This is the landmark judgment, it was held that when a second complaint on same facts but fresh evidence is filed it can be entertained.
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In this landmark case, Hon’ble Supreme Court has struck down the following laws as being violative of Constitutional rights of Citizens.
Citation: [(2015) 5 SCC 1], [2015 COMPLJ SC 2 143], [2015 SCC ONLINE SC 248], [2015 AIR SC 1523], [2015 DLT 218 370], [2015 KLJ 2 292], [2015 KERLT 2 1], [2015 KLT 2 1]
Other Sources : https://indiankanoon.org/doc/110813550/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5790b244e561097e45a4e264
In this landmark judgment bu Hon’ble Apex Court, it was held that even prisoners has right to free legal aid. It was a terrible act of a jail warder, who practiced torture and sustained serious anal injury because a rod was driven into that aperture to inflict inhuman torture and that as the bleeding had not stopped, he was removed to the jail hospital and later to the Irvin Hospital.
BENCH:
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
PATHAK, R.S.
REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)
citations: 1980 AIR 1579, 1980 SCR (2) 557
Indiankanoon link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/778810/
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In this landmark judgment from Hon’ble Supreme Court, it was held that “We have already extracted a passage from the judgment of Field, J. in Munn v. Illinois (1), where the learned judge pointed out that “life” in the 5th and 14th Amendments of the U. S. Constitution corresponding to Art. 21, means not merely the right to the continuance of a person’s animal existence, but a right to the possession of each of his organs-his arms and legs etc. We do not entertain any doubt that the word “’life” in Art. 21 bears the same signification.”
In our view cl. (b) of Regulation 236 is plainly violative of Art. 21’ and as there is no “law” on which the same could be justified it must be struck down as unconstitutional.
This petition raises a question of far-reaching importance. namely, a right of a citizen of India to lead a free life subject to social control imposed by valid law. The fact that the question has been raised at the instance of an alleged disreputable character shall not be allowed to deflect our perspective. If the police could do what they did to the petitioner, they could also do the same to an honest and law-abiding citizen.
Let us at the outset clear the ground. We are not concerned here with a law imposing restrictions on a bad character, for admittedly there is no such law. Therefore, the petitioner’s fundamental right, if any, has to be judged on the basis that there is no such law. To state it differently, what fundamental right of the petitioner has been infringed by the acts of the police? If he has any fundamental right which has been infringed by such acts, he would be entitled to a relief straight away, for the State could not justify it on the basis of any law made by the appropriate Legislature or the rules made thereunder.
Discussion around infringement of both Articles 19 and 21
At this stage it will be convenient to ascertain the scope of the said two provisions and their relation inter se in the context of the question raised. Both of them are distinct fundamental rights. No doubt the expression “personal liberty” is a comprehensive one and the right to move freely is an attribute of personal liberty. It is said that the freedom to move freely is carved out of personal liberty and, therefore, the expression “personal liberty” in Art. 21 excludes that attribute. In our view, this is not a correct approach. Both are independent fundamental rights, though there is overlapping. There is no question of one being carved out of another. The fundamen. tal right of life and personal liberty have many attributes and some of them are found in Art. 19. If a Person’s fundamental right under Art. 21 is infringed, the State can rely upon a law to sustain the action; but that cannot be a complete answer unless the said law satisfies the test laid down in Art. 19 (2) so far as the attributes covered by Art. 19 (1) are concerned. In other words, the State must satisfy that both the fundamental rights are not infringed by showing that there is a law and that it does amount -to a reasonable restriction. within the meaning of Art. 19 (2) of the Constitution. But in this case no such defence is available, as admittedly there is no such law. So the petitioner can legitimately plead that his fundamental rights both under Art. 19 (1) (d) and Art. 21 are infringed by the State.
Discussion around Article 21
We would, therefore, define the right of personal liberty in Art. 21 as a right of an individual to be free from restrictions or encroachments on his person, whether those restrictions or encroachments are directly imposed or indirectly brought about by calculated measures. If so understood, all the acts of surveillance under,Regulation 236 infringe the fundamental right of the petitioner under Art. 21 of the Constitution.
Citation: 1963 AIR 1295, 1964 SCR (1) 332
Indiankanoon link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/619152/
The index page is here.
This is another landmark judgment which held the right to travel.
The composition of Bench is
BENCH:
RAO, K. SUBBA (CJ)
HIDAYATULLAH, M.
BACHAWAT, R.S.
SHELAT, J.M.
VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A.
Citation: AIR 1976 SC 1836, 1967 AIR 1836, 1967 SCR (2) 525
Indiankanoon link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1747577/
In this landmark judgment by the full bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court, it was held that fundamental rights provided by Articles of Constitution are not silos in nature but are connected with one another.
The bench consisted of below judges, including the Hon’ble CJI.
As such it was held that it is declared that the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act 22 of 1969 is invalid and the action taken or deemed to be taken in exercise of the powers under the Act is declared unauthorised.
Citation: 1970 AIR 564, 1970 SCR (3) 530
Indiakanoon.org link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/513801/
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In this wonderful landmark judgment, Justice Shri Nagamuthu has delivered a death-knell to the false case filing lair knifes.
From Para 13,
Now, the question is as to whether the wife, who has been neglected by her husband or refused to be maintained, is aggrieved person, as defined in Section 2(a) of the Act. In other words, whether such neglect or refusal by the husband would amount to domestic violence as defined in Section 3 of the Act.
From Para 15,
For the wife, maintenance paid by way of maintenance amount payable by the husband is a financial resource for her. Similarly, the denial of household necessities of the wife is also an economic abuse. The husband is bound to maintain the wife. If he neglects or fails to maintain, the wife is deprivation of her financial resources to maintain herself and to meet her household necessities. Denial of either of these two would amount to economic abuse. Such economic abuse will amount to domestic violence. The wife, who is the victim of such domestic violence, is, therefore, entitled for monetary relief under Section 20 of the Act.
From Para 17,
The next question, which arises for consideration, is as to whether an order for maintenance made by a Magistrate under Section 125 of the Code, shall be a bar for a Magistrate acting under Section 20 of the Act to pass an order for maintenance. In this regard, again, we should have a look into the Section 20(1)(d) of the Act, which states that the monetary relief granted under Section 20 of the Act may include an order for maintenance, in addition to an order of maintenance under Section 125 of the Code. Thus, it is crystal clear that a previous order for maintenance passed by a Magistrate under Section 125 of the Code, is not a bar for a Magistrate acting under Section 20 of the Act to pass yet another order granting monetary relief under Section 20 of the Act, by way of maintenance under Section 125 of the Code. Here, it needs to be noted that the subsequent order made under Section 20 of the Act is not in any way in modification or variation of the earlier order made under Section 125 of the Code by a Magistrate.
From Para 18,
If the wife wants to modify an order made under Section 125 of the Code, seeking enhancement of the maintenance amount, the only option available for her is to file a petition under Section 127 of the Code before the same Magistrate, who passed the order. In other words, the order made under Section 125 of the Code can be modified or varied only by the same Magistrate, who passed the earlier order. An order made under Section 125 of the Code for maintenance by one Magistrate cannot be varied or modified by a Magistrate acting under Section 20 of the Act. Therefore, it should be noted that a monetary relief granted towards maintenance under Section 20 of the Act may be not in modification of the previous order for maintenance passed under Section 125 of the Code, but it may be in addition to the said order for maintenance passed under Section 125 of the Code. If an order has already been made under Section 125 of the Code for maintenance, there can be no doubt that the wife had proved either neglect or refusal on the part of the husband. If the wife wants an order under Section 20 of the Act, in addition to the order under Section 125 of the Code, she has to prove fresh acts of the husband constituting the domestic violence subsequent to the passing of the earlier order under Section 125 of the Code. She cannot rely on the acts of the husband constituting domestic violence, which happened prior to the passing of the order under Section 125 of the Code. For getting an order under Section 20 of the Act, in addition to the earlier order under Section 125 of the Code, the wife should plead and prove that subsequent to the said order made under Section 125 of the Code, the husband had caused domestic violence and on account of the same, she had suffered loss and thus, she is entitled for additional amount as maintenance. Thus, it is manifestly clear that a previous order made under Section 125 of the Code is not a bar for an aggrieved wife to approach a Magistrate under Section 20 of the Act, for monetary relief as an additional relief of maintenance, provided subsequent to the passing of the earlier order under under Section 125 of the Code, the husband has committed domestic violence resulting loss to the wife.
From Para 19,
In this regard, we may also take note of Section 36 of the Act, which states that the provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and in derogation of the provisions of any other law, for the time being in force, which means Section 20 of the Act is not in derogation of Section 125 of the Code. It also needs to be clarified that as and when there is neglect or refusal on the part of the husband to maintain the wife, she has got option either to seek remedy under Section 125 of the Code or under Section 20 of the Act. If she elects to make a claim under Section 125 of the Code, on the same cause of action, she cannot, simultaneously, make a claim under Section 20 of the Act and vice versa. On the said cause of action, if the Magistrate dismisses the claim made by the petitioner under Section 125 of the Code, then, on the same set of allegation and cause of action, the wife cannot change her course and make a claim under Section 20 of the Act. Similarly, having elected to approach the Court under Section 20 of the Act, after having failed in her attempt to get maintenance, on the same set of allegations and cause of action, she cannot make a fresh allegation under Section 125 of the Code for maintenance. Having chosen one forum, if the aggrieved wants to approach the other forum, such approach could be made only on fresh grounds, which occurred subsequent to the order passed by the other forum.
Citation: 2016 All MR(Cri)168,
This was referred to in this 2018 judgment here.
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This judgment is considered a stain on the history of the court, which had delivered a judgment that has trummelled on the rights of citizens.
Case background:
The President of India, during the Emergency, made such a proclamation and many people were detained under various laws. Some of them moved high courts seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The Government said, since the right to move courts for the enforcement of Article 21 is suspended, the petitions were not maintainable.
Real Story:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans_Raj_Khanna#The_Habeas_Corpus_Case
https://www.bloombergquint.com/opinion/vr-krishna-iyer-the-super-judge#gs.89TGyeW0
Hon’ble Court rules:
The 4 out of 5 judges on the bench held that “The width and amplitude of the power of detention under section 3 of the Act is to be adjudged in the context of the emergency proclaimed by the President. The Court cannot compel the detaining authority to give the particulars of the grounds on which he had reasonable cause to believe that it was necessary to exercise this control. An investigation into facts or allegations of facts based on malafides is not permissible because such a course will involve advertence to the grounds of detention and materials constituting those grounds which is not competent in the context of the emergency”
Justice Hans Raj Khanna is the sole dissenting voice on the bench and after referring to earlier A.K.Gopalan case he held that “The argument that suspending the right of a person to move any court for the enforcement of right to life and personal liberty is done under a constitutional provision and, therefore, it cannot be said that the resulting situation would mean the absence of the Rule of law cannot stand close scrutiny for it tries to equate illusion of the Rule of Law with the reality of Rule of Law.“
And “The suspension of the right to move a court for the enforcement of the right contained in Art. 21 cannot have the effect of debarring an aggrieved person from approaching the courts with the complaint regarding deprivation of life or personal liberty by an authority on the score that no power has been vested in the authority to deprive a person of life or liberty. The pre-supposition of the existence of substantive power to deprive a person of his life or personal liberty in Art. 21 even though that article only mentions the procedure, would not necessarily point to the conclusion that in the event of the suspension of the right to move any court for the enforcement of Art. 21, the suspension would also dispense with the necessity of the existence of the substantive power The co-existence of substantive power and procedure established by law for depriving R person of his life and liberty which is implicit in Art. 21 would not lead to the result that even if there is suspension of the right regarding procedure, suspension would also operate upon the necessity of substantive power. What is true of a proposition need not be true of the converse of that proposition. The suspension of the right to make. any court for the enforcement of the right contained in Art. 21 may have the effect of dispensing with the necessity of prescribing procedure for the exercise.. Of substantive power to deprive a person of his life or personal liberty, it can in no case have the effect of permitting an authority to deprive a person of his life or personal liberty without the existence of substantive power. The close bond which is there between the existence of substantive power of depriving a Person of his life or personal liberty and the procedure for the exercise of that power, if the right contained in Art. 21 were in operation, would not necessarily hold good if that right were suspended because the removal of compulsion about the prescription of procedure for the exercise of the substantive power would not do away with the compulsion regarding the existence of that power.”
Final Words
There is no sufficient ground to interfere with the view taken by all the nine High Courts which went into the matter that the Presidential order dated June 27, 1975, did not affect the maintainability of the habeas corpus petitions to question the legality of the detention orders.
The principles which should be followed by the courts in dealing with petitions for writs of habeas corpus to challenge the legality of detention are well-established.
Unanimity obtained without sacrifice of conviction commends the decision to public confidence. Unanimity which is merely formal and which is recorded at the expense of strong conflicting views is not desirable in a court of last resort.
A dissent in a court of last resort is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day when a later decision may possibly correct the error into which the dissenting Judge believes the court have been betrayed.
Observation: Judges are not there simply to decide cases, but to decide them as they think they should be decided, and while it may be regrettable that they cannot always agree, it is better that their independence should be maintained and recognise than that unanimity should be secured through its sacrifice.
Citation: AIR 1976 SC 1207, 1976 SCR 172, 1976 SCC (2) 521
Indiankanoon link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1735815/
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In this landmark judgment from Hon’ble Apex Court, it was held that a daughter (not just a son) is also liable to pay maintenance to her parents under 125 CrPC read with Sec 8 of IPC.
The lower court which is Bombay High Court has given this order here, was later on confirmed by the Apex Court.
This has a precedence from a Kerala high Court judgment available here and one subsequent judgment of High Court of AP here.
Citation: [1987 SCR (2) 331], [1987 SCC (2) 278], [JT 1987 (3) 46], [1987 SCALE (1) 379], [1987 BOMCR SC 1 629], [1987 AIR SC 1100], [1987 SCC CRI 354], [1987 CRIMES SC 1 713], [1987 CRIMES SC 3 348], [1987 CRLJ SC 977], [1987 ECC 11 416], [1987 ACR SC 11 334], [1987 APLJ SC 1 35], [1987 AWC SC 676], [1987 BOMLR 89 130], [1987 KLT SC 1 674], [1987 MHLJ 395], [1987 MPLJ 218], [1988 SHIMLC 1 133]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/780813/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac39e4b014971140e515
This is the landmark ruling from Hon’ble Supreme Court wherein it was held that
“We are of the opinion that a broad and expansive interpretation should be given to the term “wife” to include even those cases where a man and woman have been living together as husband and wife for a reasonably long period of time, and strict proof of marriage should not be a precondition for maintenance under Section 125 CrPC, so as to fulfil the true spirit and essence of the beneficial provision of maintenance under Section 125. We also believe that such an interpretation would be a just application of the principles enshrined in the Preamble to our Constitution, namely, social justice and upholding the dignity of the individual.”
But in a para prior to this para, this case was referred to a larger bench (this was a 3-judge bench). But this case was but after two years dismissed as the advocate for appellant dies and the appellant did not pursue the case. Here is the Dismissal Order:
Here is the Para 45,
45.We, therefore, request the Hon’ble Chief Justice to refer the following, amongst other, questions to be decided by a larger Bench. According to us, the questions are:
1. Whether the living together of a man and woman as husband and wife for a considerable period of time would raise the presumption of a valid marriage between them and whether such a presumption would entitle the woman to maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C?
2. Whether strict proof of marriage is essential for a claim of maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. having regard to the provisions of Domestic Violence Act, 2005?
3. Whether a marriage performed according to customary rites and ceremonies, without strictly fulfilling the requisites of Section 7(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, or any other personal law would entitle the woman to maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C.?
So, this judgment is NOT a landmark judgment as the question of law was NOT decided either by this Court nor by a larger bench of this Court.
Citation: [2011 ANJ SC 1 26], [2010 AIOL 681], [2011 SCC 1 141], [2011 ALLMR CRI SC 346], [2010 SCALE 10 602], [2011 BOMCR SC 2 787], [2011 SCC CRI 2 666], [2011 CRLJ SC 96], [2010 RCR CIVIL SC 4 801], [2010 JT 11 132], [2010 AIR SC 6497], [2011 SCC CIV 1 53]
Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1949767/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609aedbe4b0149711414ea0
But this judgment declared it so here.
Reproduced in accordance with Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from main.sci.gov.in/judgments, judis.nic.in, lobis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court and District Court Websites such as ecourts.gov.in
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