Hon’ble High Court of AP has held that, the High Court, by exercising its inherent powers can quash the F.I.R. or Investigation in appropriate cases following the tests laid down in Bhajanlal’s case by exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
Tag: Legal Procedure Explained – Interpretation of Statutes
Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre Vs State Of Maharashtra And Others on 2 December, 2010
This is the landmark judgment from my favorite judge Shri Dalveer Bhandari J on the duration of a anticipatory bail granted by a High Court of a Sessions Court.
- Based on Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia case available here, it was held that once granted anticipatory bail continues to protect the accused until the end of trial.
- In Sushila Aggarwal & Ors Vs State (NCT of Delhi) in 15 May, 2018 here, a reference is made to a larger bench of Supreme Court on the point of valid time period of an anticipatory bail. This was at last decided in favor this Mhetre judgment only here.
From Para 25,
Mr. Bhushan submitted that a plain reading of the section 438 Cr.P.C. clearly reveals that the legislature has not placed any fetters on the court. In other words, the legislature has not circumscribed court’s discretion in any manner while granting anticipatory bail, therefore, the court should not limit the order only for a specified period till the charge-sheet is filed and thereafter compel the accused to surrender and ask for regular bail under section 439 Cr.P.C., meaning thereby the legislature has not envisaged that the life of the anticipatory bail would only last till the charge-sheet is filed. Mr. Bhushan submitted that when no embargo has been placed by the legislature then this court in some of its orders was not justified in placing this embargo.
From Para 93,
Some courts of smaller strength have erroneously observed that section 438 Cr.P.C. should be invoked only in exceptional or rare cases. Those orders are contrary to the law laid down by the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Sibbia’s case (supra).
From Para 94,
The complaint filed against the accused needs to be thoroughly examined including the aspect whether the complainant has filed false or frivolous complaint on earlier occasion. The court should also examine the fact whether there is any family dispute between the accused and the complainant and the complainant must be clearly told that if the complaint is found to be false or frivolous, then strict action will be takenagainst him in accordance with law. If the connivance betweenthe complainant and the investigating officer is established then action be taken against the investigating officer in accordance with law.
From Para 97,
A great ignominy, humiliation and disgrace is attached to the arrest. Arrest leads to many serious consequences not only for the accused but for the entire family and at times for the entire community. Most people do not make any distinction between arrest at a pre-conviction stage or post-conviction stage.
From Para 101,
The proper course of action ought to be that after evaluating the averments and accusation available on the record if the court is inclined to grant anticipatory bail then an interim bail be granted and notice be issued to the public prosecutor. After hearing the public prosecutor the court may either reject the bail application or confirm the initial order of granting bail. The court would certainly be entitled to impose conditions for the grant of bail. The public prosecutor or complainant would be at liberty to move the same court for cancellation or modifying the conditions of bail any time if liberty granted by the court is misused. The bail granted by the court should ordinarily be continued till the trial of the case.
From Para 102, (VERY IMPORTANT)
The order granting anticipatory bail for a limited duration and thereafter directing the accused to surrender and apply before a regular bail is contrary to the legislative intention and the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Sibbia’s case (supra).
From Para 105, (VERY IMPORTANT)
The court which grants the bail has the right to cancel the bail according to the provisions of the General Clauses Act but ordinarily after hearing the public prosecutor when the bail order is confirmed then the benefit of the grant of the bail should continue till the end of the trial of that case.
From Para 106, (VERY IMPORTANT)
The judgment in Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh (supra) is contrary to legislative intent and the spirit of the very provisions of the anticipatory bail itself and has resulted in an artificial and unreasonable restriction on the scope of enactment contrary to the legislative intention.
From Para 108,
Section 438 Cr.P.C. does not mention anything about the duration to which a direction for release on bail in the event of arrest can be granted. The order granting anticipatory bail is a direction specifically to release the accused on bail in the event of his arrest. Once such a direction of anticipatory bail is executed by the accused and he is released on bail, the concerned court would be fully justified in imposing conditions including direction of joining investigation.
From Para 110,
In pursuance to the order of the Court of Sessions or the High Court, once the accused is released on bail by the trial court, then it would be unreasonable to compel the accused to surrender before the trial court and again apply for regular bail.
From Para 112,
The validity of the restrictions imposed by the Apex Court, namely, that the accused released on anticipatory bail must submit himself to custody and only thereafter can apply for regular bail. This is contrary to the basic intention and spirit of section 438 Cr.P.C. It is also contrary to Article 21 of the Constitution. The test of fairness and reasonableness is implicit under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Directing the accused to surrender to custody after the limited period amounts to deprivation of his personal liberty.
From Paras 115, 116 (VERY IMPORTANT)
The Apex Court in Salauddin’s case (supra) held that anticipatory bail should be granted only for a limited period and on the expiry of that duration it should be left to the regular court to deal with the matter is not the correct view. The reasons quoted in the said judgment is that anticipatory bail is granted at a stage when an investigation is incomplete and the court is not informed about the nature of evidence against the alleged offender.
The said reason would not be right as the restriction is not seen in the enactment and bail orders by the High Court and Sessions Court are granted under sections 437 and 439 also at such stages and they are granted till the trial.
From Para 119, (VERY VERY IMPORTANT)
This Court in the Sibbia’s case (supra) laid down the following principles with regard to anticipatory bail:
a) Section 438(1) is to be interpreted in light of Article21 of the Constitution of India.
b) Filing of FIR is not a condition precedent to exercise of power under section 438.
c) Order under section 438 would not affect the right of police to conduct investigation.
d) Conditions mentioned in section 437 cannot be read into section 438.
e) Although the power to release on anticipatory bail can be described as of an “extraordinary” character this would “not justify the conclusion that the power must be exercised in exceptional cases only.” Powers are discretionary to be exercised in light of the circumstances of each case.
f) Initial order can be passed without notice to the Public Prosecutor. Thereafter, notice must be issued forthwith and question ought to be reexamined after hearing. Such ad interim order must conform to requirements of the section and suitable conditions should be imposed on the applicant.
From Para 128, (VERY VERY IMPORTANT)
In case, the State consider the following suggestions in proper perspective then perhaps it may not be necessary to curtail the personal liberty of the accused in a routine manner. These suggestions are only illustrative and not exhaustive.
1) Direct the accused to join investigation and only when the accused does not cooperate with the investigating agency, then only the accused be arrested.
2) Seize either the passport or such other related documents, such as, the title deeds of properties or the Fixed Deposit Receipts/Share Certificates of the accused.
3) Direct the accused to execute bonds;
4) The accused may be directed to furnish sureties of number of persons which according to the prosecution are necessary in view of the facts of the particular case.
5) The accused be directed to furnish undertaking that he would not visit the place where the witnesses reside so that the possibility of tampering of evidence or otherwise influencing the course of justice can be avoided.
6) Bank accounts be frozen for small duration during investigation.
Citation: [(2011) 1 SCC 694], [AIR 2011 SC 312],
Indiankanoon.org or Casemine link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1108032/
Index of all Anticipatory Bail Matters is here.
Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia Etc Vs State of Punjab on 9 April 1980
In this judgment from Hon’ble Supreme Court, it was held that,
Highlight
Should the operation of an order passed under Section 438(1) be limited in point of time? Not necessarily. The Court may, if there are reasons for doing so, limit the operation of the order to a short period until after the filing of an F.I.R. in respect of the matter covered by the order. The applicant may in such cases be directed to obtain an order of bail under Section 437 or 439 of the Code within a reasonably short period after the filing of the F.I.R. as aforesaid. But this need not be followed as an invariable rule. The normal rule should be not to limit the operation of the order in relation to a period of time.
Another set of clarifications here:
This should be the end of the matter, but it is necessary to clarify a few points which have given rise to certain misgivings.
Section 438(1) of the Code lays down a condition which has to be satisfied before anticipatory bail can be granted. The applicant must show that he has “reason to believe” that he may be arrested for a non-bailable offence. The use of the expression “reason to believe” shows that the belief that the applicant may be so arrested must be founded on reasonable grounds. Mere ‘fear’ is not ‘belief’, for which reason it is not enough for the applicant to show that he has some sort of a vague apprehension that some one is going to make an accusation against him, in pursuance of which he may be arrested. The grounds on which the belief of the applicant is based that he may be arrested for a non- bailable offence, must be capable of being examined by the court objectively, because it is then alone that the court can determine whether the applicant has reason to believe that he may be so arrested. Section 438(1), therefore, cannot be invoked on the basis of vague and general allegations, as if to arm oneself in perpetuity against a possible arrest. Otherwise, the number of applications for anticipatory bail will be as large as, at any rate, the adult populace. Anticipatory bail is a device to secure the individual’s liberty; it is neither a passport to the commission of crimes nor a shield against any and all kinds of accusations, likely or unlikely.
Secondly, if an application for anticipatory bail is made to the High Court or the Court of Session it must apply its own mind to the question and decide whether a case has been made out for granting such relief. It cannot leave the question for the decision of the Magistrate concerned under Section 437 of the Code, as and when an occasion arises. Such a course will defeat the very object of Section 438.
Thirdly, the filing of a First Information Report is not a condition precedent to the exercise of the power under Section 438. The imminence of a likely arrest founded on a reasonable belief can be shown to exist even if an F.I.R. is not yet filed.
Fourthly, anticipatory bail can be granted even after an F.I.R. is filed, so long as the applicant has not been arrested.
Fifthly, the provisions of Section 438 cannot be invoked after the arrest of the accused. The grant of “anticipatory bail” to an accused who is under arrest involves a contradiction in terms, in so far as the offence or offences for which he is arrested, are concerned. After arrest, the accused must seek his remedy under Section 437 or Section 439 of the Code, if he wants to be released on bail in respect of the offence or offences for which he is arrested.
Citation: [1980 AIR 1632], [1980 SCR (3) 383], [(1980) 2 SCC 565], [AIR 1980 SC 1632], [(1980 Cri LJ 1125)],
Indiankanoon.org or Casemine link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/173889445/
Index of all Bail Matters is here.
How to fight legal case as Petitioner or Party in Person (PIP)
As per CrPC 302, a petitioner can request per permission of magistrate to conduct and lead the prosecution case, instead of a advocate. Read more here.
Similarly, per Advocates Act Section 32, any person who is not as advocate, can appear in a particular case. Read more here.
CrPC 302 – Permission to conduct prosecution
Permission to conduct prosecution.
(1) Any Magistrate inquiring into or trying a case may permit the prosecution to be conducted by any person other than a police officer below the rank of Inspector; but no person, other than the Advocate General or Government Advocate or a Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor, shall be entitled to do so without such permission: Provided that no police officer shall be permitted to conduct the prosecution if he has taken part in the investigation into the offence with respect to which the accused is being prosecuted.
(2) Any person conducting the prosecution may do so personally or by a pleader.
Sushil Kumar Sharma Vs Union Of India And Ors on 19 July, 2005
In this Writ Petition by Sushil Kumar Sharma, which was dismissed though, had this prayer,
By this petition purported to have been filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short ‘the Constitution’) prayer is to declare Section 498A of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short ‘the IPC’) to be unconstitutional and ultra vires in the alternative to formulate guidelines so that innocent persons are victimized by unscrupulous persons making false accusations.
And,
Further prayer is made that whenever, any court comes to the conclusion that the allegations made regarding commission of offence under Section 498 IPC are unfounded, stringent action should be taken against person making the allegations. This according to the petitioner, would discourage persons from coming to courts with unclean hands and ulterior motives. Several instances have been highlighted to show as to how commission of offence punishable under Section 498A IPC has been made with oblige motive and with a view to harass the husband, in-laws and relatives.
Here is the legal terrorism comment,
The object of the provision is prevention of the dowry menace. But as has been rightly contended by the petitioner many instances have come to light where the complaints are not bonafide and have filed with oblique motive. In such cases acquittal of the accused does not in all cases wipe out the ignonymy suffered during and prior to trial. Sometimes adverse media coverage adds to the misery. The question, therefore, is what remedial measures can be taken to prevent abuse of the well-intentioned provision. Merely because the provision is constitutional and intra-vires, does not give a licence to unscrupulous persons to wreck personal vendetta or unleash harassment. It may, therefore, become necessary for the legislature to find out ways how the makers of frivolous complaints or allegations can be appropriately dealt with. Till then the Courts have to take care of the situation within the existing frame work. As noted the object is to strike at the roots of dowry menace. But by misuse of the provision a new legal terrorism can be unleashed. The provision is intended to be used a shield and not assassins’ weapon. If cry of “wolf” is made too often as a prank assistance and protection may not be available when the actual “wolf” appears. There is no question of investigating agency and Courts casually dealing with the allegations. They cannot follow any strait jacket formula in the matters relating to dowry tortures, deaths and cruelty. It cannot be lost sight of that ultimate objective of every legal system is to arrive at truth, punish the guilty and protect the innocent. There is no scope for any pre- conceived notion or view. It is strenuously argued by the petitioner that the investigating agencies and the courts start with the presumption that the accused persons are guilty and that the complainant is speaking the truth. This is too wide available and generalized statement. Certain statutory presumption are drawn which again are reputable. It is to be noted that the role of the investigating agencies and the courts is that of watch dog and not of a bloodhound. It should be their effort to see that in innocent person is not made to suffer on account of unfounded, baseless and malicious allegations. It is equally indisputable that in many cases no direct evidence is available and the courts have to act on circumstantial evidence. While dealing with such cases, the law laid down relating to circumstantial evidence has to be kept in view.
And it was dismissed like this,
Prayer has been made to direct investigation by the Central Bureau of Investigation (in short the ‘CBI’) in certain matters where the petitioner is arrayed as an accused. We do not find any substance in this plea. If the petitioner wants to prove his innocence, he can do so in the trial, if held.
Citations: [2005 ALLMR SC 5 982], [2005 SCR 730], [2006 CRLR 44], [2005 SRJ 8 90], [2005 CRLJ 0 3439], [2005 CRI LJ 3439], [2005 RCR CRI 3 745], [2005 SCC CR 0 1473], [2005 AIOL 300], [2005 CCR 3 43], [2005 KERLT 3 611], [2005 JT 6 266], [2005 CRLR 661], [2005 SCALE 5 523], [2005 MLJ CRI 1 887], [2005 ALLMR 5 982], [2006 CALCRILR 44], [2005 SLT 5 438], [2005 JCRIC 2 1193], [2005 ALD CRI 2 633], [2005 DMC 2 325], [2005 SCJ 5 303], [2005 SCC 6 281], [2005 AIR SC 3100], [2005 SCC CRI 0 1473], [2005 AIR SC 0 3569], [2005 UJ SC 2 1057], [2005 SUPREME 5 137]
Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1172674/ and https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae15e4b0149711412e70
Amarsang Nathaji As Himself Vs Hardik Harshadbhai Patel And Ors on 23 November, 2016
Hon’ble Apex Court has, in this 341 Appeal, held that it was not expedient in the interest of justice to continue with CrPC 340 proceedings at High Court of Gujarat and moreover it held that lower court has not followed the procedure in making the opinion that it was expedient in the interests of justice to file a complaint against respondent no.1 in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 340 of the CrPC.
“6. The mere fact that a person has made a contradictory statement in a judicial proceeding is not by itself always sufficient to justify a prosecution under Sections 199 and 200 of the Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860) (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”); but it must be shown that the defendant has intentionally given a false statement at any stage of the judicial proceedings or fabricated false evidence for the purpose of using the same at any stage of the judicial proceedings. Even after the above position has emerged also, still the court has to form an opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice to initiate an inquiry into the offences of false evidence and offences against public justice and more specifically referred to in Section 340(1) CrPC, having regard to the overall factual matrix as well as the probable consequences of such a prosecution. (See K.T.M.S. Mohd. v. Union of India (1992) 3 SCC 178 , 1992 SCC (Cri) 572.) The court must be satisfied that such an inquiry is required in the interests of justice and appropriate in the facts of the case.”
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/100876905/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5837160d53bee74f64c25ebd
https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2016/11/25/merely-making-contradictory-statement-in-a-judicial-proceeding-is-not-by-itself-always-sufficient-to-justify-a-prosecution-under-sections-199-and-200-ipc/
Index of Perjury case laws is here.
Anurag Mittal Vs Shaily Mishra Mittal on 24 Aug 2018
In this judgment from Hon’ble Apex Court, it was held that a pending appeal in a divorce decree does not make second marriage null and void, if it was withdrawn before second marriage.
From Paras 18-20,
18. Section 15 of the Act provides that it shall be lawful for either party to marry again after dissolution of a marriage if there is no right of appeal against the decree. A second marriage by either party shall be lawful only after dismissal of an appeal against the decree of divorce, if filed. If there is no right of appeal, the decree of divorce remains final and that either party to the marriage is free to marry again. In case an appeal is presented, any marriage before dismissal of the appeal shall not be lawful. The object of the provision is to provide protection to the person who has filed an appeal against the decree of dissolution of marriage and to ensure that the said appeal is not frustrated. The purpose of Section 15 of the Act is to avert complications that would arise due to a second marriage during the pendency of the appeal, in case the decree of dissolution of marriage is reversed. The protection that is afforded by Section 15 is primarily to a person who is contesting the decree of divorce.
19. Aggrieved by the decree of divorce, the Appellant filed an appeal and obtained a stay of the decree. During the pendency of the appeal, there was a settlement between him and his former spouse. After entering into a settlement, he did not intend to contest the decree of divorce. His intention was made clear by filing of the application for withdrawal. It cannot be said that he has to wait till a formal order is passed in the appeal, or otherwise his marriage dated 06.12.2011 shall be unlawful. Following the principles of purposive construction, we are of the opinion that the restriction placed on a second marriage in Section 15 of the Act till the dismissal of an appeal would not apply to a case where parties have settled and decided not to pursue the appeal.
20. It is not the case of the Appellant that the marriage dated 06.12.2011 is lawful because of the interim order that was passed in the appeals filed by him against the decree of divorce. He rested his case on the petition filed for withdrawal of the appeal. The upshot of the above discussion would be that the denouement of the Family Court is correct and upheld, albeit for different reasons. The conclusion of the High Court that the marriage dated 06.12.2011 is void is erroneous. Hence, the judgment of the High Court is set aside.
Citations: [AIR 2018 SUPREME COURT 3983], [2018 (9) SCC 691], [AIR 2018 SC (CIV) 2946], [(2018) 5 MAD LW 582], [(2018) 4 RAJ LW 2917], [(2018) 4 RECCIVR 103], [(2018) 8 MAD LJ 394], [(2018) 4 MPLJ 11], [(2018) 5 MAH LJ 714], [(2019) 1 PUN LR 189], [(2018) 2 WLC(SC)CVL 439], [(2018) 10 SCALE 202], [(2018) 3 KER LT 980], [(2019) 1 CIVLJ 734], [(2018) 3 DMC 1], [(2018) 4 PAT LJR 99], [(2019) 1 CAL LJ 41], [(2018) 4 CIVILCOURTC 314], [(2019) 132 ALL LR 725], [(2018) 6 ANDHLD 79], [(2018) 5 BOM CR 505], [(2019) 2 CALLT 56], [(2019) 193 ALLINDCAS 193 (SC)], [(2018) 3 HINDULR 343], [(2018) 5 CAL HN 252], [(2018) 126 CUT LT 1001], [(2018) 4 JCR 179 (SC)], [(2018) 251 DLT 552], [(2019) 1 GUJ LH 197], [(2018) 4 JLJR 61], [AIRONLINE 2018 SC 215]
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/124571211/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5b87b4c018a681333960cea8
https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2018/08/25/marriage-solemnized-before-dismissal-of-appeal-against-decree-of-divorce-held-valid-on-purposive-construction-sc/
Pankaj Mahajan vs Dimple @ Kajal on 30 September, 2011
Hon’ble Supreme Court granted divorce to husband on the grounds of cruelty (constantly giving threats of suicide) and desertion by knife who is a patient of Bipolar Affective Disorder (A.K.A Chronic Paramoid Schizophrenia). Permanent alimony is granted in this case, God knows why.
Citations : [2012 SCC CRI 1 345], [2011 SCC 12 1], [2011 AIOL 731], [2011 SLT 7 317], [2011 RCR CIVIL SC 4 534], [2011 SCALE 11 278], [2012 ALLMR SC 1 473], [2012 SCC CIV 1 685], [2011 GUJ LH 3 513], [2012 CTC 3 75], [2011 ULJ 4 85], [2011 LW 5 690], [2012 CHN 1 34], [2011 KLJ 4 528]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/55665/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5767b12ae691cb22da6d5570
Index of Divorce judgments is here.
Sri Rameshwar Yadav Vs The State Of Bihar on 16 March, 2018
This judgment from Hon’ble Apex Court allowed Exemption from Personal Appearance under CrPC 205 to parents and family of Arnesh Kumar.
