Namathoti Sankaramma Vs State of A.P. and Ors on 15 Sep 2000

Posted on January 1, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

This is a case decided by single-judge bench of AP High Court regard a case involving CrPC 210.

From Paras 13, 14 and 15,

13. Sub-section (1) of Section 210 of Cr.P.C. is designed to ensure that the enquiry or trial in the case instituted on the basis of a complaint and enquiry or trial on the basis of a police report in respect of the same incident do not proceed tangentially but proceed in tandem. To enable the Magistrate to monitor the enquiry or trial under these two different streams to ensure simultaneously such enquiry or trial, Sub-section (1) of Section 210 of Cr.P.C. provides that when the case is instituted on the basis of a complaint, if it is brought to the notice of the Magistrate during the course of enquiry or trial on the basis of the said complaint that the investigation by the police in relation to the same offence is under way, the Magistrate shall stay the proceedings of such enquiry or trial and call for a report on the matter from the police officer conducting investigation. The condition for applicability of Section 210(1) of Cr.P.C. is that there must be commonality of the ‘offence’ in the subject of investigation by the police and the subject of enquiry by the Magistrate in the complaint case. But considering the context and the object of the provision, the word ‘offence’ used in Sub-section (1) of Section 210 of Cr.P.C. cannot be construed to refer to a particular provision of law defining certain offence. But it must be deemed to denote the incident or transaction in which an offence or offences have been committed.
14. However, under Sub-section (2) of Section 210 of Cr.P.C., the word ‘offence’ appears to have been used to indicate a particular transgression labelled as a particular offence under IPC or any other law. It is obvious from the fact that normally when the Court takes cognizance of an offence, it does not refer to taking cognizance of the whole incident in which offences are committed but to particular violations, which have been defined as specific offences. Inasmuch as the object of the provision appears to be as stated above to avoid enquiries or trials sought to be initiated on two different footings, namely, the complaint and the police report on parallel tracks leading to conflicting results, obviously it is the commonality of the
incident which are the subject matters of the complaint and the first information report under investigation by the police and not the labels of a particular transgression of law affixed by the complainant in the complaint or in the first information report which, if it were not so, the provisions of Section 210 of Cr.P.C. can be evaded by a mere device of labelling the transaction with different offences. As stated above in this case, the stage of staying the proceedings in the complaint case under Sub-section (1) of Section 210 of Cr.P.C., has passed and the stage for calling for a report from the police has also been passed inasmuch as the police report under Section 173 of Cr.P.C. has been filed already. The provision in Sub-section (1) of Section 210 of Cr.P.C. has been made as stated above for preventing parallel enquiries or trials. Where a question as to application of the provisions under Section 210 of Cr.P.C. arises at certain stage of enquiry in the complaint case or after the report under Section 173 of Cr.P.C. has been filed by the police, it cannot be said that because the stage for invoking Sub-section (1) of Section 210 of Cr.P.C. has crossed, the other provisions under it are not applicable.
15. For application of Sub-section (2) of Section 210 of Cr.P.C., two conditions are required to be satisfied, (i) On the report of the police under Section 173 of Cr.P.C., cognizance of some offences has been taken by the Magistrate; and (ii) Any person who is an accused in the complaint case is among the accused against whom the Magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence on the basis of the police report.

From Paras 21 and 22,

21. Section 210(3) Cr.P.C., would apply in two situations (i) Where the police report does not relate to ‘any’ accused in the complaint case, and (ii) if the Magistrate does not take cognizance of any offence on the police report at all. The word ‘any’ with reference to the accused and the offence in Section 210(3) and for that matter in Sub-section (2) of Section 210 of Cr.P.C. would only mean ‘one or more’ and not ‘all’. The Judgment of the Orissa High Court supra proceeds on the basis that Section 210(3) of Cr.P.C., will be applicable where all the offences and all the accused are not common in both the cases.
22. In this case as seen above, in view of the application of the provision of Section 210(2) Cr.P.C., an enquiry on the basis of a police report and the complaint case for the purpose of committal proceedings was required to be conducted together as if both were instituted on a police report.

Finally, from Para 25,

25. The learned Sessions Judge ought to have examined the committal order to ensure whether the requirements under Sub-section (2) of Section 210 Cr.P.C. have been complied with or not. It was necessary for him to ascertain whether the learned Magistrate while enquiring into the matter has treated the material available in the com- plaint case as if it was material brought forth on record in the police report case. This was not done. I am, therefore, satisfied that there was no substantial compliance of Section 210(2) Cr.P.C. For the purpose of committing the case not only the material available in the police report has to be considered, but the material available in the complaint case also requires to be considered as it if it is material placed before the Court in the police report case.

Namathoti Sankaramma Vs State of A.P. and Ors on 15 Sep 2000

Casemine version:

Namathoti Sankaramma Vs State of A.P. and Ors on 15 Sep 2000 Casemine

Citations : [2000 ALD CRI 2 588], [2001 RCR CRIMINAL 2 323], [2000 SCC ONLINE AP 772], [2001 ALT CRI 1 17], [2000 SUP CRLJ AP 4831]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/678335/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5608f7c8e4b0149711140c35

Bhushan Kumar and Anr Vs State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 4 April 2012

Posted on December 29, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

A 2-judge Division Bench held that Quash petition is maintainable even though this instant matter is dismissed on merits.

From Para 5,

5) The questions which arise for consideration in these appeals are:
(a) Whether taking cognizance of an offence by the Magistrate is same as summoning an accused to appear?
(b) Whether the Magistrate, while considering the question of summoning an accused, is required to assign reasons for the same?

From Para 7,

7) In S.K. Sinha, Chief Enforcement Officer vs. Videocon International Ltd. & Ors., (2008) 2 SCC 492, the expression “cognizance” was explained by this Court as it merely means“become aware of” and when used with reference to a court or a Judge, it connotes “to take notice of judicially”. It indicates the point when a court or a Magistrate takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiating proceedings in respect of such offence said to have been committed by someone. It is entirely a different thing from initiation of proceedings; rather it is the condition precedent to the initiation of proceedings by the Magistrate or the Judge. Cognizance is taken of cases and not of persons.

From Para 8 (Very Imp)

8) Under Section 190 of the Code, it is the application of judicial mind to the averments in the complaint that constitutes cognizance. At this stage, the Magistrate has to be satisfied whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding and not whether there is sufficient ground for conviction. Whether the evidence is adequate for supporting the conviction can be determined only at the trial and not at the stage of enquiry. If there is sufficient ground for proceeding then the Magistrate is empowered for issuance of process under Section 204 of the Code.

From Para 9,

9) A summon is a process issued by a Court calling upon a person to appear before a Magistrate. It is used for the purpose of notifying an individual of his legal obligation to appear before the Magistrate as a response to violation of law. In other words, the summons will announce to the person to whom it is directed that a legal proceeding has been started against that person and the date and time on which the person must appear in Court. A person who is summoned is legally bound to appear before the Court on the given date and time. Willful disobedience is liable to be punished under Section 174 IPC. It is a ground for contempt of court.

From Paras 10 and 11, (Very IMP)

10) Section 204 of the Code does not mandate the Magistrate to explicitly state the reasons for issuance of summons. It clearly states that if in the opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence, there is sufficient ground for proceeding, then the summons may be issued. This section mandates the Magistrate to form an opinion as to whether there exists a sufficient ground for summons to be issued but it is nowhere mentioned in the section that the explicit narration of the same is mandatory, meaning thereby that it is not a pre-requisite for deciding the validity of the summons issued.
11) Time and again it has been stated by this Court that the summoning order under Section 204 of the Code requires no explicit reasons to be stated because it is imperative that the Magistrate must have taken notice of the accusations and applied his mind to the allegations made in the police report and the materials filed therewith.

Bhushan Kumar and Anr Vs State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 4 April 2012

Citations : [2012 RCR CRIMINAL SC 2 794], [2012 SUPREME 2 699], [2012 BOMCR CRI SC 4 138], [2012 SLT 3 221], [2012 AIR SC 1747], [2012 SCALE 3 191], [2012 AIOL 161], [2012 CRIMES SC 2 101], [2012 CRLJ SC 2286], [2012 AIR SC 2476], [2012 SCALE 4 191], [2012 SCC 5 424], [2012 SCC CRI 2 872], [2012 JT 4 127], [2012 SCC ONLINE SC 325], [2012 AIC 113 116], [2012 UC 2 1121], [2012 JCR SC 2 269], [2012 ACR SC 2 1514], [2012 LW CRL 2 33], [2012 PLJR 2 422], [2012 JLJR 2 307], [2012 RLW SC 3 2467], [2012 SCC 5 422], [2012 DRJ 130 225], [2012 ALT CRI SC 3 223], [2012 AIR SCW 2476], [2012 DLT SC 189 252]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/71570434/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af1de4b0149711415a6b

Bhagirath Vs Delhi Administration on 16 April, 1985

Posted on December 20, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

A highly technical issue is resolved in affirmative, by the 5-judge Constitutional Bench by interpreting a term, ‘TERM‘.

Whether persons sentenced to imprisonment for life entitled to set-off their under trial period of detention against their sentence?

The Bench said,

Life is uncertain. In more ways than one. Who knows what good may come tomorrow and how many good tomorrows there are still to go ? But , philosophical digressions apart , especially optimistic , the fact that the term of life is of an uncertain duration does not justify the conclusion that the sentence of imprisonment for life is not for a term. The relevant question and , the only one , to ask under section 428 is: Has this person been sentenced to imprisonment for a term ? For the sake of convenience , the question may be split into two parts. One, has this person been sentenced to imprisonment ? And, two, is the imprisonment to which he has been sentenced an imprisonment for a term ? There can possibly be no dispute that a person sentenced to life imprisonment is sentenced to imprisonment. Then , what is the term to which he is sentenced ? The obvious answer to that question is that term to which he has been sentenced is the term of his life. Therefore , a person who is sentenced to life imprisonment is sentenced to imprisonment for term.

In conclusion,

We have considered with great care the reasoning upon which the decision in Kartar Singh proceeds. With respect, we are unable to agree with the decision. We have already discussed why ’imprisonment for life is imprisonment for a term , within the meaning of section 428. We would like to
add that we find it difficult to agree that the expressions ’imprisonment for life’ and imprisonment for a term’ are used either in the Penal Code or in the Criminal Procedure Code in contra-distinction with each other. Sections 304 , 305 , 307 and 391 of the penal Code undoubtedly provide that persons quilty of the respective offences shall be punished with imprisonment for life or with imprisonment for a term not exceeding a certain number of years. But , that is the only manner in which the Legislature could have expressed its intention that persons who are guilty of those offences shall be punished with either of the sentences mentioned in the respective sections. The circumstance on which the learned judges have placed reliance in Kartar Singh , do not afford any evidence , intrinsic or otherwise’ of the use of the two expressions in contra-distinction with each other. Two or more expressions are often used in the same section in order to exhaust the alternatives which are available to the Legislature. That does not mean that there is , necessarily , an antithesis between those expressions.
The reasoning in Kartar Singh that an order of remission does not interfere with the sentence recorded by the court but merely affects the execution of the sentence, stands answered by the interpretation which we have put upon the language of section 428 that persons sentenced to imprisonment for life are sentenced to imprisonment for a term. It is not because of remission that a sentence of life imprisonment becomes an imprisonment for a term.
We have also already answered the last of the reasons given in Kartar Singh that the question is not whether the beneficent provision contained in section 428 should be extended to life convicts on equitable considerations. We enter a most respectful caveat. Equity sustains law and the twain must meet. They cannot run in parallel streams. Equitable considerations must have an important place in the construction of beneficent provisions, particularly in the field of criminal law. To exclude such considerations is to denude law’s benevolence Or its true and lasting content. Lastly , the view expressed by the Joint Committee in its Report does not yield to the inference that the “mischief sought to be remedied has no relevance where gravity of offence requires the imposition of imprisonment for life”. As we have indicated earlier , graver the crime , longer the sentence and , longer the
sentence , greater the need for set-offs and remissions. Punishments are no longer retributory. They are reformative.
The order passed by this Court in Sukhlal Hansda related to the cases of 24 prisoners who were sentenced to life imprisonment. Most of those prisoners had undergone imprisonment for a period which , after taking account the remissions earned by them , exceeded fourteen years. It was
held by this Court that , for the purpose of considering whether the cases of those prisoners should be examined for premature release under the relevant provisions of the West Bengal Jail Manual , there was no reason why the period of imprisonment undergone by them as undertrial prisoners
should not be taken into account. The Court directed that the cases of the prisoners should be considered by the State Government , both for the purpose of setting off the period of detention undergone by them as undertrial prisoners and for taking into account the remissions earned by them. The order passed by the Court does not discuss the point which arises before us though , the observations made therein are consistent more with the view which we have taken than with the view taken in Kartar Singh.

Bhagirath Vs Delhi Administration on 16 April, 1985

Citations : [1985 SCC CRI 280], [1985 SCALE 1 719], [1985 AIR SC 1050], [1985 SCC 2 580], [1985 CRIMES SC 1 832], [1985 SCR 3 743], [1985 CRILJ 1179], [1985 AWC 11 510], [1985 BOMLR 85 400], [1985 ACR 340]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/733492/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac19e4b014971140e060

Ganga Kumar Srivastava Vs The State of Bihar on 20 Jul 2005

Posted on December 15, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

The following are the principles that emerge in regards to the exercise of power of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution:

“(i) The powers of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution are very wide but in criminal appeals this Court does not interfere with the
concurrent findings of fact save in exceptional circumstances.
(ii) It is open to this Court to interfere with the findings of fact given by the High Court, if the High Court has acted perversely or otherwise improperly.
(iii) It is open to this Court to invoke the power under Article 136 only in very exceptional circumstances as and when a question of law of general public importance arises or a decision shocks the conscience of the Court.
(iv) When the evidence adduced by the prosecution fell short of the test of reliability and acceptability and as such it is highly unsafe to act upon it.
(v) Where the appreciation of evidence and finding is vitiated by any error of law of procedure or found contrary to the principles of natural justice, errors of record and misreading of the evidence, or where the conclusions of the High Court are manifestly perverse and unsupportable from the evidence on record.”

Ganga Kumar Srivastava Vs The State of Bihar on 20 Jul 2005

Citations : [2005 SCC 6 211], [2005 JT 6 356], [2005 RCR CRI 3 707], [2005 AIR SC 3123], [2005 CRI 5 95], [2005 SAR CRI 0 640], [2005 SCJ 5 364], [2005 CALCRILR 419], [2005 CRLR 650], [2005 BLJ 1630], [2005 ALD CRI 1 485], [2005 ALD CRI 2 485], [2005 ALL MR CRI 2540], [2005 MAHLR 3 542], [2005 SUPREME 5 123], [2005 SCALE 5 535], [2005 AIR SC 3617], [2005 CCR 3 35], [2005 JCRIC 2 1182], [2005 SRJ 7 47], [2005 SLT 5 393], [2005 SCC CRI 1424], [2005 CRLJ SC 3454], [2005 MADLJ CRI 1 864], [2005 AIR SCW 3617]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1238385/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae1ce4b0149711412fe4

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/ganga-kumar-srivastava-versus-the-state-of-bihar

Kamlesh Kumar Vs Girish Kapoor and Anr on 12 Apr 1984

Posted on December 13, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

One of the earliest judgments on Stay proceedings in a Revision at Sessions Court.

From Paras 6 and 7,

6. The above order was passed in revisional jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge. Obviously that jurisdiction was exercised Under Section 397, Cr.P.C. Under its provisions the Sessions Judge could pass an interlocutory order by directing “that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended….” It is, therefore, clear that in a revision, the Sessions Judge could, during the pendency of the revision, suspend either sentence or order against which the revision has been filed. In the present case there is no question of any sentence. There was only the order in question against which revision was filed. At best the said order could only be suspended during the pendency of the revision.
7. The question of suspending the order would only arise if it was still to be executed. If the order had already come into operation, there remained nothing to be suspended. In the present case it is undisputed fact that in pursuance of the order of the learned Magistrate, applicant Kamlesh Kumar had already executed the necessary bonds on the same date and had taken delivery of the said print of the film ‘Naseeb’. Accordingly there remained nothing which could be suspended.

Casemine Version:

Kamlesh Kumar Vs Girish Kapoor and Anr on 12 Apr 1984

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1179659/

https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/473801/kamlesh-kumar-vs-girish-kapoor-anr

Arun Thakur Vs State of Chhattisgarh on 10 July 2019

Posted on December 12, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Whether an Advocate, while acting under the instructions of his client and proceeding professionally, can be prosecuted / punished for the offence of defamation punishable under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code is the precise question involved in this petition which came before High Court of Chhattisgarh.

From Para 10,

10. It appears from the aforesaid genealogical tree that respondent No.2 herein has been shown to be the concubine / wife of Ghanshyam Pandey. This, according to respondent No.2, is defamatory, as she is the legally married wife of Ghanshyam Pandey after the death of his first wife Smt. Tarini Pandey and that led to the present dispute.

From Para 24,

24. In light of above-stated legal analysis, an advocate, who acted professionally as per instructions of his/her client, cannot be made criminally liable for the offence of defamation under Section 500 of the IPC unless contrary is alleged and established.

From Para 26,

….
As such, an Advocate who has acted professionally and drafted plaint making averment as per the instructions of his client, cannot be held liable for the offence of defamation under Section 500 of the IPC.

Finally from Para 33,

33. Admittedly, respondent No.2 claims that the alleged incident happened in the year 2014 and after lapse of 3-4 years, FIR has been lodged which clearly goes to show that there was no intention of the petitioner to cause harm, as in such a case, she would have rushed to the police authority well in time. As such, even it cannot be held that the petitioner has abused and insulted respondent No.2 in terms of Section 506 of the IPC.

Arun Thakur Vs State of Chhattisgarh on 10 July 2019

Vipul Lakhanpal Vs Pooja Sharma on 01 June 2015

Posted on December 12, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Single-judge bench held that husband has to pay maintenance even if wife is earning salary and he does not have salary. Just 15 pages. Read yourself.

Vipul Lakhanpal Vs Pooja Sharma on 01 June 2015

Asharam@Ashumal Vs The State of Rajasthan and Ors on 12 Apr 2014

Posted on December 4, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

A academic query was posed to the High Court in these batch of Revisions as follows.

The thrust of the accused-petitioners in their arguments is to the effect that if charges under POCSO Act, 2012 do not survive then the case from the Special Court ( Sessions Judge, Jodhpur District, Jodhpur, who is trying the cases of POCSO Act, 2012) may be transferred to the regular Sessions Court where presumption under Sections 29 and 30 of POCSO Act, 2012 will not be available against the petitioner and the accused-petitioners will be benefited accordingly.

And then after perusing provisions of POCSO Act, Juvenile Justice Act, IPC, the Court observed and ordered as follows:

It has been argued on behalf of accused Asharam@Ashumal that at the most his conduct may come within the definition of attempted fellatio and he cannot be charged for the offence of fellatio. The conduct of the accused asking the girl to suck his organ is called fellatio. Had the girl started sucking his organ, it would have been argued that it was her consensual act. Certainly the charge of attempt to fellatio is graver offence than the fellatio itself. So, the charge even if it relates to fellatio, it will cover the charge of attempted fellatio and the accused is not going to be prejudiced when the charge of fellatio has been framed against him in place of attempted fellatio. Some times the prosecutrix, who is a minor girl may hesitate to tell complete truth before the Investigating Officer and many a times it happens in such type of cases that the prosecutrix unfolds the complete truth only during the camera trial when she is assured that nobody will be able to cause any harm to her because of her statement. Hon’ble the Supreme Court has mandated that in cases of Section 304 B IPC, a charge of Section 302 IPC should also be framed against the accused and on the same logic, this Court hereby directs all the trial courts in Rajasthan that in all cases of attempt to commit rape, a charge for the offence of rape should also be framed against the accused so that, at the stage of conclusion of the trial, the Court may not have to undertake tedious process of amendment of charge and recalling the witnesses causing serious prejudice to the cause of justice in such cases.

Asharam@Ashumal Vs The State of Rajasthan and Ors on 12 Apr 2014

Citations : [2014 SCC ONLINE RAJ 1812], [2014 RLW 3 2596], [2014 WLC 4 481]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/83475160/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56ea742f607dba36cc74581c

Sambhaji and Ors vs Gangabai and Ors on 20 Nov 2008

Posted on December 4, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court held that. ‘a Civil/Trial Court can accept the written statement even after statutory time limit of 90 days‘, as prescribed under Order 8 Rule 1.

15. In the instance case the trial court proceeded on the erroneous premises that there was no scope to accept the written statement after 90 days. The High Court by the impugned order held that though it had power, no case was made out to accept the prayer. We have considered the grounds indicated by the appellants seeking acceptance of the written statement filed belatedly. They cannot be considered to be trivial or without substance. In the case of this nature where close relatives are litigants a liberal approach is called for. In the circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the High Court affirming the order passed by the trial court refusing acceptance of the written statement. The matter is not very complex. We request the trial court to complete trial of the suit within the period of six months. The appeal is allowed without any order as to costs.

Sambhaji and Ors Vs Gangabai and Ors on 20 Nov 2008

Citations : [2009 ELT SC 240 1612008 AIR SC SUPP 7672008 SUPREME 8 7142008 SCC 17 1172009 BOMCR SC 1 812008 JT 13 442008 SCALE 15 5222008 AIOL 13332008 SLT 9 2982009 ALLMR SC 1 9212008 SCR 16 4692009 ELT 240 161]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/90423/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae73e4b0149711413e98

Rajaram Prasad Yadav Vs State of Bihar and Anr on 4 Jul 2013

Posted on November 23, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court passed these guidelines when a witness is called or recalled for evidence.

a) Whether the Court is right in thinking that the new evidence is needed by it? Whether the evidence sought to be led in under Section 311 is noted by the Court for a just decision of a case?
b) The exercise of the widest discretionary power under Section 311 Cr.P.C. should ensure that the judgment should not be rendered on inchoate,
inconclusive speculative presentation of facts, as thereby the ends of justice would be defeated.
c) If evidence of any witness appears to the Court to be essential to the just decision of the case, it is the power of the Court to summon and examine or recall and re-examine any such person.
d) The exercise of power under Section 311 Cr.P.C. should be resorted to only with the object of finding out the truth or obtaining proper proof for
such facts, which will lead to a just and correct decision of the case.
e) The exercise of the said power cannot be dubbed as filling in a lacuna in a prosecution case, unless the facts and circumstances of the case make it
apparent that the exercise of power by the Court would result in causing serious prejudice to the accused, resulting in miscarriage of justice.
f) The wide discretionary power should be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily.
g) The Court must satisfy itself that it was in every respect essential to examine such a witness or to recall him for further examination in order to
arrive at a just decision of the case.
h) The object of Section 311 Cr.P.C. simultaneously imposes a duty on the Court to determine the truth and to render a just decision.
i) The Court arrives at the conclusion that additional evidence is necessary, not because it would be impossible to pronounce the judgment without it, but because there would be a failure of justice without such evidence being considered.
j) Exigency of the situation, fair play and good sense should be the safe guard, while exercising the discretion. The Court should bear in mind that no party in a trial can be foreclosed from correcting errors and that if proper evidence was not adduced or a relevant material was not brought on record due to any inadvertence, the Court should be magnanimous in permitting such mistakes to be rectified.
k) The Court should be conscious of the position that after all the trial is basically for the prisoners and the Court should afford an opportunity to them in the fairest manner possible. In that parity of reasoning, it would be safe to err in favour of the accused getting an opportunity rather than protecting the prosecution against possible prejudice at the cost of the accused. The Court should bear in mind that improper or capricious exercise of such a discretionary power, may lead to undesirable results.
l) The additional evidence must not be received as a disguise or to change the nature of the case against any of the party.
m) The power must be exercised keeping in mind that the evidence that is likely to be tendered, would be germane to the issue involved and also
ensure that an opportunity of rebuttal is given to the other party.
n) The power under Section 311 Cr.P.C. must therefore, be invoked by the Court only in order to meet the ends of justice for strong and valid reasons and the same must be exercised with care, caution and circumspection. The Court should bear in mind that fair trial entails the interest of the accused, the victim and the society and, therefore, the grant of fair and proper opportunities to the persons concerned, must be ensured being a constitutional goal, as well as a human right.

Rajaram Prasad Yadav Vs State of Bihar and Anr on 4 Jul 2013

Citations : [2013 AD SC 8 583], [2013 AIR SC 3081], [2013 JLJR 3 447], [2013 JCC 3 2179], [2013 JT SC 11 118], [2013 NCC 2 582], [2013 PLJR 4 34], [2013 RCR CRIMINAL 3 726], [2013 SCALE 8 316], [2013 SCC 14 461], [2013 SCR 7 420], [2013 UC 3 1631], [2014 SCC CRI 4 256], [2013 SCC ONLINE SC 577], [2013 AIC 128 29], [2013 AIR SC 0 4179], [2013 AIR SC 1746], [2013 CRLJ SC 3777], [2013 SLT 6 571], [2013 SUPREME 4 621], [2013 AIOL 432], [2013 KCCR SN 4 396], [2013 SCJ 7 986], [2013 BOMCR CRI SC 4 35], [2013 AIR SCW 0 4179]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/3583407/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af2be4b0149711415b41

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Legal Procedure Explained – Interpretation of Statutes

Namathoti Sankaramma Vs State of A.P. and Ors on 15 Sep 2000

Bhushan Kumar and Anr Vs State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 4 April 2012

Bhagirath Vs Delhi Administration on 16 April, 1985

Ganga Kumar Srivastava Vs The State of Bihar on 20 Jul 2005

Kamlesh Kumar Vs Girish Kapoor and Anr on 12 Apr 1984

Arun Thakur Vs State of Chhattisgarh on 10 July 2019

Vipul Lakhanpal Vs Pooja Sharma on 01 June 2015

Asharam@Ashumal Vs The State of Rajasthan and Ors on 12 Apr 2014

Sambhaji and Ors vs Gangabai and Ors on 20 Nov 2008

Rajaram Prasad Yadav Vs State of Bihar and Anr on 4 Jul 2013