Iqbal Singh Marwah & Anr Vs Meenakshi Marwah & Anr on 11 March, 2005

Posted on June 12, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

This is an important judgment from Hon’ble Supreme Court on a contention point as documented in Para 5,

5. The principal controversy revolves round the interpretation of the expression “when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court” occurring in clause (b)(ii) of sub-section (1) of Section 195 Cr.P.C.

Simply put, if a document is forged before being submitted in a court, there is no bar to file a complaint on the accused of the forgery under clause (b)(ii) of sub-section (1) of Section 195 Cr.P.C.

A Magistrate may take cognizance of any offence
(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence,
(b) upon a police report of such facts, and
(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed.

From a victim standpoint who is facing an offender of forgery, thereafter in this case, the respondents moved an application under Section 340 Cr.P.C. requesting the Court to file a criminal complaint against appellant no.1 as the will set up by him was forged.

From Paras 23-26, very valuable aspect is explained ‘expedient in the interests of justice‘:

23. In view of the language used in Section 340 CrPC the court is not bound to make a complaint regarding commission of an offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b), as the section is conditioned by the words “court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice”. This shows that such a course will be adopted only if the interest of justice requires and not in every case. Before filing of the complaint, the court may hold a preliminary enquiry and record a finding to the effect that it is expedient in the interests of justice that enquiry should be made into any of the offences referred to in Section 195(1)(b). This expediency will normally be judged by the court by weighing not the magnitude of injury suffered by the person affected by such forgery or forged document, but having regard to the effect or impact, such commission of offence has upon administration of justice. It is possible that such forged document or forgery may cause a very serious or substantial injury to a person in the sense that it may deprive him of a very valuable property or status or the like, but such document may be just a piece of evidence produced or given in evidence in court, where voluminous evidence may have been adduced and the effect of such piece of evidence on the broad concept of administration of justice may be minimal. In such circumstances, the court may not consider it expedient in the interest of justice to make a complaint. The broad view of clause (b)(ii), as canvassed by learned counsel for the appellants, would render the victim of such forgery or forged document remediless. Any interpretation which leads to a situation where a victim of a crime is rendered remediless, has to be discarded.
24. There is another consideration which has to be kept in mind. Sub-section (1) of Section 340 CrPC contemplates holding of a preliminary enquiry. Normally, a direction for filing of a complaint is not made during the pendency of the proceeding before the court and this is done at the stage when the proceeding is concluded and the final judgment is rendered. Section 341 provides for an appeal against an order directing filing of the complaint. The hearing and ultimate decision of the appeal is bound to take time. Section 343(2) confers a discretion upon a court trying the complaint to adjourn the hearing of the case if it is brought to its notice that an appeal is pending against the decision arrived at in the judicial proceeding out of which the matter has arisen. In view of these provisions, the complaint case may not proceed at all for decades specially in matters arising out of civil suits where decisions are challenged in successive appellate fora which are time-consuming. It is also to be noticed that there is no provision of appeal against an order passed under Section 343(2), whereby hearing of the case is adjourned until the decision of the appeal. These provisions show that, in reality, the procedure prescribed for filing a complaint by the court is such that it may not fructify in the actual trial of the offender for an unusually long period. Delay in prosecution of a guilty person comes to his advantage as witnesses become reluctant to give evidence and the evidence gets lost. This important consideration dissuades us from accepting the broad interpretation sought to be placed upon clause (b)(ii).
25. An enlarged interpretation to Section 195(1)(b)(ii), whereby the bar created by the said provision would also operate where after commission of an act of forgery the document is subsequently produced in court, is capable of great misuse. As pointed out in Sachida Nand Singh after preparing a forged document or committing an act of forgery, a person may manage to get a proceeding instituted in any civil, criminal or revenue court, either by himself or through someone set up by him and simply file the document in the said proceeding. He would thus be protected from prosecution, either at the instance of a private party or the police until the court, where the document has been filed, itself chooses to file a complaint. The litigation may be a prolonged one due to which the actual trial of such a person may be delayed indefinitely. Such an interpretation would be highly detrimental to the interest of the society at large.
26. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that the courts are normally reluctant to direct filing of a criminal complaint and such a course is rarely adopted. It will not be fair and proper to give an interpretation which leads to a situation where a person alleged to have committed an offence of the type enumerated in clause (b)(ii) is either not placed for trial on account of non-filing of a complaint or if a complaint is filed, the same does not come to its logical end. Judging from such an angle will be in consonance with the principle that an unworkable or impracticable result should be avoided.

Iqbal Singh Marwah & Anr Vs Meenakshi Marwah & Anr on 11 March, 2005

Citations : [2005 AIR SC 2119], [2005 SCR 2 708], [2005 JT 3 195], [2005 SCALE 3 93], [2005 AIOL 135], [2005 MHLJ SC 3 530], [2005 BOMCR CRI SC 2 470], [2005 SCC 4 370], [2005 SUPREME 2 549], [2005 CRLJ SC 2161], [2005 SCC CRI 1101]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/618763/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae13e4b0149711412e0a

https://mynation.net/docs/402-2005/

https://www.insaafindia.in/judgements/misc/iqbal-singh-marwah-vs-meenakshi-marwah-forgery/

Maneka Gandhi Vs Union of India on 25 January 1978

Posted on June 12, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

The landmark judgment from Apex Court which held that any law that deprives the life and liberty must be just and fair.

The composition of the Bench is

BENCH:
BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH (CJ)
CHANDRACHUD, Y.V.
BHAGWATI, P.N.
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
UNTWALIA, N.L.
FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA
KAILASAM, P.S.

Maneka Gandhi Vs Union Of India on 25 January, 1978

Citation: [1978 AIR 597], [1978 SCR (2) 621], [1978 SCC (1) 248]

Indiankanoon link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1766147/

List of other case laws around Article 21 are here.

State Of Orissa Vs Debendra Nath Padhi on 29 November, 2004

Posted on June 4, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

A key question is clarified by the 3-judge bench of Supreme Court in this landmark judgment.

Can the trial court at the time of framing of charge consider material filed by the accused?

The scope of Sections 227 and 228 and scope of Sections 239 and 240 are explained along with scope of Sections 482

At the end the following is the summary arrived at.

Under Sections 227 and 228, a Magistrate of the trial court, is supposed to consider only the material sent by prosecution along with the record of the case and the documents sent along with it, at the time of framing of the charge. The accused at that stage has no right to place before the court any material.
Under Sections 239 and 240, requires the Magistrate to consider ‘the police report and the documents sent with it under Section 173’ and, if necessary, examine the accused and after giving accused an opportunity of being heard, if the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, the accused is liable to be discharged by recording reasons thereof.
Regarding the argument of accused having to face the trial despite being in a position to produce material of unimpeachable character of sterling quality, the width of the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code and Article 226 of Constitution of India is unlimited whereunder in the interests of justice the High Court can make such orders as may be necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice within the parameters laid down in Bhajan Lal’s case. Under Section 482 of the Code, along with the petition the accused may file unimpeachable evidence of sterling quality and on that basis seek quashing.

Legal point around application under/of CrPC 91

In so far as the accused is concerned, his entitlement to seek order under Section 91 would ordinarily not come till the stage of defence. When the section talks of the document beingnecessary and desirable, it is implicit that necessity and desirability is to be examined considering the stage when such a prayer for summoning andproduction is made and the party who makes it whether police or accused. If under Section 227 what is necessary and relevant is only the record produced in terms of Section 173 of the Code, the accused cannot at that stage invoke Section 91 to seek production of any document to show his innocence. Under Section 91 summons for production of document can beissued by Court and under a written order an officer in charge of policestation can also direct production thereof. Section 91 does not confer any right on the accused to produce document in his possession to prove his defence. Section 91 presupposes that when the document is not produced process may be initiated to compel production thereof.

Final conclusion: (from Para 29)

We are of the view that jurisdiction under Section 91 of the Code when invoked by accused the necessity and desirability would have to be seen by the Court in the context of the purpose investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceedings under the Code. It would also have to be borne in mind that law does not permit a roving or fishing inquiry. Regarding the argument of accused having to face the trial despite being in a position to produce material of unimpeachable character of sterling quality, the width of the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code and Article 226 of Constitution of India is unlimited whereunder in the interests of justice the High Court can make such orders as may be necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice within the parameters laid down in Bhajan Lal’s case.

State Of Orissa Vs Debendra Nath Padhi on 29 November, 2004

Citations : [2005 AIR SC 359], [2005 ALT CRI 1 1198], [2005 CLT SC 99 348], [2005 GLH 1 312], [2004 JT SC 10 303], [2005 KLT SC 1 80], [2005 OLR SC 1 357], [2005 RLW SC 3 414], [2004 SCALE 10 50], [2005 SCC 1 568], [2005 SCC CRI 415], [2004 SLT 7 339], [2004 SUPREME 8 568], [2005 OCR 30 177], [2005 RCR CRI 1 297], [2005 CALCRILR 1 487], [2005 CRIMES SC 1 1], [2004 AIR SCW 6813], [2005 CTC SC 1 134]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/7496/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae0be4b0149711412c9f

Index of Quash judgments u/s 482 are here.

Rajiv Thapar and Ors Vs Madan Lal Kapoor on 23 January, 2013

Posted on June 3, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Wonderful Judgment from our Supreme Court. See Hon’ble Apex Court has in detailed analyzed the contention of to quash or not to quash. This has become a landmark judgment which provides the below guidelines to quash/discharge.

Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.:-
(i) Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the material is of sterling and impeccable quality?
(ii) Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false?
(iii) Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted by the prosecution/ complainant; and/or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/ complainant?
(iv) Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice?

If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.

Read the way in which Justice J.S. Khehar has answered the above steps and finally quashed the High Court order to not discharge the accused.

Definitely a interesting read !!

Rajiv Thapar & Ors Vs Madan Lal Kapoor on 23 January, 2013

Citations: [2

Kans Raj Vs State of Punjab and Ors on 26 April 2000

Posted on June 3, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme court held that one should discourage the tendency to rope in all relations in dowry cases.

For the fault of the husband, the in-laws or the other relations cannot, in all cases, be held to be involved in the demand of dowry. In cases where such accusations are made, the overt acts attributed to persons other than husband are required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. By mere conjectures and implications such relations cannot be held guilty for the offence relating to dowry deaths. A tendency has, however, developed for roping in all relations of the in-laws of the deceased wives in the matters of dowry deaths which, if not discouraged, is likely to affect the case of the prosecution even against the real culprits. In their over enthusiasm and anxiety to seek conviction for maximum people, the parents of the deceased have been found to be making efforts for involving other relations which ultimately weaken the case of the prosecution even against the real accused as appears to have happened in the instant case.

Kans Raj Vs State Of Punjab & Ors on 26 April, 2000

Citations: [2000 JT SC 5 223], [2000 ACR SC 2 1263], [2000 SCC CRI 0 935], [2000 EASTCRIC 2 698], [2000 RCR CRIMINALINAL 2 695], [2000 SCC CR 0 935], [2000 RCR CRI 2 696], [2000 SCC 5 207], [2000 RCR CRI 2 695], [2000 CCR 2 156], [2000 AIR SC 2324 1], [2000 PLJR 3 68], [2000 ALLMR CRI 0 1180], [2000 MLJ CRI 1 844], [2000 RCR CRIMINAL 2 695], [2000 SLT 4 162], [2002 CLJ 0 2993], [2000 SCR 3 662], [2000 ACC 41 3], [2000 ALD CRI 2 467], [2002 SCC 5 207], [2000 CRI LJ 2993], [2000 LW CRL 2 660], [2000 JIC 2 353], [2000 AIR SC 0 2093], [2000 SRJ 10 330], [2000 ALD CRL 2 467], [2000 SCALE 3 429], [2000 KERLT 2 42], [2000 CRLLJ 2993], [2000 CRLJ 0 2993], [2000 RENTCR 2 695], [2000 AIR SC 2324], [2002 RCR CRIMINAL 2 695], [2000 JCRIC 2 665], [2000 DMC SC 1 645], [2000 SCC 5 2007], [2000 SUPREME 3 554], [2000 CRIMES 2 213]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1263837/

Dilawar Balu Kurane Vs State of Maharashtra on 8 January, 2002

Posted on June 2, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Nice judgment from Apex Court regarding discharge of an accused under S 227 of CrPC.

In exercising powers under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the settled position of law is that the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under the said section has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out; where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial; by and large if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully justified to discharge the accused, and in exercising jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Judge cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court but should not make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.

Dilawar Balu Kurane Vs State Of Maharashtra on 8 January, 2002

Citations: [2002 SCR 1 75], [2002 AIR SC 146], [2002 CRLJ SC 980], [2002 SCJ 1 203], [2002 JCC SC 1 172], [2002 SCC CRI 310], [2002 AIR SC 564], [2002 SCC 2 135], [2002 CRJ SC 2 284], [2002 BOMCR CRI SC 612], [2002 CRIMES SC 1 243], [2002 SCALE 1 47], [2002 SRJ 2 475], [2002 CCR SC 1 61], [2002 SLT 1 99], [2002 JT 1 6], [2002 SUPREME 1 55], [2002 UJ SC 1 269], [2002 RCR CRIMINAL SC 1 451], [2002 CRILJ 980], [2002 LLN 1 671]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1868789/ and https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609adb6e4b01497114120c8

Index of Discharge judgments u/s 227 are here.

Reproduced in accordance with Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from main.sci.gov.in/judgments, judis.nic.in, lobis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court and District Court Websites such as ecourts.gov.in

Union of India Vs Prafulla Kumar Samal and Anr on 6 Nov 1978

Posted on June 1, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Awesome judgment from Hon’ble Apex Court whereby a person is discharged under section 227 Cr.P.C. from the offence under Prevention of Corruption Act.

From Para 3

The short point which arises for determination in this case is the scope and ambit of an order of discharge to be passed by a Special Judge under section 227 of the Code. The appeal does not raise any new question of law and there have been several authorities of the High Courts as also of this Court on the various aspects and grounds on which an accused person can be discharged, but as section 227 of the Code is a new section and at the time when the application for special leave was filed, there was no direct decision of this Court on the interpretation of section 227 of the Code, the matter was thought fit to be given due consideration by this Court.

From Para 5,

Thus, it would appear that the legislature while dispensing with the procedure for commitment enquiry under the Code of 1898 has conferred a dual responsibility on the Trial Judge who has first to examine the case on the basis of the statement of witnesses recorded by the police and the documents filed with a view to find out whether a prima facie case for trial has been made out and then if such a case is made out to proceed to try the same. In our view the legislature has adopted this course in order to avoid frivolous prosecutions and prevent the accused from being tried of an offence on materials which do not furnish a reasonable probability of conviction.

From Para 7,

At the stage of section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him.

Few terms used by Hon’ble Justices of Apex Court in earlier judgments are

… Magistrate … is not to act as a mere Post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution
Magistrate holding an enquiry is not intended to act merely as a recording machine.

Following principles have emerged

(1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out:
(2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the Court will be, fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.
(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused.
(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under section 227 of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior and experienced Judge cannot act merely as a Post office or a mouth-piece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.

Union Of India Vs Prafulla Kumar Samal & Anr on 6 November, 1978

The following is from SCI’s SCR repository.

Union of India Vs Prafulla Kumar Samal and Anr on 6 Nov 1978 (SCR)

Citations: [1979 SCR 2 229], [1979 AIR SC 366], [1979 MLJ CRI 361], [1979 SCC 3 4], [1979 CRILJ 154], [1979 SCC CRI 609]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1360078/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609abcce4b014971140d5de

Index of Discharge Judgments u/s 227 Cr.P.C. is here.

Lalita Kumari Vs Govt. of U.P. and Ors on 12 November, 2013

Posted on June 1, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

In this landmark case, Supreme Court clarified the position on whether a police officer is bound to register a First Information Report (FIR) upon receiving any information relating to commission of a cognizable offence under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short ‘the Code’) or the police officer has the power to conduct a “preliminary inquiry” in order to test the veracity of such information before registering the same?”

Trivia: The victim Lalita Kumari is recovered here.

Conclusion/Directions:

111) In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold:

(i) Registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of the Code, if the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation.
(ii) If the information received does not disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not.
(iii) If the inquiry discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the FIR must be registered. In cases where preliminary inquiry ends in closing the complaint, a copy of the entry of such closure must be supplied to the first informant forthwith and not later than one week. It must disclose reasons in brief for closing the complaint and not proceeding further.
(iv) The police officer cannot avoid his duty of registering offence if cognizable offence is disclosed. Action must be taken against erring officers who do not register the FIR if information received by him discloses a cognizable offence.
(v) The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify the veracity or otherwise of the information received but only to ascertain whether the information reveals any cognizable offence.
(vi) As to what type and in which cases preliminary inquiry is to be conducted will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The category of cases in which preliminary inquiry may be made are as under:
(a) Matrimonial disputes/ family disputes
(b) Commercial offences
(c) Medical negligence cases
(d) Corruption cases
(e) Cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, for example, over 3 months delay in reporting the matter without satisfactorily explaining the reasons for delay.
The aforesaid are only illustrations and not exhaustive of all conditions which may warrant preliminary inquiry.
(vii) While ensuring and protecting the rights of the accused and the complainant, a preliminary inquiry should be made time bound and in any case it should not exceed 7 days. The fact of such delay and the causes of it must be reflected in the General Diary entry.
(viii) Since the General Diary/Station Diary/Daily Diary is the record of all information received in a police station, we direct that all information relating to cognizable offences, whether resulting in registration of FIR or leading to an inquiry, must be mandatorily and meticulously reflected in the said Diary and the decision to conduct a preliminary inquiry must also be reflected, as mentioned above.

Lalita Kumari Vs Govt.Of U.P.& Ors on 12 November, 2013

Citation: [(2014) 2 SCC 1], [2014 JCC SC 1 1], [2013 SCALE 13 559], [2013 RCR CRIMINAL SC 4 979], [2014 AIR SC 187], [2013 JT 14 399], [2013 CRIMES SC 4 243], [2013 AIOL 744], [2013 SLT 9 1], [2013 BOMCR CRI SC 4 680], [2013 SUPREME 8 1], [2014 CRIMES SC 4 488], [2013 ALLMR CRI SC 4444], [2013 AIR SC 6386], [2014 SCC CRI 1 524], [2014 SCC 2 1], [2013 SCC ONLINE SC 999], [2013 CTC 6 353], [2013 KERLT 4 632], [2014 CRILJ 470], [2014 AIC 134 155], [2013 KLJ 4 686], [2014 ECRN 1 180], [2014 KCCR 2 1305], [2014 CHN 2 7], [2013 PLJR 4 504], [2014 GLT SC 2 1], [2013 KHC 4 552], [2014 NCC 1 161], [2014 ALT CRL AP 1 100], [2014 ALLCC 84 719], [2014 SCJ 1 68], [2014 GLD SC 2 355], [2013 JLJR 4 505], [2013 UC 3 2017], [2013 MPHT SC 5 336], [2013 AD SC 12 209], [2014 OLR 1 5], [2014 ALD CRL SC 1 159], [2013 MLJ CRI 4 579], [2014 LW CRL 1 1], [2014 CHN SC 2 7], [2014 OLR SC 1 5], [2013 KLT SC 4 632], [2013 ALLMR CRI 4444], [2013 KLT 4 632], [2013 MLJ CRL 4 579], [2013 BOMCR CRI 4 680], [2014 CRI LJ 470], [2013 RCR CRIMINAL 4 979], [2013 JT SC 14 399], [2013 AIR SCW 6386]

Indra Sarma vs V.K.V.Sarma on 26 November, 2013

Posted on May 26, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

This is awesome judgment from Hon’ble Supreme Court that reaffirmed that When there is no relationship in the nature of marriage, no DV can apply.

iStory!

Ms. Indra Sarma, an unmarried woman, left her job and began a “live-in” relationship with Mr. V.K.V. Sarma for a period as long as 18 years, despite knowing that he was married. Mr. Sarma abandoned Ms. Sarma in a state where she could not maintain herself. Under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, failure to maintain a woman involved in a “domestic relationship” amounts to “domestic violence.” Two lower courts held that Mr. V.K.V. committed domestic violence by not maintaining Ms. Sarma, and directed Mr. Sarma to pay a maintenance amount of Rs.18,000 per month. Thereafter, on appeal, the High Court of Karnataka set aside the orders of the lower courts on the ground that Ms. Sarma was aware that Mr. Sarma was married and thus her relationship with him would fall outside the protected ambit of “relationship in the nature of marriage” under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. On further appeal, the Supreme Court, while affirming the High Court’s order, created an exception to the general rule. The Supreme Court clarified that a woman who begins to live with a man who is already married to someone else, without knowing that he is married, will still be considered to be in a “domestic relationship” under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005; thus, the man’s failure to maintain her will amount to “domestic violence” within the meaning of the Act and she will be eligible to claim reliefs such as maintenance and compensation. This case is important because it established for the first time such an exception and calls for legislative action to protect women like Ms. Sarma whose contributions in a joint household are often overlooked.

Guidelines issues in the Judgment

55. We may, on the basis of above discussion cull out some guidelines for testing under what circumstances, a live-in relationship will fall within the expression “relationship in the nature of marriage” under Section 2(f) of the DV Act. The guidelines, of course, are not exhaustive, but will definitely give some insight to such relationships.
1) Duration of period of relationship Section 2(f) of the DV Act has used the expression “at any point of time”, which means a reasonable period of time to maintain and continue a relationship which may vary from case to case, depending upon the fact situation.
(2) Shared household The expression has been defined under Section 2(s) of the DV Act and, hence, need no further elaboration.
(3) Pooling of Resources and Financial Arrangements Supporting each other, or any one of them, financially, sharing bank accounts, acquiring immovable properties in joint names or in the name of the woman, long term investments in business, shares in separate and joint names, so as to have a long standing relationship, may be a guiding factor.
(4) Domestic Arrangements Entrusting the responsibility, especially on the woman to run the home, do the household activities like cleaning, cooking, maintaining or upkeeping the house, etc. is an indication of a relationship in the nature of marriage.
(5) Sexual Relationship Marriage like relationship refers to sexual relationship, not just for pleasure, but for emotional and intimate relationship, for procreation of children, so as to give emotional support, companionship and also material affection, caring etc.
(6) Children Having children is a strong indication of a relationship in the nature of marriage. Parties, therefore, intend to have a long standing relationship. Sharing the responsibility for bringing up and supporting them is also a strong indication.
(7) Socialization in Public Holding out to the public and socializing with friends, relations and others, as if they are husband and wife is a strong circumstance to hold the relationship is in the nature of marriage.
(8) Intention and conduct of the parties Common intention of parties as to what their relationship is to be and to involve, and as to their respective roles and responsibilities, primarily determines the nature of that relationship.

Indra Sarma vs V.K.V.Sarma on 26 November, 2013

Citations: [AIR 2014 SC 309], [Manu/SC/1230/2013], [2014-1 LW.(Crl.) 129], [2013 SCC 15 755], [2014 SCC CIV 5 440], [2014 SCC CRI 6 593], [2013 SCC ONLINE SC 1042], [2013 KERLT 4 763], [2013 GUJ LH 3 720], [2014 AIC 133 225], [2014 ALR 102 711], [2014 LW 1 561], [2013 AIOL 781], [2014 AIR BOMR 1 615], [2014 ALLMR CRI SC 319], [2014 BOMCR CRI SC 1 496], [2014 JLJR SC 1 549], [2014 RCR CRIMINAL SC 1 179]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/192421140/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af32e4b0149711415ca2

The index page is here.

Hiral P Harsora and Ors Vs Kusum Narottamdas Harsora and Ors on October 6, 2016

Posted on May 21, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

This landmark judgment from Justice R.F. Nariman and Justice Kurian Joseph at Hon’ble Supreme Court has struck down the words “adult male” appearing in Section 2(q) of the Act as discriminatory.

From Last Para,

46. We, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment of the Bombay High Court and declare that the words “adult male” in Section 2(q) of the 2005 Act will stand deleted since these words do not square with Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Consequently, the proviso to Section 2(q), being rendered otiose, also stands deleted. We may only add that the impugned judgment has ultimately held, in paragraph 27, that the two complaints of 2010, in which the three female respondents were discharged finally, were purported to be revived, despite there being no prayer in Writ Petition No.300/2013 for the same. When this was pointed out, Ms. Meenakshi Arora very fairly stated that she would not be pursuing those complaints, and would be content to have a declaration from this Court as to the constitutional validity of Section 2(q) of the 2005 Act. We, therefore, record the statement of the learned counsel, in which case it becomes clear that nothing survives in the aforesaid complaints of October, 2010. With this additional observation, this appeal stands disposed of.

Hiral P Harsora and ors Vs. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora & Ors on October 6, 2016

Citation: [2016 SCC OnLine SC 1118] or [(2016) 10 SCC 165]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/114237665/

More than 5 years back, Supreme Court has actually held that Women can also be made respondents in a DV case here.

The index page is here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Landmark Case

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