Arun Thakur Vs State of Chhattisgarh on 10 July 2019

Posted on December 12, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Whether an Advocate, while acting under the instructions of his client and proceeding professionally, can be prosecuted / punished for the offence of defamation punishable under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code is the precise question involved in this petition which came before High Court of Chhattisgarh.

From Para 10,

10. It appears from the aforesaid genealogical tree that respondent No.2 herein has been shown to be the concubine / wife of Ghanshyam Pandey. This, according to respondent No.2, is defamatory, as she is the legally married wife of Ghanshyam Pandey after the death of his first wife Smt. Tarini Pandey and that led to the present dispute.

From Para 24,

24. In light of above-stated legal analysis, an advocate, who acted professionally as per instructions of his/her client, cannot be made criminally liable for the offence of defamation under Section 500 of the IPC unless contrary is alleged and established.

From Para 26,

….
As such, an Advocate who has acted professionally and drafted plaint making averment as per the instructions of his client, cannot be held liable for the offence of defamation under Section 500 of the IPC.

Finally from Para 33,

33. Admittedly, respondent No.2 claims that the alleged incident happened in the year 2014 and after lapse of 3-4 years, FIR has been lodged which clearly goes to show that there was no intention of the petitioner to cause harm, as in such a case, she would have rushed to the police authority well in time. As such, even it cannot be held that the petitioner has abused and insulted respondent No.2 in terms of Section 506 of the IPC.

Arun Thakur Vs State of Chhattisgarh on 10 July 2019

Vipul Lakhanpal Vs Pooja Sharma on 01 June 2015

Posted on December 12, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Single-judge bench held that husband has to pay maintenance even if wife is earning salary and he does not have salary. Just 15 pages. Read yourself.

Vipul Lakhanpal Vs Pooja Sharma on 01 June 2015

Asharam@Ashumal Vs The State of Rajasthan and Ors on 12 Apr 2014

Posted on December 4, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

A academic query was posed to the High Court in these batch of Revisions as follows.

The thrust of the accused-petitioners in their arguments is to the effect that if charges under POCSO Act, 2012 do not survive then the case from the Special Court ( Sessions Judge, Jodhpur District, Jodhpur, who is trying the cases of POCSO Act, 2012) may be transferred to the regular Sessions Court where presumption under Sections 29 and 30 of POCSO Act, 2012 will not be available against the petitioner and the accused-petitioners will be benefited accordingly.

And then after perusing provisions of POCSO Act, Juvenile Justice Act, IPC, the Court observed and ordered as follows:

It has been argued on behalf of accused Asharam@Ashumal that at the most his conduct may come within the definition of attempted fellatio and he cannot be charged for the offence of fellatio. The conduct of the accused asking the girl to suck his organ is called fellatio. Had the girl started sucking his organ, it would have been argued that it was her consensual act. Certainly the charge of attempt to fellatio is graver offence than the fellatio itself. So, the charge even if it relates to fellatio, it will cover the charge of attempted fellatio and the accused is not going to be prejudiced when the charge of fellatio has been framed against him in place of attempted fellatio. Some times the prosecutrix, who is a minor girl may hesitate to tell complete truth before the Investigating Officer and many a times it happens in such type of cases that the prosecutrix unfolds the complete truth only during the camera trial when she is assured that nobody will be able to cause any harm to her because of her statement. Hon’ble the Supreme Court has mandated that in cases of Section 304 B IPC, a charge of Section 302 IPC should also be framed against the accused and on the same logic, this Court hereby directs all the trial courts in Rajasthan that in all cases of attempt to commit rape, a charge for the offence of rape should also be framed against the accused so that, at the stage of conclusion of the trial, the Court may not have to undertake tedious process of amendment of charge and recalling the witnesses causing serious prejudice to the cause of justice in such cases.

Asharam@Ashumal Vs The State of Rajasthan and Ors on 12 Apr 2014

Citations : [2014 SCC ONLINE RAJ 1812], [2014 RLW 3 2596], [2014 WLC 4 481]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/83475160/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56ea742f607dba36cc74581c

Sambhaji and Ors vs Gangabai and Ors on 20 Nov 2008

Posted on December 4, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court held that. ‘a Civil/Trial Court can accept the written statement even after statutory time limit of 90 days‘, as prescribed under Order 8 Rule 1.

15. In the instance case the trial court proceeded on the erroneous premises that there was no scope to accept the written statement after 90 days. The High Court by the impugned order held that though it had power, no case was made out to accept the prayer. We have considered the grounds indicated by the appellants seeking acceptance of the written statement filed belatedly. They cannot be considered to be trivial or without substance. In the case of this nature where close relatives are litigants a liberal approach is called for. In the circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the High Court affirming the order passed by the trial court refusing acceptance of the written statement. The matter is not very complex. We request the trial court to complete trial of the suit within the period of six months. The appeal is allowed without any order as to costs.

Sambhaji and Ors Vs Gangabai and Ors on 20 Nov 2008

Citations : [2009 ELT SC 240 1612008 AIR SC SUPP 7672008 SUPREME 8 7142008 SCC 17 1172009 BOMCR SC 1 812008 JT 13 442008 SCALE 15 5222008 AIOL 13332008 SLT 9 2982009 ALLMR SC 1 9212008 SCR 16 4692009 ELT 240 161]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/90423/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae73e4b0149711413e98

Rajaram Prasad Yadav Vs State of Bihar and Anr on 4 Jul 2013

Posted on November 23, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court passed these guidelines when a witness is called or recalled for evidence.

a) Whether the Court is right in thinking that the new evidence is needed by it? Whether the evidence sought to be led in under Section 311 is noted by the Court for a just decision of a case?
b) The exercise of the widest discretionary power under Section 311 Cr.P.C. should ensure that the judgment should not be rendered on inchoate,
inconclusive speculative presentation of facts, as thereby the ends of justice would be defeated.
c) If evidence of any witness appears to the Court to be essential to the just decision of the case, it is the power of the Court to summon and examine or recall and re-examine any such person.
d) The exercise of power under Section 311 Cr.P.C. should be resorted to only with the object of finding out the truth or obtaining proper proof for
such facts, which will lead to a just and correct decision of the case.
e) The exercise of the said power cannot be dubbed as filling in a lacuna in a prosecution case, unless the facts and circumstances of the case make it
apparent that the exercise of power by the Court would result in causing serious prejudice to the accused, resulting in miscarriage of justice.
f) The wide discretionary power should be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily.
g) The Court must satisfy itself that it was in every respect essential to examine such a witness or to recall him for further examination in order to
arrive at a just decision of the case.
h) The object of Section 311 Cr.P.C. simultaneously imposes a duty on the Court to determine the truth and to render a just decision.
i) The Court arrives at the conclusion that additional evidence is necessary, not because it would be impossible to pronounce the judgment without it, but because there would be a failure of justice without such evidence being considered.
j) Exigency of the situation, fair play and good sense should be the safe guard, while exercising the discretion. The Court should bear in mind that no party in a trial can be foreclosed from correcting errors and that if proper evidence was not adduced or a relevant material was not brought on record due to any inadvertence, the Court should be magnanimous in permitting such mistakes to be rectified.
k) The Court should be conscious of the position that after all the trial is basically for the prisoners and the Court should afford an opportunity to them in the fairest manner possible. In that parity of reasoning, it would be safe to err in favour of the accused getting an opportunity rather than protecting the prosecution against possible prejudice at the cost of the accused. The Court should bear in mind that improper or capricious exercise of such a discretionary power, may lead to undesirable results.
l) The additional evidence must not be received as a disguise or to change the nature of the case against any of the party.
m) The power must be exercised keeping in mind that the evidence that is likely to be tendered, would be germane to the issue involved and also
ensure that an opportunity of rebuttal is given to the other party.
n) The power under Section 311 Cr.P.C. must therefore, be invoked by the Court only in order to meet the ends of justice for strong and valid reasons and the same must be exercised with care, caution and circumspection. The Court should bear in mind that fair trial entails the interest of the accused, the victim and the society and, therefore, the grant of fair and proper opportunities to the persons concerned, must be ensured being a constitutional goal, as well as a human right.

Rajaram Prasad Yadav Vs State of Bihar and Anr on 4 Jul 2013

Citations : [2013 AD SC 8 583], [2013 AIR SC 3081], [2013 JLJR 3 447], [2013 JCC 3 2179], [2013 JT SC 11 118], [2013 NCC 2 582], [2013 PLJR 4 34], [2013 RCR CRIMINAL 3 726], [2013 SCALE 8 316], [2013 SCC 14 461], [2013 SCR 7 420], [2013 UC 3 1631], [2014 SCC CRI 4 256], [2013 SCC ONLINE SC 577], [2013 AIC 128 29], [2013 AIR SC 0 4179], [2013 AIR SC 1746], [2013 CRLJ SC 3777], [2013 SLT 6 571], [2013 SUPREME 4 621], [2013 AIOL 432], [2013 KCCR SN 4 396], [2013 SCJ 7 986], [2013 BOMCR CRI SC 4 35], [2013 AIR SCW 0 4179]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/3583407/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af2be4b0149711415b41

Shailaja Patil Vs Khobbanna Patil on 18 Jan 2017

Posted on November 14, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

In this Order, Supreme Court held as follows,

That apart, we find that the High Court has proceeded on the basis that the appellant No.1 was capable of earning and that is one of the reasons for reducing the maintenance granted to her by the Family Court. Whether the appellant No.1 is capable of earning or whether she is actually earning are two different requirements. Merely because the appellant No.1 is capable of earning is not, in our opinion, sufficient reason to reduce the maintenance awarded by the Family Court.

This means, due to the mistake of High Court in assuming that being capable means earning, Supreme Court clarified that it is NOT so. This principle should apply to men as much as it was applied to women.

And, it is not clear why no Court is asking this question: Why are your needs/expenses out of sync with your income? Just because of the termination of financial assistance from husband?

Shailaja Patil Vs Khobbanna Patil on 18 Jan 2017

Citations : [2017 SCC ONLINE SC 2692017 AIR SC 11742017 AKR 2 3142017 ALLMR CRI 31072017 CRILJ 23062017 KCCR 3 18092017 OLR 1 9212017 RLW SC 3 24902017 RCR CIVIL 2 7012017 RCR CRIMINAL 2 4972017 SCC ONLINE SC 2692017 AIR SC 1174]

Other Sources :

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5a65cbb44a93263320779de5

Here is the High Court Order.

Shailaja Patil Vs Khobbanna Patil on 17 Apr 2013

Note: The mistake is this… All Assumptions are highlighted…

Petitioner is said to be working as a Lecturer and in a matrimonial dispute between him and the 1st respondent wife, the Family Court has ordered to pay maintenance of Rs.15,000/- to the wife and Rs.10,000/- per month to the son. According to the petitioner’s counsel, the 1st respondent is also working as a Teacher and is earning.
However, according to the counsel representing the 1st respondent, there is no proof of income being produced and she has no permanent source of income. Accordingly, he has sought for rejection of the application filed by the petitioner and to enhance the maintenance awarded.
Having regard to the fact that the wife is also capable of earning, she could be awarded Rs.6,000/- per month and the son could be awarded Rs.6,000/- per month. Ordered accordingly. Amount in deposit be adjusted towards arrears and also for future payment. Amount in deposit be released in favour of the respondent wife and child, as per the modified award.

Vikas Sharma Vs Monica Parashar on 30 Sep 2016

Posted on November 14, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Single Judge declared as follows with regards to the application of Sec 25(2) of PWDV Act 2005 and specifically, what does ‘change in circumstances’ mean.

32. I find no force in the contention of the appellant that merely filing of application under section 25 (2) of the D. V. Act would amount to a change in the circumstances. The phrase “change in circumstances” would require that the circumstances on the basis of which any previous order was passed under this Act have undergone alteration, modification or have ceased to exist and warrant interference of the court. Hence, the contention of the appellant that merely filing an application under section 25(2) of the D. V. Act would amount to change in circumstances cannot be accepted. Moreover, if such arguments of the appellant is accepted then parties will take advantage of such interpretation and would intentionally stay away from court on a day when any order is to be passed so that after passing of the order, they would file the application under section 25(2) of the D. V. Act and would plead that mere filing of an application under section 25(2) of the D.V. Act is a change in the circumstances thereby warranting passing of orders under section 25(2) of the D. V. Act.
33. A perusal of the application under section 25(2) of the D. V. Act filed by the appellant before the trial court shows that in the said application, the appellant has nowhere mentioned that consequent to the passing of the order by which interim maintenance has been fixed, there has been any change in the circumstances which warranted filing the application under section 25(2) of the D. V. Act for modification of the previous order dated 10.04.2015.

Vikas Sharma Vs Monica Parashar on 30 Sep 2016

Sabina Sahdev and Ors Vs Vidur Sahdev on 9 Jul 2018

Posted on November 14, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

A Division bench of Delhi High Court held that, the law does not prescribe any precondition such that the arrears amount of maintenance has to be deposited before appeal or revision can be allowed.

From Para 22,

22. Neither the language used by the Legislature in Section 399 read with Section 401 of the Cr.P.C., nor the language used in Section 29 of the DV Act even remotely suggest that the Legislature intended to impose pre-conditions to the availment of the said remedies, of the kind evolved in Rajeev Preenja (supra).

And then from Para 25,

25. Laudable as the object of the learned Single Judge may have been, the question is, whether in the light of the settled law taken note of hereinabove, the learned Single Judge while deciding Rajeev Preenja (supra) could have issued a general direction barring entertainment of criminal revisions under Section 399 read with Section 401 Cr.P.C. against orders granting interim maintenance to the wife/ child under Section 125 Cr.P.C., unless the entire arrears of maintenance up to date were first deposited? In our view, with due respect to the learned Single Judge, the answer is clearly in the negative. As to what should be the policy of the law is a matter which squarely falls within the preserve of the Legislature, and it is not a matter which the Courts can dictate, or evolve. It is one thing to interpret an existing law and, while doing so, to adopt an interpretation which is purposive, i.e. one which advances the objective of the enactment. However, it is quite a different thing to evolve a statutory scheme which, even the Legislature did not provide for.

Finally, in Paras 29 and 30,

29. As rightly pointed out by Mr. Bahl, imposition of a limitation on the statutory remedy of revision/ appeal under Section 399 of the Cr.P.C. or Section 29 of the DV Act- as the case may be, also falls foul of Article 14 of the Constitution of India for the reasons noticed by the Division Bench in Gagan Makkar (supra).Even if the condition in question – of the nature directed by the learned Single Judge in Rajeev Preenja (supra), were to exist in the statutory framework, the same may fail the test of reasonableness under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This is for the reason that, in a given case, the order granting interim maintenance passed by the Ld. Magistrate either under Section 125 Cr.P.C or under Section 29 of the DV Act, may be so harsh and so unreasonable, as to make it impossible for the opposite party/ husband to comply with the same. Experience shows that in a large number of cases, the arrears of interim maintenance- which may be granted from the date of moving of the application before the Ld. Magistrate, may accumulate to a very large amount running into lakhs of rupees. The arrears of interim maintenance may not necessarily be a meager amount in all cases. It would be most unjust and unreasonable to bar his statutory remedy of revision/ appeal as the case may be, merely because he may not be in a position to deposit the entire arrears of interim maintenance.

From Para 30 (Corum cleverly clubbed 125 Cr.P.C. cases also along with DV cases!)

30. Thus, we answer the reference by holding that the general direction issued in Rajeev Preenja (supra) in paragraphs 15, 16 and 20 are not sustainable. The said directions could not have been issued by the learned Single Judge as they seek to curtail the statutory remedy of revision available under Section 399 read with Section 401 of the Cr.P.C, and of appeal under Section 29 of the DV Act, against orders granting interim maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and Section 23 of the DV Act respectively. The direction in question over steps into the legislative field, which was impermissible for the Court to do. We agree with the view taken by the learned Single Judge in Brijesh Kumar Gupta (supra), that there cannot be an absolute rider that the entire maintenance amount, as granted by the Trial Court, should be deposited prior to the entertainment of the statutory remedy, because it would leave the remedy of statutory revision/ appeal illusory. Accordingly, we hold that a revision under Section 399 read with Section 401 Cr.P.C. and an appeal under Section 29 of the DV Act, against the order granting maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and under Section 23 of the DV Act respectively, would be maintainable, and would be entertained and heard without any pre-condition of deposit of the arrears of maintenance as ordered by the Ld. MM. We further hold that the pendency of such a Revision or Appeal- as the case may be, shall not operate as a stay of the operation of the order granting interim maintenance. The reference is answered accordingly.

Sabina Sahdev and Ors Vs Vidur Sahdev on 9 Jul 2018

Citations : [2018 DLT 251 245], [2018 HLR 3 413], [2019 CRI LJ 218],[2018 (4) RCR (Criminal) 30], [2018 SCC OnLine Del 9747],

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/80568294/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5b44dfac9eff431bb54655a9

Index of PWDV Act cases here. Index of Maintenance cases u/s 144 BNSS (125 Cr.P.C.) here.

Binita Dass Vs Uttam Kumar on 9 Aug 2019

Posted on November 14, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Single-judge Bench said one thing in this Order which is as follows:

7. Qualification of the wife and the capacity to earn cannot be a ground to deny interim maintenance to a wife who is dependant and does not have any source of income.

The converse is read like this:

Wife who is independant and have source of income, can be a ground to deny interim maintenance to a wife.

Binita Dass Vs Uttam Kumar on 9 Aug 2019

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/92763076/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5d8b2ff8714d58374079df99

Index of Maintenance cases under Section 125 CrPC here.

State Of Goa Vs Jose Maria Albert Vales @ Robert Vales on 18 Aug 2017

Posted on November 13, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

2-Judge bench held that without prima facie opinion in a complaint made otherwise than a police complaint, invoking of perjury u/s 340 CrPC or 341 CrPC is indefensible.

From Para 58,

58. We are thus of the firm opinion that a Trial Magistrate, on receipt of a complaint under Section 340 and/or Section 341 of the Code, if there is a preliminary inquiry and adequate materials in support of the considerations impelling action under the above provisions are available, would be required to treat such complaint to constitute a case, as if instituted on police report and proceed in accordance with law. However, in absence of any preliminary inquiry or adequate materials, it would be open for the Trial Magistrate, if he genuinely feels it necessary, in the interest of justice and to avoid unmerited prosecution to embark on a summary inquiry to collect further materials and then decide the future course of action as per law. In both the eventualities, the Trial Magistrate has to be cautious, circumspect, rational, objective and further informed with the overwhelming caveat that the offence alleged is one affecting the administration of justice, requiring a responsible, uncompromising and committed approach to the issue referred to him for inquiry and trial, as the case may be. In no case, however, in the teeth of Section 343(1), the procedure prescribed for cases instituted otherwise than on police report would either be relevant or applicable qua the complaints under Section 340 and/or 341 of the Cr.P.C.

And from Final Para,

60. In view of the determination as above, the approach of the High Court is wholly indefensible, as in the face of Section 343(1) of the Cr.P.C., the procedure prescribed for cases instituted otherwise than on police report is not attracted qua a complaint under Section 340 and/or Section 341 of the Code. Even assuming that the Trial Magistrate had examined few witnesses in support of the complaint, it was in the form of a summary inquiry, to be satisfied as to whether the materials on record would justify the framing of charge against the respondent or not and nothing further. Any other view would fly in the face of the ordainment of Section 343(1) of the Cr.P.C. and thus cannot receive judicial imprimatur. The impugned judgment of the High Court in quashing the charge framed by the Trial Magistrate and remanding the case to him to follow the procedure outlined for cases, instituted otherwise than on police report, under Chapter XIX-B is on the face of it unsustainable in law and on facts. It is thus set aside. The appeals are allowed. The Trial Magistrate would proceed from the stage of framing of charge, strictly in compliance of the letter and spirit of the precept contained in Section 343(1) of the Code. We make it clear that we have not offered any observation on the merits of the charge and the Trial Court would further the proceedings in accordance with law.

State Of Goa Vs Jose Maria Albert Vales @ Robert Vales on 18 Aug 2017

Citations : [2017 SCC ONLINE SC 1021], [2017 ALLCC 101 330], [2017 CCR SC 4 28], [2017 JCC 4 2245], [2017 RCR CRIMINAL 3 981], [2017 SCALE 9 527], [2017 SCC ONLINE SC 1021]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/194410529/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5a65cbaf4a93263320778706

Index of Perjury Case laws is here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Legal Procedure Explained – Interpretation of Statutes

Arun Thakur Vs State of Chhattisgarh on 10 July 2019

Vipul Lakhanpal Vs Pooja Sharma on 01 June 2015

Asharam@Ashumal Vs The State of Rajasthan and Ors on 12 Apr 2014

Sambhaji and Ors vs Gangabai and Ors on 20 Nov 2008

Rajaram Prasad Yadav Vs State of Bihar and Anr on 4 Jul 2013

Shailaja Patil Vs Khobbanna Patil on 18 Jan 2017

Vikas Sharma Vs Monica Parashar on 30 Sep 2016

Sabina Sahdev and Ors Vs Vidur Sahdev on 9 Jul 2018

Binita Dass Vs Uttam Kumar on 9 Aug 2019

State Of Goa Vs Jose Maria Albert Vales @ Robert Vales on 18 Aug 2017