Swaran Singh Vs State of Punjab on 26 Apr 2000

Posted on June 26, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

From the decision of the division bench of Supreme Court, this is the concurring opinion of Justice D.P. Wadhwa. Wonderful, indeed!

D.P Wadhwa, J. (concurring)— I agree with the judgment pronounced by my noble and learned sister Ruma Pal, J. I, however, wish to add a few lines.
35. The first information report was lodged within 2-1/2 hours of the occurrence and the case registered against four persons, namely, Shamsher Singh, Jagjit Singh, Amrik Singh and Mittar Pal Singh alias Lovely. These four accused were named in the FIR. While Shamsher Singh surrendered a day following the lodging of the FIR, no steps were taken to apprehend the other named accused. The case was not only investigated by Sub-Inspector Karnail Singh, SHO of the police station concerned but also by Mohinder Singh, DSP, Baldev Sharma, DSP, Sanjeev Gupta, SP (Detective) and B.P Tiwari, DIG (Crime). When challan was put up, it was only against Shamsher Singh. A criminal complaint was filed by the complainant and all the accused were committed to stand their trial in the Court of Session for various offences. In the course of the trial, more than 50 prosecution witnesses were given up having been won over and the case hinged on the statements of seven witnesses which led to the conviction of Shamsher Singh and Jagjit Singh by the trial court, upheld by the High Court and now affirmed by this Court. The questions that arise for consideration are as to why the police did not challan the accused Jagjit Singh and why over 50 witnesses should have been given up. It only shows that the criminal justice system is in doldrums. There has to be honest investigation uninfluenced by any political or other pressure.
36. A criminal case is built on the edifice of evidence, evidence that is admissible in law. For that, witnesses are required whether it is direct evidence or circumstantial evidence. Here are the witnesses who are a harassed lot. A witness in a criminal trial may come from a far-off place to find the case adjourned. He has to come to the court many times and at what cost to his own self and his family is not difficult to fathom. It has become more or less a fashion to have a criminal case adjourned again and again till the witness tires and gives up. It is the game of unscrupulous lawyers to get adjournments for one excuse or the other till a witness is won over or is tired. Not only is a witness threatened, he is abducted, he is maimed, he is done away with, or even bribed. There is no protection for him. In adjourning the matter without any valid cause a court unwittingly becomes party to miscarriage of justice. A witness is then not treated with respect in the court. He is pushed out from the crowded courtroom by the peon. He waits for the whole day and then he finds that the matter is adjourned. He has no place to sit and no place even to have a glass of water. And when he does appear in court, he is subjected to unchecked and prolonged examination and cross-examination and finds himself in a hapless situation. For all these reasons and others a person abhors becoming a witness. It is the administration of justice that suffers. Then appropriate diet money for a witness is a far cry. Here again the process of harassment starts and he decides not to get the diet money at all. High Courts have to be vigilant in these matters. Proper diet money must be paid immediately to the witness (not only when he is examined but for every adjourned hearing) and even sent to him and he should not be left to be harassed by the subordinate staff. If the criminal justice system is to be put on a proper pedestal, the system cannot be left in the hands of unscrupulous lawyers and the sluggish State machinery. Each trial should be properly monitored. Time has come that all the courts, district courts, subordinate courts are linked to the High Court with a computer and a proper check is made on the adjournments and recording of evidence. The Bar Council of India and the State Bar Councils must play their part and lend their support to put the criminal system back on its trail. Perjury has also become a way of life in the law courts. A trial Judge knows that the witness is telling a lie and is going back on his previous statement, yet he does not wish to punish him or even file a complaint against him. He is required to sign the complaint himself which deters him from filing the complaint. Perhaps law needs amendment to clause (b) of Section 340(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in this respect as the High Court can direct any officer to file a complaint. To get rid of the evil of perjury, the court should resort to the use of the provisions of law as contained in Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Citations : [2000 ACR SC 2 1648], [2000 AIR SC 2017], [2000 CRI LJ 2780], [2000 JT SC 6 623], [2000 RCR CRIMINAL 2 762], [2000 SCALE 4 153], [2000 SCC 5 668], [2001 SCC CRI 190], [2000 CRLJ 0 2780], [2001 SCC CR 0 190], [2000 AIR SC 1895], [2000 CRIMES SC 3 12], [2000 SUPREME 4 364], [2000 CRLJ 106 2780], [2000 CCR 2 149], [2000 SLT 4 138], [2000 SRJ 5 487], [2000 JCC SC 2 694], [2000 JT 6 623], [2000 CRIMES 3 12], [2000 RECENTCR 2 762], [2000 AIR SCW 1895], [2000 CRILJ 2780]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/489802/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad6ae4b0149711411587

Elizabeth Dinshaw Vs Arvand M.Dinshaw and Anr on 11 Nov 1986

Posted on June 21, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

The Division Bench of the Apex Court held as follows (in regards to Custody of Children):

8. Whenever a question arises before a court pertaining to the custody of a minor child, the matter is to be decided not on considerations of the legal rights of parties but on the sole and predominant criterion of what would best serve the interest and welfare of the minor. We have twice interviewed Dustan in our chambers and talked with him. We found him to be too tender in age and totally immature to be able to form any independent opinion of his own as to which parent he should stay with. The child is an American citizen. Excepting for the last few months that have elapsed since his being brought to India by the process of illegal abduction by the father, he has spent the rest of his life in the United States of America and he was doing well in school there. In our considered opinion it will be in the best interests and welfare of Dustan that he should go back to the United States of America and continue his education there under the custody and guardianship of the mother to whom such custody and guardianship have been entrusted by a competent court in that country. We are also satisfied that the petitioner who is the mother, is full of genuine love and affection for the child and she can be safely trusted to look after him, educate him and attend in every possible way to his proper upbringing. The child has not taken root in this country and he is still accustomed and acclimatized to the conditions and environments obtaining in the place of his origin in the United States of America. The child’s presence in India is the result of an illegal act of abduction and the father who is guilty of the said act cannot claim any advantage by stating that he has already put the child in some school in Pune. The conduct of the father has not been such as to inspire confidence in us that he is a fit and suitable person to be entrusted with the custody and guardianship of the child for the present.

Comity of Courts:

9. In Re H. (infants)1 the Court of Appeal in England had occasion to consider a somewhat similar question. That case concerned the abduction to England of two minor boys who were American citizens. The father was a natural-born American citizen and the mother, though of Scottish origin, had been resident for 20 years in the United States of America. They were divorced in 1953 by a decree in Mexico, which embodied provisions entrusting the custody of the two boys to the mother with liberal access to the father. By an amendment made in that order in December 1964, a provision was incorporated that the boys should reside at all times in the State of New York and should at all times be under the control and jurisdiction of the State of New York. In March 1965, the mother removed the boys to England, without having obtained the approval of the New York court, and without having consulted the father; she purchased a house in England with the intention of remaining there permanently and of cutting off all contacts with the father. She ignored an order made in June 1965, by the Supreme Court of New York State to return the boys there. On a motion on notice given by the father in the Chancery Division of the Court in England, the trial Judge Cross, J. directed that since the children were American children and the American court was the proper court to decide the issue of custody, and as it was the duty of courts in all countries to see that a parent doing wrong by removing children out of their country did not gain any advantage by his or her wrongdoing, the court without going into the merits of the question as to where and with whom the children should live, would order that the children should go back to America. In the appeal filed against the said judgment in the Court of Appeal, Willmer, L.J while dismissing the appeal extracted with approval the following passage from the judgment of Cross, J.‡:
“The sudden and unauthorised removal of children from one country to another is far too frequent nowadays, and as it seems to me, it is the duty of all courts in all countries to do all they can to ensure that the wrongdoer does not gain an advantage by his wrongdoing.

The courts in all countries ought, as I see it, to be careful not to do anything to encourage this tendency. This substitution of self-help for due process of law in this field can only harm the interests of wards generally, and a Judge should, as I see it, pay regard to the orders of the proper foreign court unless he is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that to do so would inflict serious harm on the child.”
10. With respect we are in complete agreement with the aforesaid enunciation of the principles of law to be applied by the courts in situations such as this.

Elizabeth Dinshaw Vs Arvand M.Dinshaw and Anr on 11 Nov 1986

Citations : [1987 SCC 1 42], [1987 SCR 1 175], [1987 CRIMES SC 1 71], [1986 SCALE 2 745], [1987 AIR SC 3], [1986 JT 1 795], [1987 SCC CRI 13]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/271434/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac23e4b014971140e22f

In Re Enforcement And Implementation of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 on 02 May 2005

Posted on June 14, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A full bench of Apex Court held as follows and passed directions to take steps to implement specific sections of DP Act 1961:

From Para 2,

2. Possibly, a social revolution is needed to put an end to the menace. Refusal by the bride’s father to pay dowry, refusal of the girls to get married if dowry is insisted upon and the attaching of a social stigma to those who demand dowry, can alone ultimately put an end to this system or at least reduce its prevalence. Obviously, the enactment of a law prohibiting this evil should go a long way in tackling the menace.

From Para 4,

4. There was a further amendment to the Act by Act 43 of 1986 making the provisions more stringent and enhancing the punishment for taking or abetting the taking of dowry. In spite of all this, it was seen that the enforcement of the provisions of the Act was thoroughly unsatisfactory and this is reflected by the filing of this Writ Petition in this Court, in public interest.

From Para 8,

8. In the context of the developments that have taken place, it is submitted by the amicus curiae appointed by this Court that no serious effort has been made to implement the provisions of the Act and the Rules and unless directions are issued by this Court it is highly unlikely that the provisions of the Act and the Rules will be effectively implemented. It is, therefore, submitted that this Court may direct the Central Government and the State Governments to give wide publicity to the relevant provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and Rules 2 and 3 of the Dowry Prohibition (Maintenance of Lists of presents to the Bride and Bridegroom) Rules, 1985 by appropriate means including educating the student community about the relevant provisions and the mandatory requirements of the Act and the Rules. It is further submitted that the State Governments may be directed to appoint sufficient number of Dowry Prohibition Officers with independent charge in each district of the concerned State, commensurate with the population of the District and to ensure that only dedicated and sincere officers are so appointed. It is submitted that directions may be issued to the Dowry Prohibition Officers to take immediate steps for strict enforcement and implementation of the provisions of Section 3, 4, 4A and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and Rules 2 and 3 of the Dowry Prohibition (Maintenance of Lists of presents to the Bride and Bridegroom) Rules, 1985.

From Para 10,

10. When there is failure on the part of the Executive to strictly implement a law like the one in question, enacted to tackle a social problem which has assumed menacing proportions, the Court has a duty to step in with a mandamus to direct its implementation rigorously and effectively. In that context, we find that it is necessary to step in and issue some more directions to the respondents in addition to incorporating the directions already issued by this Court by way of interim measure as part of this final judgment.

From Para 11,

11. Therefore, in addition to directing the respondents to implement all the interim directions which were issued in this case thus far, we further direct the Union of India and the States to take more effective steps to implement the provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 with particular reference to Sections 3 and 4 thereof and the various rules framed thereunder. In that process, they are also directed to activate the Dowry Prohibition Officers.

Closing comments:

12. The conscience of the society needs to be fully awakened to the evils of the dowry system so that the demand for dowry itself should lead to loss of face in the society for those who demand it. We have no doubt that our young and enlightened women would rise to the occasion to fight the evil which tends to make them articles of commerce. We also hope that our educated young males would refuse to be sold in the marriage market and come forward to choose their partners in life in a fair manner.
13. The establishment of a committed and sincere machinery to implement the Act and the Rules can hasten the eradication of the evil. The Union of India and the State Governments are directed to devise means to create honest, efficient and committed machinery for the purpose of implementation of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and the various Rules framed thereunder.

In Re Enforcement And Implementation Of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 on 02 May 2005

Citations : [2005 BOMCR 5 198], [2005 SUPREME 3 739], [2005 DLT SC 119 452], [2005 DMC SC 1 805], [2005 CRILJ 2598], [2005 CRLJ SC 2598], [2005 AIR SC 2375], [2005 JCR SC 3 170], [2005 JT SC 5 71], [2005 UJ SC 2 880], [2005 AIOL 241], [2005 SCC 4 565], [2005 SCALE 4 535], [2005 ALLMR SC 5 570], [2005 SCR 3 1020], [2005 BLJR 2 1285], [2005 SCC CRI 1163], [2005 CRI LJ 2598]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/899749/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae12e4b0149711412dda

https://www.legitquest.com/case/in-re-enforcement-and-implementation-of-dowry-prohibition-act-1961/18C

Rohitash Kumar and Ors Vs Om Prakash Sharma and Ors on 6 Nov 2012

Posted on June 13, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

Apex Court talks about Interpretation of Statutes:

Addition and Subtraction of words:
22. The Court has to keep in mind the fact that, while interpreting the provisions of a Statute, it can neither add, nor subtract even a single word. The legal maxim “A Verbis Legis Non Est Recedendum” means, “From the words of law, there must be no departure”. A section is to be interpreted by reading all of its parts together, and it is not permissible, to omit any part thereof. The Court cannot proceed with the assumption that the legislature, while enacting the Statute has committed a mistake; it must proceed on the footing that the legislature intended what it has said; even if there is some defect in the phraseology used by it in framing the statute, and it is not open to the court to add and amend, or by construction, make up for the deficiencies, which have been left in the Act. The Court can only iron out the creases but while doing so, it must not alter the fabric, of which an Act is woven. The Court, while interpreting statutory provisions, cannot add words to a Statute, or read words into it which are not part of it, especially when a literal reading of the same, produces an intelligible result. (Vide: Nalinakhya Bysack v. Shyam Sunder Haldar & Ors., AIR 1953 SC 148; Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1959 SC 459; M. Pentiah & Ors. v. Muddala Veeramallappa & Ors., AIR 1961 SC 1107; The Balasinor Nagrik Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Babubhai Shankerlal Pandya & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 849; and Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu & Ors., (2001) 7 SCC 71).
23. The Statute is not to be construed in light of certain notions that the legislature might have had in mind, or what the legislature is expected to have said, or what the legislature might have done, or what the duty of the legislature to have said or done was. The Courts have to administer the law as they find it, and it is not permissible for the Court to twist the clear language of the enactment, in order to avoid any real, or imaginary hardship which such literal interpretation may cause.
24. In view of the above, it becomes crystal clear that, under the garb of interpreting the provision, the Court does not have the power to add or subtract even a single word, as it would not amount to interpretation, but legislation.

Citations : [2013 AIR SC 30], [2013 ALD SC 1 135], [2013 ALR 96 825], [2013 AWC SC 2 1245], [2013 FLR 136 92], [2012 JT SC 11 219], [2012 SCALE 11 30], [2013 SCC 11 451], [2012 SCR 13 47], [2013 SCT SC 1 537], [2013 SLJ SC 1 27], [2013 SLJ SC 2 16], [2013 SCC L&S 3 368], [2012 SCC ONLINE SC 922], [2013 AIC 121 163], [2012 AIOL 508], [2012 SLT 8 316], [2012 SUPREME 7 696], [2012 LLN 5 83], [2012 SCJ 8 534], [2012 AIR SC 6157], [2012 CLT 4 325], [2013 KCCR SN 1 19], [2012 AIR SCW 6157]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/58524857/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af20e4b0149711415afe

State of Jharkhand and Anr Vs Govind Singh on 3 Dec 2004

Posted on June 13, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows:

10. When the words of a statute are clear, plain or unambiguous i.e they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences. The intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. (See J.P Bansal v. State of Rajasthan 2003 5 SCC 134.)
11. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. As was noted by the Privy Council in Crawford v. Spooner 1846 6 Moo PC 1:
“We cannot aid the legislature’s defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend and, by construction make up deficiencies which are left there.”
The view was reiterated by this Court in State of M.P v. G.S Dall and Flour Mills AIR 1991 SC 772 and State of Gujarat v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel JT 1998 2 SC 253. Speaking briefly, the court cannot reframe the legislation, as noted in J.P Bansal case for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate.
12. It is said that a statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting or construing a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature.
13. Interpretation postulates the search for the true meaning of the words used in the statute as a medium of expression to communicate a particular thought. The task is not easy as the “language” is often misunderstood even in ordinary conversation or correspondence. The tragedy is that although in the matter of correspondence or conversation the person who has spoken the words or used the language can be approached for clarification, the legislature cannot be approached as the legislature, after enacting a law or Act, becomes functus officio so far as that particular Act is concerned and it cannot itself interpret it. No doubt, the legislature retains the power to amend or repeal the law so made and can also declare its meaning, but that can be done only by making another law or statute after undertaking the whole process of law-making.

State of Jharkhand and Anr Vs Govind Singh on 3 Dec 2004

Citations : [2005 SCC CRI 1570], [2004 SCALE 10 174], [2005 CRIMES SC 1 49], [2005 AIR SC 294], [2005 SUPREME 1 477], [2005 SCC 10 437], [2004 JT SC 10 349]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1029488/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae07e4b0149711412c03

Nathi Devi Vs Radha Devi Gupta on 17 Dec 2004

Posted on June 13, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A 5-judge Constitutional Bench held as follows regarding when the need of interpreting a statute arises.

The interpretative function of the Court is to discover the true legislative intent. It is trite that in interpreting a statute the Court must, if the words are clear, plain, unambiguous and reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, give to the words that meaning, irrespective of the consequences. Those words must be expounded in their natural and ordinary sense. When a language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning no question of construction of statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself. Courts are not concerned with the policy involved or that the results are injurious or otherwise, which may follow from giving effect to the language used. If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the Courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. In considering whether there is ambiguity, the Court must look at the statute as a whole and consider the appropriateness of the meaning in a particular context avoiding absurdity and inconsistencies or unreasonableness which may render the statute unconstitutional.
It is equally well settled that in interpreting a statute, effort should be made to give effect to each and every word used by the Legislature. The Courts always presume that the Legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. A construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons such as obvious drafting errors. (See \026 State of U.P. and others vs. Vijay Anand Maharaj : AIR 1963 SC 946 ; Rananjaya Singh vs. Baijnath Singh and others : AIR 1954 SC 749 ; Kanai Lal Sur vs. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan : AIR 1957 SC 907; Nyadar Singh vs. Union of India and others : AIR 1988 SC 1979 ; J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of U.P. : AIR 1961 S.C. 1170 and Ghanshyam Das vs. Regional Assistant Commissioner, Sales Tax : AIR 1964 S.C. 766).
It is well settled that literal interpretation should be given to a statute if the same does not lead to an absurdity.

Nathi Devi Vs Radha Devi Gupta on 17 Dec 2004

Citations : [2005 AIR SC 648], [2005 DRJ SUPP 80 518], [2005 JCR SC 2 71], [2005 JT SC 1 1], [2005 KLT SC 1 443], [2005 SCC 2 271], [2005 DRJ SUPPL 80 518]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/641119/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609adf2e4b01497114129b9

Bai Tahira A Vs Ali Hussain Fissalli Chothia and Anr on 06 Oct 1978

Posted on May 29, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A full bench of Apex Court held that, a statutory right created as a projection of public policy can not be negated by a contract.

The last defence, based on mehar payment, merits more serious attention. The contractual limb of the contention must easily fail. The consent decree of 1962 resolved all disputes and settled all claims then available But here is a new statutory right created as a projection of public policy by the Code of 1973, which could not have been in the contemplation of the parties when in 1962, they entered into a contract to adjust their then mutual rights. No settlement of claims which does not have the special statutory right of the divorcee under s. 125 can operate to negate that claim.

Bai Tahira A Vs Ali Hussain Fissalli Chothia and Anr on 06 Oct 1978

Citations : [1979 SCC CRI 473], [1979 SCR 2 75], [1979 AIR SC 362], [1979 MPLJ SC 132], [1979 CRLJ SC 151], [1979 SCC 2 316]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/359354/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/575fd27f607dba63d7e69d57

Index is here.

MS Knit Pro International Vs State of NCT Delhi and Anr on 20 May 2022

Posted on May 23, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court referred to the Part II of the First Schedule of the Cr.P.C. to decide if a penal provision in any law is a cognizable or non-cognizable offence.

5.1 The short question which is posed for consideration before this Court is, whether, the offence under Section 63 of the Copyright Act is a cognizable offence as considered by the Trial Court or a non-cognizable offence as observed and held by the High Court.
5.2 While answering the aforesaid question Section 63 of the Copyright Act and Part II of the First Schedule of the Cr.P.C. are required to be referred to.
5.3 Thus, for the offence under Section 63 of the Copyright Act, the punishment provided is imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to three years and with fine. Therefore, the maximum punishment which can be imposed would be three years. Therefore, the learned Magistrate may sentence the accused for a period of three years also. In that view of the matter considering Part II of the First Schedule of the Cr.P.C., if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for three years and onwards but not more than seven years the offence is acognizable offence. Only in a case where the offence is punishable for imprisonment for less than three years or with fine only the offence can be said to be non-cognizable. In view of the above clear position of law, the decision in the case of Rakesh Kumar Paul (supra) relied upon by learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no.2 shall not be applicable to the facts of the case on hand. The language of the provision in Part II of First Schedule is very clear and there is no ambiguity whatsoever.

MS Knit Pro International Vs State of NCT Delhi and Anr on 20 May 2022

Citations :

Other Sources :

Prabha Tyagi Vs Kamlesh Devi on 12 May 2022

Posted on May 20, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court as follows,

From Para 52,

52. In view of the above discussion, the three questions raised in this appeal are answered as under:
“(i) Whether the consideration of Domestic Incidence Report is mandatory before initiating the proceedings under Domestic Violence Act, 2005 in order to invoke substantive provisions of Sections 18 to 20 and 22 of the said Act?” It is held that Section 12 does not make it mandatory for a Magistrate to consider a Domestic Incident Report filed by a Protection Officer or service provider before passing any order under the D.V. Act. It is clarified that even in the absence of a Domestic Incident Report, a Magistrate is empowered to pass both ex parte or interim as well as a final order under the provisions of the D.V. Act.
“(ii) Whether it is mandatory for the aggrieved person to reside with those persons against whom the allegations have been levied at the point of commission of violence?” It is held that it is not mandatory for the aggrieved person, when she is related by consanguinity, marriage or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family, to actually reside with those persons against whom the allegations have been levelled at the time of commission of domestic violence. If a woman has the right to reside in the shared household under Section 17 of the D.V. Act and such a woman becomes an aggrieved person or victim of domestic violence, she can seek reliefs under the provisions of D.V. Act including enforcement of her right to live in a shared household.
“(iii) Whether there should be a subsisting domestic relationship between the aggrieved person and the person against whom the relief is claimed?” It is held that there should be a subsisting domestic relationship between the aggrieved person and the person against whom the relief is claimed vis-à-vis allegation of domestic violence. However, it is not necessary that at the time of filing of an application by an aggrieved person, the domestic relationship should be subsisting. In other words, even if an aggrieved person is not in a domestic relationship with the respondent in a shared household at the time of filing of an application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act but has at any point of time lived so or had the right to live and has been subjected to domestic violence or is later subjected to domestic violence on account of the domestic relationship, is entitled to file an application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act.

Prabha Tyagi Vs Kamlesh Devi on 12 May 2022

Citations : [2022 SCC ONLINE SC 607]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/85317640/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/627eb23ab50db90fd1943198

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/prabha-tyagi-vs-kamlesh-devi

https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2022/05/18/right-residence-shared-household-actual-residence-domestic-violence-subsisting-domestic-relationship-supreme-court-india-judgments-legal-law-research-updates-news/

This decision (with respect to shared householding requirement in DV cases) overrules decision by Andhra Pradesh High Court here.

Index of DV Cases here.

Doongar Singh and Ors Vs The State Of Rajasthan on 28 Nov 2017

Posted on May 20, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court passed the following guidelines…

13. To conclude:
(i) The trial courts must carry out the mandate of Section 309 of the Cr.P.C. as reiterated in judgments of this Court, inter alia, in State of U.P. versus Shambhu Nath Singh and Others, Mohd. Khalid versus State of W.B. and Vinod Kumar versus State of Punjab.
(ii) The eye-witnesses must be examined by the prosecution as soon as possible.
(iii) Statements of eye-witnesses should invariably be recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. as per procedure prescribed thereunder.

Doongar Singh and Ors Vs The State Of Rajasthan on 28 Nov 2017

Citations : [2017 SCC ONLINE SC 1391], [2017 SCALE 13 752], [2018 SCC 13 741], [2019 SCC CRI 1 410], [2017 CTC 6 883], [2018 KLT 1 629], [2018 AIC 183 5], [2018 ECRN 1 667], [2017 AIR SC SUPP 328]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/99075271/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5a261fe74a9326744f39e37e

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Landmark Case

Swaran Singh Vs State of Punjab on 26 Apr 2000

Elizabeth Dinshaw Vs Arvand M.Dinshaw and Anr on 11 Nov 1986

In Re Enforcement And Implementation of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 on 02 May 2005

Rohitash Kumar and Ors Vs Om Prakash Sharma and Ors on 6 Nov 2012

State of Jharkhand and Anr Vs Govind Singh on 3 Dec 2004

Nathi Devi Vs Radha Devi Gupta on 17 Dec 2004

Bai Tahira A Vs Ali Hussain Fissalli Chothia and Anr on 06 Oct 1978

MS Knit Pro International Vs State of NCT Delhi and Anr on 20 May 2022

Prabha Tyagi Vs Kamlesh Devi on 12 May 2022

Doongar Singh and Ors Vs The State Of Rajasthan on 28 Nov 2017