A division bench of the Apex Court held that ‘Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (popularly called as Restitution of Conjugal Rights case) is not violative of Articles 14 and 21 (right to privacy)‘.
Tag: Legal Procedure Explained – Interpretation of Statutes
Bipin Chander Jaisinghbhai Shah Vs Prabhawati on 19 Oct 1956
A division bench of Apex Court held as follows, (with respect to ‘desertion’)
Thus the quality of permanence is one of the essential elements which differentiates desertion from wilful separation. If a spouse abandons the other spouse in a state of temporary passion, for example, anger or disgust, without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion. For the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there, namely, (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Similarly two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned : (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention aforesaid.
Citations: [1957 AIR 176], [1956 SCR 838]
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1131783/
Index of Divorce judgments is here.
Grasim Industries Ltd Vs Collector of Customs Bombay on 04 Apr 2002
Sitting on the full bench of Apex Court, Justice Arijit Pasayat, held as follows, while interpreting the statutes passed by the Legislature.
From Para 9,
No words or expressions used in any statute can be said to be redundant or superfluous. In matters of interpretation one should not concentrate too much on one word and pay too little attention to other words. No provision in the statute and no word in any section can be construed in isolation. Every provision and every word must be looked at generally and in the context in which it is used. It is said that every statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting any word while considering a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. Where the words are clear and there is no obscurity, and there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the Court to take upon itself the task of amending or alternating the statutory provisions. Wherever the language is clear the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language used. While doing so what has been said in the statute as also what has not been said has to be noted. The construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words has to be avoided. As stated by the Privy Council in Crawford v. Spooner [(1846) 6 Moore PC 1] “we cannot aid the Legislature’s defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend and, by construction make up deficiencies which are left there”. In case of an ordinary word there should be no attempt to substitute or paraphrase of general application. Attention should be confined to what is necessary for deciding the particular case. This principle is too well settled and reference to few decisions of this Court would suffice. [See: Gwalior Rayons Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. v. Custodian of Vested Forests, Palghat and Anr. (AIR 1990 SC 1747), Union of India and Anr. v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal (AIR 1992 SC 96), Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price Waterhouse and Anr. (1997 (6) SCC 312) and Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India and Ors. (JT 2002 (3) SC 21)]
Court Kutchehry Version:
Ashwini Pradhan Vs UOI and Anr on 08 Aug 2023
A division bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur, held as follows,
From Para 19, (Presumption of Legislature is correct)
19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of U.P., reported in 1960 SCC OnLine SC 16 has held that in the interpretation of the statutes the Court always presumes that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. Therefore, a provision of a statute cannot be used to defeat another unless it is impossible to effect reconciliation between them. Hence, the interpretation which involves conflict, must be avoided.
From Para 20,
20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Aphali Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (1989) 4 SCC 378 has explained the principles of interpretation of statutes. It has been held as follows:
“39. …….The best interpretation is made from the context, ‘Injustum est nisi tota lege inspecta, de una aliqua ejus particula proposita judicare vel respondere’. It is unjust to decide or respond as to any particular part of a law without examining the whole of the law. ‘Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus’. To interpret and in such a way as to harmonise laws with laws, is the best mode of interpretation…….”
From Para 21,
21. In the case of Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, reported in (2002) 4 SCC 297, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:
“10. ………Where the words are clear and there is no obscurity, and there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the court to take upon itself the task of amending or alternating (sic altering) the statutory provisions……”
Note: My intention of adding this case on the website is to make use of the Supreme Court judgments cited in this case, specifically the Grasim Industries Ltd one.
Index of DV cases is here.
Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 07 Oct 2021 (and other Directions)
A division bench of Apex Court passed these guidelines with respect to issue of Summons and Warrants and Recall of NBW,
After filing of chargesheet/complaint taking of cognizance
a) Ordinary summons at the 1st instance/including permitting appearance through Lawyer.
b) If such an accused does not appear despite service of summons, then Bailable Warrant for physical appearance may be issued.
c) NBW on failure to failure to appear despite issuance of Bailable Warrant.
d) NBW may be cancelled or converted into a Bailable Warrant/Summons without insisting physical appearance of accused, if such an application is moved on behalf of the accused before execution of the NBW on an undertaking of the accused to appear physically on the next date/s of hearing.
e) Bail applications of such accused on appearance may be decided w/o the accused being taken in physical custody or by granting interim bail till the bail application is decided.
Citations: [(2021) 10 SCC 773], [2022 LiveLaw (SC) 577]
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/16350770/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/62ba660db50db90d4b55ecaf
A corrected Reportable judgment is passed on 11 Jul 2022…
Further time is given to comply with the directions earlier given on 03 Feb 2023…
Supreme Court also directed as follows.
The judgment in the present case i.e. “Satender Kumar Antil Vs. CBI” reported in (2022) 10 SCC 51 and the judgment in Siddharth’s case (supra) should be incorporated as part of the curriculum of the State Judicial Academies and the National Judicial Academy.
Interim directions given on 21 Mar 2023 considering the States and High Courts did not provide the required information to Amicus
Some individual cases were filed alleging non-compliance of this Order by some Magistrates… SC passed this order on 02 May 2023
Final Judgment on 13 Feb 2024
Supreme gave another ‘last’ change on 07 May 2024 to file affidavits that have not complied with the directions issued in this case.
Notices must not be issued via WhatsApp, says Supreme Court.
Negating the plea of State of Haryana, Supreme Court held that notices u/s 41A of Cr.P.C. or u/s 35 of BNSS cannot be sent via WhatsApp or any other electronic communication medium, unlike section 530 BNSS, which mandates that, Trials, Inquires and Proceedings that may be held in electronic mode, by use of electronic communication or use of audio-video electronic means.” So, Parliament says, Courts can use technologia but Police must use postman.
Index of NBW Judgments is here.
Kamisetty Pedda Venkata Subbamma and Anr Vs Chinna Kummagandla Venkataiah on 21 Dec 2004
Following his own decision here, Justice S.R.K. Prasad of AP High Court, held as follows,
From Para 4,
4. Adverting to the same, I have perused the record.
The contention of the revision petitioners that the revision petitioners presented the written arguments, appears to be correct. The Rent Control Appellate Court has failed to consider the written arguments presented on behalf of landlords before the Court. This Court has observed at Paragraph 6 in the decision referred above which is as follows:
“I have perused the written arguments. None of the contentions raised in the written arguments are considered. In fact, the decisions of the Supreme Court, this Court and Patna High Court have been cited in the written arguments. The same does not find place in the judgment of the Appellate Tribunal. The lower Appellate Court shall keep in mind that written arguments are submitted not for fancy sake. It is a right conferred by the statue to a party to submit the written arguments which are meant for consideration and adjudication. No Court shall ignore the written arguments and refuse to consider the same. If it were to do so, they are liable for action by the Superior Courts. This is nothing short of judicial dishonesty. A Judge is not supposed to exhibit such dishonesty. A Judge is supposed to exhibit extreme patience and give long rope and hear arguments and then pronounce his
decision after adjudicating the matter. I find that this is a classic case where the Judge refused to consider the written arguments. He has not considered the decisions cited before him. In such cases, the judgment should not be upheld. It deserves to be set aside since no party can be allowed to leave the Court with dissatisfaction for non-consideration of his arguments. If such things were to happen, the litigant public certainly loses confidence in the judicial systems. I am of the considered view that the Appellate Court”s judgment shall not stand for judicial scrutiny before this Court for the learned Judge”s failure to consider the written arguments and adjudicate the matter in the light of the written arguments which lead to miscarriage of justice.”
The written arguments were not considered. One should remember that the Courts existed for rendering justice in accordance with law, but not in accordance whims and fancies. In case the material placed by the Counsel, is ignored, the litigant public who approaches the Courts with fond hope of getting justice, will lose confidence in the judicial system. Judges must keep in kind that it is their duty to go through the written arguments, advert to them and refer them in the course of the judgment by giving answers. In the present case, the written arguments are not adverted to. When the Judge does not mind through the written arguments and advert to the same in the judgment, it cannot be said that fair hearing has been given by the Judge. In such cases, the revisional authority has to correct the mistake committed by the Appellate Authority and the things have to be put in order. Two options are open for this Court viz., (1) the revisional Court has to take the burden of rehearing the entire matter and arrive at the conclusion and render the justice (2) the revisional Court has to send back the matter to the Appellate Judge for reconsideration.
Citations:
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1249841/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5608f84de4b0149711141f93
https://www.courtkutchehry.com/Judgement/Search/t/930117-kamisetty-pedda-venkata-subbamma-and?s=Kamisetty%20Pedda%20Venkata%20Subbamma&refine_search=&s_acts=
G.Jaya Rao Vs State of A.P. Land Reforms Srikakulam on 21 Feb 2003
A single judge bench of AP High Court held as follows,
From Paras 6 and 7,
6. I have perused the written arguments. None of the contentions raised in the written arguments are considered. In fact, the decisions of the Supreme Court, this Court and Patna High Court have been cited in the written arguments. The same does not find place in the judgment of the appellate Tribunal. The lower appellate Court shall keep in mind that written arguments are submitted not for fancy sake. It is a right conferred by the statute to a party to submit the written arguments which are meant for consideration and adjudication. No Court shall ignore the written arguments and refuse to consider the same. If it were to do so, they are liable for action by the superior Courts. This is nothing short of judicial dishonesty. A judge is not supposed to exhibit such dishonesty. A judge is supposed to exhibit extreme patience and give long rope and hear arguments and then pronounce his decision after adjudicating the matter. I find that this is a classic case where the judge refused to consider the written arguments. He has not considered the decisions cited before him. In such cases, the judgment should not be upheld. It deserves to be set aside since no party can be allowed to leave the Court with dissatisfaction for non-consideration of his arguments. If such things were to happen, the litigant public certainly loses confidence in the judicial system. I am of the considered view that the appellate Court’s judgment shall not stand for judicial scrutiny before this Court for the learned Judge’s failure to consider the written arguments and adjudicate the matter in the light of the written arguments which lead to miscarriage of justice.
7. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed. The judgment of the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal in L.R.A No. 13 of 1992 is set aside. The matter is remitted back to the appellate Tribunal for fresh consideration. It shall consider every point raised in the written arguments by traversing through the necessary material namely evidence including oral and documentary and give answer to every point and adjudicate the same as expeditiously as possible. Both the parties are directed to appear before the appellate Tribunal on 1.4.2003. In view of the direction for their appearance, there is no need to issue a fresh notice to both the parties. Costs shall abide by the result of the appeal.
Citations: [(2003) 02 AP CK 0073], [2003 (3) ALT 127], [2003 (1) LS 324]
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/17028650/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56b48cbc607dba348ffee82e
https://lextechsuite.com/G-JAYA-RAO-VERSUS-STATE-OF-AP-2003-02-01
https://www.courtkutchehry.com/Judgement/Search/t/947782-g-jay-rao-vs-state
This was followed in this subsequent case here.
MS Godrej Sara Lee Limited Vs Excise and Taxation Officer cum AO and Ors on 01 Feb 2023
A division bench of Supreme Court held that, Not pursued the alternative remedy available to him/it cannot mechanically be construed as a ground for a Writ’s dismissal.
Further it was held that, A writ petition despite being maintainable may not be entertained by a high court for very many reasons or relief could even be refused to the petitioner, despite setting up a sound legal point, if grant of the claimed relief would not further public interest.
From Para 4,
4. Before answering the questions, we feel the urge to say a few words on the exercise of writ powers conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution having come across certain orders passed by the high courts holding writ petitions as “not maintainable” merely because the alternative remedy provided by the relevant statutes has not been pursued by the parties desirous of invocation of the writ jurisdiction. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 is plenary in nature. Any limitation on the exercise of such power must be traceable in the Constitution itself. Profitable reference in this regard may be made to Article 329 and ordainments of other similarly worded articles in the Constitution. Article 226 does not, in terms, impose any limitation or restraint on the exercise of power to issue writs. While it is true that exercise of writ powers despite availability of a remedy under the very statute which has been invoked and has given rise to the action impugned in the writ petition ought not to be made in a routine manner, yet, the mere fact that the petitioner before the high court, in a given case, has not pursued the alternative remedy available to him/it cannot mechanically be construed as a ground for its dismissal. It is axiomatic that the high courts (bearing in mind the facts of each particular case) have a discretion whether to entertain a writ petition or not. One of the self-imposed restrictions on the exercise of power under Article 226 that has evolved through judicial precedents is that the high courts should normally not entertain a writ petition, where an effective and efficacious alternative remedy is available. At the same time, it must be remembered that mere availability of an alternative remedy of appeal or revision, which the party invoking the jurisdiction of the high court under Article 226 has not pursued, would not oust the jurisdiction of the high court and render a writ petition “not maintainable”. In a long line of decisions, this Court has made it clear that availability of an alternative remedy does not operate as an absolute bar to the “maintainability” of a writ petition and that the rule, which requires a party to pursue the alternative remedy provided by a statute, is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. Though elementary, it needs to be restated that “entertainability” and “maintainability” of a writ petition are distinct concepts. The fine but real distinction between the two ought not to be lost sight of. The objection as to “maintainability” goes to the root of the matter and if such objection were found to be of substance, the courts would be rendered incapable of even receiving the lis for adjudication. On the other hand, the question of “entertainability” is entirely within the realm of discretion of the high courts, writ remedy being discretionary. A writ petition despite being maintainable may not be entertained by a high court for very many reasons or relief could even be refused to the petitioner, despite setting up a sound legal point, if grant of the claimed relief would not further public interest. Hence, dismissal of a writ petition by a high court on the ground that the petitioner has not availed the alternative remedy without, however, examining whether an exceptional case has been made out for such entertainment would not be proper.
Citations : [2023 INSC 92], [2023 SCC ONLINE SC 95]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/62928741/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/63dc0f95831db01604ba254b
https://www.courtkutchehry.com/Judgement/Search/AdvancedV2?docid=2368646
https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/m-s-godrej-sara-lee-ltd-vs-the-excise-and-taxation-officer-cum-assessing-authority
https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/supreme-court/godrej-taxation-alternative-remedy-not-absolute-writ-petition-maintainability-entertainability-apex-court-1460513
Sanjeev Kumar and Ors Vs Sushma Devi on 01 Jun 2023
A single judge of Himachal Pradesh High Court as follows, regarding framing of points/issues in Domestic Violence cases.
From Para 4(iii),
4(iii) In the instant case, parties led evidence in support of their respective pleadings. The record makes it apparent that the parties led their evidence without any points/issues having been framed in the matter.
Not only the points/issues were framed by the learned Trial Court in its judgment but the onus to prove such issues was also fastened upon respective parties, who were not even aware of formulation of the issues leave aside the onus to prove them. This approach was wholly erroneous. The parties were required to be made aware of the issues or the points they needed to prove in the case before directing them to lead evidence. This would have been not only in the interest of justice and fair play, but would have also provided the parties an opportunity to know the issues required to be proved by them. In accordance with provisions of the Act, demonstration by the complainant of existence of a relationship in the nature of marriage with the petitioner would have been sufficient under the Act. The complainant accordingly led her evidence. However, the learned Trial Court held the complainant could not establish that she was lawfully married to the petitioner. The complainant was not made aware of the points/issues framed by the learned Trial Court that she was required to prove her marriage with the petitioner in order to be successful in the proceedings. In case in the given facts, learned trial Court was of the view that the respondent-complainant was required to prove solemnization of her marriage with the petitioner, then the correct procedure would have been to make this issue known to the parties before ordering them to lead evidence. Framing of issues, for the first time, only in the judgment, placing burden of proving such issues on respective parties, deciding the case on the basis of such issues about which parties have not even been made aware of, is a procedure alien to well established legal and procedural conventions. It was imperative for the learned Trial Court to have framed issues/points for determination before directing the parties to lead evidence. The order passed by the learned Trial Court determining the points/issues and fixing the onus of proving those issues/points at the time of deciding the case was not in consonance with law. The order passed by the learned Trial Court was, therefore, justly interfered with by the learned First Appellate Court. The learned First Appellate Court also correctly observed that the petitioner had not signed the pleadings before the learned Trial Court. Accordingly, it gave an opportunity to the petitioner to rectify this irregularity by filing his affidavit before the learned Trial Court in support of unsigned pleadings.
Citations:
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/58984784/
Index of Domestic Violence cases is here.
Showkat Aziz Zargar Vs Nabeel Showkat and Anr on 02 Sep 2022
A single judge bench of J&K&L High Court held as follows, while declaring two judgments as per incuriam, relying on multiple Supreme Court decisions as Precedents.
From Paras 13-15,
13) It is a settled principle of interpretation of Statutes that words and expressions used in a Statute have to be assigned their plain meaning. A court does not have power to add or subtract something from a Statute which is not there. If a court finds some ambiguity in a Statute which becomes an impediment in achieving the aim and object of the Statute, the court can give a purposive interpretation to the Statute but where the language of the Statute is clear and unambiguous, it is not open to the Court to add, alter or supply words to the said Statute and no need of interpretation would arise. The purpose of interpretation of Statutes is to help the Judge to ascertain the intention of the Legislature and not to control that intention or to confine it within the limits, which the Judge may deem reasonable or expedient.
14) The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has, in the case of A. R. Antulay vs. R. S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602, held that if the words of the Statute are clear and unambiguous, it is the plainest duty of the Court to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used in the provision. The Court observed that the question of interpretation arises only in the event of an ambiguity or if the plain meaning of the words used in the Statute would be self defeating.
15) Again, the Supreme in the case of Grasim Industries Ltd. vs. Collector of Customs, Bombay, (2002) 4 SCC 297, has followed the same principle and observed that where the words are clear and there is no obscurity or ambiguity, the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language used. The Court further observed that while doing so, what has been said in the statute as also what has not been said has to be noted. The construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words has to be avoided.
From Paras 22 and 24,
22) In a recent case of Abhilasha vs. Parkash & ors. (Criminal Appeal No.615 of 2020 decided on 15th September, 2020), a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court considered the question as to whether a Hindu unmarried daughter is entitled to claim maintenance from her father under Section 125 of the Cr. P. C only till she attains majority or she can claim maintenance till she remains unmarried. The Court observed that a bare perusal of Section 125(1) of the Cr. P. C indicates that it limits the claim of maintenance of a child until he or she attains majority.
24) From the foregoing analysis of the law on the subject, it is clear that the Supreme Court has taken a consistent view that a major son or daughter cannot be awarded maintenance by a Magistrate in exercise of his powers under Section 125 of the Central Cr. P. C/488 of the Jammu and Kashmir Cr. P. C but in an appropriate case, a Family Court has jurisdiction to grant maintenance to a major Hindu daughter on the basis of a combined reading of the provisions contained in Section 125 of the Cr. P. C and Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act.
Finally,
27) For what has been discussed hereinbefore, the petition is allowed and the impugned order passed by the trial Magistrate as upheld by the Revisional Court is set aside and it is held that the respondents are entitled to maintenance from their father i.e., the petitioner herein, only up to the age of their majority. If any amount of maintenance has been paid by the petitioner to the respondents after the attainment of their age of majority, the same, having regard to the relationship between the parties, shall not be recovered from them. The amount deposited in the Registry pursuant to the order dated 11.09.2019, shall be released in favour of the petitioner. The petition stands disposed of accordingly.
Maintenance cases index here.
