Shail Kumari Devi & Anr Vs Krishan Bhagwan Pathak on 28 July, 2008

Posted on August 1, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Landmark judgment from Apex Court here around the Sec 125 CrPC and few more details.

From Para 16,

Bare reading of sub-section (1) of Section 125 leaves no room for doubt that if any person having sufficient means, neglects or refuses to maintain his wife who is unable to maintain herself or his legitimate (or illegitimate) child (children) unable to maintain itself (themselves), or his father, or mother, unable to maintain himself or herself, a Court, upon proof of negligence or refusal, order such person to pay maintenance to his wife or child (children) or parents, as the case may be. It is also clear that maximum amount which could be ordered to be paid was Rs.500/- p.m. which was clear from the expression “not exceeding Rs.500/- in the whole”.

From Para 18,

By the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2001 (Act 50 of 2001), subsections (1) and (2) came to be amended with effect from September 24, 2001. The amended sub-sections now read thus:
…..
a Magistrate of the first class may, upon proof of such neglect or refusal, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife or such child, father or mother, at such monthly rate, as such Magistrate thinks fit, and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate may from time to time direct:

How the interim maintenance’ came to be about?

So far as ‘interim’ maintenance is concerned, it is true that Section 125 of the Code as it originally enacted did not expressly empower the Magistrate to make such order and direct payment of interim maintenance. But the Code equally did not prohibit the Magistrate from making such order. Now, having regard to the nature of proceedings, the primary object to secure relief to deserted and destitute wives, discarded and neglected children and disabled and helpless parents and to ensure that no wife, child or parent is left beggared and destitute on the scrap-heap of society so as to be tempted to commit crime or to tempt others to commit crime in regard to them, it was held that the Magistrate had ‘implied power’ to make such order. The jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Chapter IX (Order for Maintenance of Wives, Children and Parents) is not strictly criminal in nature. Moreover, the remedy provided by Section 125 of the Code is a summary remedy for securing reasonable sum by way of maintenance subject to a decree passed by a competent civil Court. Hence, in absence of any express bar or prohibition, Section 125 could be interpreted as conferring power by necessary implication to make interim order of maintenance subject to final outcome in the application.

Golden Words

Again, maintenance is a right which accrues to a wife against her husband the minute the former gets married to the latter. It is not only a moral obligation but is also a legal duty cast upon the husband to maintain his wife. Hence, whenever a wife does not stay with her husband and claims maintenance, the only question which the Court is called upon to consider is whether she was justified to live separately from her husband and still claim maintenance from him? If the reply is in the affirmative, she is entitled to claim maintenance.

Shail Kumari Devi & Anr Vs Krishan Bhagwan Pathak on 28 July, 2008

Citations : [2008 CRLJ SC 3881], [2008 AIR SC 5063], [2008 AIOL 871], [2008 SCR 11 386], [2008 ANJ SC SUPP 2 70], [2009 BOMCR SC SUPP 1 324], [2008 SCC CRI 3 839], [2008 JT 8 227], [2008 SCALE 10 602], [2008 AIR SC 3006], [2008 SCC 9 632], [2008 KERLT 3 576], [2008 AIR SCW 5063]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1952766/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae64e4b0149711413b53

Bhagwan Dutt Vs Kamla Devi And Anr on 17 October, 1974

Posted on August 1, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Hon’ble Apex Court has held the following that Section 488 under Old Code and Section 125 under new CrPC

Section 488 does not confer an absolute right on a neglected wife to get an order of maintenance against the husband nor does it impose an absolute liability on the husband to support her in all circumstances. The use of the word “may” in Section 488(1) indicates that the power conferred on the Magistrate is discretionary. A neglected wife, therefore, cannot, under this Section, claim, as of right, an order of maintenance against the husband. of course, the Magistrate has to exercise his discretion in a judicial manner consistently with the language of the statute with the regard to other relevant circumstances of the case. Nevertheless, the Magistrate has to exercise his discretion primarily towards the end which the Legislature had in view in enacting the provision.

And then…

The mere fact that the language of s.488(1) does not expressly make the inability of a wife to
maintain herself a condition precedent to the maintainability of her petition, does not imply that while determining her claim and fixing the amount of maintenance, the Magistrate is debarred from taking into consideration the wife’s own separate income or means of support. There is a clear distinction between a wife’s locus standi, to file a petition under s. 488 and her being entitled, on merits, to a particular amount of maintenance thereunder. This distinction appears to have been overlooked in Major Joginder Singh’s case (supra). Proof of the preliminary condition attached to a neglected child will establish only his competence to file the petition but his entitlement to maintenance, particularly the fixation of its amount, will still depend upon the discretion of the Magistrate. As the Magistrate is required to exercise that discretion in a just manner, the income of the wife, also, must be put in the scales of justice as against the means of the husband.

Finally,

There is nothing in these provisions to show that in determining the maintenance and its rate, the Magistrate has to inquire into the means of the husband alone, and exclude the means of the wife altogether from consideration. Rather, there is a definite indication in the language of the associate s. 489(1) that the financial resources of the wife are also a relevant consideration in making such a determination. Section 489(1) provides inter alia, that “on proof of a change in the circumstances of any person receiving under s. 488 a monthly allowance, the Magistrate, may make such alteration in the allowance as he thinks fit”. The “circumstances” contemplated by s. 489(1) must include financial circumstances and in that view,the inquiry as to the change in the circumstances must extend to a change in the financial circumstances of the wife.

Bhagwan Dutt Vs Kamla Devi And Anr on 17 October, 1974

Dimple Jatin Khanna Vs Anita Advani And Anr on 9 April, 2015

Posted on August 1, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

In this judgment of High Court of Bombay, the DVC is quashed under Section 482 CrPC, as the petitioner was not having any domestic relationship with the deceased Rajesh Khanna, in the nature of marriage.

Dimple Jatin Khanna Vs Anita Advani And Anr on 9 April, 2015

R.P. Kapur Vs State of Punjab on 25 March, 1960

Posted on July 28, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down three categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction could and should be exercised to quash proceedings:

(i) where there was a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the proceedings;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint did not make out the offence alleged; and
(iii)where either there was no legal evidence adduced in support of the charge or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly failed to prove the charge.

Conclusion:

It is not a case where the appellant can justly contend that on the face of the record the charge levelled against him is unsustainable.

R.P. Kapur Vs State of Punjab 25 March, 1960

Citation: [1960 AIR 862], [1960 SCR (3) 311], [(1960) 3 SCR 388], [1960 CRLJ SC 1239], [1960 CRILJ 239], [1961 AWR 31 49], [1960 AIR SC 866]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1033301/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ab10e4b014971140b8c1

Reproduced in accordance with Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from judis.nic.in, lobis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court and District Court Websites such as ecourts.gov.in

Dipakbhai Ratilal Patel Vs State Of Gujarat on 26 September, 2014

Posted on July 28, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Awesome judgment from Justice J.B.PARDIWALA, at Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat. Excellent analysis and dissection of cunning knife’s mind.

Funny Anecdote #1:

Establishing Jurisdiction:
The sum and substance of the FIR lodged by the respondent No.2 appears to be a matrimonial dispute between the husband and the wife, but as usual, all other family members have been roped in as accused persons. The applicant No.2, Dipikaben, is the wife of the applicant No.1’s brother. I am told that Dipikaben is a widow and she is residing independently at Padra of District Baroda. Dipikaben has a daughter aged about 20 years. The applicant No.3 Hetalben is the niece of the applicant No.1, and is residing at her matrimonial home at Gotri. The applicant No.3 got married in the year 2006, and before her marriage, was residing at Delhi. The applicants Nos. 4 and 5 are the husband and wife, and both are residing at Delhi. The applicant No.4 is one of the brothers of the applicant No.1. The applicant No.6, who is the sister of the applicant No.1, is residing at her matrimonial home at Baroda.

Funny Anecdote #2:

Delay in filing Complaint/FIR:
It appears on a plain reading of the FIR that on her own admission, she had stayed at her matrimonial home upto the year 2004, and thereafter, she left the matrimonial home and started residing at her parental home. The respondent No.2 lodged the F.I.R after a period of four years thereafter i.e. in 2009.

Legal Point #1:

When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.

One more:

Although the respondent No.2 is much more annoyed with her husband, with an obvious motive, has arrayed all the close relatives of her husband in the FIR. The Police also seems to have recorded stereo-type statements of the witnesses who are none other than the parents and other relatives of the respondent No.2 and has filed a charge-sheet.

Legal Point #3

Thus, it could be seen from the above that the apex Court has noticed the tendency of the married women roping in all the relatives of her husband in such complaints only with a view to harass all of them, though they may not be even remotely involved in the offence alleged.

One more here

In all cases where wife complains of harassment or ill-treatment, Section 498-A of the IPC cannot be applied mechanically. No F.I.R is complete without Sections 506(2) and 323 of the IPC.

Dipakbhai Ratilal Patel Vs State Of Gujarat on 26 September, 2014

Rejilal Vs State Of Kerala on 10 Frebruary, 2017

Posted on July 27, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

In this judgment from Hon’ble High Court of Kerala held that,

Legal Point:

Section 198(1) of the Cr.P.C provides that no court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Chapter XX of the IPC except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence. Section 493 comes under Chapter XX of the IPC. Therefore cognizance could be taken only upon a complaint. Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C which defines ‘complaint’ specifically excludes a police report.

Finally,

if a complaint contains allegations about commission of offence under section 498A of the IPC which is a cognizable offence, apart from allegations about the commission of offence under section 494 of the IPC, the court can take cognizance thereof even on a police report. That is not the case in the present case. Here section 420 IPC, a cognizable offence, was shown in the FIR and the charge-sheet without any basis whatsoever. You cannot bypass section 198 of the Cr.P.C by simply adding a cognizable offence in the FIR and the charge-sheet without any basis as was done in the present case. Section 420 IPC was shown in the present case only to get over the bar under section 198 (1) of the Cr.P.C. That ‘smartness’ cannot be permitted. Magistrates shall be very careful and cautious when they are called upon to take cognizance of an offence falling under Chapter XX of the IPC upon a police report. The Magistrate shall ascertain whether the investigating officer included a cognizable offence in the FIR, charge-sheet et cetera only to get over the bar under section 198 (1) of the Cr.P.C. It is crystal clear in the present case that section 420 of the IPC is shown only to bypass the bar under section 198 (1) of the Cr.P.C.

Rejilal Vs State Of Kerala on 10 Frebruary, 2017

Sachin Vs Sau. Sushma on 6 May, 2014

Posted on July 26, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Hon’ble High Court of Bombay in this judgment for recovering maintenance amount, has held that

From Para 5,

Therefore, it is abundantly clear that basically the learned Magistrate has to follow the procedure laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure for recovery of maintenance either final or interim. Subsection (2) of Section 28 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 can be pressed into service when there is no provision available for implementing a particular order passed under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. If the procedure is available in Code of Criminal Procedure, that is necessarily to be followed.

From Para 9,

As such the first option available to the Magistrate was to issue a warrant for levying fine. If whole of the amount was recovered by adopting the procedure under Section 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the question of putting the defaulter in prison did not arise. In case amount was not recovered or part of it was recovered and part of it was not recovered, then the question would have arisen as to how much sentence should be imposed on the defaulter as per the provision laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The stage of issuing warrant comes only after sentencing and not before that.

Sachin Vs Sau. Sushma on 6 May, 2014

U.Suvetha Vs State By Insp.Of Police & Anr on 6 May, 2009

Posted on July 23, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that, a concubine is not a relative to the husband of the knife, with regards to IPC 498A.

The word ‘cruelty” having been defined in terms of the aforesaid explanation, no other meaning can be attributed thereto. Living with another woman may be an act of cruelty on the part of the husband for the purpose of judicial separation or dissolution of marriage but the same, in our opinion, would not attract the wrath of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code.

Meaning or definition of “relative”:

In the absence of any statutory definition, the term ‘relative’ must be assigned a meaning as is commonly understood. Ordinarily it would include father, mother, husband or wife, son, daughter, brother, sister, nephew or niece, grandson or grand-daughter of an individual or the spouse of any person. The meaning of the word ‘relative’ would depend upon the nature of the statute. It principally includes a person related by blood, marriage or
adoption.
The word ‘relative’ has been defined in P. Ramanatha Aiyar Advanced Law Lexicon – Volume 4, 3rd Edition as under :-
“Relative, “RELATIVE” includes any person related by blood, marriage or adoption. [Lunacy Act ].
The expression “RELATIVE” means a husband wife, ancestor, lineal descendant, brother or sister. [Estate Duty Act].
“RELATIVE” means in relation to the deceased,
a) the wife or husband of the deceased;
b) the father, mother, children, uncles and aunts of the deceased, and
c) any issue of any person falling, within either of the preceding sub-clauses and the other party to a marriage with any such person or issue [Estate Duty Act].
A person shall be deemed to be a relative of another if, and only if, –
a) they are the members of a Hindu undivided family, or
b) they are husband and wife; or
c) the one is related to the other in the manner indicated in Schedule I-A [Companies Act, 1956].
“RELATIVE” in relation to an individual means –
a) The mother, father, husband or wife of the individual, or
b) a son, daughter, brother, sister, nephew or niece of the individual, or
c) a grandson or grand-daughter of the individual, or
d) the spouse of any person referred to in subclause (b) [Income tax Act].
“RELATIVE” means –
1) spouse of the person ;
2) brother or sister of the person ;
3) brother or sister of the spouse of the person;
4) any lineal ascendant or descendant of the person;
5) any lineal ascendant or descendant of the spouse of the person; [Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act].”

From Para 18,

By no stretch of imagination a girl friend or even a concubine in an etymological sense would be a ‘relative’. The word ‘relative’ brings within its purview a status. Such a status must be conferred either by blood or marriage or adoption. If no marriage has taken place, the question of one being relative of another would not arise.

U.Suvetha Vs State By Insp.Of Police & Anr on 6 May, 2009

Citations: [2009 ACC 67 903], [2009 SCC 6 787], [2009 SCC CRI 3 36], [2009 AIR SC 0 3491], [2009 SUPREME 3 797], [2009 RCR CRI 2 923], [2009 SCC 6 757], [2009 KERLT 2 686], [2009 MLJ CRI 2 1079], [2009 DMC 1 887], [2009 SLT 4 462], [2009 CUTLT SUPPL 1126], [2009 AIOL 675], [2009 AIR SC 1451], [2009 ANJ SC 2 16], [2009 BOMCR CRI SC 3 845], [2009 CRIMES SC 2 357], [2009 JT 7 222], [2009 SCALE 7 149], [2009 SCR 7 902], [2009 AIR SCW 3491], [2009 CRLJ SC 2974]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/953117/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609aec9e4b0149711414c47

Anand Tewari Vs Union Of India & Ors, on 18 September, 2013

Posted on July 23, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

In this judgment from Hon’ble High Court of Delhi, Writ Petition is allowed and the Passport Authority is ordered to re-consider the request of petitioner.

From Para 8,

The plea in the counter affidavit filed in W.P(C) No.3885/2013 is that the passport of the petitioner in the said case was impounded under clause (c) and (e) of sub section 3 of Section 10 of the Passport Act. However, the show cause notice dated 14.3.2012 contains absolutely no reference to clause (c) of the said sub section. Moreover, there is no mention in the said notice that it was necessary to impound the passport in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, security of India, friendly relations of India with any foreign country or in the interest of the general public. The only reason given in the show cause notice dated 14.3.2012 for the proposed revocation receipt of information report from CBI regarding registration of a criminal case against the passport holder. In fact, these communications sent by the Regional Passport Office to the petitioners do not contain any such averment and the only reason given for impounding the passport was the adverse recommendation of CBI in connection with a criminal case registered by it. Therefore, it would not be correct to say that the passports were impounded under clause (c) of sub section 3 of Section 10 of the Passport Act, 1967.

From Para 9,

As regards the applicability of sub clause (b), the counter affidavit is conspicuously silent as to the material information, if any, suppressed or the written information, if any, provided by the passport holder while applying for issue of passport. There is no reference to clause (b) of sub section (3) in the reasons conveyed to the petitioners. There is no averment in the said communication that the passport was obtained by suppressing the material information or providing wrong information. In the communicated dated 5.9.2012, which was dispatched only on 7.1.2013, as is evident from the postal stamp appearing on the communication, there is a reference to an adverse police verification report, but admittedly, no such report was provided to the passport holders at any point of time, nor did the communication referred to any suppression of material information or furnishing of wrong information at the time of obtaining the passport. More importantly, the passports according to the respondents were impounded vide circular dated 14.9.2012, whereas the communication dated 5.9.2012 was dispatched to the petitioners only on 7.1.2013. Therefore, the said communication dated 5.9.2012 in any case could not have been the basis for impounding the passport.

From Para 11,

Admittedly, no opportunity of personal hearing was given to the petitioners before this Court despite their having duly replied to the show cause notice. In my view, the show cause notices issued to the petitioners should have been followed by an opportunity of personal hearing to them. No such hearing, however, was given to them either before or after passing the order impounding their passports. This is yet another reason why the impugned order dated 14.9.2012 cannot be sustained.

Very important point from para 13,

Clause (e) of Section 10 (3) applies only if the proceedings in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by the passport holder are pending before a criminal court at the time the passport is revoked/ impounded. Mere registration of a criminal case against a person does not amount to proceedings being pending against him before a criminal court. The proceedings can be said to be pending only when a charge-sheet is filed. During the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the respondents placed on record a communication dated 4.9.2013 received from CBI which shows that a charge-sheet against Mr. Anand Tewari and P.K. Tewari, the petitioners in W.P(C) Nos. 3885/2013 and 5153/2013 has been filed in the Court on 23.8.2013 whereas the remaining cases are still pending investigation. Thus, no charge-sheet has yet been filed against Mr. Abhishek Tewari, petitioner in W.P (C) No.5155/2013 and no charge-sheet either against Mr. P.K. Tewari or against Abhishek Tewari had been filed by the time their passports were impounded vide order dated 14.9.2012. The passports, therefore, could not have been impounded prior to 23.8.2013, when the charge sheet was filed. In fact, in Abhijit Sen Vs. Superintendent (Administration) Regional Passport Officer & Ors. 2004 Cri LJ 1281, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court was of the view that the criminal proceedings in terms of clause (e) can be said to be pending only from the date on which cognizance is taken, by the Court, after filing of a charge sheet.

Anand Tewari Vs Union Of India & Ors, on 18 September, 2013

Suresh Nanda vs C.B.I. on 24 January, 2008

Posted on July 22, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

In this landmark judgment, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that, no one, except Passport Authority, can impound a passport; nor police nor Courts. Period.

The Apex Court held that

there is a difference between seizing a document and impounding a document. A seizure is made at a particular moment when a person or authority takes into his possession some property which was earlier not in his possession. Thus, the seizure is done at a particular moment of time. However, if after seizing of a property or document, said property or document is retained for some period of time, then such retention amounts impounding of property/or document.

And also

Maintaining that, the Passport Act, 1967 is a special act and thereby prevails over the Cr.P.C. which is a general law, vide G.P. Singh’s Principles of Statutory Interpretation (9th Edition pg. 133). This principle is expressed in the maxim \023Generalia specialibus non derogant\024. Hence, impounding of a passport cannot be done by the Court under Section 104 Cr.P.C. though it can impound any other document or thing.

This judgment has lead to lot of other judgments wherein the various High Courts in India had ordered lower courts to return back the passports of accused, that were either confiscated by the police as part of their search operations or crime investigation or had been surrendered to Courts, as a condition to obtaining Anticipatory Bail. They are listed here.

Suresh Nanda vs C.B.I on 24 January, 2008

Citations : [2008 AIR SC 1414], [2008 AIR SC 0 898], [2008 SCC 3 674], [2008 LW CRL 1 503], [2008 SCALE 2 46], [2008 JT 2 174], [2008 ALL MR CRI 1189], [2008 ALT CRI 2 344], [2008 DLT 147 397], [2008 CCR 1 318], [2008 SLT 2 245], [2008 AIOL 107], [2008 BOMCR CRI SC 2 514], [2008 SCC CRI 2 121], [2008 AIR SCW 898], [2008 CRLJ SC 1599], [2008 MLJ CRL 1 1195]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/572504/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae74e4b0149711413efc

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Legal Procedure Explained – Interpretation of Statutes

Shail Kumari Devi & Anr Vs Krishan Bhagwan Pathak on 28 July, 2008

Bhagwan Dutt Vs Kamla Devi And Anr on 17 October, 1974

Dimple Jatin Khanna Vs Anita Advani And Anr on 9 April, 2015

R.P. Kapur Vs State of Punjab on 25 March, 1960

Dipakbhai Ratilal Patel Vs State Of Gujarat on 26 September, 2014

Rejilal Vs State Of Kerala on 10 Frebruary, 2017

Sachin Vs Sau. Sushma on 6 May, 2014

U.Suvetha Vs State By Insp.Of Police & Anr on 6 May, 2009

Anand Tewari Vs Union Of India & Ors, on 18 September, 2013

Suresh Nanda vs C.B.I. on 24 January, 2008