Based on the landmark judgment from Supreme Court is here, Allahabad High Court held against the Love Jihad marriages in India.
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/22354729/
Many such Love Jihad marriages are listed here, for awareness purpose, as nothing can be done to such legally major ladies.
Supreme Court has struck down the Section 8(4) as ultra vires to the Constitution which was in the following fashion,
(4) Notwithstanding anything in sub-section (1), sub-section (2) and sub-section (3) a disqualification under either sub-section shall not, in the case of a person who on the date of the conviction is a member of Parliament or the Legislature of a State, take effect until three months have elapsed from that date or, if within that period an appeal or application for revision is brought in respect of the conviction or the sentence, until that appeal or application is disposed of by the court.
From Paras 19 and 20,
19. The result of our aforesaid discussion is that the affirmative words used in Articles 102(1)(e) and 191(1)(e) confer power on Parliament to make one law laying down the same disqualifications for a person who is to be chosen as member of either House of Parliament or as a member of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State and for a person who is a sitting member of a House of Parliament or a House of the State Legislature and the words in Articles 101(3)(a) and 190(3)(a) of the Constitution put express limitations on such powers of the Parliament to defer the date on which the disqualifications would have effect. Accordingly, sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act which carves out a saving in the case of sitting members of Parliament or State Legislature fromthe disqualifications under sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 of the Act or which defers the date on which thedisqualification will take effect in the case of a sitting member of Parliament or a State Legislature is beyond the powers conferred on Parliament by the Constitution.
20. Looking at the affirmative terms of Articles 102(1)(e) and 191(1)(e) of the Constitution, we hold that Parliament has been vested with the powers to make law laying down the same disqualifications for person to be chosen as a member of Parliament or a State Legislature and for a sitting member of a House of Parliament or a House of a State Legislature. We also hold that the provisions of Article 101(3)(a) and 190(3)(a) of the Constitution expressly prohibitParliament to defer the date from which the disqualification will come into effect in case of a sitting member of Parliament or a State Legislature.Parliament, therefore, has exceeded its powers conferred by the Constitution in enacting sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act and accordingly subsection(4) of Section 8 of the Act is ultra vires the Constitution.
From Para 23,
…
Sitting members of Parliament and State Legislature who have already been convicted for any of the offences mentioned in sub-section (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 of the Act and who have filed appeals or revisions which are pending and are accordingly saved from the disqualifications by virtue of sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act should not, in our considered opinion, be affected by the declaration now made by us in this judgment.
…
However, if any sitting member of Parliament or a State Legislature is convicted of any of the offences mentioned in sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 of the Act and by virtue of such conviction and/or sentence suffers the disqualifications mentioned in sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 of the Act after the pronouncement of this judgment, his membership of Parliament or the State Legislature, as the case may be, will not be saved by subsection (4) of Section 8 of the Act which we have by this judgment declared as ultra vires the Constitution notwithstanding that he files the appeal or revision against the conviction and /or sentence.
Citations : [2013 ABR 6 236], [2013 AD SC 10 655], [2013 AIR SC 2662], [2013 AWC SC 6 5458], [2013 BOMCR 5 261], [2013 CGLRW SC 2 339], [2014 CLT SC 117 284], [2013 JLJR 3 351], [2013 JT SC 9 419], [2013 KARLJ 5 1], [2013 KLJ 3 284], [2013 KERLT 3 296], [2013 LW 4 857], [2013 MLJ 5 463], [2013 OLR 2 941], [2013 PLJR 3 261], [2013 RCR CIVIL 3 713], [2013 SCALE 8 469], [2013 SCC 7 653], [2013 SCC L&S 7 811], [2014 WBLR SC 1 69], [2013 SCC CIV 3 678], [2013 SCC CRI 3 641], [2013 SCC L&S 2 811], [2013 SCC ONLINE SC 603], [2013 GUJ LH 2 408], [2013 GUJ LR 3 2209], [2013 ILR KERALA 3 203], [2014 CUT LT 117 284]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/63158859/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af2ee4b0149711415be4
Supreme Court Landmark Judgment- Lilly Thomas v. Union of India
The 3-judge bench again reiterated the usage and importance of Sec 313 CrPC, in this case where the parties very well knew they cannot get married due to their different religions and their parents are opposed to their marriage as they insisted that the marriage happen in a Temple Vs a Church !!!
From Para 6,
9. It stands well settled that circumstances not put to an accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. cannot be used against him, and must be excluded from consideration. In a criminal trial, the importance of the questions put to an accused are basic to the principles of natural justice as it provides him the opportunity not only to furnish his defence, but also to explain the incriminating circumstances against him. A probable defence raised by an accused is sufficient to rebut the accusation without the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt. This Court, time and again, has emphasised the importance of putting all relevant questions to an accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
A division bench of Supreme Court held as follows in regards to the protection given to public servants from prosecution u/s 197 CrPC, mandating a sanction from Government.
8. The protection given under Section 197 Cr.P.C. is to protect responsible public servants against the institution of possibly vexatious criminal proceedings for offences alleged to have been committed by them while they are acting or adequate protection to public servants to ensure that they are not prosecuted for anything done by them, in the discharge of their official duties without reasonable cause, and if sanction is granted, to confer on the Government, if it chooses to exercise it, complete control of the prosecution. This protection has certain limits and is available only when the alleged act done by the public servant is reasonably connected with the discharge of his official duty and is not merely a cloak for doing the objectionable act. If in doing his official duty, he acted in excess of his duty, but there is a reasonable connection between the act and the performance of the official duty, the excess will not be a sufficient ground to deprive the public servant from the protection. The question is not as to the nature of the offence such as whether the alleged offence contained an element necessarily dependent upon the offender being a public servant, but whether it was committed by a public servant acting or purporting to act as such in the discharge of his official capacity. Before Section 197 Cr.P.C. can be invoked, it must be shown that the official concerned was accused of an offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official capacity. It is not the duty which requires examination so much as the act, because the official act can be performed both in the discharge of the official duty as well as in dereliction of it. The act must fall within the scope and range of the official duties of the public servant concerned. It is the quality of the act which is important and the protection of the section is available if the act falls within the scope and range of his official duty. There cannot be any universal rule to determine whether there is a reasonable connection between the act done and the official duty, nor is it possible to lay down any such rule. One safe and sure test in this regard would be to consider if the omission or neglect on the part of the public servant to commit the act complained of could have made him answerable for a charge of dereliction of his official duty: if the answer to this question is in the affirmative, it may be said that such act was committed by the public servant while acting in the discharge of his official duty and there was every connection with the act complained of and the official duty of the public servant. This aspect makes it clear that the concept of Section 197 Cr.P.C. does not get immediately attracted on institution of the complaint case.
Citations : [2008 RCR CRI 1 1042], [2008 AIR SC 1486], [2008 BLJR 56 1000], [2008 SCC 11 289], [2008 ALD CRI 2 134], [2008 SCALE 2 303], [2008 AICLR 2 150], [2008 MLJ CRI 2 458], [2008 AD SC 3 153], [2008 CCR 2 203], [2008 JT 2 374], [2008 CRIMES 1 346], [2008 SLT 3 680], [2008 AIOL 155], [2008 AIR SC 1375], [2008 BOMCR CRI SC 2 131], [2009 SCC CRI 1 130], [2008 SCR 2 580], [2008 SUPREME 1 572], [2008 AIC SC 63 28], [2008 CRLJ SC 2054], [2008 AIR SCW 1375]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1809946/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae6ee4b0149711413d79
A 5-judge bench decided the test to apply in case of a sedition charge against an individual, while upholding the constitutional validity of the sedition section i.e., 124A IPC.
Citations : [1963 ANWR 1 40], [1962 BLJR 10 636], [1963 MLJ SC 1 40], [1962 SUPP SCR 2 769], [1962 CRI LJ 2 103], [1962 SCR SUPL 2 769], [1962 AIR SC 955], [1962 AIR SC 995], [1962 SCC 0 955], [1962 CRLJ 103], [1962 AIR SCC 955], [1962 SCR 2 769], [1962 SC 0 955], [1962 SUPSCR 2 769], [1962 SUPPSCR 2 769], [1962 AIR 955], [1962 SCR SUPP 2 769]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/111867/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ab1fe4b014971140bb97
Supreme Court held that, just by using the words/expressions used in statutes/provisions does not disclose any offence, when the necessary ingredients constituting Section 420 are conspicuously lacking in the complaint.
From Para 5,
5. Except using the expressions fraudulent misappropriation and mala fide intention, the allegations in the complaint do not at all disclose as to how the appellant can be found guilty of the offence under Section 420 IPC. The ingredients constituting Section 420 are conspicuously lacking in the complaint. All the courts have failed to address themselves to the crucial question whether as far as the appellant is concerned any offence under Section 420 or for that matter any offence under Section 409 has been committed. Even going by the allegations in the complaint, allowing the criminal proceedings to go on against the appellant, would result in abuse of the process of the court. Hence, the proceedings in Complaint Case No. 10 of 2000 on the file of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sikar are quashed as against the appellant. The appeal is allowed accordingly.
Citations : [2006 CCR 2 122], [2006 SLT 3 405], [2005 SCC 7 69], [2005 SCC CRI 1600]
Others Sources :
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56ea89ae607dba38b6e4923a
Supreme Court has overruled SR Batra landmark case law here on the aspect of ‘Shared Household‘ and held as following:
From Para 64,
64. In paragraph 29 of the judgment, this Court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) held that wife is only entitled to claim a right to residence in a shared household and a shared household would only mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband, or the house which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member. The definition of shared household as noticed in Section 2(s) does not indicate that a shared household shall be one which belongs to or taken on rent by the husband. We have noticed the definition of “respondent” under the Act. The respondent in a proceeding under Domestic Violence Act can be any relative of the husband. In event, the shared household belongs to any relative of the husband with whom in a domestic relationship the woman has lived, the conditions mentioned in Section 2(s) are satisfied and the said house will become a shared household. We are of the view that this court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) although noticed the definition of shared household as given in Section 2(s) but did not advert to different parts of the definition which makes it clear that for a shared household there is no such requirement that the house may be owned singly or jointly by the husband or taken on rent by the husband. The observation of this Court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) that definition of shared household in Section 2(s) is not very happily worded and it has to be interpreted, which is sensible and does not lead to chaos in the society also does not commend us. The definition of shared household is clear and exhaustive definition as observed by us. The object and purpose of the Act was to grant a right to aggrieved person, a woman of residence in shared household. The interpretation which is put by this Court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) if accepted shall clearly frustrate the object and purpose of the Act. We, thus, are of the opinion that the interpretation of definition of shared household as put by this Court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) is not correct interpretation and the said judgment does not lay down the correct law.
And from para 106,
106. The right is to be implemented by an order under Section 19, on an application filed under sub-section (1) of Section 12. Sub-section (2) of Section 17, however, contains an exception in the right granted by sub-section (2), i.e., “save in accordance with the procedure established by law”. Sub-section (2) of Section 17, thus, contemplates that aggrieved person can be evicted or excluded from the shared household in accordance with the procedure established by law. What is the meaning and extent of expression “save in accordance with the procedure established by law” is a question which has come up for consideration in this appeal. Whether the suit filed by the plaintiff for mandatory and permanent injunction against the defendant in the Civil Court is covered by the expression “save in accordance with the procedure established by law”. We may further notice that the learned Magistrate while passing the interim order on 26.11.2016 in favour of the defendant on her application filed under Section 12 has directed that “the respondent shall not alienate the alleged shared household nor would they dispossess the complainant or their children from the same without orders of a Competent Court”. The Magistrate, thus, has provided that without the orders of Competent Court the applicant (respondent herein) should not be dispossessed. In the present case, interim order specifically contemplates that it is only by the order of the Competent Court respondent shall be dispossessed.
Note: Even though this may seem Topsy-turvy case law (Since it held SR Batra not correct law), not much is lost. Just arrange for alternate accommodation and make use of reliefs made available at reliefs from judiciary page and get the case closed in 2-3 months.
Citations : [2020 AIR SC 5397], [2020 SCALE 11 576], [2021 SCC CIV 1 325], [2020 KLT 6 208], [2020 SCC ONLINE SC 841], [2020 GUJ LH 4 416], [2021 SCC 1 414], [2021 SCC CRI 1 667], [2020 ALD 6 94]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/62368827/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5f89406b9868c3226a8e7b51
The index page is here.
After giving some inputs to Law commission and Bar Council of India in this para,
16. The interest of justice may suffer if the counsel conducting the trial is physically or mentally unfit on account of any disability. The interest of the society is paramount and instead of trials being conducted again on account of unfitness of the counsel, reform may appear to be necessary so that such a situation does not arise. Perhaps time has come to review the Advocates Act and the relevant Rules to examine the continued fitness of an advocate to conduct a criminal trial on account of advanced age or other mental or physical infirmity, to avoid grievance that an Advocate who conducted trial was unfit or incompetent. This is an aspect which needs to be looked into by the concerned authorities including the Law Commission and the Bar Council of India.
Supreme Court passed these reasons for not recalling a witness
29. We may now sum up our reasons for disapproving the view of the High Court in the present case:
(i) The trial court and the High Court held that the accused had appointed counsel of his choice. He was facing trial in other cases also. The earlier counsel were given due opportunity and had duly conducted cross-examination. They were under no handicap;
(ii) No finding could be recorded that the counsel appointed by the accused were incompetent particularly at back of such counsel;
(iiii) Expeditious trial in a heinous offence as is alleged in the present case is in the interests of justice;
(iv) The trial Court as well as the High Court rejected the reasons for recall of the witnesses;
(v) The Court has to keep in mind not only the need for giving fair opportunity to the accused but also the need for ensuring that the victim of the crime is not unduly harassed;
(vi) Mere fact that the accused was in custody and that he will suffer by the delay could be no consideration for allowing recall of witnesses, particularly at the fag end of the trial;
(vii) Mere change of counsel cannot be ground to recall the witnesses;
(viii) There is no basis for holding that any prejudice will be caused to the accused unless the witnesses are recalled;
(ix) The High Court has not rejected the reasons given by the trial court nor given any justification for permitting recall of the witnesses except for making general observations that recall was necessary for ensuring fair trial. This observation is contrary to the reasoning of the High Court in dealing with the grounds for recall, i.e., denial of fair opportunity on account of incompetence of earlier counsel or on account of expeditious proceedings;
(x) There is neither any patent error in the approach adopted by the trial court rejecting the prayer for recall nor any clear injustice if such prayer is not granted.
Citations : [2016 ACR SC 1 142], [2016 ALT CRL AP 1 167], [2016 MPJR 1 1], [2016 NCC 1 393], [2016 SCC 2 402], [2016 SCJ 1 93], [2015 AIR SC 3501], [2015 AD SC 10 165], [2015 ALLCC 91 640], [2015 BOMCR CRI 4 366], [2015 CCR SC 3 468], [2015 CRILJ 4640], [2015 CRIMES SC 4 1], [2015 JLJR 4 97], [2015 PLJR 4 258], [2015 RCR CRIMINAL 4 312], [2015 RLW SC 4 3271], [2015 SCALE 9 649], [2015 UC 3 1794], [2016 SCC CRI 1 510], [2015 SCC ONLINE SC 799], [2015 AIC 155 68], [2015 CRI LJ 4640]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/33982557/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5790b391e561097e45a4e3ea
Guidelines around fixed timelines given by earlier SC judgments were deleted in this 5-Judge judgment in respect of u/s 468 CrPC
Concurring opinion from Justice Doraiswamy Raju.
Citations : 2002 MHLJ SC 3 1452002 SUPREME 3 2602002 SCC 4 5782002 SCALE 3 4972002 MPLJ SC 3 32002 CRLJ SC 25472002 AIR SC 18412002 BOMCR CRI SC 8592002 AIR SC 18562002 SCR 3 602012 SCC 9 4302002 PLJR 3 2292002 KLT SC 2 1892002 WLN 4 7512002 CRIMES SC 2 2002002 JCR SC 2 2732002 RCR CRIMINAL 2 5532002 OLR 1 6972002 SCR 3 682002 UC 2 2072002 JT SC 4 922002 ALD CRI 1 7922002 GLH 2 5182002 ACR SC 2 13822002 CRILJ 25472002 GLR 2 15492002 SCC CRI 8302002 MHLJ 3 1452002 AIR SCW 18412002 MPLJ SC 3
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/516669/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609adb4e4b014971141208d
Supreme Court held as follows when Cross-examination of a Prosecution witness was adjourned/deferred to over 1 year.
It is also to be pointed out that PW4 Vikram Singh (informant) who had lodged FIR immediately was under constant threat and was compelled not to speak the truth despite the fact that he was the brother of deceased. Other witnesses also turned hostile including PW6 Prem Singh son of Pratap Singh and PW8 Rattan Lal, which indicates, as observed by the High Court, that accused party was stronger in terms of money power and muscle power. At this stage, we would observe that the Sessions Judge ought to have followed the mandate of Section 309 Cr.P.C. of completing the trial by examining the witnesses from day to day and not giving a chance to accused to threaten or win over the witnesses so that they may not support the prosecution. It appears from the record that examination-in-chief of PW4 Vikram Singh was over on 06.2.1984. The counsel representing Ambika Prasad requested the court that because of his uncles demise, he would not be in a position to cross-examine the witness and, therefore, recording of further cross-examination might be adjourned. Thereafter, the witness was cross-examined in the month of July, 1985. In our view, this is highly improper. Even if the request for adjournment of the learned counsel for the accused was accepted, the cross-examination ought not to have been deferred beyond two or three days.
Citations : [2000 ACR SC 1 282], [2000 AIR SC 718], [2000 ALD CRI 1 460], [2000 CRI LJ 810], [2000 JT SC 1 273], [2000 RCR CRIMINAL 1 64], [2000 SCALE 1 219], [2000 SCC 2 646], [2000 SCR 1 342], [2000 SCC CRI 522], [2000 DLT 83 476], [2000 AIR SC 719], [2000 SCC 2 464], [2000 ACC 40 462], [2000 SCO 2 646], [2000 AIR SC 253], [2000 CRIMES SC 2 63], [2000 SUPREME 2 633], [2000 CRLJ 106 810], [2000 CCR 1 130], [2000 RCR CRIMINAL 1 643], [2000 SCJ 2 472], [2000 SLT 1 442], [2000 SRJ 2 235], [2000 JCC SC 1 197], [2000 SCC SC 1 197], [2000 CRIMES 2 63], [2000 CRLJ SC 810], [2000 RECENTCR 1 643], [2000 AIR SCW 253]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/151141/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad6ee4b014971141165e
Bad Behavior has blocked 1034 access attempts in the last 7 days.
