Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu and Ors Vs Gobardhan Sao and Ors on 27 Feb 2002

Posted on February 4, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court passed this Landmark observation wrt the Sec 5 of Limitation Act 1963,

From Para 12,

12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression “sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute “sufficient cause” or not will be dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hyper technical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way.

Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu and Ors Vs Gobardhan Sao and Ors on 27 Feb 2002

Citations : [2002 SCALE 2 334], [2002 SCC 3 195], [2002 AIR SC 978], [2002 ALLMR SC 2 588], [2002 SCR 2 77], [2002 AIR SC 1201], [2002 SUPREME 2 143], [2002 RD 93 556], [2006 JCR SC 1 93], [2002 LW 3 417], [2002 UC 1 718], [2002 BLJR 1 794], [2002 MLJ SC 2 85], [2002 ALR 48 101], [2002 JT SC 2 349], [2002 AIR SCW 978]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/826396/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609adbce4b01497114121f8

Indian Oil Corporation Ltd and Ors Vs Subrata Borah Chowlek and Anr on 12 Nov 2010

Posted on February 4, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows with respect to granting exemption from limitation under Limitation Act 1963,

From Para 7,

7. Having heard the learned counsel, we are of the opinion that in the instant case a sufficient cause had been made out for condonation of delay in filing the appeal and therefore, the High Court erred in declining to condone the same. It is true that even upon showing a sufficient cause, a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay as a matter of right, yet it is trite that in construing sufficient cause, the Courts generally follow a liberal approach particularly when no negligence, inaction or mala fides can be imputed to the party.

From Para 11,

11.It is manifest that though Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 envisages the explanation of delay to the satisfaction of the Court, and makes no distinction between the State and the citizen, nonetheless adoption of a strict standard of proof in case of the Government, which is dependant on the actions of its officials, who often do not have any personal interest in its transactions, may lead to grave miscarriage of justice and therefore, certain amount of latitude is permissible in such cases.

Indian Oil Corporation Ltd and Ors Vs Subrata Borah Chowlek and Anr on 12 Nov 2010

Citations : [2010 SCC 14 419], [2011 AIR SC 0 269], [2011 LW 1 385], [2011 KCCR SC SN 1 44], [2011 MLJ 1 1010], [2011 LLN 2 43], [2011 CUTLT SUPPL 826], [2010 AIOL 787], [2010 ELT SC 262 3], [2010 SCALE 12 209], [2011 SCC L&S 2 581], [2012 SCC CIV 1 640], [2011 AIC 97 34], [2011 ALR 84 462], [2011 AIR SC SUPP 446], [2011 FLR 130 324], [2011 AIR SCW 269], [2011 JT SC 1 535], [2011 CAL LT 2 91]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/29521266/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609aee4e4b01497114150a9

Y.Narasimha Rao and Ors Vs Y.Venkata Lakshmi and Anr on 9 Jul 1991

Posted on January 19, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court gave these interpretations to the various conditions under Section 13 of C.P.C. while deciding a foreign judgment is enforceable in India or not.

From Para 12,

12. We believe that the relevant provisions of Section 13 of the Code are capable of being interpreted to secure the required certainty in the sphere of this branch of law in conformity with public policy, justice, equity and good conscience, and the rules so evolved will protect the sanctity of the institution of marriage and the unity of family which are the corner stones of our societal life.
Clause (a) of Section 13 states that a foreign judgment shall not be recognised if it has not been pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction. We are of the view that this clause should be interpreted to mean that only that court will be a court of competent jurisdiction which the Act or the law under which the parties are married recognises as a court of competent jurisdiction to entertain the matrimonial dispute. Any other court should be held to be a court without jurisdiction unless both parties voluntarily and unconditionally subject themselves to the jurisdiction of that court. The expression “competent court” in Section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act has also to be construed likewise.
Clause (b) of Section 13 states that if a foreign has not been given on the merits of the case, the courts in this country will not recognise such judgment. This clause should be interpreted to mean (a) that the decision of the foreign court should be on a ground available under the law under which the parties are married, and (b) that the decision should be a result of the contest between the parties. The latter requirement is fulfilled only when the respondent is duly served and voluntarily and unconditionally submits himself/herself to the jurisdiction of the court and contests the claim, or agrees to the passing of the decree with or without appearance. A mere filing of the reply to the claim under protest and without submitting to the jurisdiction of the court, or an appearance in the Court either in person or through a representative for objecting to the jurisdiction of the Court, should not be considered as a decision on the merits of the case. In this respect the general rules of the acquiescence to the jurisdiction of the Court which may be valid in other matters and areas should be ignored and deemed inappropriate.
The second part of clause (c) of Section 13 states that where the judgment is founded on a refusal to recognise the law of this country in cases in which such law is applicable, the judgment will not be recognised by the courts in this country. The marriages which take place in this country can only be under either the customary or the statutory law in force in this country. Hence, the only law that can be applicable to the matrimonial disputes is the one under which the parties are married, and no other law. When, therefore, a foreign judgment is founded on a jurisdiction or on ground not recognised by such law, it is a judgment which is in defiance of the Law. Hence, it is not conclusive of the matters adjudicated therein and therefore, unenforceable in this country. For the same reason, such a judgment will also be unenforceable under clause (f) of Section 13, since such a judgment would obviously be in breach of the matrimonial law in force in this country.
Clause (d) of Section 13 which makes a foreign judgment unenforceable on the ground that the proceedings in which it is obtained are opposed to natural justice, states no more than an elementary principle on which any civilised system of justice rests. However, in matters concerning the family law such as the matrimonial disputes, this principle has to b extended to mean something more than mere compliance with the technical rules of procedure. If the rule of audi alteram partem has any meaning with reference to the proceedings in a foreign court, for the purposes of the rule it should not be deemed sufficient that the respondent has been duly served with the process of the court. It is necessary to ascertain whether the respondent was in a position to present or represent himself/herself and contest effectively the said proceedings. This requirement should apply equally to the appellate proceedings if and when they are file by either party. If the foreign court has not ascertained and ensured such effective contest by requiring the petitioner to make all necessary provisions for the respondent to defend including the costs of travel, residence and litigation where necessary, it should be held that the proceedings are in breach of the principles of natural justice. It is for this reason that we find that the rules of Private International Law of some countries insist, even in commercial matters, that the action should be filed in the forum where the defendant is either domiciled or is habitually resident. It is only in special cases which is called special jurisdiction where the claim has some real link with other forum that a judgment of such forum is recognised. This jurisdiction principle is also recognised by the Judgments Convention of this European Community . If, therefore, the courts in this country also insist as a matter of rule that foreign matrimonial judgment will be recognised only it it is of the forum where the respondent is domiciled or habitually and permanently resides, the provisions of clause (d) may be held to have been satisfied. The provision of clause (e) of Section 13 which requires that the courts in this country will not recognise a foreign judgment if it has been obtained by fraud, is self-evident. However, in view of the decision of this Court in Smt. Satya v. Teja Singh, (supra) it must be understood that the fraud need not be only in relation to the merits of the mater but may also be in relation to jurisdictional facts.

Y.Narasimha Rao and Ors Vs Y.Venkata Lakshmi and Anr on 9 Jul 1991

Citations : [1991 SCC CRI 1 626], [1991 CRIMES SC 2 855], [1991 SCALE 2 1], [1991 SCR 2 821], [1991 SCC 3 451], [1991 DMC SC 2 366], [1991 JT SC 1 33], [1991 LW 2 646]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/989920/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac6be4b014971140ed08

Messers S.J.S. Business Enterprises Vs State of Bihar and Ors on 17 Mar 2004

Posted on January 17, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held as follows,

As a general rule, suppression of a material fact by a litigant disqualifies such litigant from obtaining any relief. This rule has been evolved out of the need of the Courts to deter a litigant from abusing the process of Court by deceiving it. But the suppressed fact must be a material one in the sense that had it not been suppressed it would have had an effect on the merits of the case. It must be a matter which was material for the consideration of the Court, whatever view the Court may have taken.
The existence of an adequate or suitable alternative remedy available to a litigant is merely a factor which a Court entertaining an application under Article 226 will consider for exercising the discretion to issue a writ under Article 226 . But the existence of such remedy does not impinge upon the jurisdiction of the High Court to deal with the matter itself if it is in a position to do so on the basis of the affidavits filed. If however a party has already availed of the alternative remedy while invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226, it would not be appropriate for the Court to entertain the writ petition. The Rule is based on public policy but the motivating factor is the existence of a parallel jurisdiction in another Court. But this Court has also held in C. B. Gosain Bhan V. State of Orissa 14 STC 766= 1963 (2) SCR 879 that even when an alternative remedy has been availed of by a party but not pursued that the party could prosecute proceedings under Article 226 for the same relief. This Court has also held that that when a party has already moved the High Court under Article 226 and failed to obtain relief and then moved an application under Article 32 before this Court for the same relief, normally the Court will not entertain the application under Article 32. But where in the parallel jurisdiction, the order is not a speaking one or the matter has been disposed of on some other ground, this Court has, in a suitable case, entertained the application under Article 32 . Instead of dismissing the writ petition on the ground that the alternative remedy had been availed of the Court may call upon the party to elect whether it will proceed with the alternative remedy or with the application under Article 226. Therefore the fact that a suit had already been filed by the appellant was not such a fact the suppression of which could have affected the final disposal of the writ petition on merits.

Finally,

In this case, admittedly the appellant has withdrawn the suit two weeks after the suit had been filed. In other words the appellant elected to pursue its remedies only under Article 226. The pleadings were also complete before the High Court. No doubt, the interim order which was passed by the High Court was obtained when the suit was pending. But by the time the writ petition was heard the suit had already been withdrawn a year earlier. Although the appellant could not, on the High Court’s reasoning, take advantage of the interim order, it was not correct in rejecting the writ petition itself when the suit had admittedly been withdrawn, especially when the matter was ripe for hearing and all the facts necessary for determining the writ petition on merits were before the Court, and when the Court was not of the view that the writ petition was otherwise not maintainable.

Messers S.J.S. Business Enterprises Vs State of Bihar and Ors on 17 Mar 2004

Citations : [2004 SUPREME 5 485], [2004 JT SUPP 2 601], [2004 ALLMR SC 5 793], [2004 SCC 7 166], [2004 AIR SC 2421], [2004 SCR 3 56], [2004 SCALE 3 374], [2004 ALD SC 5 84], [2005 ALT 2 4], [2004 BLJR 3 1739], [2005 COMPLJ SC 4 503], [2004 JCR SC 2 284], [2004 PLJR 2 171], [2004 COMPCAS SC 121 99]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1770523/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609adffe4b0149711412a94

Ramjas Foundation and Ors vs Union of India and Ors on 9 Nov 2010

Posted on January 17, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows,

From Para 14,

14. The principle that a person who does not come to the Court with clean hands is not entitled to be heard on the merits of his grievance and, in any case, such person is not entitled to any relief is applicable not only to the petitions filed under Articles 32, 226 and 136 of the Constitution but also to the cases instituted in others courts and judicial forums. The object underlying the principle is that every Court is not only entitled but is duty bound to protect itself from unscrupulous litigants who do not have any respect for truth and who try to pollute the stream of justice by resorting to falsehood or by making misstatement or by suppressing facts which have bearing on adjudication of the issue(s) arising in the case. In Dalglish v. Jarvie 2 Mac. & G. 231, 238, Lord Langdale and Rolfe B. observed: “It is the duty of a party asking for an injunction to bring under the notice of the Court all facts material to the determination of his right to that injunction; and it is no excuse for him to say that he was not aware of the importance of any fact which he has omitted to bring forward. In Castelli v. Cook (1849) 7 Hare, 89, 94 Wigram V.C. stated the rule in the following words: “A plaintiff applying ex parte comes under a contract with the Court that he will state the whole case fully and fairly to the Court. If he fails to do that, and the Court finds, when other party applies to dissolve the injunction, that any material fact has been suppressed or not property brought forward, the plaintiff is told the Court will not decide on the merits, and that, as he has broken faith with the Court, the injunction must go.”

Ramjas Foundation and Ors vs Union of India and Ors on 9 Nov 2010

Citations : [2010 SCC 14 38], [2011 AIR SC 147], [2011 KCCR SC SN 1 8], [2011 LW 1 416], [2011 SCJ 2 391], [2011 MLJ 2 162], [2010 AIR SC 7091], [2010 CLT 4 351], [2010 SLT 8 156], [2010 DLT 174 100], [2010 AIOL 763], [2010 JT 12 134], [2010 SCALE 11 598], [2010 SUPREME 7 585], [2011 SCC CIV 4 889], [2010 AIR SCW 7091], [2011 RCR CIVIL SC 1 176], [2012 CUT LT 113 632]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/265836/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609aee8e4b0149711415189

Abhishek Singh Vs State of M.P. on 26 Dec 2022

Posted on January 7, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench of MP High Court held as follows, relying on Reema Aggarwal decision here

From Para 9,

9. Though it is an admitted position that complainant/respondent No.4 was already married and had a living spouse, when she contracted the second marriage with petitioner, however, there is no indication of word ‘valid marriage’ in Section 498-A of I.P.C. The language used therein is ‘husband or relative of husband’. These words not only rope in those who are validly married but also anyone who has undergone some or other form of marriage and thereby assumed for himself the position of husband.

Abhishek Singh Vs State of M.P. on 26 Dec 2022

Sandeep Kumar Tekriwal Vs State of Bihar and Anr on 09 Sep 2008

Posted on December 28, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Patna High Court held as follows,

From Para 15,

15. Section 317, Cr. P.C provides for inquiries and trial being held in the absence of accused in certain cases. However, if the Magistrate finds that personal appearance of the accused is necessary, he would direct that accused would no longer be represented on the next date by a pleader under Section 317, Cr. P.C but would appear in person. If the accused in spite of such order does not appear in person, it would be open for the learned Magistrate to issue warrant of arrest and proceed in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Chapter-VI of the Cr. P.C and may also cancel bail and bail bond and proceed in accordance with Chapter XXXIII of the Cr. P.C It does not appear from the order of the preceding dates i.e 31-1-2008, 26-3-2008 that personal attendance of petitioner would no longer be dispensed with, and he is required to attend in person. The Magistrate in view of Section 317(1) Cr. P.C ought to have given an opportunity to an accused to appear in person who was being allowed to be represented through a pleader. The order of preceding dates in the case on the contrary shows that Magistrate in fact accepted the representation under Section 317, Cr. P.C The magistrate has to follow the procedure prescribed therein, if it does not dispenses with his personal attendance. A Magistrate while rejecting a representation under Section 317 Cr. P.C cannot at the same time cancel bail bond and issue non-bailable warrant of arrest, if on preceding dates has not clearly directed that personal attendance under Section 317, Cr. P.C will no longer be dispensed with. The Court ought to provide a reasonable opportunity to the accused to appear in person whose representation was earlier being allowed under Section 317, Cr. P.C In this case, it appears that trial lingered as a co-accused Prem Prakash was absconding. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that there have been no latches on his part.

Sandeep Kumar Tekriwal Vs State of Bihar and Anr on 09 Sep 2008

Citations : [2009 AIR JHAR R 2 203], [2009 PLJR 2 260], [2008 SCC ONLINE PAT 254], [2009 (2) PLJR 263], [2009 CRI LJ 523]

Other Sources :

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56b49331607dba348f00518d

Atul and Ors Vs State and Anr on 30 Nov 2022

Posted on December 15, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Bombay High Court held, marrying another woman while having an alive spouse is cruelty u/s 498A IPC.

From Para 5,

5. The cruelty prima facie handed out to non-applicant no. 2 did not stop at physically torturing non-applicant no. 2 but, it went beyond the physical state of pain in the sense that the husband i.e. applicant no. 1 with impunity performed marriage with another woman and that was done with the active aid and assistance of the rest of the applicants. When a husband performs the second marriage while his first marriage is alive, a question arises as to whether such act on the part of husband would amount to cruelty within the meaning of Section 498-A of the IPC. As per explanation to Section 498-A of the IPC, cruelty means; any wilful conduct of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (mental or physical) of the woman. It also includes harassment caused with a view to coercing the woman or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security. Here, we are concerned with wilful conduct of such a nature which has caused or which is likely to cause danger to health of non-applicant no. 2. Marrying another woman by the husband during existence of his first marriage is something which is most likely to cause trauma and grave injury to the mental health of the first wife, unless it has been done with the consent of the first wife. If the act of performance of second marriage during subsistence of the first marriage is not interpreted as amounting to cruelty contemplated under Section 498-A of the IPC, it would frustrate the legislative intent to prevent the torture to a woman by her husband or by relative of her husband and, therefore, that interpretation has to be adopted which sub-serves the object sought to be achieved by the Legislation. Useful reference in this regard may be made to the cases of B.S. Joshi and ors. Vs. State Of Haryana and anr. [2003 Cri L.J. 2028 (SC)] and Reema Aggarwal Vs. Anupam and ors. [(2004) 3 SCC 199]. By these parameters, we find here that the second marriage performed by applicant no. 1 while his first marriage with non-applicant no. 2 was on, prima facie amounted to cruelty. It has been further prima facie aggravated here when the applicant no. 1 made a false representation to other woman with whom he performed marriage during subsistence of the present marriage with non-applicant no. 2 that his first wife had died and the rest of the applicants i.e. both his parents, his siblings and also aunt joined in chorus with applicant no. 1. They falsely told the second woman that the first wife of applicant no. 1 had died. All these details have been graphically stated by the second woman in her statement recorded under Section 161 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short the “Cr.P.C.”). She has also informed the police
that she too had lodged a criminal complaint against applicant no. 1 which was registered by Police Station, Imamwada, Nagpur for certain cognizable offences. Although, it is not known as to exactly which are those offences but, the fact remains that even the second wife of applicant no. 1 has lodged a criminal report against him.

Atul and Ors Vs State and Anr on 30 Nov 2022

CPIO SCI Vs Subhash Chandra Agarwal on 13 Nov 2019

Posted on July 28, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A constitution bench of Apex Court held as follows:

From Para 59,

59. Reading of the aforesaid judicial precedents, in our opinion, would indicate that personal records, including name, address, physical, mental and psychological status, marks obtained, grades and answer sheets, are all treated as personal information. Similarly, professional records, including qualification, performance, evaluation reports, ACRs, disciplinary proceedings, etc. are all personal information. Medical records, treatment, choice of
medicine, list of hospitals and doctors visited, findings recorded, including that of the family members, information relating to assets, liabilities, income tax returns, details of investments, lending and borrowing, etc. are personal information. Such personal information is entitled to protection from unwarranted invasion of privacy and conditional access is available when stipulation of larger public interest is satisfied. This list is indicative and not exhaustive.

CPIO SCI Vs Subhash Chandra Agarwal on 13 Nov 2019 Para 59

Citations : [2019 SCC ONLINE SC 1459]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/101637927/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5dcc51443321bc4f5eaf25b5

Commissioner of Income Tax and Ors Vs Chhabil Dass Agarwal on 8 Aug 2013

Posted on July 24, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held as follows,

From Para 15,

15. Before discussing the fact proposition, we would notice the principle of law as laid down by this Court. It is settled law that non-entertainment of petitions under writ jurisdiction by the High Court when an efficacious alternative remedy is available is a rule of self-imposed limitation. It is essentially a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. Undoubtedly, it is within the discretion of the High Court to grant relief under Article 226 despite the existence of an alternative remedy. However, the High Court must not interfere if there is an adequate efficacious alternative remedy available to the petitioner and he has approached the High Court without availing the same unless he has made out an exceptional case warranting such interference or there exist sufficient grounds to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. (See: State of U.P. vs. Mohammad Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86; Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433; Harbanslal Sahnia vs. Indian Oil Corpn.
Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 107; State of H.P. vs. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd., (2005) 6 SCC 499).
16. The Constitution Benches of this Court in K.S. Rashid and Sons vs. Income Tax Investigation Commission, AIR 1954 SC 207; Sangram Singh vs. Election Tribunal, Kotah, AIR 1955 SC 425; Union of India vs. T.R. Varma, AIR 1957 SC 882; State of U.P. vs. Mohd. Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 and K.S. Venkataraman and Co. (P) Ltd. vs. State of Madras, AIR 1966 SC 1089 have held that though Article 226 confers a very wide powers in the matter of issuing writs on the High Court, the remedy of writ absolutely discretionary in character. If the High Court is satisfied that the aggrieved party can have an adequate or suitable relief elsewhere, it can refuse to exercise its jurisdiction. The Court, in extraordinary circumstances, may exercise the power if it comes to the conclusion that there has been a breach of principles of natural justice or procedure required for decision has not been adopted.
(See: N.T. Veluswami Thevar vs. G. Raja Nainar, AIR 1959 SC 422; Municipal Council, Khurai vs. Kamal Kumar, (1965) 2 SCR 653; Siliguri Municipality vs. Amalendu Das, (1984) 2 SCC 436; S.T. Muthusami vs. K. Natarajan, (1988) 1 SCC 572; Rajasthan SRTC vs. Krishna Kant, (1995) 5 SCC 75; Kerala SEB vs. Kurien E. Kalathil, (2000) 6 SCC 293; A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu vs. S. Chellappan, (2000) 7 SCC 695; L.L. Sudhakar Reddy vs. State of A.P., (2001) 6 SCC 634; Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami (Moingiri Maharaj) Sahakari Dugdha Utpadak Sanstha vs. State of Maharashtra, (2001) 8 SCC 509; Pratap Singh vs. State of Haryana, (2002) 7 SCC 484 and GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. vs. ITO, (2003) 1 SCC 72).

From Para 19,

19. Thus, while it can be said that this Court has recognized some exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy, i.e., where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice, the proposition laid down in Thansingh Nathmal case, Titagarh Paper Mills case and other similar judgments that the High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance still holds the field. Therefore, when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation.

Commissioner of Income Tax and Ors Vs Chhabil Dass Agarwal on 8 Aug 2013

Citations : [2013 AD SC 8 620], [2013 CTR SC 261 113], [2013 ITR SC 357], [2013 JLJR 4 35], [2013 JT SC 11 387], [2013 PLJR 4 179], [2013 SCALE 10 326], [2014 SCC 1 603], [2013 TAXMAN SC 217 143], [2013 SCC ONLINE SC 717], [2013 TAXMANNCOM SC 36]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/51987756/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af2ce4b0149711415ba2

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Legal Procedure Explained – Interpretation of Statutes

Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu and Ors Vs Gobardhan Sao and Ors on 27 Feb 2002

Indian Oil Corporation Ltd and Ors Vs Subrata Borah Chowlek and Anr on 12 Nov 2010

Y.Narasimha Rao and Ors Vs Y.Venkata Lakshmi and Anr on 9 Jul 1991

Messers S.J.S. Business Enterprises Vs State of Bihar and Ors on 17 Mar 2004

Ramjas Foundation and Ors vs Union of India and Ors on 9 Nov 2010

Abhishek Singh Vs State of M.P. on 26 Dec 2022

Sandeep Kumar Tekriwal Vs State of Bihar and Anr on 09 Sep 2008

Atul and Ors Vs State and Anr on 30 Nov 2022

CPIO SCI Vs Subhash Chandra Agarwal on 13 Nov 2019

Commissioner of Income Tax and Ors Vs Chhabil Dass Agarwal on 8 Aug 2013