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Tag: Legal Procedure Explained – Interpretation of Statutes

Satprakash Meena Vs Alka Meena on 07 Jul 2021

Posted on July 9, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

The single-judge bench of Prathiba M. Singh held out a passionate appeal to Union Government to implement long pending Article 44 of the Constitution of India, Uniform Civil Code for all.

From Para 50,

50. Courts have been repeatedly confronted with the conflicts that arise in personal laws. Persons belonging to various communities, castes and religions, who forge marital bonds, struggle with such conflicts. It is with the hope of bringing uniformity and to eliminate these struggles and conflicts, that the Supreme Court way back in 1985, in Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum and Ors, (1985) 2 SCC 556 observed:
“32. It is also a matter of regret that Article 44 of our Constitution has remained a dead letter. It provides that “The State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India”. There is no evidence of any official activity for framing a common civil code for the country. A belief seems to have gained ground that it is for the Muslim community to take a lead in the matter of reforms of their personal law. A common Civil Code will help the cause of national integration by removing disparate loyalties to laws which have conflicting ideologies. No community is likely to bell the cat by making gratuitous concessions on this issue. It is the State which is charged with the duty of securing a uniform civil code for the citizens of the country and, unquestionably, it has the legislative competence to do so. A counsel in the case whispered, somewhat audibly, that legislative competence is one thing, the political courage to use that competence is quite another. We understand the difficulties involved in bringing persons of different faiths and persuasions on a common platform. But, a beginning has to be made if the Constitution is to have any meaning. Inevitably, the role of the reformer has to be assumed by the courts because, it is beyond the endurance of sensitive minds to allow injustice to be suffered when it is so palpable. But piecemeal attempts of courts to bridge the gap between personal laws cannot take the place of a common Civil Code. Justice to all is a far more satisfactory way of dispensing justice than justice from case to case.”

From Para 51,

51. Again in Ms Jordon Diengdeh v. S.S. Chopra, (1985) 3 SCC 62, the Supreme Court observed in the context of dissolution of marriage between a couple wherein the wife belong to the Naga Tribe and the husband was a Sikh by religion that Article 44 of the Constitution needs to be implemented in its letter and spirit. The Supreme Court notices the various provisions under the personal laws applicable to marriages under the Hindu Marriage Act, Special Marriage Act, Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, Muslim Law etc. The Court then concluded and observed as under:-
“7. It is thus seen that the law relating to judicial separation, divorce and nullity of marriage is far, far from uniform. Surely the time has now come for a complete reform of the law of marriage and make a uniform law applicable to all people irrespective of religion or caste. It appears to be necessary to introduce irretrievable breakdown of marriage and mutual consent as grounds of divorce in all cases. The case before us is an illustration of a case where the parties are bound together by a marital tie which is better untied. There is no point or purpose to be served by the continuance of a marriage which has so completely and signally broken down. We suggest that the time has come for the intervention of the legislature in these matters to provide for a uniform code of marriage and divorce and to provide by law for a way out of the unhappy situations in which couples like the present have found themselves in. We direct that a copy of this order may be forwarded to the Ministry of Law and Justice for such action as they may deem fit to take. In the meanwhile, let notice go to the respondents.”

From Para 52,

52. The decisions in Shah Bano (supra) and Ms Jordon Diengdeh (supra) were rendered way back in 1985 and more than 35 years have been passed. The Supreme Court had expressed hope and observed that the time has come for enacting a uniform code of marriage and divorce and urged for a ‘complete reform’. These very sentiments have been again reiterated in Sarla Mudgal Vs. UOI AIR 1995 SC 1531 and Lily Thomas (2000) 6 SCC 224.

From Para 53,

53. In John Vallamattom and Another v. Union of India, (2003) 6 SCC 611, the Supreme Court considered Sarla Mudgal (supra) and further observed:
“44. Before I part with the case, I would like to state that Article 44 provides that the State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India. The aforesaid provision is based on the premise that there is no necessary connection between religious and personal law in a civilized society. Article 25 of the Constitution confers freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion. The aforesaid two provisions viz. Articles 25 and 44 show that the former guarantees religious freedom whereas the latter divests religion from social relations and personal law. It is no matter of doubt that marriage, succession and the like matters of a secular character cannot be brought within the guarantee enshrined under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. Any legislation which brings succession and the like matters of secular character within the ambit of Articles 25 and 26 is a suspect legislation, although it is doubtful whether the American doctrine of suspect legislation is followed in this country. In Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India [(1995) 3 SCC 635: 1995 SCC (Cri) 569] it was held that marriage, succession and like matters of secular character cannot be brought within the guarantee enshrined under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. It is a matter of regret that Article 44 of the Constitution has not been given effect to. Parliament is still to step in for framing a common civil code in the country. A common civil code will help the cause of national integration by removing the contradictions based on ideologies.”

From Para 54,

54. The need for a Uniform Code has been again echoed by the Supreme Court in ABC v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2015) 10 SCC 1, wherein it was held:
“20. It is imperative that the rights of the mother must also be given due consideration. As Ms Malhotra, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, has eloquently argued, the appellant’s fundamental right of privacy would be violated if she is forced to disclose the name and particulars of the father of her child. Any responsible man would keep track of his offspring and be concerned for the welfare of the child he has brought into the world; this does not appear to be so in the present case, on a perusal of the pleading as they presently portray. Furthermore, Christian unwed mothers in India are disadvantaged when compared to their Hindu counterparts, who are the natural guardians of their illegitimate children by virtue of their maternity alone, without the requirement of any notice to the putative fathers. It would be apposite for us to underscore that our directive principles envision the existence of a Uniform Civil Code, but this remains an unaddressed constitutional expectation.”

From Para 55,

55. Recently, in Jose Paulo Coutinho v. Maria Luiza Valentina Pereira and Another, (2019) 20 SCC 85, the Supreme Court observed:
“..24. It is interesting to note that whereas the Founders of the Constitution in Article 44 in Part IV dealing with the Directive Principles of State Policy had hoped and expected that the State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a Uniform Civil Code throughout the territories of India, till date no action has been taken in this regard. Though Hindu laws were codified in the year 1956, there has been no attempt to frame a Uniform Civil Code applicable to all citizens of the country despite exhortations of this Court in Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum [Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, (1985) 2 SCC 556 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 245] and Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India [Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India, (1995) 3 SCC 635 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 569] .”

From Para 56, a slipper shot to all opponents of UCC

56. The backdrop of all the above decisions and the crux of Art. 44 of the Constitution is well captured in the Constituent Assembly Debates. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar while debating on Article 35 (now Article 44 of the Constitution of India) [Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume 7, 23rd November 1948] said:
“My friend, Mr. Hussain Imam, in rising to support the amendments, asked whether it was possible and desirable to have a uniform Code of laws for a country so vast as this is. Now I must confess that I was very much surprised at that statement, for the simple reason that we have in this country a uniform code of laws covering almost every aspect of human relationship. We have a uniform and complete Criminal Code operating throughout the country, which is contained in the Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code. We have the Law of Transfer of Property, which deals with property relations and which is operative throughout the country. Then there are the Negotiable Instruments Acts: and I can cite innumerable enactments which would prove that this country has practically a Civil Code, uniform in its content and applicable to the whole of the country. The only province the Civil Law has not been able to invade so far is Marriage and Succession. It is this little corner which we have not been able to invade so far and it is the intention of those who desire to have article 35 as part of the Constitution to bring about that change. Therefore, the argument whether we should attempt such a thing seems to me somewhat misplaced for the simple reason that we have, as a matter of fact, covered the whole lot of the field which is covered by a uniform Civil Code in this country. It is therefore too late now to ask the question whether we could do it. As I say, we have already done it.”

And finally from Para 57,

57. The need for a Uniform Civil Code as envisioned under Article 44, has been reiterated from time to time by the Supreme Court. Cases like the present one repeatedly highlight the need for such a Code – ‘common to all’, which would enable uniform principles being applied in respect of aspects such as marriage, divorce, succession etc., so that settled principles, safeguards and procedures can be laid down and citizens are not made to struggle due to the conflicts and contradictions in various personal laws. In modern Indian society which is gradually becoming homogenous, the traditional barriers of religion, community and caste are slowly dissipating. The youth of India belonging to various communities, tribes, castes or religions who solemnise their marriages ought not to be forced to struggle with issues arising due to conflicts in various personal laws, especially in relation to marriage and divorce. The hope expressed in Article 44 of the Constitution that the State shall secure for its citizens Uniform Civil Code ought not to remain a mere hope. The Supreme Court had, in 1985 directed that the judgment in Ms. Jordon Diengdeh (supra) to be placed before the Ministry of Law to take appropriate steps. However, more than three decades have passed since then and it is unclear as to what steps have been taken in this regard till date. Accordingly, let the copy of the present judgment be communicated to the Secretary, Ministry of Law & Justice, Government of India, for necessary action as deemed appropriate.

Satprakash Meena Vs Alka Meena on 07 Jul 2021

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/106393931/

Posted in High Court of Delhi Judgment or Order or Notification | Tagged 1-Judge Bench Decision Article 44 of The Constitution of India Catena of Landmark Judgments Referred/Cited to Landmark Case Legal Procedure Explained - Interpretation of Statutes Satprakash Meena Vs Alka Meena Uniform Civil Code for the Citizens of India | Leave a comment

Udai Shankar Awasthi Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 09 Jan 2013

Posted on July 9, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A Division Bench of the Apex Court quash the complaint case filed against the appellants and while doing to enunciated and reiterated lot of legal principles supported by case laws.

From Para 6,

LIMITATION IN CRIMINAL CASES- Section 468 Cr.P.C.:
6. Section 468 Cr.P.C. places an embargo upon court from taking cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the limitation period provided therein. Section 469 prescribes when the period of limitation begins. Section 473 enables the court to condone delay, provided that the court is satisfied with the explanation furnished by the prosecution/complainant, and where, in the interests of justice, extension of the period of limitation is called for. The principle of condonation of delay is based on the general rule of the criminal justice system which states that a crime never dies, as has been
explained by way of the legal maxim, nullum tempus aut locus occurrit regi (lapse of time is no bar to the Crown for the purpose of it initiating proceeding against offenders). A criminal offence is considered as a wrong against the State and also the society as a whole, even though the same has been committed against an individual.

From Para 7, regd delay in registering a complaint

7. The question of delay in launching a criminal prosecution may be a circumstance to be taken into consideration while arriving at a final decision, however, the same may not itself be a ground for dismissing the complaint at the threshold. Moreover, the issue of limitation must be examined in light of the gravity of the charge in question.

From Para 8, regd while condoning delay has to record the reasons

8. The court, while condoning delay has to record the reasons for its satisfaction, and the same must be manifest in the order of the court itself. The court is further required to state in its conclusion, while condoning such delay, that such condonation is required in the interest of justice.

From Para 10,

CONTINUING OFFENCE:
10. Section 472 Cr.P.C. provides that in case of a continuing offence, a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment of the time period during which the offence continues. The expression, ‘continuing offence’ has not been defined in the Cr.P.C. because it is one of those expressions which does not have a fixed connotation, and therefore, the formula of universal application cannot be formulated in this respect.

From Para 16,

16. Thus, in view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that, in the case of a continuing offence, the ingredients of the offence continue, i.e., endure even after the period of consummation, whereas in an instantaneous offence, the offence takes place once and for all i.e. when the same actually takes place. In such cases, there is no continuing offence, even though the damage resulting from the injury may itself continue.

From Para

SECOND COMPLAINT ON SAME FACTS-MAINTAINABILITY:
17. While considering the issue at hand in Shiv Shankar Singh v. State of Bihar & Anr., (2012) 1 SCC 130, this Court, after considering its earlier judgments in Pramatha Nath Talukdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar AIR 1962 SC 876; Jatinder Singh & Ors. v. Ranjit Kaur AIR 2001 SC 784; Mahesh Chand v. B. Janardhan Reddy & Anr., AIR 2003 SC 702; Poonam Chand Jain & Anr. v. Fazru AIR 2005 SC 38 held:
“It is evident that the law does not prohibit filing or entertaining of the second complaint even on the same facts provided the earlier complaint has been decided on the basis of insufficient material or the order has been passed without understanding the nature of the complaint or the complete facts could not be placed before the court or where the complainant came to know certain facts after disposal of the first complaint which could have tilted the balance in his favour. However, second complaint would not be maintainable wherein the earlier complaint has been disposed of on full consideration of the case of the complainant on merit.”

From Para 28,

28. Approaching the court at a belated stage for a rightful cause, or even for the violation of the fundamental rights, has always been considered as a good ground for its rejection at the threshold. The ground taken by the learned counsel for respondent No. 2 that the cause of action arose on 20.10.2009 and 5.11.2009, as the appellants refused to return money and other materials, articles and record, does not have substance worth consideration. In case a representation is made by the person aggrieved and the same is rejected by the competent statutory authority, and such an order is communicated to the person aggrieved, making repeated representations will not enable the party to explain the delay.


Citations : [2013 SCALE 1 212], [2013 JT 1 539], [2013 JCC SC 1 711], [2013 SCC 2 435], [2013 SUPREME 1 590], [2013 AIOL 18], [2013 SLT 1 249], [2013 CRIMES SC 1 231], [2013 SCC CIV 1 1121], [2013 SCC CRI 2 708], [2013 SCC ONLINE SC 41], [2013 AIC 123 137], [2013 UC 1 449], [2013 ACR 1 689], [2013 BLJ 3 28], [2013 NCC 1 549], [2013 AD SC 1 537], [2013 JLJR 1 235], [2013 RCR CRIMINAL 2 503], [2013 SCR 3 935], [2013 MLJ CRI 1 462], [2013 JCC 1 711], [2013 MLJ CRL 1 462], [2013 JT SC 1 539]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/39425468/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af3fe4b0149711415eef

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/udai-shankar-awasthi-vs-state-of-u-p-anr


The High Court judgment is here.

Posted in Supreme Court of India Judgment or Order or Notification | Tagged 2-Judge (Division) Bench Decision Catena of Landmark Judgments Referred/Cited to CrPC 468 - Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation CrPC 472 - Continuing offence Landmark Case Legal Procedure Explained - Interpretation of Statutes Reportable Judgement or Order Udai Shankar Awasthi Vs State of U.P. and Anr | Leave a comment

State of Himachal Pradesh Vs Tara Dutt and Anr on 19 Nov 1999

Posted on July 9, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A 3-judge full bench of Apex Court held that the limitation available under section 468 CrPC deals only with taking of the initial cognizance of an offence by a Court.

Indiankanoon version:

State of Himachal Pradesh Vs Tara Dutt and Anr on 19 November, 1999

Casemine version:

State of H.P Vs Tara Dutt and Anr on 19 Nov 1999

Citations : [1999 ACR SC 3 2841], [2000 AIR SC 297], [2000 ALD CRI 2 278], [1999 JT SC 9 215], [2000 LW CRL 1 379], [2000 OLR 1 153], [2000 RCR CRIMINAL 1 41], [1999 SCALE 7 183], [2000 SCC 1 230], [1999 SUPP SCR 4 514], [2000 SCC CRI 125], [2000 AIR SC 207], [1999 SUPREME 9 421], [1999 AIR SC 4413], [2000 CRIMES SC 1 15], [1999 CCR 4 280], [1999 SLT 9 612], [2000 SRJ 1 79], [2000 JCC 1 121], [2000 UJ SC 1 498], [2000 CRLJ SC 485], [1999 AIR SCW 4413]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1807975/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad5ae4b0149711411286

Posted in Supreme Court of India Judgment or Order or Notification | Tagged 3-Judge (Full) Bench Decision CrPC 468 - Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation Landmark Case Legal Procedure Explained - Interpretation of Statutes Reportable Judgement or Order State of Himachal Pradesh Vs Tara Dutt and Anr | Leave a comment

Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya and Ors Vs State of Gujarat and Anr on 16 Oct 2019

Posted on June 28, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A landmark judgment by a Full Bench of Supreme Court of India around the question,

From Para 9,

whether, after a charge-sheet is filed by the police, the Magistrate has the power to order further investigation, and if so, up to what stage of a criminal proceeding.

From Para 25,

25. Whereas it is true that Section 156(3) remains unchanged even after the 1973 Code has been brought into force, yet the 1973 Code has one very important addition, namely, Section 173(8), which did not exist under the 1898 Code. As we have noticed earlier in this judgment, Section 2(h) of the 1973 Criminal Procedure Code defines “investigation” in the same terms as the earlier definition contained in Section 2(l) of the 1898 Criminal Procedure Code with this difference – that “investigation” after the 1973 Code has come into force will now include all the proceedings under the CrPC for collection of evidence conducted by a police officer. “All” would clearly include proceedings under Section 173(8) as well. Thus, when Section 156(3) states that a Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order “such an investigation”, such Magistrate may also order further investigation under Section 173(8), regard being had to the definition of “investigation” contained in Section 2(h).

From Para 36,

36. Despite the aforesaid judgments, some discordant notes were sounded in three recent judgments. In Amrutbhai Shambubhai Patel v. Sumanbhai Kantibai Patel (2017) 4 SCC 177, on the facts in that case, the Appellant/Informant therein sought a direction under Section 173(8) from the Trial Court for further investigation by the police long after charges were framed against the Respondents at the culminating stages of the trial. The Court in its ultimate conclusion was correct, in that, once the trial begins with the framing of charges, the stage of investigation or inquiry into the offence is over, as a result of which no further investigation into the offence should be ordered. But instead of resting its judgment on this simple fact, this Court from paragraphs 29 to 34 resuscitated some of the earlier judgments of this Court, in which a view was taken that no further investigation could be ordered by the Magistrate in cases where, after cognizance is taken, the accused had appeared in pursuance of process being issued. In particular, Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy (supra) was strongly relied upon by the Court. We have already seen how this judgment was rendered without adverting to the definition of “investigation” in Section 2(h) of the CrPC, and cannot therefore be relied upon as laying down the law on this aspect correctly.

From Para 38,

38. There is no good reason given by the Court in these decisions as to why a Magistrate’s powers to order further investigation would suddenly cease upon process being issued, and an accused appearing before the Magistrate, while concomitantly, the power of the police to further investigate the offence continues right till the stage the trial commences. Such a view would not accord with the earlier judgments of this Court, in particular, Sakiri (supra), Samaj Parivartan Samudaya (supra), Vinay Tyagi (supra), and Hardeep Singh (supra); Hardeep Singh (supra) having clearly held that a criminal trial does not begin after cognizance is taken, but only after charges are framed. What is not given any importance at all in the recent judgments of this Court is Article 21 of the Constitution and the fact that the Article demands no less than a fair and just investigation. To say that a fair and just investigation would lead to the conclusion that the police retain the power, subject, of course, to the Magistrate’s nod under Section 173(8) to further investigate an offence till charges are framed, but that the supervisory jurisdiction of the Magistrate suddenly ceases mid-way through the pre-trial proceedings, would amount to a travesty of justice, as certain cases may cry out for further investigation so that an innocent person is not wrongly arraigned as an accused or that a prima facie guilty person is not so left out. There is no warrant for such a narrow and restrictive view of the powers of the Magistrate, particularly when such powers are traceable to Section 156(3) read with Section 156(1), Section 2(h), and Section 173(8) of the CrPC, as has been noticed hereinabove, and would be available at all stages of the progress of a criminal case before the trial actually commences. It would also be in the interest of justice that this power be exercised suo motu by the Magistrate himself, depending on the facts of each case. Whether further investigation should or should not be ordered is within the discretion of the learned Magistrate who will exercise such discretion on the facts of each case and in accordance with law. If, for example, fresh facts come to light which would lead to inculpating or exculpating certain persons, arriving at the truth and doing substantial justice in a criminal case are more important than avoiding further delay being caused in concluding the criminal proceeding, as was held in Hasanbhai Valibhai Qureshi (supra). Therefore, to the extent that the judgments in Amrutbhai Shambubhai Patel (supra), Athul Rao (supra) and Bikash Ranjan Rout (supra) have held to the contrary, they stand overruled. Needless to add, Randhir Singh Rana v. State (Delhi Administration) (1997) 1 SCC 361 and Reeta Nag v. State of West Bengal and Ors. (2009) 9 SCC 129 also stand overruled.

From Para 43,

43. We, therefore, set aside the impugned High Court judgment insofar as it states that post-cognizance the Magistrate is denuded of power to order further investigation.

Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya and Ors Vs State of Gujarat and Anr on 16 Oct 2019

Citations : [2019 SCC ONLINE SC 1346], [(2019) 17 SCC 1], [AIR 2019 SC 5233], [2020(1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 1], [(2019) 14 SCALE 1]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/131202146/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5da99d013321bc410549721e

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/vinubhai-haribhai-malaviya-and-ors-versus-the-state-of-gujarat-and-anr

 

Posted in Supreme Court of India Judgment or Order or Notification | Tagged 3-Judge (Full) Bench Decision Catena of Landmark Judgments Referred/Cited to CrPC 156(3) - Any Magistrate Empowered u/s 190 May Order Such an Investigation as above-mentioned CrPC 173(8) - Magistrate can Order Further Investigation Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman Landmark Case Legal Procedure Explained - Interpretation of Statutes Overruling Judgment Reportable Judgement or Order Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya and Ors Vs State of Gujarat and Anr | Leave a comment

Kishanvihari Sharma Vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors

Posted on June 28, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Two vital and interesting legal questions of interpretation have reached a Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High court.

On 09 Jun 2021,

The Court framed the questions that need determination

(1) As to whether the provision of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. can be invoked by accused alleging improper/delayed investigation or not ?
(2) As to whether the provision of Section 161 Cr.P.C. providing for examination of witnesses by the police can include examination of accused also or not, only for the purpose of ascertaining the truth and not for recording confession ?

Kishanvihari Sharma Vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors on 09 Jun 2021

On 24 Jun 2021,

Noting from the submissions of the rival counsels, the Bench held that there are conflicting decision from the Supreme Court on the legal points for determination and so opened up the questions to the entire Bar and sought assistance from the Bar Association.

Kishanvihari Sharma Vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors on 24 Jun 2021

On first week of Aug 2021,

Posted in High Court of Madhya Pradesh Judgment or Order or Notification | Tagged 2-Judge (Division) Bench Decision CrPC 156(3) - Any Magistrate Empowered u/s 190 May Order Such an Investigation as above-mentioned CrPC 161 - Examination of Witnesses By Police Kishanvihari Sharma Vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors Legal Procedure Explained - Interpretation of Statutes Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya and Ors Vs State of Gujarat and Anr Work-In-Progress Article | Leave a comment

S.Gopal Reddy Vs State of Andhra Pradesh on 11 Jul 1996

Posted on June 28, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

This a landmark judgment from a Division bench of the Supreme Court around section 2, 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act 1961.

Definition of Dowry and the offence of Demanding Dowry

The definition of the term ’dowry’ under Section 2 of the Act shows that any property or valuable security given or “agreed to be given” either directly or indirectly by one party to the marriage to the other party to the marriage “at or before or after the marriage” as a “consideration for the marriage of the said parties” would become ’dowry’ punishable under the Act. Property or valuable security so as to constitute ’dowry’ within the meaning of the Act must therefore be given or demanded “as consideration for the marriage”.

Section 4 of the Act aims at discouraging the very “demand” of “dowry” as a ’Consideration for the marriage’ between the parties thereto and lays down that if any person after the commencement of the Act, “demands”, directly or indirectly, from the parents or guardians of a ’bride’ or ’bridegroom’, as the case may be, any ’dowry’, he shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to Rs.5,000/- or with both.

Thus, it would be seen that section 4 makes punishable the very demand of property or valuable security as a consideration for marriage, which demand, if satisfied, would constitute the graver offence under section 3 of the Act punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years and with fine which shall not be less than fifteen thousand rupees or the amount of the value of such dowry whichever is more.

The definition of the expression ’dowry’ contained in Section 2 of the Act cannot be confined merely to the ’demand’ of money, property or valuable security ’made at or after the performance of marriage’ as is urged by Mr. Rao. The legislature has in its wisdom while providing for the definition of ’dowry’ emphasised that any money, property or valuable security given, as a consideration for marriage, ’before, at or after the marriage would be covered by the expression ’dowry’ and this definition as contained in Section 2 has to be read wherever the expression ’dowry’ occurs in the Act. Meaning of the expression ’dowry’ as commonly used and understood is different than the peculiar definition thereof under the Act. Under Section 4 of the Act, mere demand of ’dowry’ is sufficient to bring home the offence to an accused. Thus, any “demand” of money, property or valuable security made from the bride or her parents or other relatives by the bridegroom or his parents or other relatives or vice-versa would fall within the mischief of ’dowry’ under the Act where such demand is not properly referable to any legally recognised claim and is consideration of marriage. Marriage in this context would include a proposed marriage also more particularly where the non-fulfilment of the “demand of dowry” leads to the ugly consequence of the marriage not taking place at all. The expression ’dowry’ under the Act must be interpreted in the sense which the Statute wishes to attribute to it. Mr. P.P.Rao, learned senior counsel referred to various dictionaries for the meaning of ’dowry’, ’bride’ and ’bridegroom’ and on the basis of those meanings submitted that ’dowry’ must be construed only as such property, goods or valuable security which is given to a husband by and on behalf of the wife at marriage and any demand made prior to marriage would not amount to dowry. We cannot agree. Where definition has been given in a statute itself, it is neither proper nor desirable to look to the dictionaries etc. to find out the meaning of the expression. The definition given in the statute is the determinative- factor. The Act is a piece of social legislation which aims to check the growing menace of the social evil of dowry and it makes punishable not only the actual receiving of dowry but also the very demand of dowry made before or at the time or after the marriage where such demand is referable to the consideration of marriage. Dowry as a quid pro for marriage is prohibited and not the giving of traditional presents to the bride or the bride groom by friends and relatives. Thus, voluntary presents given at or before or after the marriage to the bride or the bridegroom, as the case may be, of a traditional nature, which are given not as a consideration for marriage but out of love, affection on regard, would not fall within the mischief of the expression ’dowry’ mare punishable under the Act.

On the point of Interpretation of Statutes

It is a well known rule of interpretation of statutes that the text and the context of the entire Act must be looked into while interpreting any of the expressions used in a statute. The courts must look to the object which the statute seeks to achieve while interpreting any of the provisions of the Act. A purposive approach for interpreting the Act is necessary. We are unable to persuade ourselves to agree with Mr. Rao that it is only the property or valuable security given at the time of marriage which would bring the same within the definition of ’dowry’ punishable under the Act, as such an interpretation would be defeating the very object for which the Act was enacted. Keeping in view the object of the Act, “demand of dowry” as a consideration for a proposed marriage would also come within the meaning of the expression dowry under the Act. If we were to agree with Mr. Rao that it is only the demand made at or after marriage which is punishable under Section 4 of the Act, Some serious consequences, which the legislature wanted to avoid, are bound to follow. Take for example a case where the bridegroom or his parents or other relatives make a ’demand’ of dowry during marriage negotiations and later on after bringing the bridal party to the bride’s house find that the bride or her parents or relative have not met the earlier ’demand’ and call off the marriage and leave the bride house should they escape the punishment under the Act. The answer has to be an emphatic ’no’. It would be adding insult to injury if we were to countenance that their action would not attract the provisions of Section 4 of the Act. Such an interpretation would frustrate the very object of the Act and would also run contrary to the accepted principles relating to the interpretation of statutes.

S.Gopal Reddy Vs State of Andhra Pradesh on 11 Jul 1996

Citations : [1996 AD SC 5 229], [1996 AIR SC 2184], [1996 ALD CRI 2 926], [1996 ALT CRI 2 418], [1996 BLJR 2 1329], [1996 CRILJ 3237], [1996 CRIMES SC 3 35], [1997 DMC SC 2 100], [1996 JT SC 6 268], [1996 RCR CRIMINAL 3 153], [1996 SCALE 5 78], [1996 SCC 4 596], [1996 SUPP SCR 3 439], [1996 SCC CRI 792], [1996 OLR SC 2 229]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1213429/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ace1e4b014971140fef2

Posted in Supreme Court of India Judgment or Order or Notification | Tagged 2-Judge (Division) Bench Decision Catena of Landmark Judgments Referred/Cited to DP Act 2 - Definition of Dowry DP Act 3(1) - Giving Taking or Abet to Give or Take is Crime DP Act 4 - Penalty for Demanding Dowry Landmark Case Legal Procedure Explained - Interpretation of Statutes PIL - Dowry Givers should be Prosecuted Reportable Judgement or Order S.Gopal Reddy Vs State of Andhra Pradesh | Leave a comment

Navendra Kumar Vs Union of India on 06 Nov 2013

Posted on May 19, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Gauhati High Court held in this Writ Appeal that, CBI to be an unconstitutional body.

Navendra Kumar Vs Union of India on 06 Nov 2013

Citations : [2013 SCC ONLINE GAU 305], [2014 GAU LR 1 529], [2014 AIC 133 743], [2013 CRI LJ 5009]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/133280611/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56eaac16607dba3c8ce40e16


The above Judgment and Order was stayed in 3 days time by a Division bench of Supreme Court.

Union of India Vs Navendra Kumar on 09 Nov 2013

Last update from Supreme Court website is this…

Union of India Vs Navendra Kumar on 26 Jun 2019
Posted in High Court of Gauhati Judgment or Order or Notification | Tagged 2-Judge (Division) Bench Decision CBI is Unconstitutional Landmark Case Law or Provision is Alleged as Unconstitutional Legal Procedure Explained - Interpretation of Statutes Navendra Kumar Vs Union of India | Leave a comment

Dwarika Prasad Satpathy Vs Bidyut Prava Dixit and Anr on 14 Oct 1999

Posted on May 13, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A Division bench of the Supreme Court held as follows,

“6………………In our view, validity of the marriage for the purpose of summary proceeding under Section 125 Cr.P.C. is to be determined on the basis of the evidence brought on record by the parties. The standard of proof of marriage in such proceeding is not as strict as is required in a trial of offence under section 494 of the I.P.C. If the claimant in proceedings under Section 125 of the Code succeeds in showing that she and the respondent have lived together as husband and wife, the Court can presume that they are legally wedded spouses, and in such a situation, the party who denies the marital status can rebut the presumption………………”

Dwarika Prasad Satpathy Vs Bidyut Prava Dixit and Anr on 14 Oct 1999

Citations : [1999 ACR SC 3 2547], [1999 AIR SC 3348], [1999 ALD CRI 2 955], [1999 ALR 37 733], [2000 ALT CRI 1 29], [1999 CALLT SC 3 61], [2000 CLT SC 89 167], [1999 GLH 2 1037], [1999 JT SC 8 329], [2000 LW CRL 1 218], [2000 PLJR 1 61], [2000 RLW SC 1 23], [1999 SCALE 6 579], [1999 SCC 7 675], [1999 SUPP SCR 3 684], [1999 SCC CRI 1345], [1999 SUPREME 8 602], [2000 CRLJ 0 1], [1999 RCR CRIMINAL 4 577], [2000 CRI LJ 0 1], [2000 OCR SC 18 348], [1999 AIR SC 3844], [2000 BOMCR CRI SC 731], [1999 CRIMES SC 3 206], [2000 LW CRL 1 217], [2000 CRLJ SC 1], [1999 AIR SCW 3844]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/305700/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad5ee4b0149711411339

Posted in Supreme Court of India Judgment or Order or Notification | Tagged 2-Judge (Division) Bench Decision CrPC 125 or BNSS 144 - Order for Maintenance of Wives Children and Parents CrPC 125 or BNSS 144 - Women In Live-In Relationships Entitled To Maintenance Dwarika Prasad Satpathy Vs Bidyut Prava Dixit and Anr IPC 494 - Marrying again during life-time of husband or wife Landmark Case Legal Procedure Explained - Interpretation of Statutes Reportable Judgement or Order | Leave a comment

Bhagwat Singh Vs Commissioner of Police and Anr on 25 Apr 1985

Posted on May 11, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Wonderful judgment clearly states how law takes care of scenarios where the Police do not investigate a complaint/FIR.

Rule-1

If, notwithstanding the First Information Report, the officer-in-charge of a police station decides not to investigate the case on the view that there is no sufficient ground for entering on an investigation, he is required under sub-section (2) of Section 157 to notify to the informant the fact that he is not going to investigate the case because it to be investigated.

Rule-2

Then again, the officer in charge of a police station is obligated under sub-section(2)(ii) of Section 173 to communicate the action taken by him to the informant and the report forwarded by him to the magistrate under subsection (2)(i) has therefore to be supplied by him to the informant.

Rule-3

Now, when the report forwarded by the officer-in charge of a police station to the Magistrate under sub-section (2)(i) of Section 173 comes up for consideration by the Magistrate, one of two different situations may arise. The report may conclude that an offence appears to have been committed by a particular person or persons and in such a case, the Magistrate may do one of three things:
(1) he may accept the report and take cognizance of the offence and issue process or
(2) he may disagree with the report and drop the proceeding or
(3) he may direct further investigation under sub-section (3) of Section 156 and require the police to make a further report.

Rule-4

The report may on the other hand state that, in the opinion of the police, no offence apppears to have been committed and where such a report has been made, the Magistrate again has an option to adopt one of three courses:
(1) he may accept the report and drop the proceeding or
(2) he may disagree with the report and taking the view that there is sufficient ground for proceeding further, take cognizance of the offence and issue process or
(3) he may direct further investigation to be made by the police under sub-section (3) of Section 156.

Opportunity of filing Protest Petition

We are accordingly of the view that in a case where the magistrate to whom a report is forwarded under sub-section (2)(i) of Section 173 decides not to take cognizance of the offence and to drop the proceeding or takes the view that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against some of the persons mentioned in the First Information Report, the magistrate must give notice to the informant and provide him an opportunity to be heard at the time of consideration of the report.

And finally,

It was urged before us on behalf of the respondents that if in such a case notice is required to be given to the informant, it might result in unnecessary delay on account of the difficulty of effecting service of the notice on the informant. But we do not think this can be regarded as a valid objection against the view we are taking, because in any case the action taken by the police on the First Information Report has to be  communicated to the informant and a copy of the report has to be supplied to him under sub-section (2) (i) of Section 173 if that be so, we do not see any reason why it should be difficult to serve notice of the consideration of the report on the informant. Moreover, in any event, the difficulty of service of notice on the informant cannot possibly provide any justification for depriving the informant of the opportunity of being heard at the time when the report is considered by the Magistrate.

Bhagwat Singh Vs Commissioner of Police and Anr on 25 Apr 1985

Citation : [1985 AIR SC 1285], [1985 SCALE 1 1194], [1985 SCC CRI 267], [1985 SCC 2 537], [1985 CRLJ SC 1179], [1985 CRIMES SC 1 994], [1985 SCR 3 942], [1986 ACR SC 10 26], [1986 AWC SC 26], [1985 BOMLR 87 421], [1985 PLJR 53], [1985 SHIMLC 260], [1985 UJ 17 820], [1985 CRI LJ 1521], [1985 UJ SC 820]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/118375/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac18e4b014971140e050

Posted in Supreme Court of India Judgment or Order or Notification | Tagged 3-Judge (Full) Bench Decision Bhagwat Singh Vs Commissioner of Police and Anr CrPC 154 - Information in Cognizable Cases CrPC 157 - Procedure for Investigation Preliminary Inquiry CrPC 173 - Report of Police Officer on Completion of Investigation Landmark Case Legal Procedure Explained - Interpretation of Statutes Reportable Judgement or Order | Leave a comment

R.Shaji Vs State of Kerala on 4 Feb 2013

Posted on April 17, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Lot of legal points explained with respect to the statements given by witnesses in Court in this landmark decision by a Division bench of Apex Court.

From Para 13,

13. Clause (iv) of Section 207 Cr.P.C. clearly provides that any statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., shall be made available to the accused along with all the other documents that have been filed along with the charge sheet.

From Para 14,

14. Evidence given in a court under oath has great sanctity, which is why the same is called substantive evidence. Statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. can be used only for the purpose of contradiction and statements under Section 164 Cr.P.C. can be used for both corroboration and contradiction. In a case where the magistrate has to perform the duty of recording a statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., he is under an obligation to elicit all information which the witness wishes to disclose, as a witness who may be an illiterate, rustic villager may not be aware of the purpose for which he has been brought, and what he must disclose in his statements under Section 164 Cr.P.C. Hence, the magistrate should ask the witness explanatory questions and obtain all possible information in relation to the said case.

From Para 15,

15. So far as the statement of witnesses recorded under Section 164 is concerned, the object is two fold; in the first place, to deter the witness from changing his stand by denying the contents of his previously recorded statement, and secondly, to tide over immunity from prosecution by the witness under Section 164. A proposition to the effect that if a statement of a witness is recorded under Section 164, his evidence in Court should be discarded, is not at all warranted.

From Para 16,

16. Section 157 of the Evidence Act makes it clear that a statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., can be relied upon for the purpose of corroborating statements made by witnesses in the Committal Court or even to contradict the same. As the defence had no opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses whose statements are recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., such statements cannot be treated as substantive evidence.

During the investigation, the Police Officer may sometimes feel that it is expedient to record the statement of a witness under Section 164 Cr.P.C. This usually happens when the witnesses to a crime are clearly connected to the accused, or where the accused is very influential, owing to which the witnesses may be influenced.

R.Shaji Vs State of Kerala on 4 Feb 2013

Citations : [2013 AIR SC 651], [2013 ALD CRI 2 153], [2013 CRIMES SC 1 217], [2013 JLJR 1 499], [2013 JT SC 2 447], [2013 KLJ 1 620], [2013 KERLT 1 493], [2013 PLJR 2 145], [2013 SCALE 2 186], [2013 SCC 14 266], [2013 SCR 3 1172], [2013 UC 1 673], [2014 SCC CRI 4 185], [2013 SCC ONLINE SC 114], [2013 SLT 1 705], [2013 SUPREME 1 545], [2013 AIOL 72], [2013 AIR SC 1095], [2013 CCR 1 494], [2013 KCCR SN 3 220], [2013 RAJ 1 435], [2013 RCR CRIMINAL SC 1 964], [2013 AIR SCW 1095], [2013 ALLMR CRI SC 1469]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/178895486/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af40e4b0149711415f37

Posted in Supreme Court of India Judgment or Order or Notification | Tagged 2-Judge (Division) Bench Decision CrPC 161 - Examination of Witnesses By Police CrPC 164 - Recording of Confessions and Statements Evidence Act 106 - Burden of Proving Fact Especially Within Knowledge Evidence Act 134 - Number of witnesses Evidence Act Sec 157 - Former statements of witness may be proved to corroborate later testimony as to same fact Legal Procedure Explained - Interpretation of Statutes R.Shaji Vs State of Kerala Reportable Judgement or Order Statements under Section 154 Cr.P.C. or under Section 161 Cr.P.C. or under Section 164 Cr.P.C. can be used for corroboration and contradictions only but NOT as Substantive Evidence | Leave a comment

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