Girish Kumar Suneja Vs CBI on 13 Jul 2017

Posted on December 13, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court held that all those Order of a Trial Court which terminate the proceedings are not interlocutory Order but are intermediate orders in nature so such Orders are not prohibited in Revision at Session or High Courts.

From Para 16, 17 and 18,

16. While the text of sub-section (1) of Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. appears to confer very wide powers on the court in the exercise of its revision jurisdiction, this power is equally severely curtailed by sub-section (2) thereof. There is a complete prohibition in a court exercising its revision jurisdiction in respect of interlocutory orders. Therefore, what is the nature of orders in respect of which a court can exercise its revision jurisdiction?
17. There are three categories of orders that a court can pass – final, intermediate and interlocutory. There is no doubt that in respect of a final order, a court can exercise its revision jurisdiction – that is in respect of a final order of acquittal or conviction. There is equally no doubt that in respect of an interlocutory order, the court cannot exercise its revision jurisdiction. As far as an intermediate order is concerned, the court can exercise its revision jurisdiction since it is not an interlocutory order.
18. The concept of an intermediate order first found mention in Amar Nath v. State of Haryana7 in which case the interpretation and impact of Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. came up for consideration. This decision is important for two reasons. Firstly it gives the historical reason for the enactment of Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. and secondly considering that historical background, it gives a justification for a restrictive meaning to Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

From Para 21,

21. The concept of an intermediate order was further elucidated in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra8 by contradistinguishing a final order and an interlocutory order. This decision lays down the principle that an intermediate order is one which is interlocutory in nature but when reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings and thereby resulting in a final order. Two such intermediate orders immediately come to mind – an order taking cognizance of an offence and summoning an accused and an order for framing charges. Prima facie these orders are interlocutory in nature, but when an order taking cognizance and summoning an accused is reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings against that person resulting in a final order in his or her favour. Similarly, an order for framing of charges if reversed has the effect of discharging the accused person and resulting in a final order in his or her favour. Therefore, an intermediate order is one which if passed in a certain way, the proceedings would terminate but if passed in another way, the proceedings would continue.

From Paras 23 and 24,

23. We may note that in different cases, different expressions are used for the same category of orders – sometimes it is called an intermediate order, sometimes a quasi-final order and sometimes it is called an order that is a matter of moment. Our preference is for the expression ‘intermediate order’ since that brings out the nature of the order more explicitly.
24. The second reason why Amar Nath is important is that it invokes the principle, in the context of criminal law, that what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. Therefore, when Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. prohibits interference in respect of interlocutory orders, Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. cannot be availed of to achieve the same objective. In other words, since Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. prohibits interference with interlocutory orders, it would not be permissible to resort to Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to set aside an interlocutory order.

Finally,

27. Our conclusion on this subject is that while the appellants might have an entitlement (not a right) to file a revision petition in the High Court but that entitlement can be taken away and in any event, the High Court is under no obligation to entertain a revision petition – such a petition can be rejected at the threshold. If the High Court is inclined to accept the revision petition it can do so only against a final order or an intermediate order, namely, an order which if set aside would result in the culmination of the proceedings. As we see it, there appear to be only two such eventualities of a revisable order and in any case only one such eventuality is before us. Consequently the result of paragraph 10 of the order passed by this Court is that the entitlement of the appellants to file a revision petition in the High Court is taken away and thereby the High Court is deprived of exercising its extraordinary discretionary power available under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C.
28. However, this does not mean that the appellants have no remedy available to them – paragraph 10 of the order does not prohibit the appellants from approaching this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. Therefore all that has happened is that the forum for ventilating the grievance of the appellants has shifted from the High Court to this Court. It was submitted by one of the learned counsel that this is not good enough for the appellants since this Court is not obliged to give reasons while dismissing such a petition unlike the High Court which would necessarily have to give reasons if it rejected a revision petition. In our opinion, the mere fact that this Court could dismiss the petition filed by the appellants under Article 136 of the Constitution without giving reasons does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that reasons will not be given or that some equitable order will not be passed. The submission of learned counsel has no basis and is only a presumption of what this Court might do. We cannot accept a submission that has its foundation on a hypothesis.

Girish Kumar Suneja Vs CBI on 13 Jul 2017

Citations : [2017 SCC ONLINE SC 766], [2017 AIR SC 3620], [2017 CRIMES SC 3 96], [2017 CCR SC 3 409], [2017 MLJ CRL 3 616], [2017 RCR CRIMINAL 3 665], [2017 SCALE 7 661], [2017 SCC 14 809], [2018 SCC CRI 1 202], [2017 CRI LJ 4980], [2017 AIC 180 100]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/174336697/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/59786fa94a9326202d8a7817

Kamlesh Kumar Vs Girish Kapoor and Anr on 12 Apr 1984

Posted on December 13, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

One of the earliest judgments on Stay proceedings in a Revision at Sessions Court.

From Paras 6 and 7,

6. The above order was passed in revisional jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge. Obviously that jurisdiction was exercised Under Section 397, Cr.P.C. Under its provisions the Sessions Judge could pass an interlocutory order by directing “that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended….” It is, therefore, clear that in a revision, the Sessions Judge could, during the pendency of the revision, suspend either sentence or order against which the revision has been filed. In the present case there is no question of any sentence. There was only the order in question against which revision was filed. At best the said order could only be suspended during the pendency of the revision.
7. The question of suspending the order would only arise if it was still to be executed. If the order had already come into operation, there remained nothing to be suspended. In the present case it is undisputed fact that in pursuance of the order of the learned Magistrate, applicant Kamlesh Kumar had already executed the necessary bonds on the same date and had taken delivery of the said print of the film ‘Naseeb’. Accordingly there remained nothing which could be suspended.

Casemine Version:

Kamlesh Kumar Vs Girish Kapoor and Anr on 12 Apr 1984

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1179659/

https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/473801/kamlesh-kumar-vs-girish-kapoor-anr

Sambhaji and Ors vs Gangabai and Ors on 20 Nov 2008

Posted on December 4, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court held that. ‘a Civil/Trial Court can accept the written statement even after statutory time limit of 90 days‘, as prescribed under Order 8 Rule 1.

15. In the instance case the trial court proceeded on the erroneous premises that there was no scope to accept the written statement after 90 days. The High Court by the impugned order held that though it had power, no case was made out to accept the prayer. We have considered the grounds indicated by the appellants seeking acceptance of the written statement filed belatedly. They cannot be considered to be trivial or without substance. In the case of this nature where close relatives are litigants a liberal approach is called for. In the circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the High Court affirming the order passed by the trial court refusing acceptance of the written statement. The matter is not very complex. We request the trial court to complete trial of the suit within the period of six months. The appeal is allowed without any order as to costs.

Sambhaji and Ors Vs Gangabai and Ors on 20 Nov 2008

Citations : [2009 ELT SC 240 1612008 AIR SC SUPP 7672008 SUPREME 8 7142008 SCC 17 1172009 BOMCR SC 1 812008 JT 13 442008 SCALE 15 5222008 AIOL 13332008 SLT 9 2982009 ALLMR SC 1 9212008 SCR 16 4692009 ELT 240 161]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/90423/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae73e4b0149711413e98

In Re To issues certain guidelines regarding inadequacies and deficiencies in criminal trials

Posted on November 30, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

These are the recommendations prepared by Amicus curie in March 2020.

In Re To issues certain guidelines regarding inadequacies and deficiencies in criminal trials

Supreme Court issued notices to all HCs and State Administrations to hear them and then pass Draft Rules.

Inadequacies and deficiencies in criminal trials on 27 Oct 2020

Final Decision on 24-Apr-2021. [(2021) 10 SCC 598]

In Re To Issue Certain Guidelines Regarding Inadequacies on 20 Apr 2021

Rajaram Prasad Yadav Vs State of Bihar and Anr on 4 Jul 2013

Posted on November 23, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court passed these guidelines when a witness is called or recalled for evidence.

a) Whether the Court is right in thinking that the new evidence is needed by it? Whether the evidence sought to be led in under Section 311 is noted by the Court for a just decision of a case?
b) The exercise of the widest discretionary power under Section 311 Cr.P.C. should ensure that the judgment should not be rendered on inchoate,
inconclusive speculative presentation of facts, as thereby the ends of justice would be defeated.
c) If evidence of any witness appears to the Court to be essential to the just decision of the case, it is the power of the Court to summon and examine or recall and re-examine any such person.
d) The exercise of power under Section 311 Cr.P.C. should be resorted to only with the object of finding out the truth or obtaining proper proof for
such facts, which will lead to a just and correct decision of the case.
e) The exercise of the said power cannot be dubbed as filling in a lacuna in a prosecution case, unless the facts and circumstances of the case make it
apparent that the exercise of power by the Court would result in causing serious prejudice to the accused, resulting in miscarriage of justice.
f) The wide discretionary power should be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily.
g) The Court must satisfy itself that it was in every respect essential to examine such a witness or to recall him for further examination in order to
arrive at a just decision of the case.
h) The object of Section 311 Cr.P.C. simultaneously imposes a duty on the Court to determine the truth and to render a just decision.
i) The Court arrives at the conclusion that additional evidence is necessary, not because it would be impossible to pronounce the judgment without it, but because there would be a failure of justice without such evidence being considered.
j) Exigency of the situation, fair play and good sense should be the safe guard, while exercising the discretion. The Court should bear in mind that no party in a trial can be foreclosed from correcting errors and that if proper evidence was not adduced or a relevant material was not brought on record due to any inadvertence, the Court should be magnanimous in permitting such mistakes to be rectified.
k) The Court should be conscious of the position that after all the trial is basically for the prisoners and the Court should afford an opportunity to them in the fairest manner possible. In that parity of reasoning, it would be safe to err in favour of the accused getting an opportunity rather than protecting the prosecution against possible prejudice at the cost of the accused. The Court should bear in mind that improper or capricious exercise of such a discretionary power, may lead to undesirable results.
l) The additional evidence must not be received as a disguise or to change the nature of the case against any of the party.
m) The power must be exercised keeping in mind that the evidence that is likely to be tendered, would be germane to the issue involved and also
ensure that an opportunity of rebuttal is given to the other party.
n) The power under Section 311 Cr.P.C. must therefore, be invoked by the Court only in order to meet the ends of justice for strong and valid reasons and the same must be exercised with care, caution and circumspection. The Court should bear in mind that fair trial entails the interest of the accused, the victim and the society and, therefore, the grant of fair and proper opportunities to the persons concerned, must be ensured being a constitutional goal, as well as a human right.

Rajaram Prasad Yadav Vs State of Bihar and Anr on 4 Jul 2013

Citations : [2013 AD SC 8 583], [2013 AIR SC 3081], [2013 JLJR 3 447], [2013 JCC 3 2179], [2013 JT SC 11 118], [2013 NCC 2 582], [2013 PLJR 4 34], [2013 RCR CRIMINAL 3 726], [2013 SCALE 8 316], [2013 SCC 14 461], [2013 SCR 7 420], [2013 UC 3 1631], [2014 SCC CRI 4 256], [2013 SCC ONLINE SC 577], [2013 AIC 128 29], [2013 AIR SC 0 4179], [2013 AIR SC 1746], [2013 CRLJ SC 3777], [2013 SLT 6 571], [2013 SUPREME 4 621], [2013 AIOL 432], [2013 KCCR SN 4 396], [2013 SCJ 7 986], [2013 BOMCR CRI SC 4 35], [2013 AIR SCW 0 4179]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/3583407/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af2be4b0149711415b41

Sabina Sahdev and Ors Vs Vidur Sahdev on 9 Jul 2018

Posted on November 14, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

A Division bench of Delhi High Court held that, the law does not prescribe any precondition such that the arrears amount of maintenance has to be deposited before appeal or revision can be allowed.

From Para 22,

22. Neither the language used by the Legislature in Section 399 read with Section 401 of the Cr.P.C., nor the language used in Section 29 of the DV Act even remotely suggest that the Legislature intended to impose pre-conditions to the availment of the said remedies, of the kind evolved in Rajeev Preenja (supra).

And then from Para 25,

25. Laudable as the object of the learned Single Judge may have been, the question is, whether in the light of the settled law taken note of hereinabove, the learned Single Judge while deciding Rajeev Preenja (supra) could have issued a general direction barring entertainment of criminal revisions under Section 399 read with Section 401 Cr.P.C. against orders granting interim maintenance to the wife/ child under Section 125 Cr.P.C., unless the entire arrears of maintenance up to date were first deposited? In our view, with due respect to the learned Single Judge, the answer is clearly in the negative. As to what should be the policy of the law is a matter which squarely falls within the preserve of the Legislature, and it is not a matter which the Courts can dictate, or evolve. It is one thing to interpret an existing law and, while doing so, to adopt an interpretation which is purposive, i.e. one which advances the objective of the enactment. However, it is quite a different thing to evolve a statutory scheme which, even the Legislature did not provide for.

Finally, in Paras 29 and 30,

29. As rightly pointed out by Mr. Bahl, imposition of a limitation on the statutory remedy of revision/ appeal under Section 399 of the Cr.P.C. or Section 29 of the DV Act- as the case may be, also falls foul of Article 14 of the Constitution of India for the reasons noticed by the Division Bench in Gagan Makkar (supra).Even if the condition in question – of the nature directed by the learned Single Judge in Rajeev Preenja (supra), were to exist in the statutory framework, the same may fail the test of reasonableness under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This is for the reason that, in a given case, the order granting interim maintenance passed by the Ld. Magistrate either under Section 125 Cr.P.C or under Section 29 of the DV Act, may be so harsh and so unreasonable, as to make it impossible for the opposite party/ husband to comply with the same. Experience shows that in a large number of cases, the arrears of interim maintenance- which may be granted from the date of moving of the application before the Ld. Magistrate, may accumulate to a very large amount running into lakhs of rupees. The arrears of interim maintenance may not necessarily be a meager amount in all cases. It would be most unjust and unreasonable to bar his statutory remedy of revision/ appeal as the case may be, merely because he may not be in a position to deposit the entire arrears of interim maintenance.

From Para 30 (Corum cleverly clubbed 125 Cr.P.C. cases also along with DV cases!)

30. Thus, we answer the reference by holding that the general direction issued in Rajeev Preenja (supra) in paragraphs 15, 16 and 20 are not sustainable. The said directions could not have been issued by the learned Single Judge as they seek to curtail the statutory remedy of revision available under Section 399 read with Section 401 of the Cr.P.C, and of appeal under Section 29 of the DV Act, against orders granting interim maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and Section 23 of the DV Act respectively. The direction in question over steps into the legislative field, which was impermissible for the Court to do. We agree with the view taken by the learned Single Judge in Brijesh Kumar Gupta (supra), that there cannot be an absolute rider that the entire maintenance amount, as granted by the Trial Court, should be deposited prior to the entertainment of the statutory remedy, because it would leave the remedy of statutory revision/ appeal illusory. Accordingly, we hold that a revision under Section 399 read with Section 401 Cr.P.C. and an appeal under Section 29 of the DV Act, against the order granting maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and under Section 23 of the DV Act respectively, would be maintainable, and would be entertained and heard without any pre-condition of deposit of the arrears of maintenance as ordered by the Ld. MM. We further hold that the pendency of such a Revision or Appeal- as the case may be, shall not operate as a stay of the operation of the order granting interim maintenance. The reference is answered accordingly.

Sabina Sahdev and Ors Vs Vidur Sahdev on 9 Jul 2018

Citations : [2018 DLT 251 245], [2018 HLR 3 413], [2019 CRI LJ 218],[2018 (4) RCR (Criminal) 30], [2018 SCC OnLine Del 9747],

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/80568294/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5b44dfac9eff431bb54655a9

Index of PWDV Act cases here. Index of Maintenance cases u/s 144 BNSS (125 Cr.P.C.) here.

State Of Goa Vs Jose Maria Albert Vales @ Robert Vales on 18 Aug 2017

Posted on November 13, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

2-Judge bench held that without prima facie opinion in a complaint made otherwise than a police complaint, invoking of perjury u/s 340 CrPC or 341 CrPC is indefensible.

From Para 58,

58. We are thus of the firm opinion that a Trial Magistrate, on receipt of a complaint under Section 340 and/or Section 341 of the Code, if there is a preliminary inquiry and adequate materials in support of the considerations impelling action under the above provisions are available, would be required to treat such complaint to constitute a case, as if instituted on police report and proceed in accordance with law. However, in absence of any preliminary inquiry or adequate materials, it would be open for the Trial Magistrate, if he genuinely feels it necessary, in the interest of justice and to avoid unmerited prosecution to embark on a summary inquiry to collect further materials and then decide the future course of action as per law. In both the eventualities, the Trial Magistrate has to be cautious, circumspect, rational, objective and further informed with the overwhelming caveat that the offence alleged is one affecting the administration of justice, requiring a responsible, uncompromising and committed approach to the issue referred to him for inquiry and trial, as the case may be. In no case, however, in the teeth of Section 343(1), the procedure prescribed for cases instituted otherwise than on police report would either be relevant or applicable qua the complaints under Section 340 and/or 341 of the Cr.P.C.

And from Final Para,

60. In view of the determination as above, the approach of the High Court is wholly indefensible, as in the face of Section 343(1) of the Cr.P.C., the procedure prescribed for cases instituted otherwise than on police report is not attracted qua a complaint under Section 340 and/or Section 341 of the Code. Even assuming that the Trial Magistrate had examined few witnesses in support of the complaint, it was in the form of a summary inquiry, to be satisfied as to whether the materials on record would justify the framing of charge against the respondent or not and nothing further. Any other view would fly in the face of the ordainment of Section 343(1) of the Cr.P.C. and thus cannot receive judicial imprimatur. The impugned judgment of the High Court in quashing the charge framed by the Trial Magistrate and remanding the case to him to follow the procedure outlined for cases, instituted otherwise than on police report, under Chapter XIX-B is on the face of it unsustainable in law and on facts. It is thus set aside. The appeals are allowed. The Trial Magistrate would proceed from the stage of framing of charge, strictly in compliance of the letter and spirit of the precept contained in Section 343(1) of the Code. We make it clear that we have not offered any observation on the merits of the charge and the Trial Court would further the proceedings in accordance with law.

State Of Goa Vs Jose Maria Albert Vales @ Robert Vales on 18 Aug 2017

Citations : [2017 SCC ONLINE SC 1021], [2017 ALLCC 101 330], [2017 CCR SC 4 28], [2017 JCC 4 2245], [2017 RCR CRIMINAL 3 981], [2017 SCALE 9 527], [2017 SCC ONLINE SC 1021]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/194410529/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5a65cbaf4a93263320778706

Index of Perjury Case laws is here.

Arnab Manoranjan Goswami Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 09 Nov 2020

Posted on November 9, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Division Bench of Bombay High Court, while denying interim protection from arrest to Arnab Goswami, held that,

From Para 45,

45. The principle stated therein will equally apply to the exercise of this Court’s power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure while considering the applications for bail since the petitioner is already in Judicial custody. The legislature has provided specific remedy under Section 439 Cr.P.C. for applying for regular bail. Having regard to the alternate and efficacious remedy available to the petitioner under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, this Court has to exercise judicial restraint while entertaining application in the nature of seeking regular bail in a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure.

and from Para 70,

70. In our opinion, the petitioner has an alternate and efficacious remedy under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to apply for regular bail. At the time of concluding the hearing of Applications, we had made it clear that if the petitioner, if so advised, to apply for regular bail under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the concerned Court, then, in that case, we have directed the concerned Court to decide the said
application within four days from filing of the same.

Arnab Manoranjan Goswami Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 09 Nov 2020

Here is the Bail application

Arnab Bail Application

Balaji Baliram Mupade Vs State of Maharashtra on 29 Oct 2020

Posted on November 8, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court, again, highlighted the need of delivering judgments at the earliest, as the “problem is compounded where the result is known but not the reasons.”

From Para 3,

3. Further, much later but still almost two decades ago, this Court in Anil Rai v. State of Bihar – 2001 (7) SCC 318 deemed it appropriate to provide some guidelines regarding the pronouncement of judgments, expecting them to be followed by all concerned under the mandate of this Court. It is not necessary to reproduce the directions except to state that normally the judgment is expected within two months of the conclusion of the arguments, and on expiry of three months any of the parties can file an application in the High Court with prayer for early judgment. If, for any reason, no judgment is pronounced for six months, any of the parties is entitled to move an application before the then Chief Justice of the High Court with a prayer to re-assign the case before another Bench for fresh arguments.

From Para 10,

10. We must note with regret that the counsel extended through various judicial pronouncements including the one referred to aforesaid appear to have been ignored, more importantly where oral orders are pronounced. In case of such orders, it is expected that they are either dictated in the Court or at least must follow immediately thereafter, to facilitate any aggrieved party to seek redressal from the higher Court. The delay in delivery of judgments has been observed to be a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in Anil Rai’s case (supra) and as stated aforesaid, the problem gets aggravated when the operative portion is made available early and the reasons follow much later.

Balaji Baliram Mupade Vs State of Maharashtra on 29 Oct 2020

Citations :

Other Sources :

Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal Vs State of Gujarat on 9 Sep 2013

Posted on November 7, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Division bench of Supreme Court held that,

From Para 306,

26. Section 306 refers to abetment of suicide. It says that if any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 10 years and shall also be liable to fine. The action for committing suicide is also on account of mental disturbance caused by mental and physical cruelty. To constitute an offence under Section 306, the prosecution has to establish that a person has committed suicide and the suicide was abetted by the accused. Prosecution has to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased committed suicide and the accused abetted the commission of suicide. But for the alleged extra marital relationship, which if proved, could be illegal and immoral, nothing has been brought out by the prosecution to show that the accused had provoked, incited or induced the wife to commit suicide.

From Para 28, exoneration of husband,

28. Suicide note completely exonerates A-1, which states that he was not responsible for death of the deceased. On the other hand, the deceased described herself as extremely selfish, egoist and, therefore, not a match for A-1. She entertained the belief that her husband A-1 was in love with A-2 and wanted to marry A-2. Note states it was for their happiness she had decided to end her life. She also wanted to have the marriage of A-1 and A-2 solemnized with pomp and gaiety. On reading the suicide note, one can infer that the deceased was so possessive of her husband, and was always under an emotional stress that she might lose her husband. Too much of possessiveness could also lead to serious emotional stress, over and above the fact that she had one abortion and her daughter died after few days of birth. No evidence is forthcoming in this case to show that A-2 ever evinced any interest to marry A-1. On the other hand, during the subsistence of the alleged relationship, A-2 herself got married.

Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal Vs State of Gujarat on 9 Sep 2013

Citations : [2013 CRLJ SC 44482013 AIOL 5932013 CRIMES SC 4 2952013 CRIMES SC 4 1102013 SCC 10 482013 AIR SC 52192013 RCR CRIMINAL SC 4 2712013 SLT 7 7062014 AIR SC 3312013 SCALE 11 1982013 JT 12 3572013 SUPREME 6 3662014 JLJR SC 1 3902013 SCC CRI 3 8012013 SCC CIV 4 6162013 SCC ONLINE SC 8142013 AIC 130 292013 CRILJ 44482014 PLJR 1 5112013 BOMCR CRI 4 5222013 UC 3 19352013 DMC 3 2452014 ALT CRL AP 1 2582013 ALD CRI 2 7552013 MLJ CRI 3 7002013 OLR 2 8672013 KHC 3 8102013 AD SC 10 452013 ABR 6 1792014 SCJ 1 5262013 RCR CRIMINAL 4 2712014 JLJR 1 3902013 CRI LJ 44482013 MLJ CRL 3 7002013 AIR SCW 5219

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/170814796/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af2de4b0149711415bb9

https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2015/02/25/husband-s-extra-marital-relationship-does-not-amount-to-cruelty/

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Landmark Case

Girish Kumar Suneja Vs CBI on 13 Jul 2017

Kamlesh Kumar Vs Girish Kapoor and Anr on 12 Apr 1984

Sambhaji and Ors vs Gangabai and Ors on 20 Nov 2008

In Re To issues certain guidelines regarding inadequacies and deficiencies in criminal trials

Rajaram Prasad Yadav Vs State of Bihar and Anr on 4 Jul 2013

Sabina Sahdev and Ors Vs Vidur Sahdev on 9 Jul 2018

State Of Goa Vs Jose Maria Albert Vales @ Robert Vales on 18 Aug 2017

Arnab Manoranjan Goswami Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 09 Nov 2020

Balaji Baliram Mupade Vs State of Maharashtra on 29 Oct 2020

Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal Vs State of Gujarat on 9 Sep 2013