Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur Vs S. S. Shukla Etc. Etc on 28 April, 1976

Posted on December 6, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

This judgment is considered a stain on the history of the court, which had delivered a judgment that has trummelled on the rights of citizens.

Case background:

The President of India, during the Emergency, made such a proclamation and many people were detained under various laws. Some of them moved high courts seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The Government said, since the right to move courts for the enforcement of Article 21 is suspended, the petitions were not maintainable.

Real Story:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans_Raj_Khanna#The_Habeas_Corpus_Case

https://www.bloombergquint.com/opinion/vr-krishna-iyer-the-super-judge#gs.89TGyeW0

Hon’ble Court rules:

The 4 out of 5 judges on the bench held that “The width and amplitude of the power of detention under section 3 of the Act is to be adjudged in the context of the emergency proclaimed by the President. The Court cannot compel the detaining authority to give the particulars of the grounds on which he had reasonable cause to believe that it was necessary to exercise this control. An investigation into facts or allegations of facts based on malafides is not permissible because such a course will involve advertence to the grounds of detention and materials constituting those grounds which is not competent in the context of the emergency”

Justice Hans Raj Khanna is the sole dissenting voice on the bench and after referring to earlier A.K.Gopalan case he held that “The argument that suspending the right of a person to move any court for the enforcement of right to life and personal liberty is done under a constitutional provision and, therefore, it cannot be said that the resulting situation would mean the absence of the Rule of law cannot stand close scrutiny for it tries to equate illusion of the Rule of Law with the reality of Rule of Law.“

And “The suspension of the right to move a court for the enforcement of the right contained in Art. 21 cannot have the effect of debarring an aggrieved person from approaching the courts with the complaint regarding deprivation of life or personal liberty by an authority on the score that no power has been vested in the authority to deprive a person of life or liberty. The pre-supposition of the existence of substantive power to deprive a person of his life or personal liberty in Art. 21 even though that article only mentions the procedure, would not necessarily point to the conclusion that in the event of the suspension of the right to move any court for the enforcement of Art. 21, the suspension would also dispense with the necessity of the existence of the substantive power The co-existence of substantive power and procedure established by law for depriving R person of his life and liberty which is implicit in Art. 21 would not lead to the result that even if there is suspension of the right regarding procedure, suspension would also operate upon the necessity of substantive power. What is true of a proposition need not be true of the converse of that proposition. The suspension of the right to make. any court for the enforcement of the right contained in Art. 21 may have the effect of dispensing with the necessity of prescribing procedure for the exercise.. Of substantive power to deprive a person of his life or personal liberty, it can in no case have the effect of permitting an authority to deprive a person of his life or personal liberty without the existence of substantive power. The close bond which is there between the existence of substantive power of depriving a Person of his life or personal liberty and the procedure for the exercise of that power, if the right contained in Art. 21 were in operation, would not necessarily hold good if that right were suspended because the removal of compulsion about the prescription of procedure for the exercise of the substantive power would not do away with the compulsion regarding the existence of that power.”

Final Words

There is no sufficient ground to interfere with the view taken by all the nine High Courts which went into the matter that the Presidential order dated June 27, 1975, did not affect the maintainability of the habeas corpus petitions to question the legality of the detention orders.

The principles which should be followed by the courts in dealing with petitions for writs of habeas corpus to challenge the legality of detention are well-established.

Unanimity obtained without sacrifice of conviction commends the decision to public confidence. Unanimity which is merely formal and which is recorded at the expense of strong conflicting views is not desirable in a court of last resort.

A dissent in a court of last resort is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day when a later decision may possibly correct the error into which the dissenting Judge believes the court have been betrayed.

Observation: Judges are not there simply to decide cases, but to decide them as they think they should be decided, and while it may be regrettable that they cannot always agree, it is better that their independence should be maintained and recognise than that unanimity should be secured through its sacrifice.

Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur Vs S. S. Shukla Etc. Etc on 28 April, 1976

Citation: AIR 1976 SC 1207, 1976 SCR 172, 1976 SCC (2) 521

Indiankanoon link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1735815/

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Dr. (Mrs.) Vijaya Manohar Arbat Vs Kashi Rao Rajaram Sawai And Anr on 18 February, 1987

Posted on December 1, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

In this landmark judgment from Hon’ble Apex Court, it was held that a daughter (not just a son) is also liable to pay maintenance to her parents under 125 CrPC read with Sec 8 of IPC.

The lower court which is Bombay High Court has given this order here, was later on confirmed by the Apex Court.

This has a precedence from a Kerala high Court judgment available here and one subsequent judgment of High Court of AP here.

Dr. (Mrs.) Vijaya Manohar Arbat Vs Kashi Rao Rajaram Sawai And Anr on 18 February, 1987

Citation: [1987 SCR (2) 331], [1987 SCC (2) 278], [JT 1987 (3) 46], [1987 SCALE (1) 379], [1987 BOMCR SC 1 629], [1987 AIR SC 1100], [1987 SCC CRI 354], [1987 CRIMES SC 1 713], [1987 CRIMES SC 3 348], [1987 CRLJ SC 977], [1987 ECC 11 416], [1987 ACR SC 11 334], [1987 APLJ SC 1 35], [1987 AWC SC 676], [1987 BOMLR 89 130], [1987 KLT SC 1 674], [1987 MHLJ 395], [1987 MPLJ 218], [1988 SHIMLC 1 133]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/780813/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac39e4b014971140e515

Chanmuniya Vs Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha & Anr on 7 October, 2010

Posted on November 30, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

This is the landmark ruling from Hon’ble Supreme Court wherein it was held that

“We are of the opinion that a broad and expansive interpretation should be given to the term “wife” to include even those cases where a man and woman have been living together as husband and wife for a reasonably long period of time, and strict proof of marriage should not be a precondition for maintenance under Section 125 CrPC, so as to fulfil the true spirit and essence of the beneficial provision of maintenance under Section 125. We also believe that such an interpretation would be a just application of the principles enshrined in the Preamble to our Constitution, namely, social justice and upholding the dignity of the individual.”

Chanmuniya Vs Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha & Anr on 7 October, 2010

But in a para prior to this para, this case was referred to a larger bench (this was a 3-judge bench). But this case was but after two years dismissed as the advocate for appellant dies and the appellant did not pursue the case. Here is the Dismissal Order:

Chanmuniya Vs Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha and Anr on 5 September 2014

Here is the Para 45,

45.We, therefore, request the Hon’ble Chief Justice to refer the following, amongst other, questions to be decided by a larger Bench. According to us, the questions are:
1. Whether the living together of a man and woman as husband and wife for a considerable period of time would raise the presumption of a valid marriage between them and whether such a presumption would entitle the woman to maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C?
2. Whether strict proof of marriage is essential for a claim of maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. having regard to the provisions of Domestic Violence Act, 2005?
3. Whether a marriage performed according to customary rites and ceremonies, without strictly fulfilling the requisites of Section 7(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, or any other personal law would entitle the woman to maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C.?

So, this judgment is NOT a landmark judgment as the question of law was NOT decided either by this Court nor by a larger bench of this Court.

Citation: [2011 ANJ SC 1 26], [2010 AIOL 681], [2011 SCC 1 141], [2011 ALLMR CRI SC 346], [2010 SCALE 10 602], [2011 BOMCR SC 2 787], [2011 SCC CRI 2 666], [2011 CRLJ SC 96], [2010 RCR CIVIL SC 4 801], [2010 JT 11 132], [2010 AIR SC 6497], [2011 SCC CIV 1 53]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1949767/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609aedbe4b0149711414ea0

But this judgment declared it so here.

Reproduced in accordance with Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from main.sci.gov.in/judgments, judis.nic.in, lobis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court and District Court Websites such as ecourts.gov.in

Gian Singh Vs State Of Punjab & Anr on 24 September, 2012

Posted on October 18, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

The legal contention to be decided authoritatively in this case in front of Apex Court is that “it should not be understood to have meant that Judges can quash any kind of criminal case merely because there has been a compromise between the parties. After all, a crime is an offence against society, and not merely against a private individual”.

This was referred from a 2-judge bench of Apex Court to decide the issue authoritatively and dissolve the ambiguity, if any.

Some or all of the following tests may be relevant to decide whether to quash or not to quash the criminal proceedings in a given case;
(a) the nature and gravity of case;
(b) does the dispute reflect overwhelming and predominantly civil flavour;
(c) would the quashing involve settlement of entire or almost the entire dispute;
(d) the compromise/settlement between parties and/or other facts and the circumstances render possibility of conviction remote and bleak;
(e) not to quash would cause extreme injustice and would not serve ends of justice and
(f) not to quash would result in abuse of process of court.

Gian Singh Vs State Of Punjab & Anr on 24 September, 2012

The key judgment cited in this judgment is here.

Citations: [2012 SCALE 9 257], [2012 SLT 7 171], [2012 CRLJ SC 4934], [2012 RCR CRIMINAL SC 4 543], [2012 SCC 10 303], [2012 AIR SC 5333], [2012 BOMCR CRI SC 4 428], [2013 SCC CRI 1 160], [2012 CRIMES SC 4 155], [2012 AIOL 413], [2012 SCC CIV 4 1188], [2012 SCC L&S 2 988], [2012 SCC ONLINE SC 769], [2012 KLJ 4 141], [2012 KERLT 4 108], [2012 GUJ LH 3 394], [2012 AIR SC SUPP 838], [2013 RLW SC 4 3573], [2013 BLJ 2 289], [2012 SCR 8 753], [2012 KARLJ 5 476], [2012 WLN 4 71], [2012 CGLRW 3 98], [2012 JT SC 9 426], [2012 AIR SCW 5333]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/69949024/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af16e4b014971141590c

https://indianlawportal.co.in/gian-singh-v-state-of-punjab/

Giduthuri Kesari Kumar And Others Vs State of Telangana on 16 February 2015

Posted on October 15, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

A landmark quash judgment by Hon’ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh, which laid down few criteria only under which DVC quash under CrPC 482 is maintainable.

From Para 13,

The next aspect is having regard to the fact that the reliefs provided under Section 18 to 22 are civil reliefs and enquiry under Sec. 12 of D.V. Act is not a trial of a criminal case, whether the respondents can seek for quashment of the proceedings that they were unnecessarily roped in and thereby continuation of the proceedings amounts to abuse of process of Court etc., pleas. In my considered view, having regard to the facts that the scheme of the Act which provide civil reliefs and the Magistrate can lay his own procedure by not taking coercive steps in general course and the enquiry being not the trial of a criminal offence, the respondents cannot rush with 482 Cr.P.C petitions seeking quashment of the proceedings on the ground that they were unnecessarily roped in. They can establish their non involvement in the matter and non-answerability to the reliefs claimed by participating in the enquiry. It is only in exceptional cases like without there existing any domestic relationship as laid under Section 2(f) of the D.V. Act between the parties, the petitioner filed D.V case against them or a competent Court has already acquitted them of the allegations which are identical to the ones leveled in the Domestic Violence Case, the respondents can seek for quashment of the proceedings since continuation of the proceedings in such instances certainly amounts to abuse of process of Court.

From Para 14,

14) To sum up the findings:
i) Since the remedies under D.V Act are civil remedies, the Magistrate in view of his powers under Section 28(2) of D.V Act shall issue notice to the parties for their first appearance and shall not insist for the attendance of the parties for every hearing and in case of non-appearance of the parties despite receiving notices, can conduct enquiry and pass exparte order with the material available. It is only in the exceptional cases where the Magistrate feels that the circumstance require that he can insist the presence of the parties even by adopting coercive measures.
ii) In view of the remedies which are in civil nature and enquiry is not a trial of criminal case, the quash petitions under Sec.482 Cr.P.C on the plea that the petitioners are unnecessarily arrayed as parties are not maintainable. It is only in exceptional cases like without there existing any domestic relationship as laid under Section 2(f) of the D.V. Act between the parties, the petitioner filed D.V. case against them or a competent Court has already acquitted them of the allegations which are identical to the ones leveled in the Domestic Violence Case, the respondents can seek for quashment of the proceedings since continuation of the proceedings in such instances certainly amounts to abuse of process of Court.

Giduthuri Kesari Kumar And Others Vs State Of Telangana on 16 February, 2015

Citations: 2015 ALD CRL AP 2 470

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/71870497/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5608f8dce4b01497111438bd

This decision (with respect to shared householding requirement in DV cases) seems to be overruled by Supreme Court here. This judgment was not considered in the SC judgment.

Index of all Domestic Violence Cases is here.

Esha Bhattacharjee Vs Mg.Commit.Of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others on 13 September, 2013

Posted on October 6, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Landmark judgment of Apex Court giving guidelines or principles to adhere to while condoning delay in appeals.

Esha Bhattacharjee Vs Mg.Commit.Of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others on 13 September, 2013

In no case, is arrest compulsory

Posted on October 4, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

In no case, is arrest compulsory

Youth Bar Association of India Vs UOI on 7 September, 2016

Posted on October 2, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

This is the landmark judgment from Hon’ble Supreme Court wherein directions were issued to Home Secretaries and DGPs of all States.

The complete directions are given below

(a) An accused is entitled to get a copy of the First Information Report at an earlier stage than as prescribed under Section 207 of the Cr.P.C.
(b) An accused who has reasons to suspect that he has been roped in a criminal case and his name may be finding place in a First Information Report can submit an application through his representative/agent/parokar for grant of a certified copy before the concerned police officer or to the Superintendent of Police on payment of such fee which is payable for obtaining such a copy from the Court. On such application being made, the copy shall be supplied within twenty-four hours.
(c) Once the First Information Report is forwarded by the police station to the concerned Magistrate or any Special Judge, on an application being filed for certified copy on behalf of the accused, the same shall be given by the Court concerned within two working days. The aforesaid direction has nothing to do with the statutory mandate inhered under Section 207 of the Cr.P.C.
(d) The copies of the FIRs, unless the offence is sensitive in nature, like sexual offences, offences pertaining to insurgency, terrorism and of that category, offences under POCSO Act and such other offences, should be uploaded on the police website, and if there is no such website, on the official website of the State Government, within twenty-four hours of the registration of the First Information Report so that the accused or any person connected with the same can download the FIR and file appropriate application before the Court as per law for redressal of his grievances. It may be clarified here that in case there is connectivity problems due to geographical location or there is some other unavoidable difficulty, the time can be extended up to forty-eight hours. The said 48 hours can be extended maximum up to 72 hours and it is only relatable to connectivity problems due to geographical location.
(e) The decision not to upload the copy of the FIR on the website shall not be taken by an officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police or any person holding equivalent post. In case, the States where District Magistrate has a role, he may also assume the said authority. A decision taken by the concerned police officer or the District Magistrate shall be duly communicated to the concerned jurisdictional Magistrate.
(f) The word ‘sensitive’ apart from the other aspects which may be thought of being sensitive by the competent authority as stated hereinbefore would also include concept of privacy regard being had to the nature of the FIR. The examples given with regard to the sensitive cases are absolutely illustrative and are not exhaustive.
(g) If an FIR is not uploaded, needless to say, it shall not enure per se a ground to obtain the benefit under Section 438 of the Cr.P.C.
(h) In case a copy of the FIR is not provided on the ground of sensitive nature of the case, a person grieved
by the said action, after disclosing his identity, can submit a representation to the Superintendent of Police or any person holding the equivalent post in the State. The Superintendent of Police shall constitute a committee of three officers which shall deal with the said grievance. As far as the Metropolitan cities are concerned, where Commissioner is there, if a representation is submitted to the Commissioner of Police who shall constitute a committee of three officers. The committee so constituted shall deal with the grievance within three days from the date of receipt of the representation and communicate it to the grieved person.
(i) The competent authority referred to hereinabove shall constitute the committee, as directed herein-above, within eight weeks from today.
(j) In cases wherein decisions have been taken not to give copies of the FIR regard being had to the sensitive nature of the case, it will be open to the accused/his authorized representative/parokar to file an application for grant of certified copy before the Court to which the FIR has been sent and the same shall be provided in quite promptitude by the concerned Court not beyond three days of the submission of the application.
(k) The directions for uploading of FIR in the website of all the States shall be given effect from 15th November, 2016.

Youth Bar Association of India Vs UOI on 7 September, 2016

Citations: [2016 SCC ONLINE SC 914], [2017 ELT SC 345 434], [2016 SCC 9 473], [2016 SCC CRI 3 691], [2016 AIR SC 4136], [2016 CTC 5 571], [2016 KLT 3 1035]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/151036912/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/58117e6a2713e17947889bcf

FIRs to be uploaded on police website or official website of Government concerned from 15th November, 2016

Here is the Petition copy.

WRIT-PETITIONCRIMINAL-NO-68-OF-2016-1

Subramanian Swamy Vs Union of India on 13 May 2016

Posted on October 2, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

In this landmark judgment from Hon’ble Supreme Court, it has uphold the constitutional validity of Sections 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 199 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Subramanian Swamy Vs Union of India on 13 May, 2016

Citations: [2016 SCC 7 221], [2016 SCC ONLINE SC 550], [2016 AIR SC 2728]

Indiankanoon.org or Casemine link: https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/581180e72713e179479dd9f3

The Index for Defamation Judgments is here.

Mary Angel & Ors Vs State Of Tamil Nadu on 13 May, 1999

Posted on October 2, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

In this landmark judgment related to awarding of costs by High Courts and below courts under CrPC 482, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that,

Section 148(3) provides that when any costs have been incurred by any party to a proceeding under Section 145, Section 146 or Section 147, the Magistrate passing a decision may direct by whom such costs shall be paid, whether by such party or by any other party to the proceeding, and whether in whole or in part or proportion and such costs may include any expenses incurred in respect of witnesses and of pleaders’ fees, which the Court may consider reasonable.
Section 342 provides that any Court dealing with an application made to it for filing a complaint under Section 340 or an appeal under Section 341, shall have power to make such order as to costs as may be just.
Section 357 provides for payment of compensation to the victim for any loss or injury caused by the offence or in case of death to the heirs of the victims out of the fine imposed and while awarding compensation court has to take into consideration, inter alia, the expenses properly incurred in the prosecution.
Section 358 provides for payment of compensation where any person causes a police officer to arrest another person, without sufficient ground for causing such arrest, then compensation can be awarded by the Magistrate not exceeding Rs. 100/-.
Further, Section 359 empowers the Court to order payment of cost to the complainant in non cognizable case, if it convicts the accused and in such case, the Court can pass an order for payment of costs incurred by the complainant in the prosecution of the case and such costs may include any expenses incurred in respect of process fees, witnesses and pleaders fees which the Court considers reasonable.

And then,

In appropriate cases, where it is necessary to pass such order, Court may award costs for the purposes, namely,
(i) to give effect to any order passed under the Court
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court and
(iii) to secure the ends of justice as there is no
(i) negative provision for exercise of such power and (ii) inconsistency with the other provisions.
Further, awarding of costs, as stated above, can be for two purposes, one for meeting the litigation expenses and, secondly, for preventing the abuse of the process of Court or to do justice in a matter and in such circumstances, costs can be exemplary.

Final order

In the result, we hold that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482, Court has power to pass such orders (not inconsistent with any provision of the Code) including the order for costs in appropriate cases, (i) to give effect to any order passed under the Code or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or
(iii) otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
As stated above, this extraordinary power is to be used in extrao rdinary circumstances and in a judicious manner. Costs may be to meet the litigation expenses or purposes can be exemplary to achieve the aforesaid In view of the aforesaid findings, this appeal is dismissed.

Mary Angel & Ors Vs State Of Tamil Nadu on 13 May, 1999

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Legal Procedure Explained – Interpretation of Statutes

Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur Vs S. S. Shukla Etc. Etc on 28 April, 1976

Dr. (Mrs.) Vijaya Manohar Arbat Vs Kashi Rao Rajaram Sawai And Anr on 18 February, 1987

Chanmuniya Vs Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha & Anr on 7 October, 2010

Gian Singh Vs State Of Punjab & Anr on 24 September, 2012

Giduthuri Kesari Kumar And Others Vs State of Telangana on 16 February 2015

Esha Bhattacharjee Vs Mg.Commit.Of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others on 13 September, 2013

In no case, is arrest compulsory

Youth Bar Association of India Vs UOI on 7 September, 2016

Subramanian Swamy Vs Union of India on 13 May 2016

Mary Angel & Ors Vs State Of Tamil Nadu on 13 May, 1999