Rejilal Vs State Of Kerala on 10 Frebruary, 2017

Posted on July 27, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

In this judgment from Hon’ble High Court of Kerala held that,

Legal Point:

Section 198(1) of the Cr.P.C provides that no court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Chapter XX of the IPC except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence. Section 493 comes under Chapter XX of the IPC. Therefore cognizance could be taken only upon a complaint. Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C which defines ‘complaint’ specifically excludes a police report.

Finally,

if a complaint contains allegations about commission of offence under section 498A of the IPC which is a cognizable offence, apart from allegations about the commission of offence under section 494 of the IPC, the court can take cognizance thereof even on a police report. That is not the case in the present case. Here section 420 IPC, a cognizable offence, was shown in the FIR and the charge-sheet without any basis whatsoever. You cannot bypass section 198 of the Cr.P.C by simply adding a cognizable offence in the FIR and the charge-sheet without any basis as was done in the present case. Section 420 IPC was shown in the present case only to get over the bar under section 198 (1) of the Cr.P.C. That ‘smartness’ cannot be permitted. Magistrates shall be very careful and cautious when they are called upon to take cognizance of an offence falling under Chapter XX of the IPC upon a police report. The Magistrate shall ascertain whether the investigating officer included a cognizable offence in the FIR, charge-sheet et cetera only to get over the bar under section 198 (1) of the Cr.P.C. It is crystal clear in the present case that section 420 of the IPC is shown only to bypass the bar under section 198 (1) of the Cr.P.C.

Rejilal Vs State Of Kerala on 10 Frebruary, 2017

Sachin Vs Sau. Sushma on 6 May, 2014

Posted on July 26, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Hon’ble High Court of Bombay in this judgment for recovering maintenance amount, has held that

From Para 5,

Therefore, it is abundantly clear that basically the learned Magistrate has to follow the procedure laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure for recovery of maintenance either final or interim. Subsection (2) of Section 28 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 can be pressed into service when there is no provision available for implementing a particular order passed under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. If the procedure is available in Code of Criminal Procedure, that is necessarily to be followed.

From Para 9,

As such the first option available to the Magistrate was to issue a warrant for levying fine. If whole of the amount was recovered by adopting the procedure under Section 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the question of putting the defaulter in prison did not arise. In case amount was not recovered or part of it was recovered and part of it was not recovered, then the question would have arisen as to how much sentence should be imposed on the defaulter as per the provision laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The stage of issuing warrant comes only after sentencing and not before that.

Sachin Vs Sau. Sushma on 6 May, 2014

U.Suvetha Vs State By Insp.Of Police & Anr on 6 May, 2009

Posted on July 23, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that, a concubine is not a relative to the husband of the knife, with regards to IPC 498A.

The word ‘cruelty” having been defined in terms of the aforesaid explanation, no other meaning can be attributed thereto. Living with another woman may be an act of cruelty on the part of the husband for the purpose of judicial separation or dissolution of marriage but the same, in our opinion, would not attract the wrath of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code.

Meaning or definition of “relative”:

In the absence of any statutory definition, the term ‘relative’ must be assigned a meaning as is commonly understood. Ordinarily it would include father, mother, husband or wife, son, daughter, brother, sister, nephew or niece, grandson or grand-daughter of an individual or the spouse of any person. The meaning of the word ‘relative’ would depend upon the nature of the statute. It principally includes a person related by blood, marriage or
adoption.
The word ‘relative’ has been defined in P. Ramanatha Aiyar Advanced Law Lexicon – Volume 4, 3rd Edition as under :-
“Relative, “RELATIVE” includes any person related by blood, marriage or adoption. [Lunacy Act ].
The expression “RELATIVE” means a husband wife, ancestor, lineal descendant, brother or sister. [Estate Duty Act].
“RELATIVE” means in relation to the deceased,
a) the wife or husband of the deceased;
b) the father, mother, children, uncles and aunts of the deceased, and
c) any issue of any person falling, within either of the preceding sub-clauses and the other party to a marriage with any such person or issue [Estate Duty Act].
A person shall be deemed to be a relative of another if, and only if, –
a) they are the members of a Hindu undivided family, or
b) they are husband and wife; or
c) the one is related to the other in the manner indicated in Schedule I-A [Companies Act, 1956].
“RELATIVE” in relation to an individual means –
a) The mother, father, husband or wife of the individual, or
b) a son, daughter, brother, sister, nephew or niece of the individual, or
c) a grandson or grand-daughter of the individual, or
d) the spouse of any person referred to in subclause (b) [Income tax Act].
“RELATIVE” means –
1) spouse of the person ;
2) brother or sister of the person ;
3) brother or sister of the spouse of the person;
4) any lineal ascendant or descendant of the person;
5) any lineal ascendant or descendant of the spouse of the person; [Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act].”

From Para 18,

By no stretch of imagination a girl friend or even a concubine in an etymological sense would be a ‘relative’. The word ‘relative’ brings within its purview a status. Such a status must be conferred either by blood or marriage or adoption. If no marriage has taken place, the question of one being relative of another would not arise.

U.Suvetha Vs State By Insp.Of Police & Anr on 6 May, 2009

Citations: [2009 ACC 67 903], [2009 SCC 6 787], [2009 SCC CRI 3 36], [2009 AIR SC 0 3491], [2009 SUPREME 3 797], [2009 RCR CRI 2 923], [2009 SCC 6 757], [2009 KERLT 2 686], [2009 MLJ CRI 2 1079], [2009 DMC 1 887], [2009 SLT 4 462], [2009 CUTLT SUPPL 1126], [2009 AIOL 675], [2009 AIR SC 1451], [2009 ANJ SC 2 16], [2009 BOMCR CRI SC 3 845], [2009 CRIMES SC 2 357], [2009 JT 7 222], [2009 SCALE 7 149], [2009 SCR 7 902], [2009 AIR SCW 3491], [2009 CRLJ SC 2974]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/953117/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609aec9e4b0149711414c47

Anand Tewari Vs Union Of India & Ors, on 18 September, 2013

Posted on July 23, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

In this judgment from Hon’ble High Court of Delhi, Writ Petition is allowed and the Passport Authority is ordered to re-consider the request of petitioner.

From Para 8,

The plea in the counter affidavit filed in W.P(C) No.3885/2013 is that the passport of the petitioner in the said case was impounded under clause (c) and (e) of sub section 3 of Section 10 of the Passport Act. However, the show cause notice dated 14.3.2012 contains absolutely no reference to clause (c) of the said sub section. Moreover, there is no mention in the said notice that it was necessary to impound the passport in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, security of India, friendly relations of India with any foreign country or in the interest of the general public. The only reason given in the show cause notice dated 14.3.2012 for the proposed revocation receipt of information report from CBI regarding registration of a criminal case against the passport holder. In fact, these communications sent by the Regional Passport Office to the petitioners do not contain any such averment and the only reason given for impounding the passport was the adverse recommendation of CBI in connection with a criminal case registered by it. Therefore, it would not be correct to say that the passports were impounded under clause (c) of sub section 3 of Section 10 of the Passport Act, 1967.

From Para 9,

As regards the applicability of sub clause (b), the counter affidavit is conspicuously silent as to the material information, if any, suppressed or the written information, if any, provided by the passport holder while applying for issue of passport. There is no reference to clause (b) of sub section (3) in the reasons conveyed to the petitioners. There is no averment in the said communication that the passport was obtained by suppressing the material information or providing wrong information. In the communicated dated 5.9.2012, which was dispatched only on 7.1.2013, as is evident from the postal stamp appearing on the communication, there is a reference to an adverse police verification report, but admittedly, no such report was provided to the passport holders at any point of time, nor did the communication referred to any suppression of material information or furnishing of wrong information at the time of obtaining the passport. More importantly, the passports according to the respondents were impounded vide circular dated 14.9.2012, whereas the communication dated 5.9.2012 was dispatched to the petitioners only on 7.1.2013. Therefore, the said communication dated 5.9.2012 in any case could not have been the basis for impounding the passport.

From Para 11,

Admittedly, no opportunity of personal hearing was given to the petitioners before this Court despite their having duly replied to the show cause notice. In my view, the show cause notices issued to the petitioners should have been followed by an opportunity of personal hearing to them. No such hearing, however, was given to them either before or after passing the order impounding their passports. This is yet another reason why the impugned order dated 14.9.2012 cannot be sustained.

Very important point from para 13,

Clause (e) of Section 10 (3) applies only if the proceedings in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by the passport holder are pending before a criminal court at the time the passport is revoked/ impounded. Mere registration of a criminal case against a person does not amount to proceedings being pending against him before a criminal court. The proceedings can be said to be pending only when a charge-sheet is filed. During the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the respondents placed on record a communication dated 4.9.2013 received from CBI which shows that a charge-sheet against Mr. Anand Tewari and P.K. Tewari, the petitioners in W.P(C) Nos. 3885/2013 and 5153/2013 has been filed in the Court on 23.8.2013 whereas the remaining cases are still pending investigation. Thus, no charge-sheet has yet been filed against Mr. Abhishek Tewari, petitioner in W.P (C) No.5155/2013 and no charge-sheet either against Mr. P.K. Tewari or against Abhishek Tewari had been filed by the time their passports were impounded vide order dated 14.9.2012. The passports, therefore, could not have been impounded prior to 23.8.2013, when the charge sheet was filed. In fact, in Abhijit Sen Vs. Superintendent (Administration) Regional Passport Officer & Ors. 2004 Cri LJ 1281, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court was of the view that the criminal proceedings in terms of clause (e) can be said to be pending only from the date on which cognizance is taken, by the Court, after filing of a charge sheet.

Anand Tewari Vs Union Of India & Ors, on 18 September, 2013

Suresh Nanda vs C.B.I. on 24 January, 2008

Posted on July 22, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

In this landmark judgment, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that, no one, except Passport Authority, can impound a passport; nor police nor Courts. Period.

The Apex Court held that

there is a difference between seizing a document and impounding a document. A seizure is made at a particular moment when a person or authority takes into his possession some property which was earlier not in his possession. Thus, the seizure is done at a particular moment of time. However, if after seizing of a property or document, said property or document is retained for some period of time, then such retention amounts impounding of property/or document.

And also

Maintaining that, the Passport Act, 1967 is a special act and thereby prevails over the Cr.P.C. which is a general law, vide G.P. Singh’s Principles of Statutory Interpretation (9th Edition pg. 133). This principle is expressed in the maxim \023Generalia specialibus non derogant\024. Hence, impounding of a passport cannot be done by the Court under Section 104 Cr.P.C. though it can impound any other document or thing.

This judgment has lead to lot of other judgments wherein the various High Courts in India had ordered lower courts to return back the passports of accused, that were either confiscated by the police as part of their search operations or crime investigation or had been surrendered to Courts, as a condition to obtaining Anticipatory Bail. They are listed here.

Suresh Nanda vs C.B.I on 24 January, 2008

Citations : [2008 AIR SC 1414], [2008 AIR SC 0 898], [2008 SCC 3 674], [2008 LW CRL 1 503], [2008 SCALE 2 46], [2008 JT 2 174], [2008 ALL MR CRI 1189], [2008 ALT CRI 2 344], [2008 DLT 147 397], [2008 CCR 1 318], [2008 SLT 2 245], [2008 AIOL 107], [2008 BOMCR CRI SC 2 514], [2008 SCC CRI 2 121], [2008 AIR SCW 898], [2008 CRLJ SC 1599], [2008 MLJ CRL 1 1195]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/572504/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae74e4b0149711413efc

Sivangala Thandi Deepak & Others Vs The State of A.P. on 11 July 2014

Posted on July 20, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

This quash judgment from Andhra Pradesh High Court, albeit dismissed, has some legal points discussed apart from citing good earlier judgments which clarified the position of law in case of out of jurisdiction cases.

Observation

In the present case, the second respondent was driven out from the matrimonial home from Mumbai. The second respondent went to the house of her parents at Tenali. In view of Manish Ratan (2 supra), Tenali Courts do not get territorial jurisdiction merely because the second respondent returned to Tenali. However, in view of Geeta Mehrotra (5 supra), where the Supreme Court held that the question of territorial jurisdiction shall be determined by the trial Court and not in a petition u/s.482Cr.P.C., I consider that this petition is misconceived.

Next Step in Summary

File the discharge petition at trial court before charged/issues are filed against the accused.

Sivangala Thandi Deepak & Others Vs The State of A.P. on 11 July 2014

Judgments cited in this judgment

Ramesh v. State of T.N
Manish Ratan v. State of M.P.
Y. Abraham Ajith v. Inspector of Police, Chennai
Nadimpalli Lakshmana Varma v. State of A.P.
Geeta Mehrotra v. State of Uttar Pradesh

Nandkishor Pralhad Vyawahare Vs Mangal on 3 May, 2018

Posted on July 19, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Two questions of interpretation of law in regards to the DV Act are explained in this landmark Judgment of Hon’ble High Court of Bombay.

Q1. Whether or not the proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2008 are in the nature of criminal proceedings ?
Proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 are predominantly of civil nature and it is only when there is a breach of the protection order as is contemplated under Section 31 and failure or refusal to discharge duty without any sufficient cause by the protection officer as contemplated under Section 33, the proceedings assume the character of criminality. The first question is answered accordingly.

Q2. Whether or not the High Court can exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in respect of the proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 ?
the second question is answered in the affirmative.

Now, one incidental question would arise as to from what stage the provisions of the Cr.P.C. would become applicable and in our view, the answer could be found out from the provisions of Sections 12 and 13 of the D.V. Act.
A combined reading of these provisions shows that the commencement of the proceedings would take place the moment, the Magistrate applies his mind to the contents of the application and passes any judicial order including that of issuance of notice. Once, the proceeding commences, the procedure under Section 28 of the D.V. Act, subject to the exceptions provided in the Act and the rules framed thereunder, would apply. In other words, save as otherwise provided in the D.V. Act and the rules framed thereunder and subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 28, the provisions of the Cr.P.C. shall govern the proceedings under Sections 12 to 23 and also those relating to an offence under Section 31 of the D.V. Act on their commencement.

Nandkishor Pralhad Vyawahare Vs Mangal on 3 May, 2018

Rabiya Bi Kassim M. Vs The Country Wide Consumer on 5 April, 2004

Posted on July 10, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

In it held in this judgment from High Court of Karnataka that once arguments are completed and judgment is reserved for pronouncement for a future date, no new application of any nature can be allow by the Hon’ble Trial court.

The Sub-rule(4) of Order 18, Rule 2 reads as follows, that came into force in 1976 via Amendment Act, has been deleted via the CPC Amendment Act 1999, with effect from 1.7.2002

“(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Rule, the Court may, for reasons to be recorded, direct or permit any party to examine any witness at any stage”

Rabiya Bi Kassim M. vs The Country Wide Consumer on 5 April, 2004

The 1963 landmark judgment is here.

Arjun Singh Vs Mohindra Kumar & Ors on 13 December, 1963

Posted on July 10, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

The Hon’ble Apex Court has explained the following in this landmark judgment

‘principle of res judicata’
difference between words “good cause” for nonappearance in O. IX, r. 7 and “sufficient cause” for the same purpose in O. IX, r. 13
‘res judicata’ could be as much applicable to different stages of the same suit as to findings on issues in different suits.
If the entirety of the “hearing” of a suit has been completed and the Court being competent to pronounce judgment then and there, adjourns the suit merely for the purpose of pronouncing judgment under O. XX, r. 1, there is clearly no adjournment of “the hearing” of the suit, for there is nothing more to be heard in the suit.
ln the present context when once the hearing starts, the Code contemplates only two stages in the trial of the suit:
- (1) Where the hearing is adjourned or
- (2) where the hearing is completed. Where the hearing is completed the parties have no further rights or privileges in the matter and it is only for the convenience of the Court that O. XX, r. 1 permits judgment to be delivered after an interval after the hearing is completed.

Arjun Singh vs Mohindra Kumar & Ors on 13 December, 1963

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Legal Procedure Explained – Interpretation of Statutes

Rejilal Vs State Of Kerala on 10 Frebruary, 2017

Sachin Vs Sau. Sushma on 6 May, 2014

U.Suvetha Vs State By Insp.Of Police & Anr on 6 May, 2009

Anand Tewari Vs Union Of India & Ors, on 18 September, 2013

Suresh Nanda vs C.B.I. on 24 January, 2008

Sivangala Thandi Deepak & Others Vs The State of A.P. on 11 July 2014

Nandkishor Pralhad Vyawahare Vs Mangal on 3 May, 2018

Rabiya Bi Kassim M. Vs The Country Wide Consumer on 5 April, 2004

Arjun Singh Vs Mohindra Kumar & Ors on 13 December, 1963