Priyanka Srivastava and Anr Vs State of UP and Ors on 19 March, 2015

Posted on December 18, 2019 by ShadesOfKnife

Justice Dipak Misra states that Magistrate has to be alive about the allegation brought to him via Non-cognizable case by Police.

From Paras 26 and 27,

26. At this stage it is seemly to state that power under Section 156(3) warrants application of judicial mind. A court of law is involved. It is not the police taking steps at the stage of Section 154 of the code. A litigant at his own whim cannot invoke the authority of the Magistrate. A principled and really grieved citizen with clean hands must have free access to invoke the said power. It protects the citizens but when pervert litigations takes this route to harass their fellows citizens, efforts are to be made to scuttle and curb the same.
27. In our considered opinion, a stage has come in this country where Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. applications are to be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the applicant who seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. That apart, in an appropriate case, the learned Magistrate would be well advised to verify the truth and also can verify the veracity of the allegations. This affidavit can make the applicant more responsible. We are compelled to say so as such kind of applications are being filed in a routine manner without taking any responsibility whatsoever only to harass certain persons. That apart, it becomes more disturbing and alarming when one tries to pick up people who are passing orders under a statutory provision which can be challenged under the framework of said Act or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But it cannot be done to take undue advantage in a criminal court as if somebody is determined to settle the scores. We have already indicated that there has to be prior applications under Section 154(1) and 154(3) while filing a petition under Section 156(3). Both the aspects should be clearly spelt out in the application and necessary documents to that effect shall be filed. The warrant for giving a direction that an the application under Section 156(3) be supported by an affidavit so that the person making the application should be conscious and also endeavour to see that no false affidavit is made. It is because once an affidavit is found to be false, he will be liable for prosecution in accordance with law. This will deter him to casually invoke the authority of the Magistrate under Section 156(3). That apart, we have already stated that the veracity of the same can also be verified by the learned Magistrate, regard being had to the nature of allegations of the case. We are compelled to say so as a number of cases pertaining to fiscal sphere, matrimonial dispute/family disputes, commercial offences, medical negligence cases, corruption cases and the cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, as are illustrated in Lalita Kumari are being filed. That apart, the learned Magistrate would also be aware of the delay in lodging of the FIR.

From Para 30,

30. In the present case, we are obligated to say that learned Magistrate should have kept himself alive to the aforesaid provision before venturing into directing registration of the FIR under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. It is because the Parliament in its wisdom has made such a provision to protect the secured creditors or any of its officers, and needles to emphasize, the legislative mandate, has to be kept in mind.

Priyanka Srivastava and Anr Vs State of UP and Ors on 19 March, 2015

Citations: [AIR 2015 SC 1758], [2015 (3) RLW 2404 (SC)], [2015(3) PLJR 78(SC)], [2015 SCL SC 130 472], [2015 AIOL 3152], [2015 CRIMES SC 2 179], [2015 CRIMES SC 2 209], [2015 CRLJ SC 2396], [2015 JCC SC 2 974], [2015 JT 5 203], [2015 SCALE 4 120], [2015 SCC 6 287], [2015 SLT 3 431], [2015 SUPREME 3 152], [2015 SCC ONLINE SC 272], [2015 CTC 3 103], [2015 KLJ 2 491], [2015 KERLT 2 451], [2015 SCC CRI 4 153], [2015 SCC CIV 3 294]

Indiankanoon.org link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/163299097/

Casemine link: https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5790b242e561097e45a4e25a

The Index for Defamation Judgments is here. Index of Judgments under Sec 156(3) Cr.P.C. are here.

Umesh Kumar Vs State of AP and Anr on 6 September, 2013

Posted on December 16, 2019 by ShadesOfKnife

In this judgment, Supreme Court held that, Law does not prohibit entertaining the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the charge sheet even before the charges are framed or before the application of discharge is filed or even during its pendency of such application before the court concerned.

In the para 12,

12. In view thereof, if any person has forged in a letter under the name of the Samithi and forged the signature of Shri M.A. Khan, M.P., the matter being of grave nature requires investigation and, in view of above, we cannot find fault with the action initiated against Umesh Kumar, appellant. Once criminal law is put in motion and after investigation the charge sheet is filed, it requires scrutiny in the court of law. However, before the charges could be framed, Umesh Kumar, appellant, approached the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of the charge sheet. The scope of Section 482 Cr.P.C. is well defined and inherent powers could be exercised by the High Court to give effect to an order under the Cr.P.C.; to prevent abuse of the process of court; and to otherwise secure the ends of justice. This extraordinary power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae. However, in exercise of such powers, it is not permissible for the High Court to appreciate the evidence as it can only evaluate material documents on record to the extent of its prima facie satisfaction about the existence of sufficient ground for proceedings against the accused and the court cannot look into materials, the acceptability of which is essentially a matter for trial. Any document filed along with the petition labelled as evidence without being tested and proved, cannot be examined. Law does not prohibit entertaining the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the charge sheet even before the charges are framed or before the application of discharge is filed or even during its pendency of such application before the court concerned. The High Court cannot reject the application merely on the ground that the accused can argue legal and factual issues at the time of the framing of the charge. However, the inherent power of the court should not be exercised to stifle the legitimate prosecution but can be exercised to save the accused to undergo the agony of a criminal trial. (Vide: Pepsi Food Ltd. & Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors., AIR 1998 SC 128; Ashok Chaturvedi & Ors. v. Shitulh Chanchani & Anr. AIR 1998 SC 2796; G. Sagar Suri & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors., AIR 2000 SC 754; and Padal Venkata Rama Reddy @ Ramu v. Kovvuri Satyanarayana Reddy & Ors., (2011) 12 SCC 437)

Umesh Kumar Vs State of AP and Anr on 6 September, 2013

Citations: [JT 2013 (12) SC 213], [2014 ALL SCR 661], [2013 AD SC 9 581], [2014 AIR SC 1106], [2014 AJR 1 350], [2014 ALD CRI 1 304], [2014 ALLCC 84 850], [2014 ALT CRL AP 1 479], [2013 JLJR 4 151], [2013 KLJ 4 334], [2013 PLJR 4 284], [2015 RLW SC 1 391], [2013 SCALE 11 28], [2013 SCC 10 591], [2014 SCC L&S 2 237], [2014 SCJ 2 209], [2013 UC 3 1918], [2014 SCC CRI 1 338], [2013 SCC ONLINE SC 809], [2013 AIC 130 53], [2013 SUPREME 6 323], [2013 AIOL 584], [2013 AIR SC 6062], [2013 SLT 7 656], [2013 AIR SCW 6062]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/194914590/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af3fe4b0149711415ef0

G.Sagar Suri and Anr Vs State of UP and Ors on 28 January, 2000

Posted on December 15, 2019 by ShadesOfKnife

In this judgment, Supreme Court has held that, there is no bar to pursue Quash at High Court under sec 482 CrPC, even when a Discharge was pending in the Trial Court under sec 239 CrPC or 245 CrPC.

It was submitted by Mr. Lalit, learned counsel for the second respondent, that the appellants have already filed an application in the Court of Additional Judicial Magistrate for their discharge and that this Court should not interfere in the criminal proceedings which are at the threshold. We do not think that on filing of any application for discharge, High Court Cannot exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. In this connection, reference may be made to two decisions of this Court in Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors., [1998] 5 SCC 749 and Ashok Chaturvedi & Ors. v. Shitul H. Chanchani & Anr., [1998] 7 SCC 698, wherein it has been specifically held that though the Magistrate trying a case has jurisdiction to discharge the accused at any stage of the trial if he considers the charge to be groundless but that does not mean that the accused cannot approach the High Court under Section 482 of the Code or Article 227 of the Constitution to have the proceeding quashed against them when no offence has been made out against them and still why must they undergo the agony of a criminal trial.

G.Sagar Suri and Anr Vs State of UP and Ors on 28 January, 2000

Citations: 2000 C Cr. LR(SC) 136 : JT 2000(1) SC 360, (2000)2 SCC 636, J.T. 2000 Vol. 1 page 126

Indiankanoon.org link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1699144/

Reproduced in accordance with Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from judis.nic.in, lobis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court and District Court Websites such as ecourts.gov.in

A.P. Minerals Development Corporation Limited Vs MS. Trimex Minerals Pvt Ltd on 21 November, 1997

Posted on December 15, 2019 by ShadesOfKnife

Similar to this judgment here, AP HC has delivered this judgment by the same Judge, on the necessity of marking documents even in Interlocutory Applications.

A.P. Minerals Development Corporation Limited Vs MS. Trimex Minerals Pvt Ltd on 21 November, 1997

Citations: 1998 (1) ALD 533, 1998 (1) ALT 182

Indiankanoon.org link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/965255/

T. Bhopal Reddy and Anr Vs KR Lakshmi Bai and Anr on 6 November, 1997

Posted on December 15, 2019 by ShadesOfKnife

Honorable Justice Sri P. Venkatarama Reddi had delivered this judgment wherein it was held that,

9. Before parting with the case, we have to record the difficulty which we experienced to find out the nature and details of 35 documents said to have been filed by the petitioners and 118 documents said to have been filed by the respondents.
10. The learned Subordinate Judge has merely stated that the petitioners have filed 35 documents while the respondents have filed 118 documents. Probably in view of the judgment of our learned brother Mr. Justice B.K. Somasekham in G. Sambrajyam v. P. Mahalakshamim and Ors., 1995 (1) ALD 358, that there is no provision in the Civil Rules of Practice for marking the documents as exhibits at the stage of interlocutory matters, the learned Subordinate Judge has not given any mark to these documents. This led to some inconvenience to us while disposing of this appeal. In our opinion, even though Rule 115 of the Civil Rules of Practice envisages marking of exhibits adduced in evidence as ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’ and ‘X’ series as the case may be during trial, the same cannot be construed so as to exclude the marking of any document in an interlocutory matter. It may be so that the Court while deciding the interlocutory application will look into the prima facie case of both sides. In that process, necessarily, each side will be depending upon certain documents which may ultimately be sought to be proved during the course of trial.
11. To visualise that the contesting parties in an interlocutory application will not be able to re!y on the documentary evidence upon which they ultimately rely in the trial would be placing the contesting party in an interlocutory application to rely only on the affidavits which the learned Judge thought would be the correct procedure, it may be so that the learned Judge was quite conscious that in spite of the fact that the affidavits cannot be the evidence as they are not included in the definition of evidence under Section 3 of the Evidence Act, the Court may permit any affidavits to be produced under Order 19 Rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. That being the premise on which the learned Judge proceeded to observe that the documents cannot be given a marking, the only alternative for any trial Court which hears interlocutory applications would be to decide the prima facie case only on the strength of affidavits. At the same time, we are unable to comprehend as to how a prima facie case is established by the successful party without referring to and marking the documents.
12. It may be pointed out that a deponent of an affidavit who can be called upon to appear for cross-examination cannot be confronted with any document on which the adversory places reliance. If the documents even at that stage are not permitted to be marked, the entire cross-examination of the deponent may be a mere denial of the suggestions made. If in a particular case the deponent himself was the author of any document or a party to it, there would not be any opportunity to the opposite parly or himself to explain the circumstances under which the document was executed or to admit or deny the genuineness or otherwise of the same. No doubt, we are conscious of the fact that a document on which a particular party relies to strengthen his own case can only be admitted in the evidence during the trial of the suit. However, as observed by us supra if the same are not given any marking, both sides would be at a disadvantage to support their respective contentions even in an interlocutory application. We think that the learned Judge has not envisaged that such of the documents on which the parties relied would have to be described in extenso in the order if they were not to be marked. Further, there would be any amount of inconvenience for any appellate Court to search for a document on which the parties have relied and go through its contents, more so, if there were a large number of documents filed by the contesting parties.
13. Thus, in order to come to a prima facie conclusion, both the trial Court and the appellate Court should necessarily be able to locate the documents and know its contents to agree with either of the contentions, we may also point out that it is nowhere envisaged that the case of the contesting parties can only be decided on the affidavits and not on any other material. Thus, in the absence of any specific rule so far as marking of documents in an interlocutory stage is concerned, the Courts would not be justified in not giving any marking at all to such of the documents on which both sides would rely.
14. It is another mailer that affidavits filed by both sides are not given marking for they after all form part of the record. But to say that the documentary evidence on which the parties would ultimately rely in the suit would not be of any relevance at the time of deciding the interlocutory matters would lead to any amount of inconvenience which was in fact felt by us in disposing of the above civil miscellaneous appeal.
15. As stated earlier, we are quite conscious of the fact that the documents marked for purpose of determination of any interlocutory application cannot be treated as evidence per se but would enable the Court to prima facie come to a conclusion about the merits or demerits of the contentions advanced. For the reasons aforesaid, we disapprove the view taken by Mr. Justice Somasekhara in the case referred to supra insofar as marking of the documents in the interlocutory applications.
16. Further, in order to avoid any future difficulties, it is desirable to incorporate a rule in Civil Rules of Practice for giving a separate marking to the documents relied upon by either party in interlocutory proceedings by directing the trial Courts to mark such of the documents relied upon by the petitioners in the interlocutory applications as ‘P’ series and the documents relied upon by the respondents as ‘R’ series to avoid any difficulty in identifying the documents at a later stage of the proceedings and also during trial.

T. Bhopal Reddy and Anr Vs KR Lakshmi Bai and Anr on 6 November, 1997

Citations: [1998 (1) ALD 770], [1998 (1) ALT 292],

Indiankanoon.org link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/330119/

Miriyala Divya and 5 Others Vs Govt of AP on 19 September, 2014

Posted on December 14, 2019 by ShadesOfKnife

Following the Apex Court judgment here, AP High Court delivered this judgment.

From Paras 17 and 18,

17 A Division Bench of this Court, in Mavuri Rani Veerabhadramma @ Kandarpa Prameela @ Mavuri Prameela v State of A.P.[10] after analysing the entire case-law on the point, in para 23, held as under:
23. The reference is answered with the following conclusions:
1. If a complaint is filed under Section 200 Cr.P.C. for the offence under Section 494 I.P.C. before a Magistrate, he may take cognizance of the offence or postpone the issue of process either by making enquiry into the case by himself or direct an investigation to be made by the Police Officer or other person as he thinks fit for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground to proceed. If the complaint is referred to the police for investigation and if the police files either the chargesheet showing that there is prima facie material to proceed against the accused or that there is no case to take cognizance of the offence, the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance of the offence irrespective of the result of the investigation and it amounts to sufficient compliance of Section 198 of Cr.P.C.
2. The police may also receive a complaint for the offence under Section 494 of I.P.C. and register a crime. As per the amendment of the schedule, Section 494 of I.P.C. is made cognizable and the police are empowered to investigate the case. But the Magistrate is precluded from taking cognizance of the offence under Section 198 of Cr.P.C. on the charge-sheet filed by the police, when a complaint is not presented before the Magistrate for taking cognizance of the offence.
3. If a complaint for the offence under Section 494 of I.P.C. is lodged along with other cognizable offences before the police and if the police files a charge-sheet, the Court can take cognizance of the offence under Section 494 of I.P.C. also along with other cognizable offences by virtue of Section 155(4) of Cr.P.C.
18 As per the principle enunciated in this case, the Magistrate can take cognizance of offence under Section 494 IPC basing on the police report, when the crime is consisting of a cognizable and non-cognizable offences.

From Paras 25 and 26,

25 As per the principle enunciated therein, the Court can take cognizance of offence under Sections 494 and 495 I.P.C basing on the police report even without corresponding amendment to Sections 320 and 198 Cr.P.C.
26 As per the principle enunciated in Krishna Kumar Case above, the ratio decidendi of the previous case alone has the force of law and became a binding precedent. In A. Subhash Babu case, the apex Court interpreted the scope of Section 198 Cr.P.C. with reference to the A.P. State amendment to Section 494 IPC. The point urged and decided by the Hon’ble apex Court is identical to the facts of the case on hand. The ratio laid down by the Hon’ble apex Court is binding on all the courts subordinate to it in view of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The judicial discipline mandates that the Courts subordinate to the Hon’ble apex Court should invariably follow the principle laid down by the Hon’ble apex Court. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and also the principle enunciated in the cases cited supra, the ratio laid down in Subhash Babu case is squarely applicable to the facts of the case on hand.

Miriyala Divya and 5 Others Vs Govt of AP on 19 September, 2014

Citations: [2015 ALD CRL AP 1 115], [2014 SCC ONLINE HYD 753], [2015 ALT CRL AP 1 242]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/168383354/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5608f8d9e4b014971114384a

Index to Bigamy Judgments under Sections 494 and 495 of IPC is here.

A.Subash Babu Vs State of A.P. and Anr on 21 Jul 2011

Posted on December 14, 2019 by ShadesOfKnife

Landmark Judgment to screw the perpetrators of 494 and 495 IPC Bigamy offences. This is specifically helpful to those who have cases in the State of Andhra Pradesh where these two crimes are made Cognizable and Non-bailable, due to a State amendment in 1992 whereas these are Non-cognizable and Bailable in the rest of the States in India.

13. In this regard, it would be, relevant to notice the provisions of Article 246 of the Constitution. Article 246 deals with subject matter of laws made by the Parliament and by the legislatures of State. Clause (1) of Article 246 inter alia provides that notwithstanding anything contained in Clauses (2) and (3) of Article 246, the Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the maters enumerated in List 1 in the Seventh Schedule. Sub-Clause 2 of the said Article provides that notwithstanding anything in Clause (3), Parliament and subject to Clause (1), the legislature of any State also have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List 3 in the Seventh Schedule, whereas, Clause (3) of Article 246 amongst other things provides that subject to Clauses (1) and (2), the legislature of any State has exclusive power to make laws for such State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List 2 in the Seventh Schedule. Entry 2 in List 3 i.e. Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule mentions “Criminal Procedure, including in matters included in the Code of “Criminal procedure, at the commencement of this Constitution”. Thus there is no manner of doubt that Parliament and subject to Clause (1), the legislature of any State also has power to make laws with respect to Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 2(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 defines the phrase “Cognizable Offence” to mean an offence for which and “Cognizable Case” means a case in which, a Police Officer may, in accordance with the First Schedule or under any other law for the time being in force arrest without warrant. Part I of the First Schedule to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 relating to offences under the Indian Penal Code inter alia mentions that Section 494 and 495 are non-cognizable. Section 154 of the Criminal Procedure Code relates to information in cognizable cases and provides inter alia that every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an Officer in charge of a Police Station, shall be reduced to writing by him and be read over to the informant. Section 156 of the Code provides that any Officer in charge of a Police Station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over a local area within the limits of such station would have power to enquire into or try under provisions of Chapter XIII of Criminal Procedure Code. As Sections 494 and 495 are made non-cognizable, a Police Officer would not have power to investigate those cases without the order of a Magistrate, having a power to try such cases or commit such cases for trial as provided under Section 155(2) of the Code.
However, this Court finds that the Legislative Assembly of the State of Andhra Pradesh enacted the Code of Criminal Procedure (Andhra Pradesh Second Amendment) Act, 1992. By the said Amending Act, the First Schedule to Central Act 2 of 1974 i.e. the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 came to be amended and against the entries relating to Section 494 in column 4 for the word “Ditto”, the word “Cognizable” and in column 5 for the word “Bailable” the word “Non-bailable” were substituted. Similarly, against the entries relating to Section 495 in column 4, for the word “Ditto” the word “Cognizable” and in column 5 for the word “Ditto”, the word “Non-bailable” were substituted. What is relevant to be noticed is that the Code of Criminal Procedure (Andhra Pradesh Second Amendment) Act, 1992 was reserved by the Governor of Andhra Pradesh on the 21st October, 1991 for consideration and assent of the President. The Presidential assent was received on 10th February, 1992 after which the Code of Criminal Procedure (Andhra Pradesh Second Amendment) Act, 1992 was published on the 15th February, 1992 in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette Part IV-B (Ext.). Thus there is no manner of doubt that Sections 494 and 495 IPC are cognizable offences so far as State of Andhra Pradesh is concerned.

And… in Para 14

* * * * * *

In view of the above settled legal position, this Court has no doubt that the amendment made in the First Schedule to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Andhra Pradesh Second Amendment) Act, 1992, shall prevail in the State of Andhra Pradesh, notwithstanding the fact that in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 offences under Section 494 and 495 are treated as cognizable offences. The reasoning given by the Division Bench of High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Mavuri Rani Veera Bhadranna (supra) that though the State Legislation amended the Schedule making the offence under Section 494 IPC cognizable, the legislation made by the Parliament i.e. Section 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code remains and in the event of any repugnancy between the two legislations, the legislation made by the Parliament would prevail, because, Section 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code still holds the field despite the fact that the State Legislation made amendment to the Schedule of Criminal Procedure Code, with respect, is erroneous and contrary to all cannons of interpretation of statute. Once First Schedule to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 stands amended and offences punishable under Sections 494 and 495 IPC are made cognizable offences, those offences will have to be regarded as cognizable offences for all purposes of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 including for the purpose of Section 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Section 198(1)(c), after the Amendment made by the Code of Criminal Procedure(Andhra Pradesh Second Amendment) Act, 1992 cannot be interpreted in isolation without referring to the fact that offences under Sections 494 and 495 IPC have been made cognizable so far as the State of Andhra Pradesh is concerned. Therefore, the provision made in Section 198(1)(c) that no Court shall take cognizance of an offences punishable under Chapter XX of the IPC except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved will have to be read subject to the amendment made by the Legislative Assembly of the State of Andhra Pradesh in 1992. Once, it is held that the offences under Section 494 and 495 IPC are cognizable offences, the bar imposed by operative part of sub-section 1 of Section 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code beginning with the words “No Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Chapter XX of the Indian Penal Code except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence” gets lifted so far as offences punishable under Sections 494 and 495 IPC are concerned. As those offences have been made cognizable offences in the State of Andhra Pradesh since 1992, the same will have to be dealt with as provided in the Section 156 which inter alia provides that any officer in charge of a Police Station, may without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to enquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. Even without the authorization under Section 155(2) or Section 156(3) of Criminal Penal Code, offences under Sections 494, 495 and 496 having been rendered cognizable and non-bailable by virtue of the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment Act, 1992) can be investigated by the Police and no illegality is attached to the investigation of these offences by the police. If the Police Officer in charge of a Police Station is entitled to investigate offences punishable under Section 494 and 495 IPC, there is no manner of doubt that the competent Court would have all jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offences after receipt of report as contemplated under Section 173(2) of the Code. Thus, this Court finds that correct proposition of law was not laid down in Mavuri Rani Veera Bhadranna (supra) when the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the said case held that as Section 198 of Criminal Procedure Code still holds the field despite the amendment made by State Legislature, the Court would have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 494 IPC on the basis of report submitted by the Investigating Officer. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that in view of Section 198(1)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate is disentitled to take cognizance of the offences punishable under Sections 494 and 495 IPC despite the State amendment making those offences cognizable, this Court notices that in Mavuri Rani Veera Bhadranna (supra), the Division Bench has considered effect of Section 155(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code and thereafter held that the bar under Section 198 would not be applicable as complaint lodged before police for offence under Section 494 IPC also related to other cognizable offences and if police files a charge sheet, the Court can take cognizance also of offence under Section 494 along with other cognizable offences by virtue of Section 155 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Code.

And then in Para 15,

15. Section 155(4) of the Code inter alia provides that:-
“Where a case relates to two or more offences of which at least one is cognizable, the case shall be deemed to be a cognizable case, notwithstanding that the other offences are non-cognizable”
Here in this case in the charge sheet it is mentioned that the appellant has also committed offence punishable under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code which is cognizable and therefore this is a case which relates to two or more offences of which at least one is cognizable and therefore the case must be deemed to be cognizable case notwithstanding that the other offences are non- cognizable. This is not a case in which the FIR is exclusively filed for commission of offences under Sections 494 and 495 IPC. The case of the respondent no. 2 is that the appellant has committed offences punishable under Sections 417, 420, 494, 495 and 498A of the IPC. A question may arise as to what should be the procedure to be followed by a complainant when a case involves not only non-cognizable offence but one or more cognizable offences as well. It is somewhat anomalous that the aggrieved person by the alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections 494 and 495 IPC should file complaint before a Court and that the same aggrieved person should approach the police officer for alleged commission of offences under Sections 417, 420 and 498A of the Indian Penal Code. Where the case involves one cognizable offence also along with non-cognizable offences it should not be treated as a non-cognizable case for the purpose of sub-section 2 of Section 155 and that is the intention of legislation which is manifested in Section 155(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, the argument that the learned Magistrate could not have taken cognizance of the offences punishable under Sections 494 and 495 IPC on the basis of submission of charge sheet, cannot be accepted and is hereby rejected.

A.Subash Babu Vs State of A.P. and Anr on 21 July, 2011

Citations: [2011 SCALE 7 671], [2011 RCR CRIMINAL SC 3 674], [2011 RCR CIVIL SC 3 840], [2011 SCC 7 616], [2011 SLT 5 727], [2011 AIOL 509], [2011 ALLMR CRI SC 2931], [2011 ANJ SC 2 202], [2012 BOMCR CRI SC 1 379], [2011 JCC SC 3 2189], [2011 AIR SC 3031], [2011 SCC CRI 3 267], [2011 SCC CIV 3 851], [2011 AIR SC 4702], [2011 ULJ 3 139], [2011 AIC 107 51], [2011 SHIMLC 3 551], [2011 DMC SC 3 50], [2011 ALT CRI 3 242], [2012 BLJ 1 260], [2011 ACR SC 3 3182], [2011 DMC 2 827], [2011 KCCR SN 4 472], [2011 UC 2 1509], [2012 ALD CRI 1 210], [2011 SCR 9 453], [2011 JT SC 8 483], [2011 CRI LJ 4373], [2011 AIR SCW 4702]

Indiankanoon.org link:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1342950/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609aeefe4b0149711415347

Here is the Andhra Pradesh HC judgement here from 2010 that got dislodged.

AP High Court had passed similar judgment here in 2014, which diligently follows the present Apex Court judgment as binding precedent under Article 141.

Another decision here in 2020 is partly perverse on the point that the Trial Court cannot take cognizance of a charge sheet because Even though offence under Section 494 IPC is made “cognizable” offence as per amendment Act 3 of 1992, there is no corresponding amendment made to Section 198 Cr.P.C. Therefore, the bar under Section 198 Cr.P.C. still subsists.

Therefore, DO NOT RELY on the above APHC Judgment with respect to taking/not taking of cognizance of a 494 IPC case by a Trial Court Magistrate.

For a similar adjudication from State of Odisha, go here.

Index of Bigamy offence u/s 494 and 495 IPC judgments is here.

Pratap Lal Teli Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 22 Oct, 2019

Posted on December 12, 2019 by ShadesOfKnife

Pratap Lal Teli Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 22 Oct, 2019

Citations:

Indiankanoon.org link:

Yogesh @ Sachin Jagdish Joshi Vs State of Maharashtra on 28 April, 2008

Posted on November 9, 2019 by ShadesOfKnife

The Apex Court had held that,

“15. It is trite that the words “not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused” appearing in the Section postulate exercise of judicial mind on the part of the Judge to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. However, in assessing this fact, the Judge has the power to sift and weigh the material for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine a prima facie case depends upon the facts of each case and in this regard it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large, however, if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him gives rise to suspicion only as distinguished from grave suspicion, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused. At this stage, he is not to see as to whether the trial will end in conviction or not. The broad test to be applied is whether the materials on record, if unrebutted, makes a conviction reasonably possible.”

Yogesh @ Sachin Jagdish Joshi Vs State of Maharashtra on 28 April, 2008

Citations:

Indiankanoon.org link:

Neeta Rakesh Jain Vs Rakesh Jeetmal Jain on 20 July, 2010

Posted on October 21, 2019 by ShadesOfKnife

Apex Court held in this decision u/s 23 of Hindu Marriage Act that, Court has to consider the petitioner’s own income and the income of the respondent before granting Interim Maintenance to application.

From Para 8,

8. Section 24 thus provides that in any proceeding under the Act, the spouse who has no independent income sufficient for her or his support may apply to the court to direct the respondent to pay the monthly maintenance as the court may think reasonable, regard being had to the petitioner’s own income and the income of the respondent. The very language in which Section is couched indicates that wide discretion has been conferred on the court in the matter of an order for interim maintenance. Although the discretion conferred on the court is wide, the Section provides guideline inasmuch as while fixing the interim maintenance the court has to give due regard to the income of the respondent and the petitioner’s own income. In other words, in the matter of making an order for interim maintenance, the discretion of the court must be guided by the criterion provided in the Section, namely, the means of the parties and also after taking into account incidental and other relevant factors like social status; the background from which both the parties come from and the economical dependence of the petitioner. Since an order for interim maintenance by its very nature is temporary, a detailed and elaborate exercise by the court may not be necessary, but, at the same time, the court has got to take all the relevant factors into account and arrive at a proper amount having regard to the factors which are mentioned in the statute.

Final Straw:

The cost of the appeal is burdened at Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees twenty thousand) on the husband to be paid to the appellant within one month from today.

Neeta Rakesh Jain Vs Rakesh Jeetmal Jain on 20 July, 2010

Citations: 2010 SCR 8 505, 2010 AIR SC 3540, 2010 SCC 12 242, 2010 SCALE 7 201,

Indiankanoon.org link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/9474/

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Legal Procedure Explained – Interpretation of Statutes

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