Kehar Singh and Anr Vs Union of India and Anr on 16 December 1988

Posted on April 15, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

This is the Writ Petition filed by one Kehar Singh who was accused and convicted for the consipracy and murder of Indira Gandhi on the following questions.

1. Whether there is justification for the view that when exercising his powers under Art. 72 the President is precluded from entering into the merits of a case decided finally by this Court.
2. To what areas does the power to scrutinise extend?
3. Whether judicial review extends to an examination of the order passed by the President under Art. 72 of the Constitution.
4. Whether the petitioner is entitled to an oral hearing from the President on his petition invoking the powers under Article 72.

Supreme Courts answers as,

We are of the view that it is open to the President in the exercise of the power vested in him by Art. 72 of the Constitution to scrutinise the evidence on the record of the criminal case and come to a different conclusion from that recorded by the court in regard to the guilt of, and sentence imposed on, the accused. In doing so, the President does not amend or modify or supersede the judicial record. The judicial record remains intact, and undisturbed. The president acts in a wholly different plane from that in which the Court acted. He acts under a constitutional power, the nature of which is entirely different from the judicial power and cannot be regarded as an extension of it. And this is so, notwithstanding that the practical effect of the Presidential act is to remove the stigma of guilt from the accused or to remit the sentence imposed on him.

and…

It is apparent that the power under Art. 72 entitles the President to examine the record of evidence of the criminal case and to determine for himself whether the case is one deserving the grant of the relief falling within that power. We are of opinion that the President is entitled to go into the merits of the case notwithstanding that it has been judicially concluded by the consideration given to it by this Court.

Kehar Singh and Anr Vs Union of India and Anr on 16 December 1988

Citations: [1988 SUPP SCR 3 1102], [1989 SCC 1 204], [1989 SCALE 1 242], [1988 SCR SUPL 3 1102], [1989 MPJR SC 10], [1989 CRLJ SC 941], [1989 CRILJ 941], [1988 SCALE 2 1565], [1988 SCR SUPP 3 1102], [1989 AIR SC 653], [1989 CRIMES SC 1 238], [1989 PLJR 23], [1989 SCC CRI 86], [1988 JT 4 693]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1152284/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609aac9e4b014971140afa4

Disclaimer:

Reproduced in accordance with Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from main.sci.gov.in/judgments, judis.nic.in, lobis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court and District Court Websites such as ecourts.gov.in

I have no control to remove copies of this document(s) that may be available on websites of High Courts or Supreme Court of India or any of the many other sites, law journal or reporters which carry the same judgment in it’s entirety, not I can remove references/links to this document(s) from the results of Search Engines such as Google.com.

Badshah Vs Urmila Badshah Godse and Anr on 18 October 2013

Posted on April 9, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Justice A.K.Sikri in a 2-judge bench had held that, for the purpose of claiming maintenance under Section 125, Cr.P.C., such a woman (who is not a legally wedded wife), is to be treated as the legally wedded wife.

From Para 25,

25. Thus, while interpreting a statute the court may not only take into consideration the purpose for which the statute was enacted, but also the mischief it seeks to suppress. It is this mischief rule, first propounded in Heydon’s Case[11] which became the historical source of purposive interpretation. The court would also invoke the legal maxim construction ut res magis valeat guam pereat, in such cases i.e. where alternative constructions are possible the Court must give effect to that which will be responsible for the smooth working of the system for which the statute has been enacted rather than one which will put a road block in its way. If the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation should be avoided. We should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should accept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result. If this interpretation is not accepted, it would amount to giving a premium to the husband for defrauding the wife. Therefore, at least for the purpose of claiming maintenance under Section 125, Cr.P.C., such a woman is to be treated as the legally wedded wife.

Badshah Vs Urmila Badshah Godse and Anr on 18 October 2013

Citations: [2014 SCJ 2 779], [2014 CRILJ 1076], [2014 SCC 1 188], [2013 SCALE 12 681], [2014 CRLJ SC 1076], [2013 RCR CRIMINAL SC 4 764], [2013 CTC 6 86], [2014 AIR SC 256], [2014 NCC 1 238], [2013 RLW SC 4 3670], [2013 AIOL 3407], [2013 AD SC 11 9], [2013 RCR CIVIL SC 4 830], [2013 SCC ONLINE SC 946], [2014 JLJR SC 1 78], [2014 LW CRL 1 646], [2014 SCC CIV 1 51], [2013 JCC SC 4 2765], [2014 LW 2 936], [2013 ACR 3 3010], [2014 MPHT 2 499], [2014 GLH 1 273], [2013 KERLT 4 367], [2013 ALR 101 704], [2013 BOMCR CRI SC 4 616], [2013 SLT 9 543], [2013 DMC 3 518], [2014 ECRN 1 241], [2014 AIR SC 869], [2013 JT 13 570], [2013 AIC 132 108]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/15901386/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af37e4b0149711415daf

Earlier Chanmuniya judgment is here.

M.E. Shivalingamurthy Vs CBI Bengaluru on 7 January 2020

Posted on April 7, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Justice K.M.Joesph from a 2-judge bench, held the following principles while deciding a discharge petition file u/s 227 CrPC. Also Governing principles regarding permissibility of defence of accused or documents produced by him, summarized.

i. If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only as distinguished from grave suspicion, the Trial Judge would be empowered to discharge the accused.
ii. The Trial Judge is not a mere Post Office to frame the charge at the instance of the prosecution.
iii. The Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. Evidence would consist of the statements recorded by the Police or the documents produced before the Court.
iv. If the evidence, which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, “cannot show that the accused committed offence, then, there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial”.
v. It is open to the accused to explain away the materials giving rise to the grave suspicion.
vi. The court has to consider the broad probabilities, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This, however, would not entitle the court to make a roving inquiry into the pros and cons.
vii. At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the material brought on record by the prosecution, has to be accepted as true.
viii. There must exist some materials for entertaining the strong suspicion which can form the basis for drawing up a charge and refusing to discharge the accused.

M.E. Shivalingamurthy Vs CBI Bengaluru on 7 January 2020

Citations: [(2020) 2 SCC 768]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/151468802/ or

Index of Discharge Judgments u/s 227 Cr.P.C. is here.

Syed Wasif Husain Rizvi Vs Hasan Raza Khan and Ors on 22 January 2016

Posted on April 3, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

3-Judge Full Bench comprising Chief Justice DY Chandrachud (as he was at Lucknow Bench of Allahabad High Court) declared the following reference in affirmative,

“Whether writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution can be filed by Power of Attorney holder?”

Safeguards

Having held so, we must, at the same time, emphasize the necessity of observing adequate safeguards where a writ petition is filed through the holder of a power of attorney. These safeguards should necessarily include the following:
(1) The power of attorney by which the donor authorises the donee, must be brought on the record and must be filed together with the petition/application;
(2) The affidavit which is executed by the holder of a power of attorney must contain a statement that the donor is alive and specify the reasons for the inability of the donor to remain present before the Court to swear the affidavit; and
(3) The donee must be confined to those acts which he is authorised by the power of attorney to discharge.

Syed Wasif Husain Rizvi Vs Hasan Raza Khan and Ors on 22 January 2016

Earlier Reference Order

Syed Wasif Husain Rizvi Vs Hasan Raza Khan and Ors on 02 December 2015

Citations: [2016 AWC 2 1525], [2016 LCD 34 373], [2016 AIR ALL 52]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/114640689/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5811a4a5e691cb26fc4d9447

The Oriental Insurance Company Ltd Vs Meena Variyal and Ors on 2 April 2007

Posted on March 21, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court held that,

An obiter dictum of this Court may be binding only on the High Courts in the absence of a direct pronouncement on that question elsewhere by this Court. But as far as this Court is concerned, though not binding, it does have clear persuasive authority.

The Oriental Insurance Company Ltd Vs Meena Variyal and Ors on 2 April 2007

Citations: [2007 KLT SUPP 3 18], [2007 SCR 4 641], [2007 JCC 2 1280], [2007 WBLR 3 264], [2007 TNMAC 2 9], [2007 SCJ 3 498], [2007 GLR 3 2356], [2007 SCC CR 2 527], [2007 ILR KER 3 569], [2007 AIR SC 0 2362], [2007 MPHT 3 1], [2007 COMPCAS 137 116], [2007 SCC 5 428], [2007 ALLLJ 3 596], [2007 ALLSCR 0 1697], [2007 MLJ 2 1230], [2007 ALD 3 99], [2007 SUPREME 3 136], [2007 AIR KAR R 3 437], [2007 ACC 4 335], [2007 AIOL 359], [2007 SCALE 5 269], [2007 TAC 2 417], [2007 SCC CRI 2 527], [2007 SLT 9 251], [2007 AIR SC 1609], [2007 ACJ 0 1284], [2007 JT 5 65], [2008 LW 1 838], [2007 ANWR 1 545]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1964308/ and https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae62e4b0149711413b05

Landmark Judgment of Kusum Ingots is here.

Sarwan Singh Lamba and Ors Vs Union of India and Ors on 12 May 1995

Posted on March 21, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court held that,

Para 17,

Normally even an obiter dictum is expected to be obeyed and followed.

TruePrint Version

TP_1995_4_scc_546_561_sandeeppamarati_gmailcom_20200320_233725

Citations: [1995 JT 5 386], [1995 AIR SC 1729], [1995 SCALE 3 457], [1995 SCC 4 546], [1995 SCC L&S 1064], [1995 ATC 30 585], [1995 BLJR 2 1295], [1995 SUPP SCR 1 427], [1995 SLJ SC 3 72], [1995 UPLBEC 2 1215]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/538878/ and https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609acc5e4b014971140fb0f

Landmark Judgment of Kusum Ingots is here.

MS. Bhaskar Industries Ltd Vs MS. Bhiwani Denim and Apparels Ltd and Ors on 27 August 2001

Posted on March 7, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court held the scope of 205 CrPC in this judgment as,

Second is that it is difficult, in the absence of other materials, to decide positively whether the order dated 28.4.2000 is an interlocutory order only.
The interdict contained in Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short the Code) is that the powers of revision shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order. Whether an order is interlocutory or not, cannot be decided by merely looking at the order or merely because the order was passed at the interlocutory stage. The safe test laid down by this Court through a series of decisions is this: If the contention of the petitioner who moves the superior court in revision, as against the order under challenge is upheld, would the criminal proceedings as a whole culminate? If it would,then the order is not interlocutory in spite of the fact that it was passed during any interlocutory stage.

And

Section 251 is the commencing provision in Chapter XX of the Code which deals with trial of summons cases by magistrates. It enjoins on the court to ask the accused whether he pleads guilty when the accused appears or is brought before the magistrate. The appearance envisaged therein can either be by personal attendance of the accused or through his advocate. This can be understood from Section 205(1) of the Code which says that whenever a magistrate issues a summons, he may, if he sees reason so to do, dispense with the personal attendance of the accused and permit him to appear by his pleader.
17. Thus, in appropriate cases the magistrate can allow an accused to make even the first appearance through a counsel. The magistrate is empowered to record the plea of the accused even when his counsel makes such plea on behalf of the accused in a case where the personal appearance of the accused is dispensed with. Section 317 of the Code has to be viewed in the above perspective as it empowers the court to dispense with the personal attendance of the accused (provided he is represented by a counsel in that case) even for proceeding with the further steps in the case. However, one precaution which the court should take in such a situation is that the said benefit need be granted only to an accused who gives an undertaking to the satisfaction of the court that he would not dispute his identity as the particular accused in the case, and that a counsel on his behalf would be present in court and that he has no objection in taking evidence in his absence. This precaution is necessary for the further progress of the proceedings including examination of the witnesses.

“18. A question could legitimately be asked – what might happen if the counsel engaged by the accused (whose personal appearance is dispensed with) does not appear or that the counsel does not co-operate in proceeding with the case? We may point out that the legislature has taken care for such eventualities. Section 205(2) says that the magistrate can in his discretion direct the personal attendance of the accused at any stage of the proceedings. The last limb of Section 317(1) confers a discretion on the magistrate to direct the personal attendance of the accused at any subsequent stage of the proceedings. He can even resort to other steps for enforcing such attendance.
“19. The position, therefore, bogs down to this: It is within the powers of a magistrate and in his judicial discretion to dispense with the personal appearance of an accused either throughout or at any particular stage of such proceedings in a summons case, if the magistrate finds that insistence of his personal presence would itself inflict enormous suffering or tribulations to him, and the comparative advantage would be less. Such discretion need be exercised only in rare instances where due to the far distance at which the accused resides or carries on business or on account of any physical or other good reasons the magistrate feels that dispensing with the personal attendance of the accused would only be in the interests of justice. However, the magistrate who grants such benefit to the accused must take the precautions enumerated above, as a matter of course. We may reiterate that when an accused makes an application to a magistrate through his duly authorised counsel praying for affording the benefit of his personal presence being dispensed with the magistrate can consider all aspects and pass appropriate orders thereon before proceeding further.”

Ms Bhaskar Industries Ltd Vs Ms Bhiwani Denim and Apparels Ltd and Ors on 27 August 2001

Citations: [2001 INSC 399], [2001 KHC 0 714], [2001 AIR SC 3625], [2001 UC 2 370], [2001 AD SC 6 612], [2001 SCC 6 339], [2001 AWC SC 4 2981], [2001 CRI LJ 4250], [2001 JIC 2 685], [2001 MPLJ 3 664], [2001 SUPREME 6 339], [2001 AIR SC 0 3413], [2001 JCC 2 127], [2001 ACR SC 3 2297], [2001 KERLT 3 307], [2001 JT SC 7 127], [2001 SCC 7 401], [2001 CRIMES SC 4 199], [2002 PLJR 4 95], [2002 MAHLJ 1 81], [2002 BOMCR CRI SC 190], [2002 BOMCR SC 2 265], [2002 ALT CRI 1 13], [2001 RCR CRI 4 137], [2003 JLJ SC 1 56], [2001 SCALE 5 503], [2001 CRLJ 0 4250], [2001 S SCR 2 219], [2001 SCC CR 0 1254], [2001 RCR CRIMINAL 4 137], [2001 DCR SC 602], [2001 OLR 2 613], [2002 LJ 1 161], [2001 CCR 0 208], [2001 SRJ 8 415], [2001 CRLR SC 0 481], [2001 SCC CRI 0 1254], [2001 CALCRILR 0 481], [2001 SLT 6 120], [2001 CCR 3 208], [2001 ALLMR CRI 0 1961], [2001 SCJ 3 176], [2002 BCR 2 265], [2002 MHLJ SC 1 81], [2001 ALD CRI 2 530], [2002 BCR CRI 0 190]

Ankit Bharti Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 02 March 2020

Posted on March 4, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

A landmark judgment, where in Full-bench (5-Judge) of Allahabad High Court held that, Sessions Court and High Court have concurrent jurisdiction in matters of 438 CrPC (Anticipatory Bail) and that there is no rule that first option at Sessions Court ought to be exhausted before seeking audience at High Court, but can be done so under Special circumstances only.

Ankit Bharti Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 02 March 2020

Citations: [

Keshav Lal Thakur Vs State of Bihar on 11 October 1996

Posted on February 23, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court held that any offence under section 31 of Representation of People Act, 1950 is a Non-cognizable offence and hence direct registration of FIR is not maintainable.

We need not go into the question whether in the facts of the instant case the above view of the High Court is proper or not for the impugned proceeding has got to be quashed as neither the police was entitled to investigate into the offence in question nor the Chief Judicial Magistrate to take cognizance upon the report submitted on completion of such investigation. On the own showing of the police, the offence under Section 31 of the Act is non cognizable and therefore the police could not have registered a case for such an offence under Section 154 Cr.P.C. of course, the police is entitled to investigate into a non-cognizable offence pursuant to an order of a competent Magistrate under Section 155 (2) Cr.P.C. but, admittedly, no such order was passed in the instant case. That necessarily means, that neither the police could investigate into the offence in question nor submit a report on which the question of taking cognizance could have arisen. While on this point, it may be mentioned that in view of the proviso to Section 2 (d) Cr.P.C., which defines ’complaint’, the police is entitled to submit, after investigation, a report a relating to a non-cognizable offence in which case such a report is to be treated as a ’complaint’ of the police officer concerned, but that explanation will not be available to the prosecution here as that related to a case where the police initiates investigation into a cognizable offence – unlike the present one – but ultimately finds that only a non-cognizable offence has been made out.

Keshav Lal Thakur Vs State of Bihar on 11 October 1996

Citations: [1996 AD SC 7 838], [1997 ALD CRI 1 123], [1997 ALT CRI 1 439], [1996 CRIMES SC 4 121], [1996 SCALE 7 598], [1996 SCC 11 557], [1996 SUPP SCR 7 578], [1996 CCR 4 205], [1996 ACJ 2 694], [1996 JT 616], [1996 SUPREME 7 608], [1997 SUPREME 1 150]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1892533/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609acdee4b014971140fe1f

Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency and Anr Vs CBI

Posted on February 16, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

In this Landmark judgment, 3-judge bench held as follows,

35. In view of above, situation of proceedings remaining pending for long on account of stay needs to be remedied. Remedy is required not only for corruption cases but for all civil and criminal cases where on account of stay, civil and criminal proceedings are held up. At times, proceedings are adjourned sine die on account of stay. Even after stay is vacated, intimation is not received and proceedings are not taken up. In an attempt to remedy this, situation, we consider it appropriate to direct that in all pending cases where stay against proceedings of a civil or criminal trial is operating, the same will come to an end on expiry of six months from today unless in an exceptional case by a speaking order such stay is extended. In cases where stay is granted in future, the same will end on expiry of six months from the date of such order unless similar extension is granted by a speaking order. The speaking order must show that the case was of such exceptional nature that continuing the stay was more important than having the trial finalized. The trial Court where order of stay of civil or criminal proceedings is produced, may fix a date not beyond six months of the order of stay so that on expiry of period of stay, proceedings can commence unless order of extension of stay is produced.
36. Thus, we declare the law to be that order framing charge is not purely an interlocutory order nor a final order. Jurisdiction of the High Court is not barred irrespective of the label of a petition, be it under Sections 397 or 482 Cr.P.C. or Article 227 of the Constitution. However, the said jurisdiction is to be exercised consistent with the legislative policy to ensure expeditious disposal of a trial without the same being in any manner hampered. Thus considered, the challenge to an order of charge should be entertained in a rarest of rare case only to correct a patent error of jurisdiction and not to re-appreciate the matter. Even where such challenge is entertained and stay is granted, the matter must be decided on day-to-day basis so that stay does not operate for an unduly long period. Though no mandatory time limit may be fixed, the decision may not exceed two-three months normally. If it remains pending longer, duration of stay should not exceed six months, unless extension is granted by a specific speaking order, as already indicated. Mandate of speedy justice applies to the PC Act cases as well as other cases where at trial stage proceedings are stayed by the higher court i.e. the High Court or a court below the High Court, as the case may be. In all pending matters before the High Courts or other courts relating to PC Act or all other civil or criminal cases, where stay of proceedings in a pending trial is operating, stay will automatically lapse after six months from today unless extended by a speaking order on above parameters. Same course may also be adopted by civil and criminal appellate/revisional courts under the jurisdiction of the High Courts. The trial courts may, on expiry of above period, resume the proceedings without waiting for any other intimation unless express order extending stay is produced.
37. The High Courts may also issue instructions to this effect and monitor the same so that civil or criminal proceedings do not remain pending for unduly period at the trial stage.

R.F. Nariman concurs and holds,

5. On a reference made to a 2-Judge Bench in the Delhi High Court, the learned Chief Justice framed, what he described as, “three facets which emanate for consideration”, as follows:
“(a) Whether an order framing charge under the 1988 Act would be treated as an interlocutory order thereby barring the exercise of revisional power of this Court?
(b) Whether the language employed in Section 19 of the 1988 Act which bars the revision would also bar the exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. for all purposes?
(c) Whether the order framing charge can be assailed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India?”
Answers given to the “three facets” are in paragraph 33 as follows:
“33. In view of our aforesaid discussion, we proceed to answer the reference on following terms:
(a) An order framing charge under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is an interlocutory order.
(b) As Section 19(3)(c) clearly bars revision against an interlocutory order and framing of charge being an interlocutory order a revision will not be
maintainable.
(c) A petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and a writ petition preferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India are
maintainable.
(d) Even if a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is entertained by the High Court under no circumstances an order of stay should be passed regard being had to the prohibition contained in Section 19(3)(c) of the 1988 Act.
(e) The exercise of power either under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India should be sparingly and in exceptional circumstances be exercised keeping in view the law laid down in Siya Ram Singh (supra), Vishesh Kumar (supra), Khalil
Ahmed Bashir Ahmed (supra), Kamal Nath & Others (supra) Ranjeet Singh (supra) and similar line of decisions in the field.
(f) It is settled law that jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot
be exercised as a “cloak of an appeal in disguise” or to re- appreciate evidence. The aforesaid proceedings should be used sparingly with great
care, caution, circumspection and only to prevent grave miscarriage of justice.”

Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency and Anr Vs CBI on 28 March 2018

Another 3-judge bench, again in Oct 2020, had to reiterate the position on the 6-months limit imposed by Supreme Courts, on all stays granted in Civil and Criminal Cases.

Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency and Anr Vs CBI on 15 Oct 2020

Another 2-judge bench clarified that the automatic vacation of 6-months stay only applies to civil and criminal matters only but not to writ petitions.

Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency and Anr Vs CBI on 25 Apr 2022 (Clarification regd Writs)

Citations: [2018 ILR KER 2 79], [2018 KHC 2 380], [2018 RCR CRIMINAL 2 415], [2018 SCALE 5 269],

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/172610348/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5abbcd474a93267cfe9ebef0

Earlier Delhi High Court order (by Shiv Narayan Dhingra ji):

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/58117f222713e179478f3bf5

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Legal Procedure Explained – Interpretation of Statutes

Kehar Singh and Anr Vs Union of India and Anr on 16 December 1988

Badshah Vs Urmila Badshah Godse and Anr on 18 October 2013

M.E. Shivalingamurthy Vs CBI Bengaluru on 7 January 2020

Syed Wasif Husain Rizvi Vs Hasan Raza Khan and Ors on 22 January 2016

The Oriental Insurance Company Ltd Vs Meena Variyal and Ors on 2 April 2007

Sarwan Singh Lamba and Ors Vs Union of India and Ors on 12 May 1995

MS. Bhaskar Industries Ltd Vs MS. Bhiwani Denim and Apparels Ltd and Ors on 27 August 2001

Ankit Bharti Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 02 March 2020

Keshav Lal Thakur Vs State of Bihar on 11 October 1996

Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency and Anr Vs CBI