Abhishek Singh Vs State of M.P. on 26 Dec 2022

Posted on January 7, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench of MP High Court held as follows, relying on Reema Aggarwal decision here

From Para 9,

9. Though it is an admitted position that complainant/respondent No.4 was already married and had a living spouse, when she contracted the second marriage with petitioner, however, there is no indication of word ‘valid marriage’ in Section 498-A of I.P.C. The language used therein is ‘husband or relative of husband’. These words not only rope in those who are validly married but also anyone who has undergone some or other form of marriage and thereby assumed for himself the position of husband.

Abhishek Singh Vs State of M.P. on 26 Dec 2022

Sandeep Kumar Tekriwal Vs State of Bihar and Anr on 09 Sep 2008

Posted on December 28, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Patna High Court held as follows,

From Para 15,

15. Section 317, Cr. P.C provides for inquiries and trial being held in the absence of accused in certain cases. However, if the Magistrate finds that personal appearance of the accused is necessary, he would direct that accused would no longer be represented on the next date by a pleader under Section 317, Cr. P.C but would appear in person. If the accused in spite of such order does not appear in person, it would be open for the learned Magistrate to issue warrant of arrest and proceed in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Chapter-VI of the Cr. P.C and may also cancel bail and bail bond and proceed in accordance with Chapter XXXIII of the Cr. P.C It does not appear from the order of the preceding dates i.e 31-1-2008, 26-3-2008 that personal attendance of petitioner would no longer be dispensed with, and he is required to attend in person. The Magistrate in view of Section 317(1) Cr. P.C ought to have given an opportunity to an accused to appear in person who was being allowed to be represented through a pleader. The order of preceding dates in the case on the contrary shows that Magistrate in fact accepted the representation under Section 317, Cr. P.C The magistrate has to follow the procedure prescribed therein, if it does not dispenses with his personal attendance. A Magistrate while rejecting a representation under Section 317 Cr. P.C cannot at the same time cancel bail bond and issue non-bailable warrant of arrest, if on preceding dates has not clearly directed that personal attendance under Section 317, Cr. P.C will no longer be dispensed with. The Court ought to provide a reasonable opportunity to the accused to appear in person whose representation was earlier being allowed under Section 317, Cr. P.C In this case, it appears that trial lingered as a co-accused Prem Prakash was absconding. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that there have been no latches on his part.

Sandeep Kumar Tekriwal Vs State of Bihar and Anr on 09 Sep 2008

Citations : [2009 AIR JHAR R 2 203], [2009 PLJR 2 260], [2008 SCC ONLINE PAT 254], [2009 (2) PLJR 263], [2009 CRI LJ 523]

Other Sources :

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56b49331607dba348f00518d

Atul and Ors Vs State and Anr on 30 Nov 2022

Posted on December 15, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Bombay High Court held, marrying another woman while having an alive spouse is cruelty u/s 498A IPC.

From Para 5,

5. The cruelty prima facie handed out to non-applicant no. 2 did not stop at physically torturing non-applicant no. 2 but, it went beyond the physical state of pain in the sense that the husband i.e. applicant no. 1 with impunity performed marriage with another woman and that was done with the active aid and assistance of the rest of the applicants. When a husband performs the second marriage while his first marriage is alive, a question arises as to whether such act on the part of husband would amount to cruelty within the meaning of Section 498-A of the IPC. As per explanation to Section 498-A of the IPC, cruelty means; any wilful conduct of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (mental or physical) of the woman. It also includes harassment caused with a view to coercing the woman or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security. Here, we are concerned with wilful conduct of such a nature which has caused or which is likely to cause danger to health of non-applicant no. 2. Marrying another woman by the husband during existence of his first marriage is something which is most likely to cause trauma and grave injury to the mental health of the first wife, unless it has been done with the consent of the first wife. If the act of performance of second marriage during subsistence of the first marriage is not interpreted as amounting to cruelty contemplated under Section 498-A of the IPC, it would frustrate the legislative intent to prevent the torture to a woman by her husband or by relative of her husband and, therefore, that interpretation has to be adopted which sub-serves the object sought to be achieved by the Legislation. Useful reference in this regard may be made to the cases of B.S. Joshi and ors. Vs. State Of Haryana and anr. [2003 Cri L.J. 2028 (SC)] and Reema Aggarwal Vs. Anupam and ors. [(2004) 3 SCC 199]. By these parameters, we find here that the second marriage performed by applicant no. 1 while his first marriage with non-applicant no. 2 was on, prima facie amounted to cruelty. It has been further prima facie aggravated here when the applicant no. 1 made a false representation to other woman with whom he performed marriage during subsistence of the present marriage with non-applicant no. 2 that his first wife had died and the rest of the applicants i.e. both his parents, his siblings and also aunt joined in chorus with applicant no. 1. They falsely told the second woman that the first wife of applicant no. 1 had died. All these details have been graphically stated by the second woman in her statement recorded under Section 161 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short the “Cr.P.C.”). She has also informed the police
that she too had lodged a criminal complaint against applicant no. 1 which was registered by Police Station, Imamwada, Nagpur for certain cognizable offences. Although, it is not known as to exactly which are those offences but, the fact remains that even the second wife of applicant no. 1 has lodged a criminal report against him.

Atul and Ors Vs State and Anr on 30 Nov 2022

CPIO SCI Vs Subhash Chandra Agarwal on 13 Nov 2019

Posted on July 28, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A constitution bench of Apex Court held as follows:

From Para 59,

59. Reading of the aforesaid judicial precedents, in our opinion, would indicate that personal records, including name, address, physical, mental and psychological status, marks obtained, grades and answer sheets, are all treated as personal information. Similarly, professional records, including qualification, performance, evaluation reports, ACRs, disciplinary proceedings, etc. are all personal information. Medical records, treatment, choice of
medicine, list of hospitals and doctors visited, findings recorded, including that of the family members, information relating to assets, liabilities, income tax returns, details of investments, lending and borrowing, etc. are personal information. Such personal information is entitled to protection from unwarranted invasion of privacy and conditional access is available when stipulation of larger public interest is satisfied. This list is indicative and not exhaustive.

CPIO SCI Vs Subhash Chandra Agarwal on 13 Nov 2019 Para 59

Citations : [2019 SCC ONLINE SC 1459]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/101637927/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5dcc51443321bc4f5eaf25b5

Commissioner of Income Tax and Ors Vs Chhabil Dass Agarwal on 8 Aug 2013

Posted on July 24, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held as follows,

From Para 15,

15. Before discussing the fact proposition, we would notice the principle of law as laid down by this Court. It is settled law that non-entertainment of petitions under writ jurisdiction by the High Court when an efficacious alternative remedy is available is a rule of self-imposed limitation. It is essentially a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. Undoubtedly, it is within the discretion of the High Court to grant relief under Article 226 despite the existence of an alternative remedy. However, the High Court must not interfere if there is an adequate efficacious alternative remedy available to the petitioner and he has approached the High Court without availing the same unless he has made out an exceptional case warranting such interference or there exist sufficient grounds to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. (See: State of U.P. vs. Mohammad Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86; Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433; Harbanslal Sahnia vs. Indian Oil Corpn.
Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 107; State of H.P. vs. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd., (2005) 6 SCC 499).
16. The Constitution Benches of this Court in K.S. Rashid and Sons vs. Income Tax Investigation Commission, AIR 1954 SC 207; Sangram Singh vs. Election Tribunal, Kotah, AIR 1955 SC 425; Union of India vs. T.R. Varma, AIR 1957 SC 882; State of U.P. vs. Mohd. Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 and K.S. Venkataraman and Co. (P) Ltd. vs. State of Madras, AIR 1966 SC 1089 have held that though Article 226 confers a very wide powers in the matter of issuing writs on the High Court, the remedy of writ absolutely discretionary in character. If the High Court is satisfied that the aggrieved party can have an adequate or suitable relief elsewhere, it can refuse to exercise its jurisdiction. The Court, in extraordinary circumstances, may exercise the power if it comes to the conclusion that there has been a breach of principles of natural justice or procedure required for decision has not been adopted.
(See: N.T. Veluswami Thevar vs. G. Raja Nainar, AIR 1959 SC 422; Municipal Council, Khurai vs. Kamal Kumar, (1965) 2 SCR 653; Siliguri Municipality vs. Amalendu Das, (1984) 2 SCC 436; S.T. Muthusami vs. K. Natarajan, (1988) 1 SCC 572; Rajasthan SRTC vs. Krishna Kant, (1995) 5 SCC 75; Kerala SEB vs. Kurien E. Kalathil, (2000) 6 SCC 293; A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu vs. S. Chellappan, (2000) 7 SCC 695; L.L. Sudhakar Reddy vs. State of A.P., (2001) 6 SCC 634; Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami (Moingiri Maharaj) Sahakari Dugdha Utpadak Sanstha vs. State of Maharashtra, (2001) 8 SCC 509; Pratap Singh vs. State of Haryana, (2002) 7 SCC 484 and GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. vs. ITO, (2003) 1 SCC 72).

From Para 19,

19. Thus, while it can be said that this Court has recognized some exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy, i.e., where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice, the proposition laid down in Thansingh Nathmal case, Titagarh Paper Mills case and other similar judgments that the High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance still holds the field. Therefore, when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation.

Commissioner of Income Tax and Ors Vs Chhabil Dass Agarwal on 8 Aug 2013

Citations : [2013 AD SC 8 620], [2013 CTR SC 261 113], [2013 ITR SC 357], [2013 JLJR 4 35], [2013 JT SC 11 387], [2013 PLJR 4 179], [2013 SCALE 10 326], [2014 SCC 1 603], [2013 TAXMAN SC 217 143], [2013 SCC ONLINE SC 717], [2013 TAXMANNCOM SC 36]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/51987756/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af2ce4b0149711415ba2

Whirlpool Corporation Vs Registrar of Trade Marks Mumbai and Ors on 26 Oct 1998

Posted on July 23, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

Landmark judgment from a division bench of the Apex Court.

From Paras 14 and 15,

14. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. This power can be exercised by the High Court not only for issuing writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights contained in Part III of the Constitution but also for “any other purpose”.
15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case- law on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field.

Whirlpool Corporation Vs Registrar of Trade Marks Mumbai and Ors on 26 Oct 1998 (CM Ver)

Citations : [1998 SCC 8 1], [1999 AIR SC 22], [1998 AIR SC 3345], [1999 BOMCR SC 2 70], [1998 JT 7 243], [1998 SCALE 5 655], [1998 SUPREME 8 176], [1998 AIR SCW 3345]

Other Sources :

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/575fd361607dba63d7e6e044

MS Radha Krishan Industries Vs State of Himachal Pradesh on 20 Apr 2021

Posted on July 22, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held the following principles in regards to approaching a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

From Para 27,

27 The principles of law which emerge are that :
(i) The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well;
(ii) The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of the High Court is where an effective alternate remedy is available to the aggrieved person;
(iii) Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise where (a) the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c) the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or (d) the vires of a legislation is challenged;
(iv) An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High Court of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law;
(v) When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion; and
(vi) In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if the High Court is objectively of the view that the nature of the controversy requires the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view would not readily be interfered with.

MS Radha Krishan Industries Vs State of Himachal Pradesh on 20 Apr 2021

Citations : [2021 SCC ONLINE SC 334]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/62362537/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/60806fd6125abdf1726ab6fb

Hrishikesh Sahoo Vs State of Karnataka and Ors on 23 Mar 2022

Posted on July 20, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

Hrishikesh Sahoo Vs State of Karnataka and Ors on 23 Mar 2022

Citations :

Other Sources :

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 11 Jul 2022

Posted on July 12, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court passed the following guidelines with respect to Arrest and Bails

From Para 24,

24.Section 41A deals with the procedure for appearance before the police officer who is required to issue a notice to the person against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received or a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed a cognizable offence, and arrest is not required under Section 41(1). Section 41B deals with the procedure of arrest along with mandatory duty on the part of the officer.
25.On the scope and objective of Section 41 and 41A, it is obvious that they are facets of Article 21 of the Constitution. We need not elaborate any further, in light of the judgment of this Court in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273:
26.We only reiterate that the directions aforesaid ought to be complied with in letter and spirit by the investigating and prosecuting agencies, while the view expressed by us on the non-compliance of Section 41 and the consequences that flow from it has to be kept in mind by the Court, which is expected to be reflected in the orders.
27.Despite the dictum of this Court in Arnesh Kumar (supra), no concrete step has been taken to comply with the mandate of Section 41A of the Code. This Court has clearly interpreted Section 41(1)(b)(i) and (ii) inter alia holding that notwithstanding the existence of a reason to believe qua a police officer, the satisfaction for the need to arrest shall also be present. Thus, sub-clause (1)(b)(i) of Section 41 has to be read along with sub-clause (ii) and therefore both the elements of ‘reason to believe’ and ‘satisfaction qua an arrest’ are mandated and accordingly are to be recorded by the police officer.
28.It is also brought to our notice that there are no specific guidelines with respect to the mandatory compliance of Section 41A of the Code. An endeavour was made by the Delhi High Court while deciding Writ Petition (C) No. 7608 of 2017 vide order dated 07.02.2018, followed by order dated 28.10.2021 in Contempt Case (C) No. 480 of 2020 & CM Application No.25054 of 2020, wherein not only the need for guidelines but also the effect of non-compliance towards taking action against the officers concerned was discussed. We also take note of the fact that a standing order has been passed by the Delhi Police viz., Standing Order No. 109 of 2020, which provides for a set of guidelines in the form of procedure for issuance of notices or orders by the police officers. Considering the aforesaid action taken, in due compliance with the order passed by the Delhi High Court in Writ Petition (C) No.7608 of 2017 dated 07.02.2018, this Court has also passed an order in Writ Petition (Crl.) 420 of 2021 dated 10.05.2021 directing the State of Bihar to look into the said aspect of an appropriate modification to give effect to the mandate of Section 41A. A recent judgment has also been rendered on the same lines by the High Court of Jharkhand in Cr.M.P. No. 1291 of 2021 dated 16.06.2022.
29.Thus, we deem it appropriate to direct all the State Governments and the Union Territories to facilitate standing orders while taking note of the standing order issued by the Delhi Police i.e., Standing Order No. 109 of 2020, to comply with the mandate of Section 41A. We do feel that this would certainly take care of not only the unwarranted arrests, but also the clogging of bail applications before various Courts as they may not even be required for the offences up to seven years.
30.We also expect the courts to come down heavily on the officers effecting arrest without due compliance of Section 41 and Section 41A. We express our hope that the Investigating Agencies would keep in mind the law laid down in Arnesh Kumar (Supra), the discretion to be exercised on the touchstone of presumption of innocence, and the safeguards provided under Section 41, since an arrest is not mandatory. If discretion is exercised to effect such an arrest, there shall be procedural compliance. Our view is also reflected by the interpretation of the specific provision under Section 60A of the Code which warrants the officer concerned to make the arrest strictly in accordance with the Code.

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 11 Jul 2022

Citations :

Other Sources :

There is another Order passed earlier in this very same case with respect to NBW recall here.

Index of Bail Judgments is here.

Malhan and 17 Ors Vs State of UP and Anr on 07 Feb 2022

Posted on July 11, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Allahabad High Court held that, Once the written statement contains an admission in favor of the plaintiff, the amendment of such admission of the defendants cannot be allowed to be withdrawn and such withdrawal would amount to totally displacing the case of the plaintiff which would cause him irretrievable prejudice. In the present case the question now is whether the admission made by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff can be withdrawn and the answer in the language of the apex court is ‘not permissible’.

From Para 4,

4. We have heard Sri Madan Mohan Chaurasiya, learned counsel for the review applicants, and requested him to explain the delay in filing the review application, to which he gave a strange reply that he advised his clients that they may take a chance by filing this review application after a period of six years. We are pained to note that an advocate should not give such an advise when there is no error apparent on the face of record nor was there any other reason that why the matter be re-agitated after it was finally decided.

From Para 7,

7. The expression “sufficient cause” in Section 5 of Act, 1963 has been held to receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally a delay in preferring appeal may be condoned in interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fide is
imputable to parties, seeking condonation of delay. In Collector, Land Acquisition Vs. Katiji, 1987(2) SCC 107, the Court said, that, when substantial justice and technical considerations are taken against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for, the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non deliberate delay. The Court further said that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.

Malhan and 17 Ors Vs State of UP and Anr on 07 Feb 2022

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Legal Procedure Explained – Interpretation of Statutes

Abhishek Singh Vs State of M.P. on 26 Dec 2022

Sandeep Kumar Tekriwal Vs State of Bihar and Anr on 09 Sep 2008

Atul and Ors Vs State and Anr on 30 Nov 2022

CPIO SCI Vs Subhash Chandra Agarwal on 13 Nov 2019

Commissioner of Income Tax and Ors Vs Chhabil Dass Agarwal on 8 Aug 2013

Whirlpool Corporation Vs Registrar of Trade Marks Mumbai and Ors on 26 Oct 1998

MS Radha Krishan Industries Vs State of Himachal Pradesh on 20 Apr 2021

Hrishikesh Sahoo Vs State of Karnataka and Ors on 23 Mar 2022

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 11 Jul 2022

Malhan and 17 Ors Vs State of UP and Anr on 07 Feb 2022