requires the competent authority to pass an order within 30 days from the date of serving the show cause notice or the suspension of licence. The word used is “shall”. Paragraph 10 of the Control Order enables the aggrieved person to prefer an appeal against an order passed under Paragraph 8 or 9 within 30 days to the State Government in Food and Supplies Department. In this context, reference to the authority in MCD v. Qimat Rai Gupta and others4 is of significance. In the said case, the Court was interpreting the word “made” occurring in Section 126(4) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, which stipulated that no amendment under sub-section 1 shall be made in the assessment list in relation to certain aspects. It was contended before this Court on behalf of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi that the use of the expression “made” occurring in the said sub-section would necessitate communication of the order. It was contended before this Court by the Corporation that the distinction must be made between communication of order and making thereof inasmuch as whereas communication may be necessary so as to enable an assessee to prefer an appeal against the order of assessment but only signing of the order would subserve the purpose of saving the period of limitation. The submission was that the expression “no amendment under sub-section (1) shall be made” should be given a liberal interpretation. Reliance was placed on the pronouncement in CCE v. M.M. Rubber and Co.5 The said stand was controverted on the ground that the Act having been enacted for the purpose of controlling the abuse of power on the part of the Commissioner, the same should be given purposive meaning so as to fulfil the purport and object of the legislation.

State of West Bengal and Ors Vs R.K.B.K. Ltd and Anr on 4 Sep 2015

Citations : [2015 AIR SC 3411], [2015 AD SC 10 112], [2015 CALLT SC 4 1], [2015 CHN SC 5 144], [2015 MLJ 7 105], [2015 SCALE 9 550], [2015 SCC 10 369], [2015 SCJ 9 421], [2015 SCC ONLINE SC 783], [2015 CAL LJ 3 57]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/170103027/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5790b345e561097e45a4e3df

R.Rambilas Vs Anita and Anr on 16 Mar 2009

Posted on May 30, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

Hon’ble Justice K.C. Bhanu had delivered this judgment.

From Paras 4-5,

(4) THE main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that, the first respondent/wife had given up her right to seek maintenance as per agreement dated 16. 11. 1998 and therefore, continuation of the proceedings in the maintenance case is nothing but abuse of process of Court.
(5) ON the other hand, the learned counsel for the first respondent contended that, even a divorced wife is entitled for maintenance; that, the agreement and the divorce were obtained by playing fraud; that, even if any such agreement is there, that will not preclude the first respondent herein from claiming the maintenance. In support of his contention, the learned Counsel relied upon various decisions, which will be referred to, at appropriate time.

From Para 12,

(12) THE learned Counsel for the first respondent also placed strong reliance on a decision in Bai Tahira v. AH Hussain Fissalli Chothia and another, AIR 1979 sc 362, wherein it is held thus : (Para 10)
“the last defence, based on Mehar payment, merits more serious attention. The contractual limb of the contention must easily fail. The consent decree of 1962 resolved all disputes and settled all claims then available. But here is a new statutory right created as a projection of public policy by the Code of 1973, which could not have been in the contemplation of the parties when in 1962, they entered into a contract to adjust their then mutual rights. No settlement of claims which does not have the special statutory right to the divorcee under Section 125 can operate to negate that claim.”

Closure from Paras 14-15,

(14) THEREFORE, from the above decisions, it is clear that, even if there is an agreement which would defeat the provisions of any law, the same cannot be used as a defence in a proceedings under section 125 Cr. P. C.
(15) IN view of the above decisions, it is clear that even if there is such an agreement where under and whereby the parties relinquished her right to maintain, it would not be a bar to file a petition under section 125 Cr. P. C. and therefore, the maintenance case is maintainable and question of quashing the same does not arise.

R.Rambilas Vs Anita and Anr on 16 Mar 2009

Citations : [2009 ALD CRI 1 855]

Other Sources :

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56ea70a6607dba369a6ee51e

https://www.lawyerservices.in/R-Rambilas-Versus-Anita-2009-03-16

Kamal Anant Khopkar Versus Union of India and Anr

Posted on May 28, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A full bench of Apex Court began looking into the Constitutional validity of Section 15 – General rules of succession in the case of female Hindus from Hindu Succession Act 1956.

Kamal Anant Khopkar Versus Union of India and Anr on 15 Mar 2019 OR

Learned Additional Solicitor General appears for the Union of India and asks and gets a period of six weeks to file counter affidavit by the Union of India

Kamal Anant Khopkar Versus Union of India and Anr on 25 Mar 2019

More time given… already 4 years passed but the Central government did not file the Counter.

Kamal Anant Khopkar Versus Union of India and Anr on 05 Apr 2022

Another petitioner also challenged the same provision of HSA and this one got tagged with above main case…

Manju Narayan Nathan Vs Union of India and Anr on 16 Mar 2022

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Legal Procedure Explained – Interpretation of Statutes

Vishnu Kumar Tiwari Vs State of Uttar Pradesh on 09 Jul 2019

Madras High Court Advocates Association Vs Dr.A.S.Anand, Honble The C.J.I. on 12 May 2001

In Re Enforcement And Implementation of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 on 02 May 2005

Rohitash Kumar and Ors Vs Om Prakash Sharma and Ors on 6 Nov 2012

State of Jharkhand and Anr Vs Govind Singh on 3 Dec 2004

Nathi Devi Vs Radha Devi Gupta on 17 Dec 2004

Vikas Chaudhary Vs Union of India and Ors on 12 Jan 2022

State of West Bengal and Ors Vs R.K.B.K. Ltd and Anr on 4 Sep 2015

R.Rambilas Vs Anita and Anr on 16 Mar 2009

Kamal Anant Khopkar Versus Union of India and Anr