In this landmark judgment from Apex Court, two sections of Article 368 of Constitution of India are struck down as being invalid and unconstitutional, as they are against the basic structure of Constitution.
Citation : 1980 AIR 1789, 1981 SCR (1) 206
Indiankanoon.org link : https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1939993/
In this Dipak Misra dole out judgment, even the judicially separated folks are also within the ambit of Aggrieved person. The Hon’ble Supreme Court rejected the view taken by lower courts and held that the status of the parties did not become different due to a decree of judicial separation. There is a distinction between the decree for divorce and the decree of judicial separation. So, the finding of the lower courts, that the parties having been judicially separated, the appellant had ceased to be an aggrieved person, is “wholly unsustainable”.
Citations: [2016 AJR 1 545], [2016 ALD CRL SC 1 46], [2016 CALLT SC 1 17], [2016 JCC SC 1 31], [2016 JLJR 1 93], [2016 LW 3 193], [2016 NCC 1 239], [2016 PLJR 1 158], [2016 SCC 2 705], [2016 WLN SC 1 52], [2015 AD SC 12 101], [2015 CCR SC 4 256], [2015 CRIMES SC 4 384], [2015 DMC SC 3 823], [2015 KLT SC 4 999], [2015 SCALE 12 521], [2015 UC 3 2229], [2015 JT 11 132], [2015 SLT 8 675], [2015 AIOL 4593], [2016 CRLJ SC 330], [2016 SCC CRI 1 810], [2015 SCC ONLINE SC 1229], [2016 GUJ LH 1 1], [2016 AIC 157 198], [2016 ALLCC SC 92 443], [2016 CGLJ SC 1 105], [2016 RCR CRIMINAL SC 1 152], [2016 RCR CIVIL SC 1 151], [2016 SCC CIV 2 223]
Other Source links:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/124775488/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5790b3ede561097e45a4e4ac
The index page is here.
Interesting case here from Apex Court from 1966.
Back story:
Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar, who is a citizen of India, serves as a Reporter on the Staff of the English Weekly “Blitz”, published in Bombay and edited by Mr. R. K. Karanjia. It appears that Mr. Krishnaraj M. D. Thackersey sued Mr. R. K. Karanjia (Suit No. 319 of 1960) on the Original Side of the Bombay High Court, and claimed Rs. 3 lakhs by way of damages for alleged malicious libel published in the Blitz on the 24th September, 1960, under the caption “Scandal Bigger Than Mundhra”. This suit was tried by Mr. Justice Tarkunde.
One of the allegations which had been made in the said article was to the effect that China Cotton Exporters, of which Mr. Thackersey was a partner, had obtained licences for import of art silk yarn on condition that the same would be sold to handloom weavers only; and that in order to sell the said silk yarn in the black market with a view to realise higher profits, three bogus handloom factories were created on paper and bills and invoices were made with a view to create the impression that the condition on which the, licences had been granted to China Cotton Exporters, had been complied with. Mr. Thackersey’s concern had thus sold the said yarn in the black-market and thereby concealed from taxation’ the large profits made in that behalf. These allegations purported to be based on the papers filed in Suits Nos. 997 and 998 of 1951 which had been instituted by China Cotton Exporters against National Handloom Weaving Works, Rayon Handloom Industries, and one Bhaichand G. Goda. The said Bhaichand G. Goda was alleged to have been the guarantor in respect of the transactions mentioned in the said suits. The said Bhaichand Goda had, in the course of insolvency proceedings which had been taken out in execution of the decrees passed against him, made an affidavit which seemed to support the main points of the allegations made by the Blitz in its article “Scandal Bigger Than Mundhra”.
During the course of the trial, the said Bhaichand Goda was called as a defence witness by Mr. Karanjia. In the witness-box, Mr. Goda feigned complete ignorance of the said transactions; and under protection given to him by the learned Judge who was trying the action, he repudiated every one of the allegations he had made against Mr. Thackersey’s concern in the said affidavit. Thereupon, Mr. Karanjia applied for permission to cross-examine Mr. Goda and the said permission was granted by the learned Judge. Accordingly, Mr. Goda came to be cross-examined by Mr. Karanjia’s counsel.
Later, during the course of further proceedings, it was discovered that Mr. Goda had made several statements before the Income-tax authorities in which he had reiterated some of the statements made by him in his affidavit on which he was crossexamined. From the said statements it also appeared that he had alleged that in addition to the invoice price of the transactions in question, he had paid Rs. 90,000/- as “on money” to China Cotton Exporters. As a result of the discovery of this material, an application was made by Mr. Karanjia before the learned Judge for permission to recall Mr. Goda and confront him with the statements which he had made before the Income-tax authorities. The learned Judge granted the said application.
On Friday, the 23rd October, 1964, Mr. Goda stepped into the witness-box in pursuance of the order passed by the learned Judge that he should be recalled for further examination. On that occasion he moved the learned Judge that the latter should protect him against his evidence being reported in the press. He stated that the publication in the press of his earlier evidence had caused loss to him in business; and so, he desired that the evidence which he had been recalled to give should not be published in the papers. When this request was made by Mr. Goda, arguments were addressed before the learned Judge and he orally directed that the evidence of Mr. Goda should not be published. It was pointed out to the learned Judge that the daily press, viz., ’The Times of India’ and ’The Indian Express’ gave only brief accounts of the proceedings before the Court in that case, whereas the ’Blitz’ gave a full report of the said proceedings. The learned Judge then told Mr. Zaveri, Counsel for Mr. Karanjia that the petitioner who was one of the reporters of the ’Blitz’ should be told not to publish reports of Mr. Goda’s evidence in the ’Blitz’. The petitioner had all along been reporting the proceedings in the said suit in the columns of the ’Blitz’.
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On Monday, the 26th October, 1964, Mr. Chari appeared for Mr. Karanjia and urged before the learned Judge that the fundamental principle in the administration of justice was that it must be open to the public and that exceptions to such public administration of justice were rare, such as that of a case where a child is a victim of a sexual offence, or of a case relating to matrimonial matters where sordid details of intimate relations between spouses are likely to come out, and proceedings in regard to official secrecy. Mr. Chari further contended that no witness could claim protection from publicity on the ground that if the evidence is published it might adversely affect his business. Mr. Chari, therefore, challenged the correctness of the said order and alternatively suggested to the learned Judge that he should pass a written order forbidding publication of Mr. Goda’s evidence. The learned Judge, however, rejected Mr. Chari’s contentions and stated that he had already made an oral order forbidding such publication, and that no written order was necessary. He added that he expected that his oral order would be obeyed.
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The petitioner felt aggrieved by the said oral order passed by Mr. Justice Tarkunde and moved the Bombay High Court by a Writ Petition No. 1685 of 1964 under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The said petition was, however, dismissed by a Division Bench of the said High Court on the 10th November, 1964 on the ground that the impugned order was a judicial order of the High Court and was not amenable to a writ under Art. 226. That is how the petitioner has moved this Court under Art. 32 for the enforcement of his fundamental rights under Art. 19(1)(a) and (g) of the Constitution.
——
In a suit for defamation against the editor of a weekly newspaper, field on the original side of the High Court, one of the witnesses prayed that the Court may order that publicity should not be given to his evidence in the press as his business would be affected. After hearing arguments, the trial Judge passed an oral order prohibiting the publication of the evidence of the witness. A reporter of the weekly along with other journalists moved this Court under Art. 32 challenging the validity of the order.
Citations: [
Other Source links:
The Index for Defamation Judgments is here.
Reproduced in accordance with Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from main.sci.gov.in/judgments, judis.nic.in, lobis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court and District Court Websites such as ecourts.gov.in
Following questions arise for consideration in this petition filed with Hon’ble Bombay High Court:
“Whether an order passed on an application made under section 23 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as “the said Act”) is appelable under section 29 of the said Act?
Whether an appeal will lie under section 29 of the said Act against every order passed by the learned Magistrate in proceedings initiated on the basis of an application made under section 12 of the said Act?
What is the scope of an appeal under section 29 of the said Act?”
From Para 25,
Thus, the conclusions which can be summarised are as under:
(i) An appeal will lie under section 29 of the said Act against the final order passed by the learned Magistrate under sub-section 1 of section 12 of the said Act;(ii) Under sub-section 2 of section 23 of the said Act, the learned Magistrate is empowered to grant an ex-parte ad-interim relief in terms of sections 18 to 22 of the said Act. The power under sub-section 1 is of granting interim relief in terms of sections 18 to 22 of the said Act. Before granting an interim relief under sub-section 1, an opportunity of being heard is required to be granted to the respondent.
(iii) An appeal will also lie against orders passed under sub section 1 and sub section 2 of the section 23 of the said Act which are passed by the learned Magistrate. However, while dealing with an appeal against the order passed under section 23 of the said Act, the Appellate Court will usually not interfere with the exercise of discretion by the learned Magistrate. The appellate Court will interfere only if it is found that the discretion has been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, perversely or if it is found that the Court has ignored settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interim relief.
(iv) An appeal under section 29 will not be maintainable against purely procedural orders which do not decide or determine the rights and liabilities of the parties.
Citations: [2
Other Source links:
This is the landmark judgment from Delhi High Court which held that “A mother who is being maltreated and harassed by her son would be an “aggrieved person”. If the said harassment is caused through the female relative of the son i.e. his wife, the said female relative will fall within the ambit of the “respondent‟. This phenomenon of the daughters-in-law harassing their mothers-in-law especially who are dependent is not uncommon in the Indian society.”
From Paras 9 and 10,
9. As a matter of fact, para ‘4(i)’ clarifies that even those women who are sisters, widows, mothers, single woman or living with the abuser are entitled to legal protection under the proposed legislation. A mother who is being maltreated and harassed by her son would be an “aggrieved person”. If the said harassment is caused through the female relative of the son i.e. his wife, the said female relative will fall within the ambit of the ‘respondent’. This phenomenon of the daughters-in-law harassing their mothers-in-law especially who are dependent is not uncommon in the Indian society.
10. In view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, para ‘4’ of the Statement of Objects and Reasons cannot be stated to have excluded a female relative of the male partner or a respondent and thus, a mother-in-law being an “aggrieved person” can file a complaint against the daughter-in-law as a respondent.
Citations : [2011 DMC 3 1], [2011 CRIMES 4 548], [2011 DLT 181 775], [2011 DRJ 126 298], [2011 ILR SUPP DELHI 4 435], [2012 RCR CRIMINAL 1 924], [2011 SCC ONLINE DEL 3710], [2011 AIC 106 846], [2011 AD DELHI 6 576]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1272794/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56090db1e4b014971117a40b
This is the Delhi High Court judgment from Shri. Shiv Narayan Dhingra, affirming that in a DV case, respondent can be other family member other than husband and are liable for relief mentioned under Monetary Relief u/s 20 of PWDV Act.
Punch Statement:
The girl and the parents of the girl knew it very well that they had selected a person for marriage with whom the girl was going to live abroad and the matrimonial home and the shared household was going to be outside India. This act of marrying a person settled abroad is a voluntary act of the girl. If she had not intended to enjoy the fat salary which boys working abroad get and the material facilities available abroad, she could have refused to marry him and settled for a boy having moderate salary within India. After having chosen a person living abroad, putting the responsibility, after failure of marriage, on the shoulders on his parents and making them criminals in the eyes of law because matrimonial ties between the two could not last for long, does not sound either legally correct or morally correct. How can the parents of a boy who is working abroad, living abroad, an adult, free to take his own decisions, be arrayed as criminals or respondents if the marriage between him and his wife failed due to any reason whatsoever after few years of marriage. If the sin committed by such parents of boy is that they facilitated the marriage, then this sin is equally committed by parents of the girl. If such marriage fails then parents of both bride and groom would have to share equal responsibility. The responsibility of parents of the groom cannot be more. Shelter of Indian culture and joint family cannot be taken to book only relatives of boy. A woman’s shared household in India in such cases is also her parents’ house where she lived before marriage and not her in-laws’ house where she did not live after marriage.
Another one here:
I am surprised that the Courts below did not give weight to the judgment of New Jersey where parties lived for 7 ½ years but assumed jurisdiction under Domestic Violence Act because of the pure temporary residence (as pleaded by her) of wife in Delhi who is otherwise resident of Hissar. The Court of ASJ wanted that the order of the Court of MM should be honoured by the US while the Court here would not honour a decree of Court of USA where the husband and wife lived for 7 ½ years.
In this Supreme Court judgment, it was held that
From Para 31, “An act of domestic violence once committed, subsequent decree of divorce will not absolve the liability of the Respondent from the offence committed or to deny the benefit to which the aggrieved person is entitled under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 including monetary relief Under Section 20, Child Custody Under Section 21, Compensation Under Section 22 and interim or ex parte order Under Section 23 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005.“.
Lesson Learnt:
Once an act of domestic violence is done, later on divorce happens, the woman can file DV case even after getting divorce, for the dv acts committed while the marriage was in vogue.
In this landmark judgment from Hon’ble Supreme Court, it has given a statutory shape to the CVC and to endow it with wider powers including supervision over Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and the Enforcement Directorate (ED). Indeed the Supreme Court, while giving the said directions had relied upon the report of the Independent Review Committee (IRC) comprising Shri B. G. Deshmukh, former Cabinet Secretary, Shri N. N. Vohra, Principal Secretary to the PM and Shri S. V. Giri, Central Vigilance Commissioner, which Committee was constituted under the Government Order dated 8th September, 1997. The directions of the Supreme Court are quite elaborate and they extend to the appointment, powers and functioning of CVC, CBI and ED all designed to insulate the said institutions from political control and to invest them with good amount of independence coupled with accountability.
Citation: [1998 CRI LJ 1208], [1997 SUPREME 10 476], [1998 SLT 1 518], [1997 SCALE 7 656], [1996 AWC SC 1 465], [1998 CRLJ 104 1208], [1998 CCR 1 190], [1998 AIR SC 889], [1998 AIR SC 645], [1998 SCC CR 307], [1998 SCC 1 226], [1997 JT SC 10 247], [1998 CRIMES 1 12], [1997 SUPP SCR 6 595], [1998 GLT 1 11], [1998 RCR CRIMINAL 1 357], [1998 SCC CRI 307]
Other Source links:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1203995/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad17e4b0149711410838#7
A landmark case wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held that, “There is warrant for proposition that even if, evidence is illegally obtained it is admissible. Over a century ago it was said in an English case where a constable searched the appellant illegally and found a quantity of offending article in his pocket that it would be a dangerous obstacle to the administration of justice if it were held, because evidence was obtained by illegal means, it could not be used against a party charged with an offence. See Jones v. Owen“.
Facts of Case:
R.M.Malkani was at the crucial time the Coroner of Bombay. The evidence is that the patient died on 13 May, 1964. Dr. Motwani saw the appellant on 3 October, 1964. The appellant demanded Rs. 20,000. The appellant asked for payment of Rs. 20,000 in order that Dr. Adatia would avoid inconvenience and publicity in newspapers in case inquest was held. Dr. Motwani informed Dr. Adatia about the conversation with the appellant. On 4 October, 1964 the appellant rang up Dr. Motwani and said that he was willing to reduce the amount to Rs. 10,000. On 5 October, 1964 Dr. Adatia received calls from the appellant asking him to attend the Coroner’s Court on 6 October, 1964. Dr. Adatia got in touch with Dr. Motwani on 6 October and gave him that message. Dr. Adatia rang up the appellant on 6 October and asked for adjournment. The appellant granted the adjournment to 7 October. On 6 October there were two calls from the appellant asking Dr. Adatia to attend the Coroner’s Court on 7 October and also that Dr. Adatia should contact the appellant on 6 October. Dr. Motwani rang up the appellant and told him that the telephonic conversation had upset Dr. Adatia. On 6 October Dr. Motwani conveyed to Mugwe, Director of Intelligence Bureau about the demand of bribe to the appellant.
Punch Line:
There is no violation of section 25 of the Telegraph Act in the facts and circumstances of the present case. There is warrant for proposition that even if, evidence is illegally obtained it is admissible. Over a century ago it was said in an English case where a constable searched the appellant illegally and found a quantity of offending article in his pocket that it would be a dangerous obstacle to the administration of justice if it were held, because evidence was obtained by illegal means, it could not be used against a party charged with an offence. See Jones v. Owen.
The Court will take care in two directions in admitting such evidence. First, the Court will find out that it is genuine and free from tampering or mutilation. Secondly, the Court may also secures scrupulous conduct and behaviour on behalf of the Police. The reason is that the Police Officer is more likely to behave properly if improperly obtained evidence is liable to be viewed with care and caution by the Judge. In every case the position of the accused, the nature of the investigation and the gravity of the offence must be judged in the light of the material facts and the Surrounding circumstances.
When a Court permits a tape recording to be played over it is acting on real evidence if it treats the intonation of the words to be relevant and genuine. The fact that tape recorded conversation can be altered is also borne in mind by the Court while admitting it in evidence.
Citations : [1973 AIR SC 157], [1973 MHLJ 92], [1973 MPLJ SC 224], [1973 SCC 1 471], [1973 SCC CRI 399], [1973 SCR 2 417], [1973 KHC 0 469], [1973 CAR 31], [1973 CRLJ SC 228]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1179783/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ab7fe4b014971140ca8e
This is the landmark judgment, it was held that when a second complaint on same facts but fresh evidence is filed it can be entertained.
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