In this landmark judgment, SC reiterated that Right to Speedy trail as established in Hussainara Khatoon and Ors Vs Home Secretary State Of Bihar.
Citations: [1991 SCALE 2 1273], [1991 SCR SUPP 3 325], [1992 AIR SC 1701], [1992 CRLJ SC 2717], [1992 SCC 1 225], [1991 JT 6 431], [1992 SCC CRI 93], [1992 CRIMES SC 1 193], [1992 BLJR 2 1319], [1991 JT SC 6 431]
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1200243/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac60e4b014971140eafc
Advocate Ashwani Kumar Upadhyaya had filed this Writ Petition way back in 2016 (2016-09-06) and still the Supreme Court is working on it.
On 2020-03-05:
A 13-column format was finalized to be filled by High Courts, as not many High Courts supplied Amicus with required information. Amicus email id is given wherein the Crime data was to be sent.
On 2020-08-31:
On 2020-09-10:
Submission of the Amicus Curiae:
Order from Court:
On 2020-09-16:
Directions were passed to CJs of High Courts for monitoring and expediting the disposal of the criminal cases.
On 2020-10-06:
Supplementary Submission of the Amicus Curiae:
On 2020-11-02:
Supplementary Submission (12th Report) of the Amicus Curiae:
On 2020-11-02:
Further directions were passed by the Court
On 2021-08-10:
In view of the law laid down by this Court, we deem it appropriate to direct that no prosecution against a sitting or former M.P./M.L.A. shall be withdrawn without the leave of the High Court in the respective suo-motu writ petitions registered in pursuance of our order dated 16.09.2020. The High Courts are requested to examine the withdrawals, whether pending or disposed of since 16.09.2020, in light of guidelines laid down by this Court.
On 2021-08-11:
The table given in previous day order was amended to include new column, ‘Whether Video Conferencing facility is available’.
On 2021-08-25:
This is the 14th Status Report by Amicus Curiae:
Here is the Order passed.
Supreme Court held that for offences under 191 and 192 IPC, procedure under 340 CrPC has to be followed and perjury application for such offences cannot be turned into private complaints under 190 CrPC.
Citations: [2020 SCC ONLINE SC 707], [(2020)20 SCC 1]
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/141105348/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5f567c183321bc6ce2ef6f51
https://www.advocatekhoj.com/library/judgments/announcement.php?WID=13132
https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/m-s-bandekar-brothers-pvt-ltd-anr-versus-prasad-vassudev-keni-etc-etc
Index of Perjury case laws is here.
Supreme Court deprecated the practice of using the photographs of politicians on Government Advertisements.
(1) publication of photographs of the Government functionaries and political leaders along with the advertisement(s).
(2) appointment of an Ombudsman
(3) the recommendation with regard to performance audit by each Ministry.
(4) embargo on advertisements on the eve of the elections.
Citations: [2015 ABR 4 219], [2015 SCC 7 1], [2015 SCC ONLINE SC 479], [2015 KERLT 2 739], [2015 KLT 2 739]
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/177370809/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5790b298e561097e45a4e2fd
State Governments filed Review Petition and got SC to allow them (Central Ministers in lieu of Prime Minister, State Ministers in lieu of Chief Minister) to feature in Advertisements here.
Supreme Court very clearly said a staff on Administration on Justice, such as Registry Staff can not exercise Judicial functions.
From Paras 9 and 10,
9. The nature of judicial function is well settled under our legal system. Judicial function is the duty to act judicially, which invests with that character. The distinguishing factor which separates administrative and judicial function is the duty and authority to act judicially. Judicial function may thus be defined as the process of considering the proposal, opposition and then arriving at a decision upon the same on consideration of facts and circumstances according to the rules of reason and justice. A Constitution Bench of five judges in Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd., Meerut vs. Lakshmichand and Ors., AIR 1963 SC 677, formulated the following criteria to ascertain whether a decision or or an act is judicial function or not, in the following manner
(1) it is in substance a determination upon investigation of a question by the application of objective standards to facts found in the light of preexisting legal rule;
(2) it declares rights or imposes upon parties obligations affecting their civil rights; and
(3) that the investigation is subject to certain procedural attributes contemplating an opportunity of presenting its case to a party, ascertainment of facts by means of evidence if a dispute be on questions of fact, and if the dispute be on question of law on the presentation of legal argument, and a decision resulting in the disposal of the matter on findings based upon those questions of law and fact.
(emphasis added)
The act of numbering a petition is purely administrative. The objections taken by the Madras High Court Registry on the aspect of maintainability requires judicial application of mind by utilizing appropriate judicial standard. Moreover, the wordings of Section 18A of the SC/ST Act itself indicates
at application of judicial mind. In this context, we accept the statement of the Attorney General, that the determination in this case is a judicial function and the High Court Registry could not have rejected the numbering.10. Therefore, we hold that the High Court Registry could not have exercised such judicial power to answer the maintainability of the petition, when the same was in the realm of the Court. As the power of judicial function cannot be delegated to the Registry, we cannot sustain the order, rejecting the numbering/registration of the Petition, by the Madras High Court Registry. Accordingly, the Madras High Court Registry is directed to number the petition and place it before an appropriate bench.
Citations: [2019 (2) Crimes 321], [2019 (2) JLJR 279], [2019 (2) KLJ 955], [2019 (2) PLJR 291], [2019 (2) RCR (Civil) 767], [2019 (2) RCR (Criminal) 767], [2019 (6) Scale 465], [2019 All.M.R.(Cri.) 3493], [(2019) 9 SCC 154], [2019 SCC ONLINE SC 507]
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/85097973/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5ca8c17e9eff430a58956741
https://www.vakilno1.com/supreme-court-of-india/high-court-registry-cannot-question-maintainability-of-petition-supreme-court.html
Supreme Court gave this landmark reportable judgment regd delay condonation under Sec 5 of Limitation Act.
13) In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for
several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated
benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the
Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay.
Citations: [2012 AIR SC 1506], [2012 ALR 91 879], [2012 AWC SC 3 2651], [2012 CALLT SC 3 65], [2012 SCSUPPL CHN 3 20], [2012 CLT 113 1066], [2012 COMPCAS SC 174 387], [2012 CTC 2 240], [2012 ELT SC 277 289], [2012 GLH 1 670], [2012 ITR SC 348 7], [2012 JLJR 2 252], [2012 JCR SC 3 59], [2012 PLJR 2 371], [2012 RLW SC 3 2142], [2012 SCALE 2 782], [2012 SCC 3 563], [2013 SLJ SC 1 320], [2012 TAXMAN SC 207 163], [2012 SCC CIV 2 327], [2012 SCC CRI 2 580], [2012 SCC L&S 1 649], [2012 SCC ONLINE SC 192], [2012 GUJ LH 1 670], [2012 AIC 112 69], [2012 CALLJ 2 93], [2012 CALLT 3 65], [2012 VST 54 188], [2012 SCT 2 269], [2012 SUPREME 2 244], [2012 CLT 1 338], [2012 AIR SC 0 1812], [2012 SCR 1 1045], [2012 SLT 2 312], [2012 JT 2 483], [2012 CHN SC 3 20], [2012 CCC 2 1], [2012 AIOL 103], [2012 SCC L&S 2 649], [2012 SCJ 3 873], [2012 SCC CR 2 580], [2012 LW 4 100], [2013 CPR 2 306], [2013 CPR 3 622], [2012 CUTLT 113 1066], [2012 SCR 0 500], [2012 TAXMANNCOM SC 20 347]
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/20289457/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af18e4b014971141598b
Supreme Court laid the law down with respect to Contracts signed by Vendor alone are valid or not.
From Para 7,
7) We find that neither of the two decisions have addressed the real issue and cannot be said to be laying down the correct law. The observation in Md. Mohar Ali (supra) stating that an agreement of sale is an unilateral contract is not correct. An unilateral contract refers to a gratuitous promise where only party makes a promise without a return promise. Unilateral contract is explained thus by John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo in The Law of Contracts (4th Edition Para 2-10(a) at pages 64-65):
“If A says to B, ‘If you walk across the Brooklyn Bridge I will pay you $ 100,’ A has made a promise but has not asked B for a return promise. A has asked B to perform, not a commitment to perform. A has thus made an offer looking to a unilateral contract. B cannot accept this offer by promising to walk the bridge. B must accept, if at all, by performing the act. Because no return promise is requested, at no point is B bound to perform. If B does perform, a contract involving two parties is created, but the contract is classified as unilateral because only one party is ever under an obligation.”
All agreements of sale are bilateral contracts as promises are made by both – the vendor agreeing to sell and the purchaser agreeing to purchase. On the other hand, the observation in S.M. Gopal Chetty (supra) that unless agreement is signed both by the vendor and purchaser, it is not a valid contract is also not sound. An agreement of sale comes into existence when the vendor agrees to sell and the purchaser agrees to purchase, for an agreed consideration on agreed terms. It can be oral. It can be by exchange of communications which may or may not be signed. It may be by a single document signed by both parties. It can also be by a document in two parts, each party signing one copy and then exchanging the signed copy as a consequence of which the purchaser has the copy signed by the vendor and a vendor has a copy signed by the purchaser. Or it can be by the vendor executing the document and delivering it to the purchaser who accepts it. Section 10 of the Act provides all agreements are contracts if they are made by the free consent by the parties competent to contract, for a lawful consideration and with a lawful object, and are not expressly declared to be void under the provisions of the Contract Act. The proviso to section 10 of the Act makes it clear that the section will not apply to contracts which are required to be made in writing or in the presence of witnesses or any law relating to registration of documents. Our attention has not been drawn to any law applicable in Bihar at the relevant time, which requires an agreement of sale to be made in writing or in the presence of witnesses or to be registered. Therefore, even an oral agreement to sell is valid. If so, a written agreement signed by one of the parties, if it evidences such an oral agreement will also be valid. In any agreement of sale, the terms are always negotiated and thereafter reduced in the form of an agreement of sale and signed by both parties or the vendor alone (unless it is by a series of offers and counter-offers by letters or other modes of recognized communication). In India, an agreement of sale signed by the vendor alone and delivered to the purchaser, and accepted by the purchaser, has always been considered to be a valid contract. In the event of breach by the vendor, it can be specifically enforced by the purchaser. There is, however, no practice of purchaser alone signing an agreement of sale.
An earlier order whereby Aloka Bose (LR of Kanika Bose) was brought on record of case:
Supreme Court laid down the following practice guidelines to be followed by all Trial Courts, while conducting a criminal trial.
From Para 12,
12. The following practice guidelines should be followed by trial courts in the conduct of a criminal trial, as far as possible:
i. a detailed case-calendar must be prepared at the commencement of the trial after framing of charges;
ii. the case-calendar must specify the dates on which the examination-in-chief and cross-examination (if required) of witnesses is to be conducted;
iii. the case-calendar must keep in view the proposed order of production of witnesses by parties, expected time required for examination of witnesses, availability of witnesses at the relevant time, and convenience of both the prosecution as well as the defence, as far as possible;
iv. testimony of witnesses deposing on the same subject-matter must be proximately scheduled;
v. the request for deferral under Section 231(2) of the Cr.P.C. must be preferably made before the preparation of the case-calendar;
vi. the grant for request of deferral must be premised on sufficient reasons justifying the deferral of cross-examination of each witness, or set of witnesses;
vii. while granting a request for deferral of cross-examination of any witness, the trial courts must specify a proximate date for the cross-examination of that witness, after the examination-in-chief of such witness(es) as has been prayed for;
viii. the case-calendar, prepared in accordance with the above guidelines, must be followed strictly, unless departure from the same becomes absolutely necessary;
ix. in cases where trial courts have granted a request for deferral, necessary steps must be taken to safeguard witnesses from being subjected to undue influence, harassment or intimidation.
Citations: [2018 SCC ONLINE SC 2251], [2019 SCC 13 297], [2019 SCC CRI 4 552], [2019 AIR SC 721], [2018 KLT 4 783], [2018 CRIMES 4 288], [2018 AIC 192 212], [2019 CRI LJ 1516], [2019 KLJ 2 398], [2019 ECRN 1 46], [2018 INSC 1021]
Other sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/187514485/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5bdfde204a93267eadff9b10
Supreme Court initiate a Suomoto WP here to assess the effectiveness of the Guidelines issue above.
Supreme Court held that the burden of proof even in a 304B Dowry death case initially lies on prosecution only and shifts to accused, only after prosecution establishes their case.
Under Section 4 of the Evidence Act whenever it is directed by this Act that the Court shall presume the fact it shall regard such fact as proved unless and until it is disproved. So the court has no option but to presume that the accused had caused dowry death unless the accused disproves it. It is a statutory compulsion on the court. However it is open to the accused to adduce such evidence for disproving the said compulsory presumption, as the
burden is unmistakably on him to do so. He can discharge such burden either by eliciting answers through cross-examination of the witnesses of the prosecution or by adducing evidence on the defence side or by both.
And then,
But the peculiar situation in respect of an offence under Section 304B IPC, as discernible from the distinction pointed out above in respect of the offence under Section 306 IPC is this: Under the former the court has a statutory compulsion, merely on the establishment of two factual positions enumerated above, to presume that the accused has committed dowry death. If any accused wants to escape from the said catch the burden is on him to disprove it. If he fails to rebut the presumption the court is bound to act on it.
Now take the case of an accused who was called upon to defend only a charge under Section 302 IPC. The burden of proof never shifts on to him. It ever remains on the prosecution which has to prove the charge beyond all reasonable doubt. The said traditional legal concept remains unchanged even now. In such a case the accused can wait till the prosecution evidence is over and then to show that the prosecution has failed to make out the said offence against him. No compulsory presumption would go to the assistance of the prosecution in such a situation. If that be so, when an accused has no notice of the offence under Section 304B IPC, as he was defending a charge under Section 302 IPC alone, would it not lead to a grave miscarriage of justice when he is alternatively convicted under Section 304B IPC and sentenced to the serious punishment prescribed thereunder, which mandates a minimum sentence of imprisonment for seven years.
The serious consequence which may ensue to the accused in such a situation can be limned through an illustration:-
If a bride was murdered within seven years of her marriage and there was evidence to show that either on the previous day or a couple of days earlier she was subjected to harassment by her husband with demand for dowry, such husband would be guilty of the offence on the language of Section 304-B IPC read with Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. But if the murder of his wife was actually committed either by a decoit or by a militant in a terrorist act the husband can lead evidence to show that he had no hand in her death at all. If he succeeds in discharging the burden of proof he is not liable to be convicted under Section 304B, IPC. But if the husband is charged only under Section 302 IPC he has no burden to prove that his wife was murdered like that as he can have his traditional defence that the prosecution has failed to prove the charge of murder against him and claim an order of acquittal. The above illustration would amplify the gravity of the consequence befalling an accused if he was only asked to defend a charge under Section 302 IPC and was alternatively convicted under Section 304B IPC without any notice to him, because he is deprived of the opportunity to disprove the burden cast on him by law.
In such a situation, if the trial court finds that the prosecution has failed to make out the case under Section 302 IPC, but the offence under Section 304-B IPC has been made out, the court has to call upon the accused to enter on his defence in respect of the said offence. Without affording such an opportunity to the accused, a conviction under Section 304-B IPC would lead to real and serious miscarriage of justice. Even if no such count was included in the charge, when the court affords him an opportunity to discharge his burden by putting him to notice regarding the prima facie view of the court that he is liable to be convicted under Section 304B IPC, unless he succeeds in disproving the presumption, it is possible for the court to enter upon a conviction of the said offence in the event of his failure to disprove the presumption.
Citations: [
Other Source links:
All Dowry related case laws are in this Index here.
Supreme Court has held that when proceeding against parents were quashed on the ground that Magistrate had taken cognizance after three years, husband also gets same benefit.
Although, the learned Single Judge of High Court dealt with various points raised by the appellants and negatived the same by recording the detailed order, his attention does not appear to have been drawn to the order dated 24.10.2006 passed by the co-ordinate bench in Criminal Petition No.1302/2003 whereby the proceedings of CC No.240/2002 were quashed qua the parents of the appellants on the ground that the learned Magistrate could not have taken cognizance after three years. Respondent No.2 is not shown to have challenged the order passed in Criminal Petition No.1302/2003. Therefore, that order will be deemed to have become final. We are sure that if attention of the learned Single Judge, who decided Criminal Petition No.4152/2006 had been drawn to the order passed by another learned Single Judge in Criminal Petition No.1302/2003, he may have, by taking note of the fact that the learned Magistrate did not pass an order for condonation of delay or extension of the period of limitation in terms of Section 473 Cr.P.C., quashed the proceedings of CC No.240/2002.
Citations: [2007 AIOL 1286], [2007 SCALE 14 321], [2007 SCC 13 165], [2008 CRLJ SC 1375], [2007 SCR 13 478], [2009 SCC CRI 1 170], [2008 AIR SC 787], [2008 AIC SC 61 102], [2008 CRILJ 1375]
Other Source links:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1494950/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae45e4b01497114135cd
Earlier judgment of AP High Court is available here.
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