Social Action Forum for Manav Adhikar and another Vs Union of India on 14 September, 2018

Posted on September 15, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Correcting few directions given in Rajesh Sharma judgment here, a Full Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court has issued this judgment.

Shutter Down of Family Welfare Committees

From Para 18,
18. It was submitted by the learned Amicus Curiae that the decision in Rajesh Sharma (supra) requires reconsideration, for the said judgment confers powers on the Family Welfare Committee to be constituted by the District Legal Services Authority which is an extra-judicial committee of para legal volunteers/social workers/retired persons/wives of working officers/other citizens to look into the criminal complaints under Sections 498-A IPC in the first instance and further, there has been a direction that till such time a report of the committee is received, no arrest should be made. It is urged that the constitution of FWC to look into the criminal complaints under Section 498-A IPC is contrary to the procedure prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure.

From Para 33,

33. On a perusal of the aforesaid paragraphs, we find that the Court has taken recourse to fair procedure and workability of a provision so Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited v. Securities and Exchange Board of India : (2012) 10 SCC 603, Para 52; SCBA v. Union of India : (1998) 4 SCC 409, Para 47; Union of India v. Raghubir Singh (d) by Lrs. : (1989) 2 SCC 754, Para 7; Dayaram v. Sudhir Batham : (2012) 1 SCC 333 State of Punjab v. Dalbir Singh : (2012) 3 SCC 346, Paras 46, 52 & 85 Gian Singh v. State of Punjab : (2012) 10 SCC 303, Para 61 that there will be no unfairness and unreasonableness in implementation and for the said purpose, it has taken recourse to the path of interpretation. The core issue is whether the Court in Rajesh Sharma (supra) could, by the method of interpretation, have issued such directions. On a perusal of the directions, we find that the Court has directed constitution of the Family Welfare Committees by the District Legal Services Authorities and prescribed the duties of the Committees. The prescription of duties of the Committees and further action therefor, as we find, are beyond the Code and the same does not really flow from any provision of the Code. There can be no denial that there has to be just, fair and reasonable working of a provision. The legislature in its wisdom has made the offence under Section 498-A IPC cognizable and non-bailable. The fault lies with the investigating agency which sometimes jumps into action without application of mind. The directions issued in Arnesh Kumar (supra) are in consonance with the provisions contained in Section 41 CrPC and Section 41-A CrPC. Similarly, the guidelines stated in Joginder Kumar (supra) and D.K. Basu (supra) are within the framework of the Code and the power of superintendence of the authorities in the hierarchical system of the investigating agency. The purpose has been to see that the investigating agency does not abuse the power and arrest people at its whim and fancy.

From Para 35,

However, the directions pertaining to Red Corner Notice, clubbing of cases and postulating that recovery of disputed dowry items may not by itself be a ground for denial of bail would stand on a different footing. They are protective in nature and do not sound a discordant note with the Code. When an application for bail is entertained, proper conditions have to be imposed but recovery of disputed dowry items may not by itself be a ground while rejecting an application for grant of bail under Section 498-A IPC. That cannot be considered at that stage. Therefore, we do not find anything erroneous in direction Nos. 19(iv) and (v). So far as direction No. 19(vi) and 19(vii) are concerned, an application has to be filed either under Section 205 CrPC or Section 317 CrPC depending upon the stage at which the exemption is sought.

From Para 38,

38. In the aforesaid analysis, while declaring the directions pertaining to Family Welfare Committee and its constitution by the District Legal Services Authority and the power conferred on the Committee is impermissible. Therefore, we think it appropriate to direct that the investigating officers be careful and be guided by the principles stated in Joginder Kumar (supra), D.K. Basu (supra), Lalita Kumari (supra) and Arnesh Kumar (supra). It will also be appropriate to direct the Director General of Police of each State to ensure that investigating officers who are in charge of investigation of cases of offences under Section 498-A IPC should be imparted rigorous training with regard to the principles stated by this Court relating to arrest.
39. In view of the aforesaid premises, the direction contained in paragraph 19(i) as a whole is not in accord with the statutory framework and the direction issued in paragraph 19(ii) shall be read in conjunction with the direction given hereinabove.
40. Direction No. 19(iii) is modified to the extent that if a settlement is arrived at, the parties can approach the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the High Court, keeping in view the law laid down in Gian Singh (supra), shall dispose of the same.
41. As far as direction Nos. 19(iv), 19(v) and 19(vi) and 19(vii) are concerned, they shall be governed by what we have stated in paragraph 35.

So, in summary, the following are the currently active guidelines from SC modified from Rajesh Sharma, apart from Arnesh Kumar.

From Para 19 of Rajesh Sharma Judgment:

iv) If a bail application is filed with at least one clear day’s notice to the Public Prosecutor/ complainant, the same may be decided as far as possible on the same day. Recovery of disputed dowry items may not by itself be a ground for denial of bail if maintenance or other rights of wife/minor children can otherwise be protected. Needless to say that in dealing with bail matters, individual roles, prima facie truth of the allegations, requirement of further arrest/ custody and interest of justice must be carefully weighed;
v) In respect of persons ordinarily residing out of India impounding of passports or issuance of Red Corner Notice should not be a routine;
vi) It will be open to the District Judge or a designated senior judicial officer nominated by the District Judge to club all connected cases between the parties arising out of matrimonial disputes so that a holistic view is taken by the Court to whom all such cases are entrusted; and
vii) Personal appearance of all family members and particularly outstation members may not be required and the trial court ought to grant exemption from personal appearance or permit appearance by video conferencing without adversely affecting progress of the trial. (On filing an application u/s 205 CrPC or 317 CrPC;Judgments here)

Social Action Forum for Manav Adhikar and another Vs Union of India on 14 September, 2018

Citations : [2018 SCC 10 443], [2019 SCC CRI 1 276], [2018 SCC ONLINE SC 1501], [2018 AIR SC 4273], [2018 DLT 252 175], [2018 CRIMES 3 503], [2018 GUJ LH 3 140]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/81618143/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5b9d5e5d9eff431109ed3e71

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/social-action-forum-for-manav-adhikar-and-another-versus-union-of-india-ministry-of-law-and

Source: https://www.livelaw.in/sec-498a-ipc-only-hc-can-quash-cases-on-settlement-a-third-agency-created-by-courts-cant-exercise-statutory-functionssc/

In Shivangi Bansal Vs Sahib Bansal on 22 Jul 2025, Division Bench of Apex Court restored the Family Welfare Committees.

Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre Vs State Of Maharashtra And Others on 2 December, 2010

Posted on September 13, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

This is the landmark judgment from my favorite judge Shri Dalveer Bhandari J on the duration of a anticipatory bail granted by a High Court of a Sessions Court.

Based on Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia case available here, it was held that once granted anticipatory bail continues to protect the accused until the end of trial.
In Sushila Aggarwal & Ors Vs State (NCT of Delhi) in 15 May, 2018 here, a reference is made to a larger bench of Supreme Court on the point of valid time period of an anticipatory bail. This was at last decided in favor this Mhetre judgment only here.

From Para 25,

Mr. Bhushan submitted that a plain reading of the section 438 Cr.P.C. clearly reveals that the legislature has not placed any fetters on the court. In other words, the legislature has not circumscribed court’s discretion in any manner while granting anticipatory bail, therefore, the court should not limit the order only for a specified period till the charge-sheet is filed and thereafter compel the accused to surrender and ask for regular bail under section 439 Cr.P.C., meaning thereby the legislature has not envisaged that the life of the anticipatory bail would only last till the charge-sheet is filed. Mr. Bhushan submitted that when no embargo has been placed by the legislature then this court in some of its orders was not justified in placing this embargo.

From Para 93,

Some courts of smaller strength have erroneously observed that section 438 Cr.P.C. should be invoked only in exceptional or rare cases. Those orders are contrary to the law laid down by the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Sibbia’s case (supra).

From Para 94,

The complaint filed against the accused needs to be thoroughly examined including the aspect whether the complainant has filed false or frivolous complaint on earlier occasion. The court should also examine the fact whether there is any family dispute between the accused and the complainant and the complainant must be clearly told that if the complaint is found to be false or frivolous, then strict action will be takenagainst him in accordance with law. If the connivance betweenthe complainant and the investigating officer is established then action be taken against the investigating officer in accordance with law.

From Para 97,

A great ignominy, humiliation and disgrace is attached to the arrest. Arrest leads to many serious consequences not only for the accused but for the entire family and at times for the entire community. Most people do not make any distinction between arrest at a pre-conviction stage or post-conviction stage.

From Para 101,

The proper course of action ought to be that after evaluating the averments and accusation available on the record if the court is inclined to grant anticipatory bail then an interim bail be granted and notice be issued to the public prosecutor. After hearing the public prosecutor the court may either reject the bail application or confirm the initial order of granting bail. The court would certainly be entitled to impose conditions for the grant of bail. The public prosecutor or complainant would be at liberty to move the same court for cancellation or modifying the conditions of bail any time if liberty granted by the court is misused. The bail granted by the court should ordinarily be continued till the trial of the case.

From Para 102, (VERY IMPORTANT)

The order granting anticipatory bail for a limited duration and thereafter directing the accused to surrender and apply before a regular bail is contrary to the legislative intention and the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Sibbia’s case (supra).

From Para 105, (VERY IMPORTANT)

The court which grants the bail has the right to cancel the bail according to the provisions of the General Clauses Act but ordinarily after hearing the public prosecutor when the bail order is confirmed then the benefit of the grant of the bail should continue till the end of the trial of that case.

From Para 106, (VERY IMPORTANT)

The judgment in Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh (supra) is contrary to legislative intent and the spirit of the very provisions of the anticipatory bail itself and has resulted in an artificial and unreasonable restriction on the scope of enactment contrary to the legislative intention.

From Para 108,

Section 438 Cr.P.C. does not mention anything about the duration to which a direction for release on bail in the event of arrest can be granted. The order granting anticipatory bail is a direction specifically to release the accused on bail in the event of his arrest. Once such a direction of anticipatory bail is executed by the accused and he is released on bail, the concerned court would be fully justified in imposing conditions including direction of joining investigation.

From Para 110,

In pursuance to the order of the Court of Sessions or the High Court, once the accused is released on bail by the trial court, then it would be unreasonable to compel the accused to surrender before the trial court and again apply for regular bail.

From Para 112,

The validity of the restrictions imposed by the Apex Court, namely, that the accused released on anticipatory bail must submit himself to custody and only thereafter can apply for regular bail. This is contrary to the basic intention and spirit of section 438 Cr.P.C. It is also contrary to Article 21 of the Constitution. The test of fairness and reasonableness is implicit under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Directing the accused to surrender to custody after the limited period amounts to deprivation of his personal liberty.

From Paras 115, 116 (VERY IMPORTANT)

The Apex Court in Salauddin’s case (supra) held that anticipatory bail should be granted only for a limited period and on the expiry of that duration it should be left to the regular court to deal with the matter is not the correct view. The reasons quoted in the said judgment is that anticipatory bail is granted at a stage when an investigation is incomplete and the court is not informed about the nature of evidence against the alleged offender.
The said reason would not be right as the restriction is not seen in the enactment and bail orders by the High Court and Sessions Court are granted under sections 437 and 439 also at such stages and they are granted till the trial.

From Para 119, (VERY VERY IMPORTANT)

This Court in the Sibbia’s case (supra) laid down the following principles with regard to anticipatory bail:
a) Section 438(1) is to be interpreted in light of Article21 of the Constitution of India.
b) Filing of FIR is not a condition precedent to exercise of power under section 438.
c) Order under section 438 would not affect the right of police to conduct investigation.
d) Conditions mentioned in section 437 cannot be read into section 438.
e) Although the power to release on anticipatory bail can be described as of an “extraordinary” character this would “not justify the conclusion that the power must be exercised in exceptional cases only.” Powers are discretionary to be exercised in light of the circumstances of each case.
f) Initial order can be passed without notice to the Public Prosecutor. Thereafter, notice must be issued forthwith and question ought to be reexamined after hearing. Such ad interim order must conform to requirements of the section and suitable conditions should be imposed on the applicant.

From Para 128, (VERY VERY IMPORTANT)

In case, the State consider the following suggestions in proper perspective then perhaps it may not be necessary to curtail the personal liberty of the accused in a routine manner. These suggestions are only illustrative and not exhaustive.
1) Direct the accused to join investigation and only when the accused does not cooperate with the investigating agency, then only the accused be arrested.
2) Seize either the passport or such other related documents, such as, the title deeds of properties or the Fixed Deposit Receipts/Share Certificates of the accused.
3) Direct the accused to execute bonds;
4) The accused may be directed to furnish sureties of number of persons which according to the prosecution are necessary in view of the facts of the particular case.
5) The accused be directed to furnish undertaking that he would not visit the place where the witnesses reside so that the possibility of tampering of evidence or otherwise influencing the course of justice can be avoided.
6) Bank accounts be frozen for small duration during investigation.

Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre Vs State Of Maharashtra And Others on 2 December, 2010

Citation: [(2011) 1 SCC 694], [AIR 2011 SC 312],

Indiankanoon.org or Casemine link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1108032/

Index of all Anticipatory Bail Matters is here.

Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia Etc Vs State of Punjab on 9 April 1980

Posted on September 8, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

In this judgment from Hon’ble Supreme Court, it was held that,

Highlight

Should the operation of an order passed under Section 438(1) be limited in point of time? Not necessarily. The Court may, if there are reasons for doing so, limit the operation of the order to a short period until after the filing of an F.I.R. in respect of the matter covered by the order. The applicant may in such cases be directed to obtain an order of bail under Section 437 or 439 of the Code within a reasonably short period after the filing of the F.I.R. as aforesaid. But this need not be followed as an invariable rule. The normal rule should be not to limit the operation of the order in relation to a period of time.

Another set of clarifications here:

This should be the end of the matter, but it is necessary to clarify a few points which have given rise to certain misgivings.
Section 438(1) of the Code lays down a condition which has to be satisfied before anticipatory bail can be granted. The applicant must show that he has “reason to believe” that he may be arrested for a non-bailable offence. The use of the expression “reason to believe” shows that the belief that the applicant may be so arrested must be founded on reasonable grounds. Mere ‘fear’ is not ‘belief’, for which reason it is not enough for the applicant to show that he has some sort of a vague apprehension that some one is going to make an accusation against him, in pursuance of which he may be arrested. The grounds on which the belief of the applicant is based that he may be arrested for a non- bailable offence, must be capable of being examined by the court objectively, because it is then alone that the court can determine whether the applicant has reason to believe that he may be so arrested. Section 438(1), therefore, cannot be invoked on the basis of vague and general allegations, as if to arm oneself in perpetuity against a possible arrest. Otherwise, the number of applications for anticipatory bail will be as large as, at any rate, the adult populace. Anticipatory bail is a device to secure the individual’s liberty; it is neither a passport to the commission of crimes nor a shield against any and all kinds of accusations, likely or unlikely.
Secondly, if an application for anticipatory bail is made to the High Court or the Court of Session it must apply its own mind to the question and decide whether a case has been made out for granting such relief. It cannot leave the question for the decision of the Magistrate concerned under Section 437 of the Code, as and when an occasion arises. Such a course will defeat the very object of Section 438.
Thirdly, the filing of a First Information Report is not a condition precedent to the exercise of the power under Section 438. The imminence of a likely arrest founded on a reasonable belief can be shown to exist even if an F.I.R. is not yet filed.
Fourthly, anticipatory bail can be granted even after an F.I.R. is filed, so long as the applicant has not been arrested.
Fifthly, the provisions of Section 438 cannot be invoked after the arrest of the accused. The grant of “anticipatory bail” to an accused who is under arrest involves a contradiction in terms, in so far as the offence or offences for which he is arrested, are concerned. After arrest, the accused must seek his remedy under Section 437 or Section 439 of the Code, if he wants to be released on bail in respect of the offence or offences for which he is arrested.

Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia Etc Vs State Of Punjab on 9 April, 1980

Raghubir Singh & Others Etc Vs State Of Bihar on 19 September, 1986

Posted on September 8, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

In this judgment from Hon’ble Supreme Court, it was held that,

Highlight

The result of our discussion and the case-law in this: An order for release on bail made under the proviso to s.167(2) is not defeated by lapse of time, the filing of the chargesheet or by remand to custody under s. 309(2). The order for release on bail may however be cancelled under s.437(5) or s. 439(2). Generally the grounds for cancellation of bail, broadly, are, interference or attempt to interfere with the due course of administration of justice, or evasion or attempt to evade the course of justice, or abuse of the liberty granted to him. The due administration of justice may be interfered with by intimidating or suborning witnesses, by interfering with investigation, by creating or causing disappearance of evidence etc. The course of justice may be evaded or attempted to be evaded by leaving the country or going underground or otherwise placing himself beyond the reach of the sureties. He may abuse the liberty granted to him by indulging in similar or other unlawful acts. Where bail has been granted under the proviso to s.167(2) for the default of the prosecution in not completing the investigation in sixty days, after the defect is cured by the filing of a chargesheet, the prosecution may seek to have the bail cancelled on the ground that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused has committed a non-bailable offence and that it is necessary to arrest him and commit him to custody. In the last mentioned case, one would expect very strong grounds indeed.

Raghubir Singh & Others Etc Vs State Of Bihar on 19 September, 1986

Satvinder Kaur vs State (Govt. Of N.C.T. Of Delhi) on 5 October, 1999

Posted on September 3, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

A landmark judgment from Hon’ble Supreme Court which held that,

(1) The S.H.O. has statutory authority under Section 156 of the Criminal Procedure Code to investigate any cognizable case for which an F.I.R. is lodged.
(2) At the stage of investigation, there is no question of interference under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code on the ground that the Investigating Officer has no territorial jurisdiction.
(3) After investigation is over, if the Investigating Officer arrives at the conclusion that the cause of action for lodging the F.I.R. has not arisen within his territorial jurisdiction, then he is required to submit a report accordingly under Section 170 of the Criminal Procedure Code and to forward the case to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence.
This would be clear from the following discussion. Section 156 of the Criminal Procedure Code empowers the Police Officer to investigate any cognizable offence. It reads as under :
” 156. Police Officer’s power to investigate cognizable case : –
(1) Any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII.
(2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate.
(3) Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation as above-mentioned.”

FIR Quash is set aside and the IO at Delhi is allowed to continue investigation.

Satvinder Kaur vs State (Govt. Of N.C.T. Of Delhi) on 5 October, 1999

Indiankanoon.org link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1841921/

Citations: [1999 (8) SCC 728], [AIR 1999 SCC (Crl) 1503]

The State Of Telangana Vs Habib Abdullah Jeelani & Ors on 6 January, 2017

Posted on September 3, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

This judgment from hon’ble Supreme Court, held that the High Court cannot direct the police not to arrest the petitioners during the pendency of the investigation just because they pleaded to be innocents, especially when it held that it is not inclined to interfere on the ground that it was not appropriate to stay the investigation of the case.

Interesting:
It is a well-settled proposition of law what cannot be done directly, cannot be done indirectly.

The State Of Telangana Vs Habib Abdullah Jeelani & Ors on 6 January, 2017

Tahmeena Kaleem And Others Vs State Of A.P. on 17 January, 2014

Posted on September 2, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

Hon’ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh has, in this judgment, reminded about the menace of roping in all relatives of husband into false litigation while granting anticipatory bail to relatives of husband.

Tahmeena Kaleem And Others Vs State Of A.P. on 17 January, 2014

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/122766842/

https://www.legitquest.com/case/tahmeena-kaleem-others-v-state-of-andhra-pradesh/86139

https://www.lawyerservices.in/Tahmeena-Kaleem-and-Others-Versus-State-of-Andhra-Pradesh-2014-01-17

Sushil Kumar Sharma Vs Union Of India And Ors on 19 July, 2005

Posted on September 1, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

In this Writ Petition by Sushil Kumar Sharma, which was dismissed though, had this prayer,

By this petition purported to have been filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short ‘the Constitution’) prayer is to declare Section 498A of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short ‘the IPC’) to be unconstitutional and ultra vires in the alternative to formulate guidelines so that innocent persons are victimized by unscrupulous persons making false accusations.

And,

Further prayer is made that whenever, any court comes to the conclusion that the allegations made regarding commission of offence under Section 498 IPC are unfounded, stringent action should be taken against person making the allegations. This according to the petitioner, would discourage persons from coming to courts with unclean hands and ulterior motives. Several instances have been highlighted to show as to how commission of offence punishable under Section 498A IPC has been made with oblige motive and with a view to harass the husband, in-laws and relatives.

Here is the legal terrorism comment,

The object of the provision is prevention of the dowry menace. But as has been rightly contended by the petitioner many instances have come to light where the complaints are not bonafide and have filed with oblique motive. In such cases acquittal of the accused does not in all cases wipe out the ignonymy suffered during and prior to trial. Sometimes adverse media coverage adds to the misery. The question, therefore, is what remedial measures can be taken to prevent abuse of the well-intentioned provision. Merely because the provision is constitutional and intra-vires, does not give a licence to unscrupulous persons to wreck personal vendetta or unleash harassment. It may, therefore, become necessary for the legislature to find out ways how the makers of frivolous complaints or allegations can be appropriately dealt with. Till then the Courts have to take care of the situation within the existing frame work. As noted the object is to strike at the roots of dowry menace. But by misuse of the provision a new legal terrorism can be unleashed. The provision is intended to be used a shield and not assassins’ weapon. If cry of “wolf” is made too often as a prank assistance and protection may not be available when the actual “wolf” appears. There is no question of investigating agency and Courts casually dealing with the allegations. They cannot follow any strait jacket formula in the matters relating to dowry tortures, deaths and cruelty. It cannot be lost sight of that ultimate objective of every legal system is to arrive at truth, punish the guilty and protect the innocent. There is no scope for any pre- conceived notion or view. It is strenuously argued by the petitioner that the investigating agencies and the courts start with the presumption that the accused persons are guilty and that the complainant is speaking the truth. This is too wide available and generalized statement. Certain statutory presumption are drawn which again are reputable. It is to be noted that the role of the investigating agencies and the courts is that of watch dog and not of a bloodhound. It should be their effort to see that in innocent person is not made to suffer on account of unfounded, baseless and malicious allegations. It is equally indisputable that in many cases no direct evidence is available and the courts have to act on circumstantial evidence. While dealing with such cases, the law laid down relating to circumstantial evidence has to be kept in view.

And it was dismissed like this,

Prayer has been made to direct investigation by the Central Bureau of Investigation (in short the ‘CBI’) in certain matters where the petitioner is arrayed as an accused. We do not find any substance in this plea. If the petitioner wants to prove his innocence, he can do so in the trial, if held.

Sushil Kumar Sharma Vs Union Of India And Ors on 19 July, 2005

Citations: [2005 ALLMR SC 5 982], [2005 SCR 730], [2006 CRLR 44], [2005 SRJ 8 90], [2005 CRLJ 0 3439], [2005 CRI LJ 3439], [2005 RCR CRI 3 745], [2005 SCC CR 0 1473], [2005 AIOL 300], [2005 CCR 3 43], [2005 KERLT 3 611], [2005 JT 6 266], [2005 CRLR 661], [2005 SCALE 5 523], [2005 MLJ CRI 1 887], [2005 ALLMR 5 982], [2006 CALCRILR 44], [2005 SLT 5 438], [2005 JCRIC 2 1193], [2005 ALD CRI 2 633], [2005 DMC 2 325], [2005 SCJ 5 303], [2005 SCC 6 281], [2005 AIR SC 3100], [2005 SCC CRI 0 1473], [2005 AIR SC 0 3569], [2005 UJ SC 2 1057], [2005 SUPREME 5 137]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1172674/ and https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae15e4b0149711412e70

Sri Rameshwar Yadav Vs The State Of Bihar on 16 March, 2018

Posted on August 20, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

This judgment from Hon’ble Apex Court allowed Exemption from Personal Appearance under CrPC 205 to parents and family of Arnesh Kumar.

Sri Rameshwar Yadav Vs The State Of Bihar on 16 March, 2018

Dhananjay Sharma Vs State Of Haryana And Ors on 2 May 1995

Posted on August 15, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

This landmark judgment from Apex Court has been cited in many cases handled by CBI as the contemnors in this case were handed out Simple Imprisonment from 1 day to 3 months.

Superintendent of Police Hissar Shri Anil Dawra to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of two months for committing contempt of court by filing false affidavits
Addl. Superintendent of Police Hissar Shri Sham Lal Goel and SHO Hissar Shri Rajendra Singh to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of three months each and to pay a fine of Rs. 1500 each and in default to further undergo simple imprisonment for fifteen days each.
Shri Sushil Kumar taxi driver to suffer one days’ simple imprisonment and to a fine of Rs. 1000 and in default to further undergo fifteen days simple imprisonment, for committing contempt of this Court

The petitioner of this Writ petition could have gotten compensation from State for his illegal detention but due to his exaggeration of the incident, has disentitled themselves from receiving any compensation.

Dhananjay Sharma Vs State Of Haryana And Ors on 2 May, 1995

Some related news here.

Citations : [1995 SCC CRI 608], [1995 SCALE 3 138], [1995 AIR SC 1795], [1995 CRIMES SC 2 592], [1995 SCC 3 757], [1995 BOMCR SC 4 366], [1995 ALR 26 180], [1995 ALT CRI 2 340], [1996 BLJR 1 352], [1995 SCR 3 964], [1996 UPLBEC 1 203], [1995 JT SC 4 483]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1877695/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609acc2e4b014971140fa5f

Index of Perjury Judgments is here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Landmark Case

Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre Vs State Of Maharashtra And Others on 2 December, 2010

Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia Etc Vs State of Punjab on 9 April 1980

Raghubir Singh & Others Etc Vs State Of Bihar on 19 September, 1986

Satvinder Kaur vs State (Govt. Of N.C.T. Of Delhi) on 5 October, 1999

The State Of Telangana Vs Habib Abdullah Jeelani & Ors on 6 January, 2017

Tahmeena Kaleem And Others Vs State Of A.P. on 17 January, 2014

Sushil Kumar Sharma Vs Union Of India And Ors on 19 July, 2005

Sri Rameshwar Yadav Vs The State Of Bihar on 16 March, 2018

Dhananjay Sharma Vs State Of Haryana And Ors on 2 May 1995