Laljee Yadav Vs The State Of Bihar on 16 September, 2011

Posted on May 10, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

This is a wonderful judgment explaining the imprisonment of accused who fails to make the maintenance payments to Knife under Sec 125(3) of CrPC.

Noticing the peculiar situation where virtually the petitioner has been made to serve life sentence and the insensitivity of the Judge in the matter, we called for the lower Court records to examine for ourselves the facts because if what is being said by the Principal Judge, Family Court is to be accepted then the petitioner would virtually be serving a life sentence with no remission possible.

What is more scandalous is, as will be shown, petitioner has been kept in prison mechanically and that too for months even without any order of remand by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court.

The Code itself provides by Section 421 for warrant for levy of fine….
… A reference to Section 421 and the proviso would show that it clearly prohibits a person to be imprisoned in execution of warrant levying fine which would simply for recovery of the maintenance and, thus, there is no scope for issuance of any distress warrant for detaining a defaulter husband.

For the purposes of sentencing, the Code has provision in terms of Sections 29 and 30 thereof but the question remains that can there be a sentence straightway upon default being shown. In our view, no.

Unfortunately, in total disregard to the binding precedent, the learned Principal Judge, Family Court proceeded. The result is that the petitioner is being detained in custody ad infinitum which is against the statutory provisions.

Again, this is significant inasmuch as the maintenance being a monthly payment, for each month’s default, defaulter can be sentenced for a month’s imprisonment.

As seen above, the maintenance is to be fixed on monthly basis. The sentence has, accordingly, been limited to a month maximum for each breach.

We, therefore, hold that the detention of the petitioner cannot be justified and is contrary to the scheme as provided under Section 125 (3) of the Code. We have no option accordingly but to direct the immediate release of the petitioner, while quashing the order committing the petitioner to custody and subsequent orders of remand. The writ application is allowed.

Laljee Yadav vs The State Of Bihar on 16 September, 2011

Geeta Mehrotra and Anr Vs State Of U.P. and Anr on 17 October, 2012

Posted on May 8, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

This is a popular quash judgment from Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case of IPC 498A, IPC 504, IPC 506 and 3 & 4 of DP Act.

The grounds on which quash is done are

No territorial jurisdiction
No specific allegations on accused
No justification for delay of 7 years in filing complaint

Geeta Mehrotra & Anr vs State Of U.P. & Anr on 17 October, 2012

Indiankanoon.org link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/125470413/

Citations: [(2012) 10 SCC 741]

Reproduced in accordance with Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from judis.nic.in, lobis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court and District Court Websites such as ecourts.gov.in

Sundar Babu & Ors Vs State Of Tamil Nadu on 19 February, 2009

Posted on May 5, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Another landmark judgment from Justice Dr. Arijit Pasayat as part of a three-judge bench.

Intro

Marriage took place on 25/11/1998
Appellant No.1 left for USA on 1/7/1999
Complaint was filed on 6/2/2000 under Sec.498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
Charge-sheet was filed on 8/6/2000
Divorce petition was filed by the complainant, which appears to have been granted ex parte on 12/7/2001
Complainant – Sukanya has remarried on 24/8/2002

Legal points enumerated by their Lordships are

No basis for making the allegations
No explanation for the delayed lodging of the complaint was offered.
Even a cursory perusal of the complaint shows that the case at hand falls within the category (7) of the illustrative parameters highlighted in Bhajan Lal’s case
1. “Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

Sundar Babu & Ors vs State Of Tamil Nadu on 19 February, 2009

The reportable version of judgment is here.

Sundar_Babu_&_Ors_vs_State_Of_Tamil_Nadu_on_19_February,_2009

Citations : [2009 SCC 14 244], [2010 SCC CRI 1 1349], [2009 ECRN SC 2 1288], [2009 AIOL 261], [2009 JT 13 666], [2009 SCALE 5 1], [2009 SCR 3 326]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1091787/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/575fd328607dba63d7e6c4d8

K.Srinivas Rao Vs D.A.Deepa on 22 February, 2013

Posted on May 1, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

This is the landmark judgment of Supreme Court confirming the divorce degree granted by Family Court.

Intro

The marriage between the appellant-husband and the respondent-wife was solemnized on 25/4/1999 as per Hindu rites and customs. Unfortunately, on the very next day disputes arose between the elders on both sides which resulted in their abusing each other and hurling chappals at each other. As a consequence, on 27/4/1999, the newly married couple got separated without consummation of the marriage and started living separately.

Later on

Knife filed complaint for the offence punishable under Section 324 of the IPC against the appellant-husband (C.C.No. 79/2009). It may be stated here that on 19/10/2009 the appellant-husband was acquitted in this case.

The appellant- husband was convicted under Section 498-A of the IPC and was sentenced to undergo six months simple imprisonment. He and his parents were acquitted of the offences under the Dowry Prohibition Act. His parents were acquitted of the offence under Section 498-A of the IPC. After this judgment the respondent-wife and her parents filed a complaint in the High Court saying that since the appellant-husband was convicted he should be dismissed from service. Similar letters were sent to the High Court by the maternal uncle of the respondent-wife

In Para 22,

The statement that the mother of the appellant-husband asked her to sleep with his father is bound to anger him. It is his case that this humiliation of his parents caused great anguish to him. He and his family were traumatized by the false and indecent statement made in the complaint. His grievance appears to us to be justified.

That this statement is false is evident from the evidence of the mother of the respondent-wife, which we have already quoted. This statement cannot be explained away by stating that it was made because the respondent-wife was anxious to go back to the appellant-husband. This is not the way to win the husband back. It is well settled that such statements cause mental cruelty. By sending this complaint the respondent-wife has caused mental cruelty to the appellant- husband.

In Para 23,

The conduct of the respondent- wife in filing a complaint making unfounded, indecent and defamatory allegation against her mother-in-law, in filing revision seeking enhancement of the sentence awarded to the appellant-husband, in filing appeal questioning the acquittal of the appellant-husband and acquittal of his parents indicates that she made all attempts to ensure that he and his parents are put in jail and he is removed from his job. We have no manner of doubt that this conduct has caused mental cruelty to the appellant- husband.

In Para 24,

Staying together under the same roof is not a pre-condition for mental cruelty. Spouse can cause mental cruelty by his or her conduct even while he or she is not staying under the same roof. In a given case, while staying away, a spouse can cause mental cruelty to the other spouse by sending vulgar and defamatory letters or notices or filing complaints containing indecent allegations or by initiating number of judicial proceedings making the other spouse’s life miserable.

Paras 25 and 26 talk about the death of the marriage.

the appellant-husband should be directed to pay a sum of Rs.15,00,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Lakhs only) to the respondent-wife as and by way of permanent alimony. In the result, the impugned judgment is quashed and set aside.

Directions issue by the Apex Court

a) In terms of Section 9 of the Family Courts Act, the Family Courts shall make all efforts to settle the matrimonial disputes through mediation. Even if the Counsellors submit a failure report, the Family Courts shall, with the consent of the parties, refer the matter to the mediation centre. In such a case, however, the Family Courts shall set a reasonable time limit for mediation centres to complete the process of mediation because otherwise the resolution of the disputes by the Family Court may get delayed. In a given case, if there is good chance of settlement, the Family Court in its discretion, can always extend the time limit.

b) The criminal courts dealing with the complaint under Section 498-A of the IPC should, at any stage and particularly, before they take up the complaint for hearing, refer the parties to mediation centre if they feel that there exist elements of settlement and both the parties are willing. However, they should take care to see that in this exercise, rigour, purport and efficacy of Section 498-A of the IPC is not diluted. Needless to say that the discretion to grant or not to grant bail is not in any way curtailed by this direction. It will be for the concerned court to work out the modalities taking into consideration the facts of each case.

c) All mediation centres shall set up pre-litigation desks/clinics; give them wide publicity and make efforts to settle matrimonial disputes at pre-litigation stage.

K. Srinivas Rao Vs D.A. Deepa on 22 Feb 2013

Click here to read the other judgments cited in this order.

Citations: [2013 SCC 5 226], [2013 AIOL 118], [2013 AIR SC 2176], [2013 AIR SC 1396], [2013 MHLJ SC 5 10], [2013 SUPREME 2 80], [2013 SLT 2 338], [2013 SCALE 2 735], [2013 BOMCR SC 3 129], [2013 RCR CIVIL SC 2 232], [2013 JT 3 97], [2013 MPLJ SC 3 567], [2013 SCC CIV 2 775], [2013 SCC CRI 2 963], [2013 SCC ONLINE SC 179], [2013 ALR 97 732], [2013 ALD 3 11], [2013 AIC 124 228], [2013 CHN 2 92], [2013 MAHLJ 5 102013 BLJ 3 379], [2013 DMC SC 1 458], [2013 ILR KER 1 813], [2013 JLJR 1 443], [2013 KHC 1 6472013 SCR 2 126], [2013 LW 2 883], [2013 PLR 171 149], [2013 CDR SC 1 161], [2013 AD SC 3 4582013 MLJ SC 3 852013 AWC SC 3 2462], [2013 WBLR SC 4 412], [2014 WLN SC 4 132], [2013 CGLRW 1 484], [2013 BOMCR 3 129], [2013 AIR SCW 1396], [2013 MAH LJ 5 10], [2013 MHLJ 5 10], [2013 ILR KERALA 1 813], [2013 RCR CIVIL 2 232], [2013 JT SC 3 97], [2013 MPLJ 3 567]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/14713882/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af30e4b0149711415c0f

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/k-srinivas-rao-vs-d-a-deepa

Samar Ghosh vs Jaya Ghosh on 26 March, 2007

Posted on April 30, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

This judgment from a Supreme Court Bench comprising Justice Dalveer Bhandari has enumerated some of the illustrations of mental cruelty citing Judgments of England, America, Canada and Australia.

Intro

The appellant and the respondent are senior officials of the Indian Administrative Service, The respondent was a divorcee and had a female child from her first marriage. The custody of the said child was given to her by the District Court of Patna where the respondent had obtained a decree of divorce against her first husband, Debashish Gupta, who was also an I.A.S. officer. The respondent’s first husband, Debashish Gupta filed a belated appeal against the decree of divorce obtained by her from the District Court of Patna. Therefore, during the pendency of the appeal, she literally persuaded the appellant to agree to the marriage immediately so that the appeal of Debashish Gupta may become infructuous.

The marriage between the parties was solemnized on 13.12.1984.

… In these circumstances, the appellant has prayed that it would not be possible to continue the marriage with the respondent and he eventually filed a suit for the grant of divorce. In the suit for divorce filed by the appellant in Alipur, Calcutta, the respondent filed her written statement and denied the averments. The learned Additional District Judge came to the finding that the appellant has succeeded in proving the case of mental cruelty against the respondent, therefore, the decree was granted by the order dated 19.12.1996 and the marriage between the parties was dissolved.

The Division Bench of the High Court vide judgment dated 20.5.2003 reversed the judgment of the Additional District Judge on the ground that the appellant has not been able to prove the allegation of mental cruelty.

Key Points

Such a vital decision cannot be taken unilaterally after marriage by the respondent and if taken unilaterally, it may amount to mental cruelty to the appellant.

The finding of the High Court that the appellant started living with the respondent amounted to condonation of the act of cruelty is unsustainable in law.

The finding of the High Court that the respondent’s refusal to cook food for the appellant could not amount to mental cruelty as she had to go to office, is not sustainable….. The question was not of cooking food, but wife’s cooking food only for herself and not for the husband would be a clear instance of causing annoyance which may lead to mental cruelty.

The High Court’s finding that the husband and wife might be sleeping in separate rooms did not lead to a conclusion that they did not cohabit and to justify this by saying that the respondent was highly educated and holding a high post was entirely unsustainable. Once the respondent accepted to become the wife of the appellant, she had to respect the marital bond and discharge obligations of marital life.

During illness, particularly in a nuclear family, the husband normally looks after and supports his wife and similarly, he would expect the same from her. The respondent’s total indifference and neglect of the appellant during his illness would certainly lead to great annoyance leading to mental cruelty.

The credibility of the witness does not depend upon his financial standing or social status only. A witness which is natural and truthful should be accepted irrespective of his/her financial standing or social status.

… the appellant and the respondent have been living separately for more than sixteen and half years (since 27.8.1990). The entire substratum of the marriage has already disappeared. During this long period, the parties did not spend a single minute together. The appellant had undergone bye-pass surgery even then the respondent did not bother to enquire about his health even on telephone. Now the parties have no feelings and emotions towards each other.

Mental Cruelty Guidelines

No uniform standard can ever be laid down for guidance, yet we deem it appropriate to enumerate some instances of human behaviour which may be relevant in dealing with the cases of ‘mental cruelty’. The instances indicated in the succeeding paragraphs are only illustrative and not exhaustive.

(i) On consideration of complete matrimonial life of the parties, acute mental pain, agony and suffering as would not make possible for the parties to live with each other could come within the broad parameters of mental cruelty.

(ii) On comprehensive appraisal of the entire matrimonial life of the parties, it becomes abundantly clear that situation is such that the wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and continue to live with other party.

(iii) Mere coldness or lack of affection cannot amount to cruelty, frequent rudeness of language, petulance of manner, indifference and neglect may reach such a degree that it makes the married life for the other spouse absolutely intolerable.

(iv) Mental cruelty is a state of mind. The feeling of deep anguish, disappointment, frustration in one spouse caused by the conduct of other for a long time may lead to mental cruelty.

(v) A sustained course of abusive and humiliating treatment calculated to torture, discommode or render miserable life of the spouse.

(vi) Sustained unjustifiable conduct and behaviour of one spouse actually affecting physical and mental health of the other spouse. The treatment complained of and the resultant danger or apprehension must be very grave, substantial and weighty.

(vii) Sustained reprehensible conduct, studied neglect, indifference or total departure from the normal standard of conjugal kindness causing injury to mental health or deriving sadistic pleasure can also amount to mental cruelty.

(viii) The conduct must be much more than jealousy, selfishness, possessiveness, which causes unhappiness and dissatisfaction and emotional upset may not be a ground for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty.

(ix) Mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of the married life which happens in day to day life would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty.

(x) The married life should be reviewed as a whole and a few isolated instances over a period of years will not amount to cruelty. The ill-conduct must be persistent for a fairly lengthy period, where the relationship has deteriorated to an extent that because of the acts and behaviour of a spouse, the wronged party finds it extremely difficult to live with the other party any longer, may amount to mental cruelty.

(xi) If a husband submits himself for an operation of sterilization without medical reasons and without the consent or knowledge of his wife and similarly if the wife undergoes vasectomy or abortion without medical reason or without the consent or knowledge of her husband, such an act of the spouse may lead to mental cruelty.

(xii) Unilateral decision of refusal to have intercourse for considerable period without there being any physical incapacity or valid reason may amount to mental cruelty.

(xiii) Unilateral decision of either husband or wife after marriage not to have child from the marriage may amount to cruelty.

(xiv) Where there has been a long period of continuous separation, it may fairly be concluded that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair. The marriage becomes a fiction though supported by a legal tie. By refusing to sever that tie, the law in such cases, does not serve the sanctity of marriage; on the contrary, it shows scant regard for the feelings and emotions of the parties. In such like situations, it may lead to mental cruelty.

Samar_Ghosh_vs_Jaya_Ghosh_on_26_March,_2007

Citations : [2007 SCC 4 511], [2007 SUPREME 3 26], [2007 JT 5 569], [2007 CTC 3 464], [2007 BLJR 2 1047], [2007 RCR CIVIL 2 595], [2007 RAJ 2 177], [2007 ALD SC 4 11], [2007 ALL SCR 0 881], [2007 SCALE 5 1], [2007 SCC 4 411], [2007 SLJ SC 2 705], [2007 ALT 3 62], [2007 DMC 1 597], [2007 SCJ 3 253], [2007 WBLR 3 525], [2007 GHJ 16 204], [2007 KERLT 2 55], [2007 RAJLW 2 1357], [2007 AWC 5 4820], [2007 CLT 2 72], [2007 JCIVC 2 1028], [2007 SLT 4 76], [2007 AIOL 339], [2007 BOMCR SC 6 834], [2007 SCR 4 428], [2007 GUJ LR 2 1520], [2007 MADLJ 2 1185]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/766894/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae45e4b01497114135d2

The index page is here.

Karam Chand Ganga Prasad And Anr. Vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 12 October, 1970

Posted on April 15, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Here is the landmark Supreme Court judgement reiterating that ‘Decisions of Civil Courts are binding on the Criminal Courts‘

Karam Chand Ganga Prasad And Anr. Vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 12 October, 1970

Rajesh Sharma and Ors Vs State of UP and Anr on 27 July, 2017

Posted on April 14, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

UPDATE 1:

SC Modifies The Earlier Directions Issued To Prevent Misuse Of 498A IPC, Says No To ‘Welfare Committees’

https://www.livelaw.in/breaking-sc-modifies-the-earlier-directions-issued-to-prevent-misuse-of-498a-ipc-says-no-to-welfare-committees/

UPDATE 2:

Few directions given in this judgment are held to be erroneous. Here is the new article.

https://www.livelaw.in/sec-498a-ipc-only-hc-can-quash-cases-on-settlement-a-third-agency-created-by-courts-cant-exercise-statutory-functionssc/

UPDATE 3:

In Shivangi Bansal Vs Sahib Bansal on 22 Jul 2025, Division Bench of Apex Court restored the Family Welfare Committees.

The detailed order is available here.

Guidelines issued by Hon’ble Supreme Court:

After considering the submissions of ASG A.S. Nadkarni, and Senior Advocate V. Giri, the Supreme Court has issued the following directions;

Part 1.

(a) In every district one or more Family Welfare Committees be constituted by the District Legal Services Authorities preferably comprising of three members. The constitution and working of such committees may be reviewed from time to time and at least once in a year by the District and Sessions Judge of the district who is also the Chairman of the District Legal Services Authority.

(b) The Committees may be constituted out of para legal volunteers/social workers/retired persons/wives of working officers/other citizens who may be found suitable and willing.
(c) The Committee members will not be called as witnesses.
(d) Every complaint under Section 498A received by the police or the Magistrate be referred to and looked into by such committee. Such committee may have interaction with the parties personally or by means of telephone or any other mode of communication including electronic communication.
(e) Report of such committee be given to the Authority by whom the complaint is referred to it latest within one month from the date of receipt of complaint.
(f) The committee may give its brief report about the factual aspects and its opinion in the matter.
(g) Till report of the committee is received, no arrest should normally be effected.
(h) The report may be then considered by the Investigating Officer or the Magistrate on its own merit.
(i) Members of the committee may be given such basic minimum training as may be considered necessary by the Legal Services Authority from time to time.
(j) The Members of the committee may be given such honorarium as may be considered viable.
(k) It will be open to the District and Sessions Judge to utilize the cost fund wherever considered necessary and proper.

Part 2.

Complaints under Section 498A and other connected offences may be investigated only by a designated Investigating Officer of the area. Such designations may be made within one month from today. Such designated officer may be required to undergo training for such duration (not less than one week) as may be considered appropriate. The training may be completed within four months from today;

Part 3.

In cases where a settlement is reached, it will be open to the District and Sessions Judge or any other senior Judicial Officer nominated by him in the district to dispose of the proceedings including closing of the criminal case if dispute primarily relates to matrimonial discord;

Part 4.

If a bail application is filed with at least one clear day’s notice to the Public Prosecutor/complainant, the same may be decided as far as possible on the same day. Recovery of disputed dowry items may not by itself be a ground for denial of bail if maintenance or other rights of wife/minor children can otherwise be protected. Needless to say that in dealing with bail matters, individual roles, prima facie truth of the allegations, requirement of further arrest/ custody and interest of justice must be carefully weighed;

Part 5.
In respect of persons ordinarily residing out of India impounding of passports or issuance of Red Corner Notice should not be a routine;

Part 6.

It will be open to the District Judge or a designated senior judicial officer nominated by the District Judge to club all connected cases between the parties arising out of matrimonial disputes so that a holistic view is taken by the Court to whom all such cases are entrusted;

Part 7.

Personal appearance of all family members and particularly outstation members may not be required and the trial court ought to grant exemption from personal appearance or permit appearance by video conferencing without adversely affecting progress of the trial.

Part 8. These directions will not apply to the offences involving tangible physical injuries or death.

Read the complete judgment here.

Rajesh Sharma & ors. Vs State of UP and Anr on 27 July, 2017

Citations: [2017 SCC ONLINE SC 821], [2017 AIR SC 3869], [2017 AJR 4 408], [2017 ALLMR CRI 3526], [2017 ALLCC 100 927], [2017 ACR 2 2225], [2017 ALT CRL AP 2 393], [2017 ALD CRL SC 2 568], [2017 BOMCR CRI 3 677], [2017 CGLJ 3 573], [2017 CCR SC 3 211], [2017 CTC 4 667], [2017 DMCSC 2 747], [2017 GLH 2 818], [2017 GLR 3 2430], [2017 ILR KER 3 425], [2017 JLJR 3 180], [2017 JCC 3 1919], [2017 KHC 4 163], [2017 KLJ 3 861], [2017 MLJ CRL 3 602], [2017 PLJR 3 240], [2017 RLW SC 3 2266], [2017 RCR CRIMINAL 3 836], [2017 SCALE 8 313], [2017 SCJ 7 94], [2017 UC 3 1601], [2017 WLN SC 3 81], [2018 SCC 10 472], [2019 SCC CRI 1 3012017 SCR 9 529], [2017 GUJ LR 3 2430], [2017 GUJ LH 2 818], [2017 AIC 177 224], [2017 CRIMES 3 268], [2017 ECRN 3 381], [2018 CRI LJ 3593

Indiankanoon.org link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/182220573/

News Article:

http://www.livelaw.in/breaking-misuse-of-s-498a-sc-directs-to-form-family-welfare-committees-to-examine-each-cases-no-arrests-before-committees-report-read-new-guidelines/

State of Karnataka Vs L. Muniswamy and Ors on 3 March, 1977

Posted on April 8, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Landmark Judgment on application of the Inherent powers of High Court u/s 482 of Cr.P.C to Quash a proceeding as there is inadequate material to sustain the charge of prosecution.

There is no material on the record on which any tribunal could reasonably convict them for any offence connected with the assault on the complainant. This is one of these cases in which a charge of conspiracy is hit upon for the mere reason that evidence of direct involvement of the accused is lacking.
The saving of the High Court’s inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a Salutary public purpose which is that a Court proceedings ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice.

State Of Karnataka vs L. Muniswamy & Ors on 3 March, 1977

Citations: [AIR 1977 SC 1489], [1977 Cri LJ 1125 (SC)], [(1977) 2 SCC 699], [1977 KARLJ 2 483], [1977 SCC 2 699], [1977 SCR 3 113], [1977 CAR 143], [1977 CRLR 188], [1977 MLJ CRI 1 428], [1977 SCC CR 0 404], [1977 CRILR 0 188], [1977 AIR SC 1498], [1978 CLR 0 39], [1977 SCC CRI 0 404]

Parbatbhai Aahir and Ors Vs State Of Gujarat and Anr on 4 October, 2017

Posted on April 7, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Read the broad principles High courts should consider for quashing of FIRs under Section 482 CrPC in this Judgment of Supreme Court.

IMPORTANT NOTE: If the FIR Quash is based on Jurisdiction ground, please note that there are Supreme Court and High Court judgments that mandate to transfer the FIR to the respective Police Station where there is jurisdiction for the case. Quash will not happen in such cases, under Jurisdiction ground alone. Find more grounds.

Broad Principles

(i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court;
(ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.
(iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power;
(iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;
(v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;
(vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences;
(vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned;
(viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute;
(ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and
(x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions (viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.

Principles for quashing of FIRs under Section 482 CrPC 40266_2016_Judgement_04-Oct-2017

Citations : [2017 SCC 9 641], [2017 SCC ONLINE SC 1189], [2017 AIR SC 4843], [2017 CTC 6 213], [2017 ALLMR CRI 4438], [2017 ACR 3 2714], [2017 BOMCR CRI 4 372], [2017 ILR KER 4 169], [2017 JLJR 4 191], [2017 KHC 5 192], [2017 PLJR 4 207], [2017 RCR CRIMINAL 4 523], [2017 SCALE 12 187], [2017 SCC ONLINE SC 1189], [2017 AIR SC 4843]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/7293093/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/59d91ddece686e237b6a8717

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/parbatbhai-aahir-parbatbhai-bhimsinhbhai-karmur-and-ors-vs-state-of-gujarat-and-anr

Rajinder Singh Vs State of Punjab on 26 February 2015

Posted on April 4, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Here is the Landmark Supreme Court judgment giving our clear definition of Dowry as ascribed in Dowry Prohibition Act. Read paras 7 and 8 which are the operative parts.

8. A perusal of this Section shows that this definition can be broken into six distinct parts.
1) Dowry must first consist of any property or valuable security – the word “any” is a word of width and would, therefore, include within it property and valuable security of any kind whatsoever.
2) Such property or security can be given or even agreed to be given. The actual giving of such property or security is, therefore, not necessary.
3) Such property or security can be given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly.
4) Such giving or agreeing to give can again be not only by one party to a marriage to the other but also by the parents of either party or by any other person to either party to the marriage or to any other person. It will be noticed that this clause again widens the reach of the Act insofar as those guilty of committing the offence of giving or receiving dowry is concerned.
5) Such giving or agreeing to give can be at any time. It can be at, before, or at any time after the marriage. Thus, it can be many years after a marriage is solemnized.
6) Such giving or receiving must be in connection with the marriage of the parties. Obviously, the expression “in connection with” would in the context of the social evil sought to be tackled by the Dowry Prohibition Act mean “in relation with” or “relating to”.

Rajinder Singh - Money to build a joint house

Citations: [2015 SCJ 2 686], [2016 NCC 1 626], [2015 ALLCC 89 352], [2015 SCR 2 835], [2015 AIC 148 33], [2015 SCC 6 477], [2015 AIR SC 1359], [2015 AD SC 3 553], [2015 CRIMES SC 2 90], [2015 SCC ONLINE SC 171], [2015 ALD CRL SC 2 32], [2015 JCC 2 1293], [2015 ACR SC 2 1301], [2015 CCR SC 1 477], [2015 CRILJ 1934], [2015 RCR CRIMINAL 2 129], [2015 UC 1 744], [2015 RLW SC 3 2359]

Indiankanoon.org or Casemine link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/38957892/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5790b23ee561097e45a4e216

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Landmark Case

Laljee Yadav Vs The State Of Bihar on 16 September, 2011

Geeta Mehrotra and Anr Vs State Of U.P. and Anr on 17 October, 2012

Sundar Babu & Ors Vs State Of Tamil Nadu on 19 February, 2009

K.Srinivas Rao Vs D.A.Deepa on 22 February, 2013

Samar Ghosh vs Jaya Ghosh on 26 March, 2007

Karam Chand Ganga Prasad And Anr. Vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 12 October, 1970

Rajesh Sharma and Ors Vs State of UP and Anr on 27 July, 2017

State of Karnataka Vs L. Muniswamy and Ors on 3 March, 1977

Parbatbhai Aahir and Ors Vs State Of Gujarat and Anr on 4 October, 2017

Rajinder Singh Vs State of Punjab on 26 February 2015