Anshu Gupta Vs Adwait Anand on 09 Aug 2023

Posted on August 31, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge from High Court of Uttarakhand passed this Judgment declaring that mother is also liable to pay maintenance to minor child. Interesting…

From Paras 17-22,

17. The provisions of Section 125 (1) Cr.P.C. makes it clear that the liability to maintain a minor child is always on “any person”, if he has sufficient means neglects and refuses to maintain a minor child and such “person” is directed to give the monthly allowance as maintenance at the rate deemed fit to the Magistrate.
18. “The person” word denotes not only the male but a female gender and it cannot be said that such person can only qualify father and not the mother. Section 2 (y) of Cr.P.C. provides as under:- “(y) words and expressions used herein and not defined but defined in the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) have the meanings respectively assigned to them in that Code. ”
19. According to Section 2(y) of Cr.P.C., the words and expressions used in the Cr.P.C. but have not been defined in the Cr.P.C., shall have the same meanings assigned to them as defined in the Indian Penal Code. Section 8 of IPC is quoted hereunder:- “8. Gender.—The pronoun “he” and its derivatives are used of any person, whether male or female.”
20. This definition of gender gives an indication that “he” and its derivatives are used of any person whether male or female.
21. Under Section 11 of the IPC, the “person” has also been defined, which includes any company or Association or body of persons, whether incorporated or not.
22. From the meticulous examination of these words having been defined in the Indian Penal Code, it can safely be inferred that any “person” use in the provisions of section 125(1) Cr.P.C. includes both mother and father.

From Para 25,

25. It is clear from the aforesaid sub-Section (2) of Section 126 Cr.P.C. that there is no such word “father” or “husband” in the aforesaid sub-section, as it was there in the old Cr.P.C. Section 488 sub-Section (6). Now, in place of “father” or “husband”, “person” has been incorporated and it is provided that “all evidence to such proceedings shall be taken in the presence of the person against whom an order for payment of maintenance is proposed to be made……….” Thus, this case law is also of no help to the revisionist and the same is distinguished by this Court on the aforesaid reasons.

Finally from Para 28,

28. The provisions of Section 125 Cr.P.C. has already been changed, as discussed above and according to the language of the present Section 125 Cr.P.C., in the opinion of this Court “person” would include both male and female and in reference to a minor child whether legitimate or illegitimate mother or father having sufficient means if neglects and refuses to maintain such minor child would be held liable to pay the maintenance of such child.

Anshu Gupta Vs Adwait Anand on 09 Aug 2023

Citations:

Other Sources:

Om Prakash Sharma Vs State of MP on 25 Mar 2021

Posted on August 9, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench at Gwalior of Madhra Pradesh High Court held as follows,

From Para 5,

5. The aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court in Suresh Chand Jain & Sakiri Vasu (supra) have held the field till date which is evident from perusal of following subsequent verdict of Apex Court rendered after relying upon Sakiri Vasu with approval.

6. In the instant case, as informed by learned counsel for petitioner, no offence has yet been registered by the police. It is also informed that the concerned police station has not yet given any report to the learned Magistrate despite repeated reminders. It is also not denied that the learned Magistrate has not proceeded to record statement of the complainant u/S.200 Cr.P.C. Therefore, in sum and substance, the entire matter hangs fire and is in a state of suspended animation leaving the petitioner-complainant high and dry with no hope of justice coming his way.

From Para 9.1

9.1 Thus, it is incumbent upon the Magistrate u/S.156(3) Cr.P.C. to not only direct for registration of cognizable offence wherever it is found to be not registered by the Police but also to ensure that theinvestigation conducted by the police is fair, expeditious and without any element of prejudice towards anyone, with the sole object ofreaching the truth. The role of the Magistrate u/S.156(3) Cr.P.C. is thus of great significance. Prompt and appropriate exercise of poweru/S.156(3) Cr.P.C. can, not only bring succor to the victim but also to the society at large by bringing the delinquent to the book and in theprocess instilling enough fear in the mind of the miscreant so as to dissuade him from indulging in delinquency again.

From Paras 15-20

Law laid down:
(1) The guidelines laid down for the Magistrates for adjudication of application u/S.156(3) Cr.P.C. complaining about delayed/improper investigation filed along with complaint u/S.200 Cr.P.C.
(2) The complaint u/S.200 Cr.P.C. filed along with 156(3) application need not be kept pending owing to bar contained in Sec.210 Cr.P.C. for more than 60/90 days or any other longer period statutorily provided on expiry of which the police fails to file the final report u/S.173(1) Cr.P.C.
(3) On failure of police to file final report u/S.173(1) Cr.P.C. within 60/90 days or any other longer period statutorily provided, the Magistrate to prevent the complaint u/S.200 Cr.P.C. from suffering a state of stalemate, should proceed by invoking powers contained in Chapter XV and XVI Cr.P.C.
If during pendency of proceedings under Chapter XV and XVI Cr.P.C., invoked as above, Police files the final report then the final report and the complaint case both should proceed as if both have arisen out of police report.

Om Prakash Sharma Vs State of MP on 25 Mar 2021

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/55499395/

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/om-prakash-sharma-vs-state-of-m-p-and-another

Hazi Abdul Khaleque Vs Mustt Samsun Nehar on 20 Aug 1990

Posted on August 6, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge from Gauhati High Court held as follows,

From Paras 11, 12 and 13,

11. Under Chapter XXXII, Section 401 of the Code provides that. “Any money (other than a fine) payable by virtue of any order made under this Code, and the method of recovery of which is not otherwise expressly provided for, shall be recoverable as if it were a fine.” The proviso to section 431 is not relevant here. The order for payment of maintenance was an order under the code for payment of money, for the recovery of which no method had been expressly provided. Accordingly, under section 431 of the code, I think the maintenance; money could be recovered, as if it were fine.

12. Section 421 of the Code provides for recovery of fine and the procedure laid down for the purpose was by issue of warrant for attachment and sale of any movable property belonging to offender in this case the present petitioner (opposite party in the maintenance proceeding) or issue of warrant to the Collector of the District, authorising him to realise the amount as arrears of land revenue from the movable or immovable property, or both, of the defaulter: The provision to Section 421 clearly stipulates that “no such warrant shall be executed by the arrest or detention in prison of the offender.”

13. On consideration of the above provisions, there should be no doubt that for recovery of money as maintenance which has to be in accordance with the procedure for recovery of fine no warrant of arrest or detention of the petitioner could have been ordered. I, therefore think that the impugned order dated 1.9.89 was clearly erroneous and has to be set aside.

Hazi Abdul Khaleque Vs Mustt Samsun Nehar on 20 Aug 1990 (IndianKanoon Ver)

Hazi Abdul Khaleque Vs Mustt Samsun Nehar on 20 Aug 1990 (Casemine Ver)

Hazi Abdul Khaleque Vs Mustt Samsun Nehar on 20 Aug 1990 (LegalData Ver)

Citations: [1990 GAULR 2 328], [1991 CRLJ 1843], [1990 SCC ONLINE GAU 36], [1990 GAU LR 2 328], [1991 CRI LJ 1843]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1507653/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56eaaa49607dba3c8ce3ef96

https://legaldata.in/court/read/2541018

Moina Khosla Vs Amardeep Singh Khosla on 31 Jan 1986

Posted on July 26, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Delhi High Court held as follows,

From Paras 18 to 26,

18. Under Section 12 (1) (a), therefore, the requisite is that ordinary and complete sexual intercourse has not taken place between the parties owing to the impotence of the respondent. The words ‘impotence of the respondent’ would, to my mind, mean incapacity of the respondent to have sexual intercourse. The Supreme Court has said in Digvijay Singh v. Pratap Kumari, AIR 1970 SC 137, that “A party is impotent if his or her mental or physical condition makes consummation of the marriage a practical impossibility”.

19. As stated above, consummation means capacity to have ‘ordinary and complete sexual intercourse’. The above stated observation of the Supreme Court in AIR 1970 SC 137, therefore, must mean that a party is impotent if his or her mental or physical condition is such, that practically speaking, it is impossible for him or her to have ordinary and complete sexual intercourse. In the instant case it is instant case it is stated by the appellant in her deposition that the respondent was unable to have any, even a partial or incipient, sexual intercourse with the appellant.

20. Respondent has himself written in his diary Ex. PW1/2, that the is a Homosexual. The appellant has stated in her deposition that the respondent told her that he was a homosexual, that he was unable “to perform sexual intercourse with me and with females in general”. In other words, the respondent was incapable of having Hetrosexual intercourse with any woman.

21. As sexual intercourse essentially has two participants, it must be ordinary and complete for both the participants, individually, and together as a marital unit. For the man participant sexual intercourse is complete when he has an orgasm and for a woman participant sexual intercourse is complete when she has an orgasm (See Encyclopaedia Brittanica: 15th Ed: 1968; Macropaedia, Vol. 16, p. 594: Sexual Response).

22. No sexual intercourse has been taken place between the parties, there is no question is this case whether sexual intercourse was ordinary any complete.

23. In this case there is unrebutted evidence of the petitioner that no sexual intercourse has taken place between the parties. As no sexual intercourse has taken place between the parties, in this case, the requirements of Section 12(1) (a) of the Act are satisfied.

24. In the above view of the matter no purpose would be served by remitting the case back to the District Judge, as in my view, there is no reason why the statement given by the wife ought not to be accepted.

25. I am of the view that in view of her statement recorded in the court, the wife is entitled to a decree of nullity of marriage on the ground mentioned under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act and the judgment of the Additional District Judge needs to be set aside which is hereby set aside.

26. A decree of nullity of marriage is granted to the wife under section 12(1)(a) of the Hindu Marriage Act.

Indian Kanoon Version:

Moina Khosla Vs Amardeep Singh Khosla on 31 Jan 1986 (IK Version)

Casemine Version:

Moina Khosla Vs Amardeep Singh Khosla on 31 Jan 1986 (CM Version)

Supreme Today Version:

Moina Khosla Vs Amardeep Singh Khosla on 31 Jan 1986 (ST Version)

Legal Data Version:

Moina Khosla Vs Amardeep Singh Khosla on 31 Jan 1986 (LD Version)

Citations: [1986 DMC 2 65], [1986 DRJ 10 286], [1986 SCC ONLINE DEL 42], [1987 PLR DEL 91 12], [1986 AIR DELHI 399], [1986 ILR DELHI 2 659]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/913344/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/560909b5e4b01497111707b8

https://legaldata.in/court/read/6288

Deoki Panjhiyara Vs Shashi Bhushan Narayan Azad and Anr on 12 Dec 2012

Posted on July 24, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held that, Unless there is a declaration of nullity by a competent Court or authority, a aggrieved person can take advantage of benefits under DV Act.

From Para 19,

19. In the present case, if according to the respondent, the marriage between him and the appellant was void on account of the previous marriage between the appellant and Rohit Kumar Mishra the respondent ought to have obtained the necessary declaration from the competent court in view of the highly contentious questions raised by the appellant on the aforesaid score. It is only upon a declaration of nullity or annulment of the marriage between the parties by a competent court that any consideration of the question whether the parties had lived in a “relationship in the nature of marriage” would be justified. In the absence of any valid decree of nullity or the necessary declaration the court will have to proceed on the footing
that the relationship between the parties is one of marriage and not in the nature of marriage. We would also like to emphasise that any determination of the validity of the marriage between the parties could have been made only by a competent court in an appropriate proceeding by and between the parties and in compliance with all other requirements of law. Mere production of a marriage certificate issued under Section 13 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 in support of the claimed first marriage of the appellant with Rohit Kumar Mishra was not sufficient for any of the courts, including the High Court, to render a complete and effective decision with regard to the marital status of the parties and that too in a collateral proceeding for maintenance. Consequently, we hold that in the present case until the invalidation of the marriage between the appellant and the respondent is made by a competent court it would only be correct to proceed on the basis that the appellant continues to be the wife of the respondent so as to entitle her to claim all benefits and protection available under the DV Act, 2005.

Deoki Panjhiyara Vs Shashi Bhushan Narayan Azad and Anr on 12 Dec 2012

Citations: [2013 ALLMR CRI SC 1099], [2013 AIR SC 168], [2013 RCR CIVIL SC 2 400], [2013 AIR SC 346], [2013 SCC 2 137], [2013 RCR CRIMINAL SC 1 338], [2012 SCALE 12 282], [2013 CRLJ SC 684], [2012 AIOL 584], [2013 BOMCR CRI SC 1 333], [2012 SLT 9 266], [2013 SCC CIV 1 1019], [2012 SCC ONLINE SC 1035], [2013 GUJ LH 1 208], [2013 CTC 2 232], [2013 ECRN 1 913], [2013 ACR 1 1089], [2013 AD SC 3 59], [2013 AJR 2 133], [2013 AKR 1 615], [2013 ALD CRI 1 469], [2013 ALT CRI 3 70], [2013 ALT CRI 1 472], [2013 DMC SC 1 18], [2013 JLJR 1 198], [2012 JCC 1 502], [2013 JCC 1 508], [2012 JT SC 12 575], [2013 LW 2 60], [2013 LW CRL 1 330], [2013 NCC 1 322], [2013 OLR 1 891], [2013 PLJR 1 172], [2013 MLJ CRL 1 137]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/154350889/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af10e4b0149711415804

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/deoki-panjhiyara-vs-shashi-bhushan-narayan-azad-anr

Shilpa Sailesh Vs Varun Sreenivasan on 01 May 2023

Posted on May 6, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A Constitution Bench of 5 judges held as follows,

From Para 40,

40. In view of our findings recorded above, we are of the opinion that the decisions of this Court in Manish Goel (supra), Neelam Kumar (supra), Darshan Gupta (supra), Hitesh Bhatnagar (supra), Savitri Pandey (supra) and others have to be read down in the context of the power of this Court given by the Constitution of India to do ‘complete justice’ in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India. In consonance with our findings on the scope and ambit of the power under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India, in the context of matrimonial disputes arising out of the Hindu Marriage Act, we hold that the power to do‘complete justice’ is not fettered by the doctrine of fault and blame, applicable to petitions for divorce under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act. As held above, this Court’s power to dissolve marriage on settlement by passing a decree of divorce by mutual consent, as well as quash and set aside other proceedings, including criminal proceedings, remains and can be exercised.

From Para 41,

41. Lastly, we must express our opinion on whether a party can directly canvass before this Court the ground of irretrievable breakdown by filing a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. In Poonam v. Sumit Tanwar65, a two judges’ bench of this Court has rightly held that any such attempt must be spurned and not accepted, as the parties should not be permitted to file a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, or for that matter under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the High Court, and seek divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. The reason is that the remedy of a person aggrieved by the decision of the competent judicial forum is to approach the superior tribunal/forum for redressal of his/her grievance. The parties should not be permitted to circumvent the procedure by resorting to the writ jurisdiction under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution of India, as the case may be. Secondly, and more importantly, relief under Article 32 of the Constitution of India can be sought to enforce the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution of India, and on the proof of infringement thereof. Judicial orders passed by the court in, or in relation to, the proceedings pending before it, are not amenable to correction under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.66 Therefore, a party cannot file a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India and seek relief of dissolution of marriage directly from this Court. While we accept the said view, we also clarify that reference in Poonam (supra) to Manish Goel (supra) and the observation that it is questionable whether the period of six months for moving the second motion can be waived has not been approved by us.

Shilpa Sailesh Vs Varun Sreenivasan on 01 May 2023

Citations: [2023 SCC OnLine SC 544]

Other Sources:

Earlier Matter is here.

Index of Divorce judgments is here.

Jitendra Kumar Rode Vs Union of India on 24 Apr 2023

Posted on April 27, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court passed these guidelines, with respect to digitization of Court records in all High Courts as well as District Courts.

From Paras 39-42,

39. Before parting with the present leave petition another important issue must be dealt with, i.e. the digitization of records. Technology has, in the present time become increasingly enmeshed with the systems of dispute resolution and adjudication with the trends pointing leading to all the more interplay, both supplementary and complimentary between technology and law.
40. On 24.9.2021, the learned E-committee of the Supreme Court of India issued an SOP for digital preservation. Step by step implementation of the digitization process involves eighteen steps therein. Primarily, it requires all High Courts to establish Judicial Digital Repositories (JDR) as well as the
standardized system therefor; A digitisation cell at each of the High Courts is to be established to monitor the progress on day to day basis; It is the work of the cell to manage contracts with vendors for specialized services; an online data tracking system to keep track of the data transferred to the High Courts and to facilitate the receipts for each set of transferred records to the District Courts as well; District Courts to have backups
of all data transferred to the High Court on a monthly basis while maintaining an independent record thereof.
41. It cannot be doubted that had there been properly preserved records of the Trial Court, the issue in the present appeal as to whether the High Court could uphold a conviction having not perused the complete Trial Court record, would not have arisen. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that, in accordance with the SOP issued, private entities providing specialized service have been contracted, and therefore considering the importance and essentiality of such record, a robust system of responsibility and accountability must be developed and fostered in order to ensure the proper protection and regular updation of all records facilitating the smooth functioning of the judicial process.
42. Therefore, this Court finds it fit to issue the following directions:
1. The Registrar General of the High Courts shall ensure that in all cases of criminal trial, as well as civil suits, the digitization of records must be duly undertaken with promptitude at all District Courts, preferably within the time prescribed for filing an appeal within the laws of procedure.
2. The concerned District Judge, once the system of digitization along with the system of authentication of the digitized records is in place in their judgeship, to ensure that the records so digitized are verified as expeditiously as possible.
3. A continually updated record of Register of Records digitized shall be maintained with periodic reports being sent to the concerned High Courts for suitable directions.
4. Interlocutory application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

Jitendra Kumar Rode Vs Union of India on 24 Apr 2023

In Re Policy Strategy for Grant of Bail (Guidelines Issued) on 31 Jan 2023

Posted on April 4, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A 3-judge bench passed these directions, in relation to release of undertrial prisoners/convicts who were granted bail.

With a view to ameliorate the problems a number of directions are sought. We have examined the directions which we reproduce hereinafter with
certain modifications:
“1) The Court which grants bail to an undertrial prisoner/convict would be required to send a soft copy of the bail order by e-mail to the prisoner through the Jail Superintendent on the same day or the next day. The Jail Superintendent would be required to enter the date of grant of bail in the e-prisons software [or any other software which is being used by the Prison Department].
2) If the accused is not released within a period of 7 days from the date of grant of bail, it would be the duty of the Superintendent of Jail to inform the
Secretary, DLSA who may depute para legal volunteer or jail visiting advocate to interact with the prisoner and assist the prisoner in all ways possible for his release.
3) NIC would make attempts to create necessary fields in the e-prison software so that the date of grant of bail and date of release are entered by the Prison Department and in case the prisoner is not released within 7 days, then an automatic email can be sent to the Secretary, DLSA.
4) The Secretary, DLSA with a view to find out the economic condition of the accused, may take help of the Probation Officers or the Para Legal Volunteers to prepare a report on the socio-economic conditions of the inmate which may be placed before the concerned Court with a request to relax the condition (s) of bail/surety.
5) In cases where the undertrial or convict requests that he can furnish bail bond or sureties once released, then in an appropriate case, the Court may consider granting temporary bail for a specified period to the accused so that he can furnish bail bond or sureties.
6) If the bail bonds are not furnished within one month from the date of grant bail, the concerned Court may suo moto take up the case and consider whether the conditions of bail require modification/ relaxation.
7) One of the reasons which delays the release of the accused/ convict is the insistence upon local surety. It is suggested that in such cases, the courts
may not impose the condition of local surety.”
We order that the aforesaid directions shall be complied with.

In Re Policy Strategy for Grant of Bail (Guidelines Issued) on 31 Jan 2023

Pravasi Legal Cell Vs Union of India and Ors on 20 Mar 2023

Posted on March 28, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A full bench of Apex Court passed directions to all High Courts and States to setup online RTI portals in their respective territories…

From Paras 8-11,

8 We are of the view that such an exercise should be carried out by all the High Courts in the country no later than within a period of three months from the date of this order.
9 A certified copy of this order shall be remitted by the Registrar (Judicial) of this Court to all the Registrars General, who shall in turn, seek administrative directions from the learned Chief Justices for implementation.
10 The High Courts shall make adequate provisions to facilitate the supply of information through online web portals and for all incidental purposes connected with the implementation of the Right to Information Act 2005.
11 As regards the district judiciary, which is under the administrative control of the High Courts, we request all the Registrars General to take administrative directions from the Chief Justices. The High Courts may utilize the support of the National Informatics Centre for the purpose. NIC shall provide all logistical and technical assistance in that regard to the High Courts.

From Para 1 on Page 4,

1 In view of the orders which have been passed in Writ Petition (Civil) No 1325 of 2020, there shall be a direction to all the State governments/Union Territories to set up and operationalize online web portals so that information sought under the Right to Information Act 2005 is made available in respect of all public authorities falling within their jurisdiction. This exercise shall be completed within a period of three months from the date of this order.

Pravasi Legal Cell Vs Union of India and Ors on 20 Mar 2023

Supreme Court launched it’s own RTI Portal in November 2022.

News here and here.

This was one of my PIL ideas here.

Jai Prakash Tiwari Vs State of Madhya Pradesh on 04 Aug 2022

Posted on March 8, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A Full bench of the Apex Court held as follows regarding the important of fundamental right available to accused u/s 313 Cr.P.C.

From Paras 18 and 19,

18. Another important issue that merits consideration in the present appeal is that the accused-appellant, in his Section 313 statement, stated that he and the complainant belonged to opposing student parties. The accused-appellant claimed that owing to the animosity pertaining to the elections, the accused-appellant was falsely implicated in the matter. He also produced two witnesses to prove his alibi. DW1 and DW2 have stated that the accused appellant was in his village as his mother was unwell. Moreover, the accused-appellant also pointed out to the Court that the father, sister and brother of the complainant were all a part of the police department. The accused-appellant also brought to the notice of the Court the fact that the complainant had also registered another criminal case against the accused-appellant in which he already stands acquitted.

19. In the case at hand, the alternate version put forth by the appellant-accused could not be ignored. Section 313 CrPC confers a valuable right upon an accused to establish his innocence and can well be considered beyond a statutory right, as a constitutional right to a fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution.[See Reena Hazarika v. State of Assam, (2019) 13 SCC 289]

From Paras 25-28,

25. In the present case, the courts below failed to scrutinize the defence version put forward by the appellant-accusedin his Section 313 statement. The object of Section 313 of the Codeis to establish a direct dialogue between the court and the accused. (See Asraf Ali v. State of Assam, (2008) 16 SCC 328)
26. The purpose of Section 313 CrPC is to provide the accused a reasonable opportunity to explain the adverse circumstances which have emerged against him during the course of trial.A reasonable opportunity entails putting all the adverse evidences in the form of questions so as to give an opportunity to the accused to articulate his defence and givehis explanation.
27. If all the circumstances are bundled together and a singleopportunity is provided to the accused to explain himself, he may not able to put forth a rational and intelligibleexplanation. Such, exercises which defeats fair opportunity are nothing but empty formality. Non-fulfilment of the true spirit of Section 313 may ultimately cause grave prejudice tothe accused and the Court may not have the benefit of all the necessary facts and circumstances to arrive at a fair conclusion.
28. Such an omission does not ipso facto vitiate the trial, unless the accused fails to prove that grave prejudice has been caused to him. Although the counsel on behalf the accused has not proved any serious prejudice caused to him due to failure of the Court in framing individual circumstances; however, considering the long pendency of the matter and the right of the accused to have a fair and expeditious trial, we propose to proceed and decide the matter on its own merit.

From Para 29,

29. It is an established principle of criminal law that the burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt is upon the prosecution. Where an accused sets up a defence or offers an explanation, it is well-settled that he is not required to prove his defence beyond a reasonable doubt but only by preponderance of probabilities. [See M. Abbas v. State of Kerala, (2001) 10 SCC 103]. Further, it has been held by this Court in Parminder Kaur v. State of Punjab, (2020) 8 SCC 811 that “once a plausible version has been put forth in defence at the Section 313 CrPC examination stage, then it is for the prosecution to negate such defence plea”.

Jai Prakash Tiwari Vs State of Madhya Pradesh on 04 Aug 2022

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Landmark Case

Anshu Gupta Vs Adwait Anand on 09 Aug 2023

Om Prakash Sharma Vs State of MP on 25 Mar 2021

Hazi Abdul Khaleque Vs Mustt Samsun Nehar on 20 Aug 1990

Moina Khosla Vs Amardeep Singh Khosla on 31 Jan 1986

Deoki Panjhiyara Vs Shashi Bhushan Narayan Azad and Anr on 12 Dec 2012

Shilpa Sailesh Vs Varun Sreenivasan on 01 May 2023

Jitendra Kumar Rode Vs Union of India on 24 Apr 2023

In Re Policy Strategy for Grant of Bail (Guidelines Issued) on 31 Jan 2023

Pravasi Legal Cell Vs Union of India and Ors on 20 Mar 2023

Jai Prakash Tiwari Vs State of Madhya Pradesh on 04 Aug 2022