Deepti Kapur Vs Kunal Julka on 30 June 2020

Posted on October 6, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

In this case, Single Judge discussed the admissibility of evidence in cases filed in Family Courts u/s 14 and also dispelled the false notion that if a spouse obtains an evidence illegally (by installing a CCTV in this case), such act would not be violative of the other spouse’s right to privacy. And also nothing in Constitution of India prohibits such evidence.

From Para 37,

37. While consistency in law is of utmost importance and law must get its full play regardless of the fact situation, this court must record the unease it feels with regard to a certain aspect that has arisen in this matter. Marriage is a relationship to which sanctity is still attached in our society. Merely because rules of evidence favour a liberal approach for admitting evidence in court in aid of dispensation of justice, this should not be taken as approval for everyone to adopt any illegal means to collect evidence, especially in relationships of confidence such as marriage. If the right to adduce evidence collected by surreptitious means in a marital or family relationship is available without any qualification or consequences, it could potentially create havoc in people’s personal and family lives and thereby in the society at large. For instance, if a spouse has the carte blanche to install a recording device in a bedroom or other private space or to adopt any means whatsoever to collect evidence against the partner, even if in circumstances of matrimonial discord, it would be difficult to foresee the length to which a spouse may go in doing so ; and such possibility would itself spell the end of the marital relationship. It is not uncommon for spouses to continue living together, even in matrimonial strife, for years on-end. So, while law must trump sentiment, a salutary rule of evidence or a beneficent statutory provision, must not be taken as a license for illegal collection of evidence.

Deepti Kapur Vs Kunal Julka on 30 June 2020

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/170404652/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5efb8cc29fca196e33048e01

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/deepti-kapur-versus-kunal-julka

[S. 14 of Family Courts Act] Del HC | In a contest between right to privacy and right to fair trial, both of which arise under expansive Art. 21, right to privacy may have to yield to right to fair trial

Note: The nut case went to Supreme Court and the SC kicked out the SLP.

Deepti Kapur Vs Kunal Julka on 10 May 2022

Index of Divorce judgments is here.

Atluri Brahmanandam (D) Thr.Lrs Vs Anne Sai Bapuji on 18 Nov 2010

Posted on October 6, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

This is regarding adoption criteria under section 10() of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act 1956, which reads as follows,

10. Persons who may be adopted.―No person shall be capable of being taken in adoption unless the following conditions are fulfilled, namely:―
(i) he or she is a Hindu;
(ii) he or she has not already been adopted;
(iii) he or she has not been married, unless there is a custom or usage applicable to the parties which permits persons who are married being taken in adoption;
(iv) he or she has not completed the age of fifteen years, unless there is a custom or usage applicable to the parties which permits persons who have completed the age of fifteen years being taken in adoption.

From Para 16,

16. The aforesaid decision is squarely applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The Andhra Pradesh High Court has recognized such a custom among the “Kamma” community of Andhra Pradesh of taking in adoption of a person even above the age of 15 years of age and has held the same to be legal and valid.

Atluri Brahmanandam (D) Thr.Lrs Vs Anne Sai Bapuji on 18 Nov 2010

Citations: 2010 JT 12 4412011 AIR SC 5452010 CTC 6 5552010 SCJ 8 5992011 MLJ 1 7422011 ALT 1 312010 CLT 4 4612010 SLT 8 3982011 CUTLT SUPPL 8222010 AIOL 7842010 ALLMR SC 6 9792011 RCR CIVIL SC 2 972010 SCALE 12 1572010 SCC 14 4662010 SUPREME 7 8682012 SCC CIV 1 6442010 ALR 83 8812010 AIC 96 92011 CHN 1 217

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/663319/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609aedae4b0149711414e5d

AP High Court Order here.

G Sarath Reddy Vs Union of India on 16 Jun 2020

Posted on September 20, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Even though this PIL petition was dismissed, the Division bench made a valuable comment, that Demanding of Justice from Concerned Authority in Govt is a Must before Seeking a Writ of Mandamus from a High Court.

Here is the snippet from the 2-page dismissal Order.

Besides this in para 7 of the writ petition a categorical statement has been made that the petitioner had not made any representation to the Government, meaning thereby, that the petitioner before making prayer for issuance of Writ of Mandamus by way of PIL, has not demanded justice before the authority concerned. This is the condition precedent for invoking Writ of Mandamus. The petitioner has not demanded any justice from the authority concerned. In the writ petition only vague submissions were made. Thereafter, a Coordinate Bench of this Court granted liberty to the petitioner to file amendment petition. Subsequently, one interlocutory application vide I.A.No.1 of 2020 was filed for amendment, which was itself defective and the same was dismissed on 24.02.2020. While dismissing I.A.No.1 of 2020, liberty was granted to the petitioner to file a fresh application along with relevant documents. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that after order, dated 24.02.2020, the petitioner has filed another interlocutory application vide I.A.No.2 of 2020, in which he made it clear to amend the writ petition by adding para 4(2) to para 4 (2) (k). In support of so called amendment petition, an affidavit has also been filed. Even after going through the amendment petitions, it is clear that no assertion has been made regarding approaching the authority concerned for demanding justice and directly this writ petition was filed. Considering the fact that the writ petition was filed with vague statements and also without approaching the authority concerned, we are of the opinion that such writ petition even as PIL may not be entertained.

G Sarath Reddy Vs Union of India on 16 Jun 2020

Recently, Allahabad HC also held this same rule here.

MS Bandekar Brothers Pvt Ltd and Anr Vs Prasad Vassudev Keni on 2 September 2020

Posted on September 4, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court held that for offences under 191 and 192 IPC, procedure under 340 CrPC has to be followed and perjury application for such offences cannot be turned into private complaints under 190 CrPC.

MS Bandekar Brothers Pvt Ltd and Anr Vs Prasad Vassudev Keni on 2 September 2020

Citations: [2020 SCC ONLINE SC 707], [(2020)20 SCC 1]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/141105348/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5f567c183321bc6ce2ef6f51

https://www.advocatekhoj.com/library/judgments/announcement.php?WID=13132

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/m-s-bandekar-brothers-pvt-ltd-anr-versus-prasad-vassudev-keni-etc-etc

Index of Perjury case laws is here.

Office of the Chief Post Master Vs Living Media India Ltd on 24 February 2012

Posted on August 31, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court gave this landmark reportable judgment regd delay condonation under Sec 5 of Limitation Act.

13) In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for
several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated
benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the
Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay.

Office of the Chief Post Master Vs Living Media India Ltd on 24 February 2012

Citations: [2012 AIR SC 1506], [2012 ALR 91 879], [2012 AWC SC 3 2651], [2012 CALLT SC 3 65], [2012 SCSUPPL CHN 3 20], [2012 CLT 113 1066], [2012 COMPCAS SC 174 387], [2012 CTC 2 240], [2012 ELT SC 277 289], [2012 GLH 1 670], [2012 ITR SC 348 7], [2012 JLJR 2 252], [2012 JCR SC 3 59], [2012 PLJR 2 371], [2012 RLW SC 3 2142], [2012 SCALE 2 782], [2012 SCC 3 563], [2013 SLJ SC 1 320], [2012 TAXMAN SC 207 163], [2012 SCC CIV 2 327], [2012 SCC CRI 2 580], [2012 SCC L&S 1 649], [2012 SCC ONLINE SC 192], [2012 GUJ LH 1 670], [2012 AIC 112 69], [2012 CALLJ 2 93], [2012 CALLT 3 65], [2012 VST 54 188], [2012 SCT 2 269], [2012 SUPREME 2 244], [2012 CLT 1 338], [2012 AIR SC 0 1812], [2012 SCR 1 1045], [2012 SLT 2 312], [2012 JT 2 483], [2012 CHN SC 3 20], [2012 CCC 2 1], [2012 AIOL 103], [2012 SCC L&S 2 649], [2012 SCJ 3 873], [2012 SCC CR 2 580], [2012 LW 4 100], [2013 CPR 2 306], [2013 CPR 3 622], [2012 CUTLT 113 1066], [2012 SCR 0 500], [2012 TAXMANNCOM SC 20 347]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/20289457/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af18e4b014971141598b

MS Sujan Multiports Ltd Vs State of Haryana and Ors on 12 March 2019

Posted on August 24, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

This is the wonderful judgment from Punjab and Haryana High Court. Very good for lawyers and law students alike.

This is what is mentioned by Hon’ble Judge on first page itself. This is just beginning.

The language of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., though is as simple as it could have been, yet seems to have fallen pray to the fear of ‘unknown’ in its applied interpretations. That ‘unknown’ is the fear arising out of a demon of the Indian system of administration of criminal justice, called the ‘FIR’. This fear is so pervasive that it starts showing its effect even before the ‘FIR’ comes into being, and continues to haunt a person even after he is acquitted of the charge leveled in ‘FIR’.

Entire Complaint filing and cognizance taking upon such complaint is detailed elaborately further.

MS Sujan Multiports Ltd Vs State of Haryana and Ors on 12 March 2019

State of Kerala Vs Rasheed on 30 October 2018

Posted on August 17, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court laid down the following practice guidelines to be followed by all Trial Courts, while conducting a criminal trial.

From Para 12,

12. The following practice guidelines should be followed by trial courts in the conduct of a criminal trial, as far as possible:
i. a detailed case-calendar must be prepared at the commencement of the trial after framing of charges;
ii. the case-calendar must specify the dates on which the examination-in-chief and cross-examination (if required) of witnesses is to be conducted;
iii. the case-calendar must keep in view the proposed order of production of witnesses by parties, expected time required for examination of witnesses, availability of witnesses at the relevant time, and convenience of both the prosecution as well as the defence, as far as possible;
iv. testimony of witnesses deposing on the same subject-matter must be proximately scheduled;
v. the request for deferral under Section 231(2) of the Cr.P.C. must be preferably made before the preparation of the case-calendar;
vi. the grant for request of deferral must be premised on sufficient reasons justifying the deferral of cross-examination of each witness, or set of witnesses;
vii. while granting a request for deferral of cross-examination of any witness, the trial courts must specify a proximate date for the cross-examination of that witness, after the examination-in-chief of such witness(es) as has been prayed for;
viii. the case-calendar, prepared in accordance with the above guidelines, must be followed strictly, unless departure from the same becomes absolutely necessary;
ix. in cases where trial courts have granted a request for deferral, necessary steps must be taken to safeguard witnesses from being subjected to undue influence, harassment or intimidation.

State of Kerala Vs Rasheed on 30 October 2018

Citations: [2018 SCC ONLINE SC 2251], [2019 SCC 13 297], [2019 SCC CRI 4 552], [2019 AIR SC 721], [2018 KLT 4 783], [2018 CRIMES 4 288], [2018 AIC 192 212], [2019 CRI LJ 1516], [2019 KLJ 2 398], [2019 ECRN 1 46], [2018 INSC 1021]

Other sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/187514485/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5bdfde204a93267eadff9b10

Supreme Court initiate a Suomoto WP here to assess the effectiveness of the Guidelines issue above.

Krishna Kumar (Minor) Vs State of Haryana on 24 July 2020

Posted on July 30, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Justice Madaan held that, the JJ Act did not prohibit the provision/protection of anticipatory bail available u/s 438 CrPC so it cannot be said that such relief is not available to the petitioner. So he granted anticipatory bail to the accused.

Krishna Kumari (Minor) Vs State of Haryana on 24 July 2020 Interim Order

CBI Vs Mukesh Pravinchandra Shroff and Ors on 25 November 2005

Posted on July 20, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Here is the one of the shortest decisions from Supreme Court

From Para 2,

2. By the impugned order, the Special Court has discharged the accused Raghunath Lekhraj Wadhwa, Jitendra Ratilal Shroff and Mukesh Pravinchandra Shroff from Special Case No. 4 of 1997. From a bare perusal of the impugned order, it would appear that the Special Court has virtually passed an order of acquittal in the garb of an order of discharge. It is well settled that at the stage of framing of the charge, what is required to be seen is as to whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused. In our view, the Special Court was not justified in discharging the aforesaid accused persons.

Casemine version:

CBI Vs Mukesh Pravinchandra Shroff and Ors on 25 November 2005 CM Ver

Supreme Court version (Record of {Proceedings):

CBI Vs Mukesh Pravinchandra Shroff and Ors on 25 November 2005

Citations: [2009 SCC 16 429], [2010 SCC CRI 3 315]

Shamnsaheb M. Multtani Vs State of Karnataka on 24 January 2001

Posted on July 17, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court held that the burden of proof even in a 304B Dowry death case initially lies on prosecution only and shifts to accused, only after prosecution establishes their case.

Under Section 4 of the Evidence Act whenever it is directed by this Act that the Court shall presume the fact it shall regard such fact as proved unless and until it is disproved. So the court has no option but to presume that the accused had caused dowry death unless the accused disproves it. It is a statutory compulsion on the court. However it is open to the accused to adduce such evidence for disproving the said compulsory presumption, as the
burden is unmistakably on him to do so. He can discharge such burden either by eliciting answers through cross-examination of the witnesses of the prosecution or by adducing evidence on the defence side or by both.

And then,

But the peculiar situation in respect of an offence under Section 304B IPC, as discernible from the distinction pointed out above in respect of the offence under Section 306 IPC is this: Under the former the court has a statutory compulsion, merely on the establishment of two factual positions enumerated above, to presume that the accused has committed dowry death. If any accused wants to escape from the said catch the burden is on him to disprove it. If he fails to rebut the presumption the court is bound to act on it.
Now take the case of an accused who was called upon to defend only a charge under Section 302 IPC. The burden of proof never shifts on to him. It ever remains on the prosecution which has to prove the charge beyond all reasonable doubt. The said traditional legal concept remains unchanged even now. In such a case the accused can wait till the prosecution evidence is over and then to show that the prosecution has failed to make out the said offence against him. No compulsory presumption would go to the assistance of the prosecution in such a situation. If that be so, when an accused has no notice of the offence under Section 304B IPC, as he was defending a charge under Section 302 IPC alone, would it not lead to a grave miscarriage of justice when he is alternatively convicted under Section 304B IPC and sentenced to the serious punishment prescribed thereunder, which mandates a minimum sentence of imprisonment for seven years.
The serious consequence which may ensue to the accused in such a situation can be limned through an illustration:-
If a bride was murdered within seven years of her marriage and there was evidence to show that either on the previous day or a couple of days earlier she was subjected to harassment by her husband with demand for dowry, such husband would be guilty of the offence on the language of Section 304-B IPC read with Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. But if the murder of his wife was actually committed either by a decoit or by a militant in a terrorist act the husband can lead evidence to show that he had no hand in her death at all. If he succeeds in discharging the burden of proof he is not liable to be convicted under Section 304B, IPC. But if the husband is charged only under Section 302 IPC he has no burden to prove that his wife was murdered like that as he can have his traditional defence that the prosecution has failed to prove the charge of murder against him and claim an order of acquittal. The above illustration would amplify the gravity of the consequence befalling an accused if he was only asked to defend a charge under Section 302 IPC and was alternatively convicted under Section 304B IPC without any notice to him, because he is deprived of the opportunity to disprove the burden cast on him by law.

In such a situation, if the trial court finds that the prosecution has failed to make out the case under Section 302 IPC, but the offence under Section 304-B IPC has been made out, the court has to call upon the accused to enter on his defence in respect of the said offence. Without affording such an opportunity to the accused, a conviction under Section 304-B IPC would lead to real and serious miscarriage of justice. Even if no such count was included in the charge, when the court affords him an opportunity to discharge his burden by putting him to notice regarding the prima facie view of the court that he is liable to be convicted under Section 304B IPC, unless he succeeds in disproving the presumption, it is possible for the court to enter upon a conviction of the said offence in the event of his failure to disprove the presumption.

Shamnsaheb M. Multtani Vs State of Karnataka on 24 January 2001

Citations: [

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Legal Procedure Explained – Interpretation of Statutes

Deepti Kapur Vs Kunal Julka on 30 June 2020

Atluri Brahmanandam (D) Thr.Lrs Vs Anne Sai Bapuji on 18 Nov 2010

G Sarath Reddy Vs Union of India on 16 Jun 2020

MS Bandekar Brothers Pvt Ltd and Anr Vs Prasad Vassudev Keni on 2 September 2020

Office of the Chief Post Master Vs Living Media India Ltd on 24 February 2012

MS Sujan Multiports Ltd Vs State of Haryana and Ors on 12 March 2019

State of Kerala Vs Rasheed on 30 October 2018

Krishna Kumar (Minor) Vs State of Haryana on 24 July 2020

CBI Vs Mukesh Pravinchandra Shroff and Ors on 25 November 2005

Shamnsaheb M. Multtani Vs State of Karnataka on 24 January 2001