Grasim Industries Ltd Vs Collector of Customs Bombay on 04 Apr 2002

Posted on February 12, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

Sitting on the full bench of Apex Court, Justice Arijit Pasayat, held as follows, while interpreting the statutes passed by the Legislature.

From Para 9,

No words or expressions used in any statute can be said to be redundant or superfluous. In matters of interpretation one should not concentrate too much on one word and pay too little attention to other words. No provision in the statute and no word in any section can be construed in isolation. Every provision and every word must be looked at generally and in the context in which it is used. It is said that every statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting any word while considering a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. Where the words are clear and there is no obscurity, and there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the Court to take upon itself the task of amending or alternating the statutory provisions. Wherever the language is clear the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language used. While doing so what has been said in the statute as also what has not been said has to be noted. The construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words has to be avoided. As stated by the Privy Council in Crawford v. Spooner [(1846) 6 Moore PC 1] “we cannot aid the Legislature’s defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend and, by construction make up deficiencies which are left there”. In case of an ordinary word there should be no attempt to substitute or paraphrase of general application. Attention should be confined to what is necessary for deciding the particular case. This principle is too well settled and reference to few decisions of this Court would suffice. [See: Gwalior Rayons Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. v. Custodian of Vested Forests, Palghat and Anr. (AIR 1990 SC 1747), Union of India and Anr. v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal (AIR 1992 SC 96), Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price Waterhouse and Anr. (1997 (6) SCC 312) and Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India and Ors. (JT 2002 (3) SC 21)]

Grasim Industries Ltd Vs Collector of Customs Bombay on 04 Apr 2002

Court Kutchehry Version:

Grasim Industries Ltd Vs Collector of Customs Bombay on 04 Apr 2002 (CK)

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 07 Oct 2021 (and other Directions)

Posted on February 7, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court passed these guidelines with respect to issue of Summons and Warrants and Recall of NBW,

After filing of chargesheet/complaint taking of cognizance
a) Ordinary summons at the 1st instance/including permitting appearance through Lawyer.
b) If such an accused does not appear despite service of summons, then Bailable Warrant for physical appearance may be issued.
c) NBW on failure to failure to appear despite issuance of Bailable Warrant.
d) NBW may be cancelled or converted into a Bailable Warrant/Summons without insisting physical appearance of accused, if such an application is moved on behalf of the accused before execution of the NBW on an undertaking of the accused to appear physically on the next date/s of hearing.
e) Bail applications of such accused on appearance may be decided w/o the accused being taken in physical custody or by granting interim bail till the bail application is decided.

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 07 Oct 2021

Citations: [(2021) 10 SCC 773], [2022 LiveLaw (SC) 577]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/16350770/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/62ba660db50db90d4b55ecaf

A corrected Reportable judgment is passed on 11 Jul 2022…

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 11 Jul 2022

Further time is given to comply with the directions earlier given on 03 Feb 2023…

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 03 Feb 2023

Supreme Court also directed as follows.

The judgment in the present case i.e. “Satender Kumar Antil Vs. CBI” reported in (2022) 10 SCC 51 and the judgment in Siddharth’s case (supra) should be incorporated as part of the curriculum of the State Judicial Academies and the National Judicial Academy.

Interim directions given on 21 Mar 2023 considering the States and High Courts did not provide the required information to Amicus

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 21 Mar 2023

Some individual cases were filed alleging non-compliance of this Order by some Magistrates… SC passed this order on 02 May 2023

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 02 May 2023

Final Judgment on 13 Feb 2024

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 13 Feb 2024

Supreme gave another ‘last’ change on 07 May 2024 to file affidavits that have not complied with the directions issued in this case.

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 07 May 2024

Notices must not be issued via WhatsApp, says Supreme Court.

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI on 21 Jan 2025

Negating the plea of State of Haryana, Supreme Court held that notices u/s 41A of Cr.P.C. or u/s 35 of BNSS cannot be sent via WhatsApp or any other electronic communication medium, unlike section 530 BNSS, which mandates that, Trials, Inquires and Proceedings that may be held in electronic mode, by use of electronic communication or use of audio-video electronic means.” So, Parliament says, Courts can use technologia but Police must use postman.

Satendar Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 16 Jul 2025

Index of NBW Judgments is here.

Amit Kumar Vs Suman Beniwal on 11 Dec 2021

Posted on January 17, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

In addition to the guidelines issue in Amardeep Singh Vs Harveen Kaur here, Additional guidelines/factors were issued in this case.

From Para 27,

27. For exercise of the discretion to waive the statutory waiting period of six months for moving the motion for divorce under Section 13B (2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, the Court would consider the following amongst other factors:
(i) the length of time for which the parties had been married;
(ii) how long the parties had stayed together as husband and wife;
(iii) the length of time the parties had been staying apart;
(iv) the length of time for which the litigation had been pending;
(v) whether there were any other proceedings between the parties;
(vi) whether there was any possibility of reconciliation;
(vii) whether there were any children born out of the wedlock;
(viii) whether the parties had freely, of their own accord, without any coercion or pressure, arrived at a genuine settlement which took care of alimony, if any, maintenance and custody of children, etc.

Amit Kumar Vs Suman Beniwal on 11 Dec 2021

Index of Divorce cases is here.

Nahar Singh Yadav and Anr Vs Union of India and Ors on 19 Nov 2010

Posted on November 13, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A Full Bench of the Apex Court passed these broad factors while considering transfer petitions u/s 406 Cr.P.C.

From Para 24,

24.Thus, although no rigid and inflexible rule or test could be laid down to decide whether or not power under Section 406 of the Cr.P.C. should be
exercised, it is manifest from a bare reading of sub-sections (2) and (3) of the said Section and on an analysis of the decisions of this Court that an order of transfer of trial is not to be passed as a matter of routine or merely because an interested party has expressed some apprehension about the proper conduct of a trial. This power has to be exercised cautiously and in exceptional situations, where it becomes necessary to do so to provide credibility to the trial. Some of the broad factors which could be kept in mind while considering an application for transfer of the trial are:-
(i) when it appears that the State machinery or prosecution is acting hand in glove with the accused, and there is likelihood of miscarriage of justice due to the lackadaisical attitude of the prosecution;
(ii) when there is material to show that the accused may influence the prosecution witnesses or cause physical harm to the complainant;
(iii) comparative inconvenience and hardships likely to be caused to the accused, the complainant/the prosecution and the witnesses, besides the burden to be borne by the State Exchequer in making payment of travelling and other expenses of the official and non-official witnesses;
(iv) a communally surcharged atmosphere, indicating some proof of inability of holding fair and impartial trial because of the accusations made and the nature of the crime committed by the accused; and
(v) existence of some material from which it can be inferred that the some persons are so hostile that they are interfering or are likely to interfere either directly or indirectly with the course of justice.

Nahar Singh Yadav and Anr Vs Union of India and Ors on 19 Nov 2010

Citations : [2011 AIR SC 1549], [2011 RCR CRIMINAL SC 1 120], [2011 SCC CRI 1 39], [2011 AIR SC 325], [2011 SCC 1 307], [2010 AIOL 798], [2010 SLT 9 322], [2010 JT 12 641], [2011 CRLJ SC 997], [2010 SCALE 12 199], [2010 SUPREME 7 729], [2010 AIC 96 1], [2011 ECRN 1 717], [2011 KCCR 2 845], [2011 AIR SCW 325], [201 OJ 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 851]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/668282/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609aedde4b0149711414eec

https://vlex.in/vid/nahar-singh-yadav-and-572148534

https://www.latestlaws.com/latest-caselaw/2010/november/2010-latest-caselaw-867-sc/

Index of Transfer Judgments is here.

MS Godrej Sara Lee Limited Vs Excise and Taxation Officer cum AO and Ors on 01 Feb 2023

Posted on October 25, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held that, Not pursued the alternative remedy available to him/it cannot mechanically be construed as a ground for a Writ’s dismissal.

Further it was held that, A writ petition despite being maintainable may not be entertained by a high court for very many reasons or relief could even be refused to the petitioner, despite setting up a sound legal point, if grant of the claimed relief would not further public interest.

From Para 4,

4. Before answering the questions, we feel the urge to say a few words on the exercise of writ powers conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution having come across certain orders passed by the high courts holding writ petitions as “not maintainable” merely because the alternative remedy provided by the relevant statutes has not been pursued by the parties desirous of invocation of the writ jurisdiction. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 is plenary in nature. Any limitation on the exercise of such power must be traceable in the Constitution itself. Profitable reference in this regard may be made to Article 329 and ordainments of other similarly worded articles in the Constitution. Article 226 does not, in terms, impose any limitation or restraint on the exercise of power to issue writs. While it is true that exercise of writ powers despite availability of a remedy under the very statute which has been invoked and has given rise to the action impugned in the writ petition ought not to be made in a routine manner, yet, the mere fact that the petitioner before the high court, in a given case, has not pursued the alternative remedy available to him/it cannot mechanically be construed as a ground for its dismissal. It is axiomatic that the high courts (bearing in mind the facts of each particular case) have a discretion whether to entertain a writ petition or not. One of the self-imposed restrictions on the exercise of power under Article 226 that has evolved through judicial precedents is that the high courts should normally not entertain a writ petition, where an effective and efficacious alternative remedy is available. At the same time, it must be remembered that mere availability of an alternative remedy of appeal or revision, which the party invoking the jurisdiction of the high court under Article 226 has not pursued, would not oust the jurisdiction of the high court and render a writ petition “not maintainable”. In a long line of decisions, this Court has made it clear that availability of an alternative remedy does not operate as an absolute bar to the “maintainability” of a writ petition and that the rule, which requires a party to pursue the alternative remedy provided by a statute, is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. Though elementary, it needs to be restated that “entertainability” and “maintainability” of a writ petition are distinct concepts. The fine but real distinction between the two ought not to be lost sight of. The objection as to “maintainability” goes to the root of the matter and if such objection were found to be of substance, the courts would be rendered incapable of even receiving the lis for adjudication. On the other hand, the question of “entertainability” is entirely within the realm of discretion of the high courts, writ remedy being discretionary. A writ petition despite being maintainable may not be entertained by a high court for very many reasons or relief could even be refused to the petitioner, despite setting up a sound legal point, if grant of the claimed relief would not further public interest. Hence, dismissal of a writ petition by a high court on the ground that the petitioner has not availed the alternative remedy without, however, examining whether an exceptional case has been made out for such entertainment would not be proper.

MS Godrej Sara Lee Limited Vs Excise and Taxation Officer cum AO and Ors on 01 Feb 2023

Citations : [2023 INSC 92], [2023 SCC ONLINE SC 95]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/62928741/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/63dc0f95831db01604ba254b

https://www.courtkutchehry.com/Judgement/Search/AdvancedV2?docid=2368646

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/m-s-godrej-sara-lee-ltd-vs-the-excise-and-taxation-officer-cum-assessing-authority

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/supreme-court/godrej-taxation-alternative-remedy-not-absolute-writ-petition-maintainability-entertainability-apex-court-1460513

Godrej Sara Lee Limited Vs The Excise and Taxation officer-cum-Assessing Authority & Ors (Supreme Court)

Anshu Gupta Vs Adwait Anand on 09 Aug 2023

Posted on August 31, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge from High Court of Uttarakhand passed this Judgment declaring that mother is also liable to pay maintenance to minor child. Interesting…

From Paras 17-22,

17. The provisions of Section 125 (1) Cr.P.C. makes it clear that the liability to maintain a minor child is always on “any person”, if he has sufficient means neglects and refuses to maintain a minor child and such “person” is directed to give the monthly allowance as maintenance at the rate deemed fit to the Magistrate.
18. “The person” word denotes not only the male but a female gender and it cannot be said that such person can only qualify father and not the mother. Section 2 (y) of Cr.P.C. provides as under:- “(y) words and expressions used herein and not defined but defined in the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) have the meanings respectively assigned to them in that Code. ”
19. According to Section 2(y) of Cr.P.C., the words and expressions used in the Cr.P.C. but have not been defined in the Cr.P.C., shall have the same meanings assigned to them as defined in the Indian Penal Code. Section 8 of IPC is quoted hereunder:- “8. Gender.—The pronoun “he” and its derivatives are used of any person, whether male or female.”
20. This definition of gender gives an indication that “he” and its derivatives are used of any person whether male or female.
21. Under Section 11 of the IPC, the “person” has also been defined, which includes any company or Association or body of persons, whether incorporated or not.
22. From the meticulous examination of these words having been defined in the Indian Penal Code, it can safely be inferred that any “person” use in the provisions of section 125(1) Cr.P.C. includes both mother and father.

From Para 25,

25. It is clear from the aforesaid sub-Section (2) of Section 126 Cr.P.C. that there is no such word “father” or “husband” in the aforesaid sub-section, as it was there in the old Cr.P.C. Section 488 sub-Section (6). Now, in place of “father” or “husband”, “person” has been incorporated and it is provided that “all evidence to such proceedings shall be taken in the presence of the person against whom an order for payment of maintenance is proposed to be made……….” Thus, this case law is also of no help to the revisionist and the same is distinguished by this Court on the aforesaid reasons.

Finally from Para 28,

28. The provisions of Section 125 Cr.P.C. has already been changed, as discussed above and according to the language of the present Section 125 Cr.P.C., in the opinion of this Court “person” would include both male and female and in reference to a minor child whether legitimate or illegitimate mother or father having sufficient means if neglects and refuses to maintain such minor child would be held liable to pay the maintenance of such child.

Anshu Gupta Vs Adwait Anand on 09 Aug 2023

Citations:

Other Sources:

Om Prakash Sharma Vs State of MP on 25 Mar 2021

Posted on August 9, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench at Gwalior of Madhra Pradesh High Court held as follows,

From Para 5,

5. The aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court in Suresh Chand Jain & Sakiri Vasu (supra) have held the field till date which is evident from perusal of following subsequent verdict of Apex Court rendered after relying upon Sakiri Vasu with approval.
6. In the instant case, as informed by learned counsel for petitioner, no offence has yet been registered by the police. It is also informed that the concerned police station has not yet given any report to the learned Magistrate despite repeated reminders. It is also not denied that the learned Magistrate has not proceeded to record statement of the complainant u/S.200 Cr.P.C. Therefore, in sum and substance, the entire matter hangs fire and is in a state of suspended animation leaving the petitioner-complainant high and dry with no hope of justice coming his way.

From Para 9.1

9.1 Thus, it is incumbent upon the Magistrate u/S.156(3) Cr.P.C. to not only direct for registration of cognizable offence wherever it is found to be not registered by the Police but also to ensure that theinvestigation conducted by the police is fair, expeditious and without any element of prejudice towards anyone, with the sole object ofreaching the truth. The role of the Magistrate u/S.156(3) Cr.P.C. is thus of great significance. Prompt and appropriate exercise of poweru/S.156(3) Cr.P.C. can, not only bring succor to the victim but also to the society at large by bringing the delinquent to the book and in theprocess instilling enough fear in the mind of the miscreant so as to dissuade him from indulging in delinquency again.

From Paras 15-20

Law laid down:
(1) The guidelines laid down for the Magistrates for adjudication of application u/S.156(3) Cr.P.C. complaining about delayed/improper investigation filed along with complaint u/S.200 Cr.P.C.
(2) The complaint u/S.200 Cr.P.C. filed along with 156(3) application need not be kept pending owing to bar contained in Sec.210 Cr.P.C. for more than 60/90 days or any other longer period statutorily provided on expiry of which the police fails to file the final report u/S.173(1) Cr.P.C.
(3) On failure of police to file final report u/S.173(1) Cr.P.C. within 60/90 days or any other longer period statutorily provided, the Magistrate to prevent the complaint u/S.200 Cr.P.C. from suffering a state of stalemate, should proceed by invoking powers contained in Chapter XV and XVI Cr.P.C.
If during pendency of proceedings under Chapter XV and XVI Cr.P.C., invoked as above, Police files the final report then the final report and the complaint case both should proceed as if both have arisen out of police report.

Om Prakash Sharma Vs State of MP on 25 Mar 2021

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/55499395/

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/om-prakash-sharma-vs-state-of-m-p-and-another

Hazi Abdul Khaleque Vs Mustt Samsun Nehar on 20 Aug 1990

Posted on August 6, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge from Gauhati High Court held as follows,

From Paras 11, 12 and 13,

11. Under Chapter XXXII, Section 401 of the Code provides that. “Any money (other than a fine) payable by virtue of any order made under this Code, and the method of recovery of which is not otherwise expressly provided for, shall be recoverable as if it were a fine.” The proviso to section 431 is not relevant here. The order for payment of maintenance was an order under the code for payment of money, for the recovery of which no method had been expressly provided. Accordingly, under section 431 of the code, I think the maintenance; money could be recovered, as if it were fine.
12. Section 421 of the Code provides for recovery of fine and the procedure laid down for the purpose was by issue of warrant for attachment and sale of any movable property belonging to offender in this case the present petitioner (opposite party in the maintenance proceeding) or issue of warrant to the Collector of the District, authorising him to realise the amount as arrears of land revenue from the movable or immovable property, or both, of the defaulter: The provision to Section 421 clearly stipulates that “no such warrant shall be executed by the arrest or detention in prison of the offender.”
13. On consideration of the above provisions, there should be no doubt that for recovery of money as maintenance which has to be in accordance with the procedure for recovery of fine no warrant of arrest or detention of the petitioner could have been ordered. I, therefore think that the impugned order dated 1.9.89 was clearly erroneous and has to be set aside.

Hazi Abdul Khaleque Vs Mustt Samsun Nehar on 20 Aug 1990 (IndianKanoon Ver)

Hazi Abdul Khaleque Vs Mustt Samsun Nehar on 20 Aug 1990 (Casemine Ver)

Hazi Abdul Khaleque Vs Mustt Samsun Nehar on 20 Aug 1990 (LegalData Ver)

Citations: [1990 GAULR 2 328], [1991 CRLJ 1843], [1990 SCC ONLINE GAU 36], [1990 GAU LR 2 328], [1991 CRI LJ 1843]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1507653/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56eaaa49607dba3c8ce3ef96

https://legaldata.in/court/read/2541018

Moina Khosla Vs Amardeep Singh Khosla on 31 Jan 1986

Posted on July 26, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Delhi High Court held as follows,

From Paras 18 to 26,

18. Under Section 12 (1) (a), therefore, the requisite is that ordinary and complete sexual intercourse has not taken place between the parties owing to the impotence of the respondent. The words ‘impotence of the respondent’ would, to my mind, mean incapacity of the respondent to have sexual intercourse. The Supreme Court has said in Digvijay Singh v. Pratap Kumari, AIR 1970 SC 137, that “A party is impotent if his or her mental or physical condition makes consummation of the marriage a practical impossibility”.
19. As stated above, consummation means capacity to have ‘ordinary and complete sexual intercourse’. The above stated observation of the Supreme Court in AIR 1970 SC 137, therefore, must mean that a party is impotent if his or her mental or physical condition is such, that practically speaking, it is impossible for him or her to have ordinary and complete sexual intercourse. In the instant case it is instant case it is stated by the appellant in her deposition that the respondent was unable to have any, even a partial or incipient, sexual intercourse with the appellant.
20. Respondent has himself written in his diary Ex. PW1/2, that the is a Homosexual. The appellant has stated in her deposition that the respondent told her that he was a homosexual, that he was unable “to perform sexual intercourse with me and with females in general”. In other words, the respondent was incapable of having Hetrosexual intercourse with any woman.
21. As sexual intercourse essentially has two participants, it must be ordinary and complete for both the participants, individually, and together as a marital unit. For the man participant sexual intercourse is complete when he has an orgasm and for a woman participant sexual intercourse is complete when she has an orgasm (See Encyclopaedia Brittanica: 15th Ed: 1968; Macropaedia, Vol. 16, p. 594: Sexual Response).
22. No sexual intercourse has been taken place between the parties, there is no question is this case whether sexual intercourse was ordinary any complete.
23. In this case there is unrebutted evidence of the petitioner that no sexual intercourse has taken place between the parties. As no sexual intercourse has taken place between the parties, in this case, the requirements of Section 12(1) (a) of the Act are satisfied.
24. In the above view of the matter no purpose would be served by remitting the case back to the District Judge, as in my view, there is no reason why the statement given by the wife ought not to be accepted.
25. I am of the view that in view of her statement recorded in the court, the wife is entitled to a decree of nullity of marriage on the ground mentioned under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act and the judgment of the Additional District Judge needs to be set aside which is hereby set aside.
26. A decree of nullity of marriage is granted to the wife under section 12(1)(a) of the Hindu Marriage Act.

Indian Kanoon Version:

Moina Khosla Vs Amardeep Singh Khosla on 31 Jan 1986 (IK Version)

Casemine Version:

Moina Khosla Vs Amardeep Singh Khosla on 31 Jan 1986 (CM Version)

Supreme Today Version:

Moina Khosla Vs Amardeep Singh Khosla on 31 Jan 1986 (ST Version)

Legal Data Version:

Moina Khosla Vs Amardeep Singh Khosla on 31 Jan 1986 (LD Version)

Citations: [1986 DMC 2 65], [1986 DRJ 10 286], [1986 SCC ONLINE DEL 42], [1987 PLR DEL 91 12], [1986 AIR DELHI 399], [1986 ILR DELHI 2 659]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/913344/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/560909b5e4b01497111707b8

https://legaldata.in/court/read/6288

Deoki Panjhiyara Vs Shashi Bhushan Narayan Azad and Anr on 12 Dec 2012

Posted on July 24, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held that, Unless there is a declaration of nullity by a competent Court or authority, a aggrieved person can take advantage of benefits under DV Act.

From Para 19,

19. In the present case, if according to the respondent, the marriage between him and the appellant was void on account of the previous marriage between the appellant and Rohit Kumar Mishra the respondent ought to have obtained the necessary declaration from the competent court in view of the highly contentious questions raised by the appellant on the aforesaid score. It is only upon a declaration of nullity or annulment of the marriage between the parties by a competent court that any consideration of the question whether the parties had lived in a “relationship in the nature of marriage” would be justified. In the absence of any valid decree of nullity or the necessary declaration the court will have to proceed on the footing
that the relationship between the parties is one of marriage and not in the nature of marriage. We would also like to emphasise that any determination of the validity of the marriage between the parties could have been made only by a competent court in an appropriate proceeding by and between the parties and in compliance with all other requirements of law. Mere production of a marriage certificate issued under Section 13 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 in support of the claimed first marriage of the appellant with Rohit Kumar Mishra was not sufficient for any of the courts, including the High Court, to render a complete and effective decision with regard to the marital status of the parties and that too in a collateral proceeding for maintenance. Consequently, we hold that in the present case until the invalidation of the marriage between the appellant and the respondent is made by a competent court it would only be correct to proceed on the basis that the appellant continues to be the wife of the respondent so as to entitle her to claim all benefits and protection available under the DV Act, 2005.

Deoki Panjhiyara Vs Shashi Bhushan Narayan Azad and Anr on 12 Dec 2012

Citations: [2013 ALLMR CRI SC 1099], [2013 AIR SC 168], [2013 RCR CIVIL SC 2 400], [2013 AIR SC 346], [2013 SCC 2 137], [2013 RCR CRIMINAL SC 1 338], [2012 SCALE 12 282], [2013 CRLJ SC 684], [2012 AIOL 584], [2013 BOMCR CRI SC 1 333], [2012 SLT 9 266], [2013 SCC CIV 1 1019], [2012 SCC ONLINE SC 1035], [2013 GUJ LH 1 208], [2013 CTC 2 232], [2013 ECRN 1 913], [2013 ACR 1 1089], [2013 AD SC 3 59], [2013 AJR 2 133], [2013 AKR 1 615], [2013 ALD CRI 1 469], [2013 ALT CRI 3 70], [2013 ALT CRI 1 472], [2013 DMC SC 1 18], [2013 JLJR 1 198], [2012 JCC 1 502], [2013 JCC 1 508], [2012 JT SC 12 575], [2013 LW 2 60], [2013 LW CRL 1 330], [2013 NCC 1 322], [2013 OLR 1 891], [2013 PLJR 1 172], [2013 MLJ CRL 1 137]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/154350889/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af10e4b0149711415804

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/deoki-panjhiyara-vs-shashi-bhushan-narayan-azad-anr

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Landmark Case

Grasim Industries Ltd Vs Collector of Customs Bombay on 04 Apr 2002

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 07 Oct 2021 (and other Directions)

Nahar Singh Yadav and Anr Vs Union of India and Ors on 19 Nov 2010

MS Godrej Sara Lee Limited Vs Excise and Taxation Officer cum AO and Ors on 01 Feb 2023

Anshu Gupta Vs Adwait Anand on 09 Aug 2023

Om Prakash Sharma Vs State of MP on 25 Mar 2021

Hazi Abdul Khaleque Vs Mustt Samsun Nehar on 20 Aug 1990

Moina Khosla Vs Amardeep Singh Khosla on 31 Jan 1986

Deoki Panjhiyara Vs Shashi Bhushan Narayan Azad and Anr on 12 Dec 2012