Landmark judgment of Apex Court giving guidelines or principles to adhere to while condoning delay in appeals.
Tag: Legal Procedure Explained – Interpretation of Statutes
Youth Bar Association of India Vs UOI on 7 Sep 2016
This is the landmark judgment from Hon’ble Supreme Court wherein directions were issued to Home Secretaries and DGPs of all States.
The complete directions are given below
(a) An accused is entitled to get a copy of the First Information Report at an earlier stage than as prescribed under Section 207 of the Cr.P.C.
(b) An accused who has reasons to suspect that he has been roped in a criminal case and his name may be finding place in a First Information Report can submit an application through his representative/agent/parokar for grant of a certified copy before the concerned police officer or to the Superintendent of Police on payment of such fee which is payable for obtaining such a copy from the Court. On such application being made, the copy shall be supplied within twenty-four hours.
(c) Once the First Information Report is forwarded by the police station to the concerned Magistrate or any Special Judge, on an application being filed for certified copy on behalf of the accused, the same shall be given by the Court concerned within two working days. The aforesaid direction has nothing to do with the statutory mandate inhered under Section 207 of the Cr.P.C.
(d) The copies of the FIRs, unless the offence is sensitive in nature, like sexual offences, offences pertaining to insurgency, terrorism and of that category, offences under POCSO Act and such other offences, should be uploaded on the police website, and if there is no such website, on the official website of the State Government, within twenty-four hours of the registration of the First Information Report so that the accused or any person connected with the same can download the FIR and file appropriate application before the Court as per law for redressal of his grievances. It may be clarified here that in case there is connectivity problems due to geographical location or there is some other unavoidable difficulty, the time can be extended up to forty-eight hours. The said 48 hours can be extended maximum up to 72 hours and it is only relatable to connectivity problems due to geographical location.
(e) The decision not to upload the copy of the FIR on the website shall not be taken by an officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police or any person holding equivalent post. In case, the States where District Magistrate has a role, he may also assume the said authority. A decision taken by the concerned police officer or the District Magistrate shall be duly communicated to the concerned jurisdictional Magistrate.
(f) The word ‘sensitive’ apart from the other aspects which may be thought of being sensitive by the competent authority as stated hereinbefore would also include concept of privacy regard being had to the nature of the FIR. The examples given with regard to the sensitive cases are absolutely illustrative and are not exhaustive.
(g) If an FIR is not uploaded, needless to say, it shall not enure per se a ground to obtain the benefit under Section 438 of the Cr.P.C.
(h) In case a copy of the FIR is not provided on the ground of sensitive nature of the case, a person grieved by the said action, after disclosing his identity, can submit a representation to the Superintendent of Police or any person holding the equivalent post in the State. The Superintendent of Police shall constitute a committee of three officers which shall deal with the said grievance. As far as the Metropolitan cities are concerned, where Commissioner is there, if a representation is submitted to the Commissioner of Police who shall constitute a committee of three officers. The committee so constituted shall deal with the grievance within three days from the date of receipt of the representation and communicate it to the grieved person.
(i) The competent authority referred to hereinabove shall constitute the committee, as directed herein-above, within eight weeks from today.
(j) In cases wherein decisions have been taken not to give copies of the FIR regard being had to the sensitive nature of the case, it will be open to the accused/his authorized representative/parokar to file an application for grant of certified copy before the Court to which the FIR has been sent and the same shall be provided in quite promptitude by the concerned Court not beyond three days of the submission of the application.
(k) The directions for uploading of FIR in the website of all the States shall be given effect from 15th November, 2016.
Citations: [2016 SCC ONLINE SC 914], [2017 ELT SC 345 434], [2016 SCC 9 473], [2016 SCC CRI 3 691], [2016 AIR SC 4136], [2016 CTC 5 571], [2016 KLT 3 1035]
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/151036912/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/58117e6a2713e17947889bcf
Here is the Petition copy.
Subramanian Swamy Vs Union of India on 13 May 2016
In this landmark judgment from Hon’ble Supreme Court, it has uphold the constitutional validity of Sections 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 199 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Citations: [2016 SCC 7 221], [2016 SCC ONLINE SC 550], [2016 AIR SC 2728]
Indiankanoon.org or Casemine link: https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/581180e72713e179479dd9f3
The Index for Defamation Judgments is here.
Mary Angel & Ors Vs State Of Tamil Nadu on 13 May, 1999
In this landmark judgment related to awarding of costs by High Courts and below courts under CrPC 482, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that,
Section 148(3) provides that when any costs have been incurred by any party to a proceeding under Section 145, Section 146 or Section 147, the Magistrate passing a decision may direct by whom such costs shall be paid, whether by such party or by any other party to the proceeding, and whether in whole or in part or proportion and such costs may include any expenses incurred in respect of witnesses and of pleaders’ fees, which the Court may consider reasonable.
Section 342 provides that any Court dealing with an application made to it for filing a complaint under Section 340 or an appeal under Section 341, shall have power to make such order as to costs as may be just.
Section 357 provides for payment of compensation to the victim for any loss or injury caused by the offence or in case of death to the heirs of the victims out of the fine imposed and while awarding compensation court has to take into consideration, inter alia, the expenses properly incurred in the prosecution.
Section 358 provides for payment of compensation where any person causes a police officer to arrest another person, without sufficient ground for causing such arrest, then compensation can be awarded by the Magistrate not exceeding Rs. 100/-.
Further, Section 359 empowers the Court to order payment of cost to the complainant in non cognizable case, if it convicts the accused and in such case, the Court can pass an order for payment of costs incurred by the complainant in the prosecution of the case and such costs may include any expenses incurred in respect of process fees, witnesses and pleaders fees which the Court considers reasonable.
And then,
In appropriate cases, where it is necessary to pass such order, Court may award costs for the purposes, namely,
(i) to give effect to any order passed under the Court
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court and
(iii) to secure the ends of justice as there is no
(i) negative provision for exercise of such power and (ii) inconsistency with the other provisions.Further, awarding of costs, as stated above, can be for two purposes, one for meeting the litigation expenses and, secondly, for preventing the abuse of the process of Court or to do justice in a matter and in such circumstances, costs can be exemplary.
Final order
In the result, we hold that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482, Court has power to pass such orders (not inconsistent with any provision of the Code) including the order for costs in appropriate cases, (i) to give effect to any order passed under the Code or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or
(iii) otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
As stated above, this extraordinary power is to be used in extrao rdinary circumstances and in a judicious manner. Costs may be to meet the litigation expenses or purposes can be exemplary to achieve the aforesaid In view of the aforesaid findings, this appeal is dismissed.
Thota Venkateswarlu Vs State Of Andhra Pradesh And Another on 2 September, 2011
Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in this judgment that,
Having regard to the above, while we see no reason to interfere with the High Court’s decision to reject the petitioner’s prayer for quashing of the proceedings in Complaint Case No.307 of 2007, we also make it clear that the learned Magistrate may proceed with the trial relating to the offences alleged to have been committed in India. However, in respect of offences alleged to have been committed outside India, the learned Magistrate shall not proceed with the trial without the sanction of the Central Government as envisaged in the proviso to Section 188 Cr.P.C.
Rajesh Gutta Vs State of A.P. on 1 March, 2011
Hon’ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that,
In which it is clearly stated that the police Officer has to question the victim girl, witnesses and contradict the witnesses and record the same. In the present case, the statement of the victim girl is concerned, the investigation officer stated in the charge sheet that he has contacted her and she confirmed the contents of the complaint given by the complainant. This Court is of the view that the Investigating Officer has to confirm the allegations mentioned in the complaint with the aggrieved person. This Court is of the view that the Officer, who is investigating the case, should record the statement as per the above said provisions. The first duty of the Investigating Officer is to find out the probability and truthfulness of her complaint unless otherwise the complainant’s version appraised by the Investigating Officer with the facts and circumstances of the case. Merely recording the statement as stated by the witnesses cannot be called as investigation. Investigation includes examination of the witnesses, confronting the witnesses on the basis of materials collected by the Investigating Officer and also the version of the person who is aggrieved because of the said complaint. Mere reproduction of the complaint without proper examination cannot be called as statement recorded during investigation.
Case Details:
Citations: [2011 RCR CRIMINAL 5 452], [2011 CRLJ 3506], [2011 CRIMES 3 236], [2011 DMC 2 655], [2011 SCC ONLINE AP 562], [2011 CRI LJ 3506], [2012 E CR N 1 365]
Other Source links: https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5767b10ee691cb22da6d1ec2 or https://mynation.net/docs/4921-2010/
Gudavalli Murali Krishna And Ors. Vs Gudavalli Madhavi And Anr. on 30 January, 2001
Hon’ble High Court of AP has held that, the High Court, by exercising its inherent powers can quash the F.I.R. or Investigation in appropriate cases following the tests laid down in Bhajanlal’s case by exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre Vs State Of Maharashtra And Others on 2 December, 2010
This is the landmark judgment from my favorite judge Shri Dalveer Bhandari J on the duration of a anticipatory bail granted by a High Court of a Sessions Court.
- Based on Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia case available here, it was held that once granted anticipatory bail continues to protect the accused until the end of trial.
- In Sushila Aggarwal & Ors Vs State (NCT of Delhi) in 15 May, 2018 here, a reference is made to a larger bench of Supreme Court on the point of valid time period of an anticipatory bail. This was at last decided in favor this Mhetre judgment only here.
From Para 25,
Mr. Bhushan submitted that a plain reading of the section 438 Cr.P.C. clearly reveals that the legislature has not placed any fetters on the court. In other words, the legislature has not circumscribed court’s discretion in any manner while granting anticipatory bail, therefore, the court should not limit the order only for a specified period till the charge-sheet is filed and thereafter compel the accused to surrender and ask for regular bail under section 439 Cr.P.C., meaning thereby the legislature has not envisaged that the life of the anticipatory bail would only last till the charge-sheet is filed. Mr. Bhushan submitted that when no embargo has been placed by the legislature then this court in some of its orders was not justified in placing this embargo.
From Para 93,
Some courts of smaller strength have erroneously observed that section 438 Cr.P.C. should be invoked only in exceptional or rare cases. Those orders are contrary to the law laid down by the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Sibbia’s case (supra).
From Para 94,
The complaint filed against the accused needs to be thoroughly examined including the aspect whether the complainant has filed false or frivolous complaint on earlier occasion. The court should also examine the fact whether there is any family dispute between the accused and the complainant and the complainant must be clearly told that if the complaint is found to be false or frivolous, then strict action will be takenagainst him in accordance with law. If the connivance betweenthe complainant and the investigating officer is established then action be taken against the investigating officer in accordance with law.
From Para 97,
A great ignominy, humiliation and disgrace is attached to the arrest. Arrest leads to many serious consequences not only for the accused but for the entire family and at times for the entire community. Most people do not make any distinction between arrest at a pre-conviction stage or post-conviction stage.
From Para 101,
The proper course of action ought to be that after evaluating the averments and accusation available on the record if the court is inclined to grant anticipatory bail then an interim bail be granted and notice be issued to the public prosecutor. After hearing the public prosecutor the court may either reject the bail application or confirm the initial order of granting bail. The court would certainly be entitled to impose conditions for the grant of bail. The public prosecutor or complainant would be at liberty to move the same court for cancellation or modifying the conditions of bail any time if liberty granted by the court is misused. The bail granted by the court should ordinarily be continued till the trial of the case.
From Para 102, (VERY IMPORTANT)
The order granting anticipatory bail for a limited duration and thereafter directing the accused to surrender and apply before a regular bail is contrary to the legislative intention and the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Sibbia’s case (supra).
From Para 105, (VERY IMPORTANT)
The court which grants the bail has the right to cancel the bail according to the provisions of the General Clauses Act but ordinarily after hearing the public prosecutor when the bail order is confirmed then the benefit of the grant of the bail should continue till the end of the trial of that case.
From Para 106, (VERY IMPORTANT)
The judgment in Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh (supra) is contrary to legislative intent and the spirit of the very provisions of the anticipatory bail itself and has resulted in an artificial and unreasonable restriction on the scope of enactment contrary to the legislative intention.
From Para 108,
Section 438 Cr.P.C. does not mention anything about the duration to which a direction for release on bail in the event of arrest can be granted. The order granting anticipatory bail is a direction specifically to release the accused on bail in the event of his arrest. Once such a direction of anticipatory bail is executed by the accused and he is released on bail, the concerned court would be fully justified in imposing conditions including direction of joining investigation.
From Para 110,
In pursuance to the order of the Court of Sessions or the High Court, once the accused is released on bail by the trial court, then it would be unreasonable to compel the accused to surrender before the trial court and again apply for regular bail.
From Para 112,
The validity of the restrictions imposed by the Apex Court, namely, that the accused released on anticipatory bail must submit himself to custody and only thereafter can apply for regular bail. This is contrary to the basic intention and spirit of section 438 Cr.P.C. It is also contrary to Article 21 of the Constitution. The test of fairness and reasonableness is implicit under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Directing the accused to surrender to custody after the limited period amounts to deprivation of his personal liberty.
From Paras 115, 116 (VERY IMPORTANT)
The Apex Court in Salauddin’s case (supra) held that anticipatory bail should be granted only for a limited period and on the expiry of that duration it should be left to the regular court to deal with the matter is not the correct view. The reasons quoted in the said judgment is that anticipatory bail is granted at a stage when an investigation is incomplete and the court is not informed about the nature of evidence against the alleged offender.
The said reason would not be right as the restriction is not seen in the enactment and bail orders by the High Court and Sessions Court are granted under sections 437 and 439 also at such stages and they are granted till the trial.
From Para 119, (VERY VERY IMPORTANT)
This Court in the Sibbia’s case (supra) laid down the following principles with regard to anticipatory bail:
a) Section 438(1) is to be interpreted in light of Article21 of the Constitution of India.
b) Filing of FIR is not a condition precedent to exercise of power under section 438.
c) Order under section 438 would not affect the right of police to conduct investigation.
d) Conditions mentioned in section 437 cannot be read into section 438.
e) Although the power to release on anticipatory bail can be described as of an “extraordinary” character this would “not justify the conclusion that the power must be exercised in exceptional cases only.” Powers are discretionary to be exercised in light of the circumstances of each case.
f) Initial order can be passed without notice to the Public Prosecutor. Thereafter, notice must be issued forthwith and question ought to be reexamined after hearing. Such ad interim order must conform to requirements of the section and suitable conditions should be imposed on the applicant.
From Para 128, (VERY VERY IMPORTANT)
In case, the State consider the following suggestions in proper perspective then perhaps it may not be necessary to curtail the personal liberty of the accused in a routine manner. These suggestions are only illustrative and not exhaustive.
1) Direct the accused to join investigation and only when the accused does not cooperate with the investigating agency, then only the accused be arrested.
2) Seize either the passport or such other related documents, such as, the title deeds of properties or the Fixed Deposit Receipts/Share Certificates of the accused.
3) Direct the accused to execute bonds;
4) The accused may be directed to furnish sureties of number of persons which according to the prosecution are necessary in view of the facts of the particular case.
5) The accused be directed to furnish undertaking that he would not visit the place where the witnesses reside so that the possibility of tampering of evidence or otherwise influencing the course of justice can be avoided.
6) Bank accounts be frozen for small duration during investigation.
Citation: [(2011) 1 SCC 694], [AIR 2011 SC 312],
Indiankanoon.org or Casemine link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1108032/
Index of all Anticipatory Bail Matters is here.
Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia Etc Vs State of Punjab on 9 April 1980
In this judgment from Hon’ble Supreme Court, it was held that,
Highlight
Should the operation of an order passed under Section 438(1) be limited in point of time? Not necessarily. The Court may, if there are reasons for doing so, limit the operation of the order to a short period until after the filing of an F.I.R. in respect of the matter covered by the order. The applicant may in such cases be directed to obtain an order of bail under Section 437 or 439 of the Code within a reasonably short period after the filing of the F.I.R. as aforesaid. But this need not be followed as an invariable rule. The normal rule should be not to limit the operation of the order in relation to a period of time.
Another set of clarifications here:
This should be the end of the matter, but it is necessary to clarify a few points which have given rise to certain misgivings.
Section 438(1) of the Code lays down a condition which has to be satisfied before anticipatory bail can be granted. The applicant must show that he has “reason to believe” that he may be arrested for a non-bailable offence. The use of the expression “reason to believe” shows that the belief that the applicant may be so arrested must be founded on reasonable grounds. Mere ‘fear’ is not ‘belief’, for which reason it is not enough for the applicant to show that he has some sort of a vague apprehension that some one is going to make an accusation against him, in pursuance of which he may be arrested. The grounds on which the belief of the applicant is based that he may be arrested for a non- bailable offence, must be capable of being examined by the court objectively, because it is then alone that the court can determine whether the applicant has reason to believe that he may be so arrested. Section 438(1), therefore, cannot be invoked on the basis of vague and general allegations, as if to arm oneself in perpetuity against a possible arrest. Otherwise, the number of applications for anticipatory bail will be as large as, at any rate, the adult populace. Anticipatory bail is a device to secure the individual’s liberty; it is neither a passport to the commission of crimes nor a shield against any and all kinds of accusations, likely or unlikely.
Secondly, if an application for anticipatory bail is made to the High Court or the Court of Session it must apply its own mind to the question and decide whether a case has been made out for granting such relief. It cannot leave the question for the decision of the Magistrate concerned under Section 437 of the Code, as and when an occasion arises. Such a course will defeat the very object of Section 438.
Thirdly, the filing of a First Information Report is not a condition precedent to the exercise of the power under Section 438. The imminence of a likely arrest founded on a reasonable belief can be shown to exist even if an F.I.R. is not yet filed.
Fourthly, anticipatory bail can be granted even after an F.I.R. is filed, so long as the applicant has not been arrested.
Fifthly, the provisions of Section 438 cannot be invoked after the arrest of the accused. The grant of “anticipatory bail” to an accused who is under arrest involves a contradiction in terms, in so far as the offence or offences for which he is arrested, are concerned. After arrest, the accused must seek his remedy under Section 437 or Section 439 of the Code, if he wants to be released on bail in respect of the offence or offences for which he is arrested.
Citation: [1980 AIR 1632], [1980 SCR (3) 383], [(1980) 2 SCC 565], [AIR 1980 SC 1632], [(1980 Cri LJ 1125)],
Indiankanoon.org or Casemine link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/173889445/
Index of all Bail Matters is here.
