Dr. Rini Johar and Anr Vs State of MP and Ors on 03 Jun 2016

Posted on April 26, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court granted compensation to victims of police harassment, while quashing the criminal proceedings.

From Para 27,

27. In the case at hand, there has been violation of Article 21 and the petitioners were compelled to face humiliation. They have been treated with an attitude of insensibility. Not only there are violation of guidelines issued in the case of D.K. Basu (supra), there are also flagrant violation of mandate of law enshrined under Section 41 and Section 41-A of CrPC. The investigating officers in no circumstances can flout the law with brazen proclivity. In such a situation, the public law remedy which has been postulated in Nilawati Behra (supra), Sube Singh v. State of Haryana9, Hardeep Singh v. State of M.P.10, comes into play. The constitutional courts taking note of suffering and humiliation are entitled to grant compensation. That has been regarded as a redeeming feature. In the case at hand, taking into consideration the totality of facts and circumstances, we think it appropriate to grant a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- (rupees five lakhs only) towards compensation to each of the petitioners to be paid by the State of M.P. within three months hence. It will be open to the State to proceed against the erring officials, if so advised.

Dr. Rini Johar and Anr Vs State of MP and Ors on 03 Jun 2016

Citations : [2016 AIOL 3407], [2016 SCC ONLINE SC 594], [2016 SCC 11 703], [2017 SCC CRI 1 364], [2016 AIR SC 2679], [2016 AIC 163 98], [2016 CRI LJ 3156], [2016 GUJ LH 2 607], [2016 KLJ 3 613], [2016 KLT 3 502]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/103942103/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5790b545e561097e45a4e6b3

Bar Council of Kerala Vs Raju Y and Anr on 04 Jan 2019

Posted on April 24, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court refused (dismissed summarily) to consider the SLPs filed by Bar Council of Kerala against the decision of the division bench of Kerala High Court upon a writ appeal from here (including one filed against T.Koshy, Diary No. 43042/2018), which held that Bar Council (of any State or India) do not have power to prescribe any fee for the enrolment, either in the form of enrolment fee or special fee. .

2019-01-04 Bar Council Of Kerala Vs Raju Y and Anr on 04 Jan 2019

Citations:

Other Sources :

Index of Bar Council Antics here.

Kamatchi Vs Lakshmi Narayanan on 13 Apr 2022

Posted on April 14, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A Full Bench of Apex Court (Justice Ravindra Bhat’s name is missing in the judgment PDF), while overruling the decision in Dr.P.Pathmanathan case here, held that, limitation under section 468 CrPC does not apply to DV cases filed under Section 12 of the Act. They are not defined as crimes under the Act.

From Paras 20 and 21,

20. It is thus clear that the High Court wrongly equated filing of an application under Section 12 of the Act to lodging of a complaint or initiation of prosecution. In our considered view, the High Court was in error in observing that the application under Section 12 of the Act ought to have been filed within a period of one year of the alleged acts of domestic violence.
21. It is, however, true that as noted by the Protection Officer in his Domestic Inspection Report dated 2.08.2018, there appears to be a period of almost 10 years after 16.09.2008, when nothing was alleged by the appellant against the husband. But that is a matter which will certainly be considered by the Magistrate after response is received from the husband and the rival contentions are considered. That is an exercise which has to be undertaken by the Magistrate after considering all the factual aspects presented before him, including whether the allegations constitute a continuing wrong.
22. Lastly, we deal with the submission based on the decision in Adalat Prasad. The ratio in that case applies when a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence and issues process, in which event instead of going back to the Magistrate, the remedy lies in filing petition under Section 482 of the Code. The scope of notice under Section 12 of the Act is to call for a response from the respondent in terms of the Statute so that after considering rival submissions, appropriate order can be issued. Thus, the matter stands on a different footing and the dictum in Adalat Prasad would not get attracted at a stage when a notice is issued under Section 12 of the Act.

Kamatchi Vs Lakshmi Narayanan on 13 Apr 2022

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/147915185/

https://www.lawyersclubindia.com/judiciary/court-entitled-to-take-cognizance-where-the-complaint-was-filed-within-the-limitation-period-sc-in-kamatchi-vs-lakshmi-narayanan-5857.asp

https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/limitation-period-us-468-crpc-not-applicable-application-us-12-domestic-violence-supreme-court-kamatchi-vs-lakshmi-narayanan-2022-livelaw-sc-370-196595

https://www.barandbench.com/news/application-under-section-12-of-domestic-violence-act-need-not-be-filed-within-1-year-of-alleged-act-of-domestic-violence-supreme-court

Earlier decision of Madras High Court here.

Index of DV cases here.

K Neelaveni Vs State Rep By Inspector of Police and Ors on 22 Mar 2010

Posted on April 13, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held that there are, prima facie, specific allegations in the FIR to attract IPC 406 and 494.

From Paras 8 and 9,

8. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced and we are inclined to accept the submission of Mr. Guru Krishna Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant. From a perusal of the allegations made in the First Information Report, it is evident that the appellant has clearly alleged that her husband had married another lady namely Bharathi and the said marriage had taken place in the presence and with the support of other accused persons. She had also stated that from the second marriage with Bharathi a girl child was born. In the First Information Report, it had clearly been alleged that besides gold ornaments other household articles were given in marriage and further she was subjected to cruelty and driven out from the matrimonial home by the accused persons. In our opinion, the allegations made in the First Information Report, at this stage, have to be accepted as true, and allegations so made prima facie, constitute offences under Sections 406 and 494 of the Indian Penal Code. It has to be borne in mind that while considering the application for quashing of the charge sheet, the allegations made in the First Information Report and the materials collected during the course of the investigation are required to be considered. Truthfulness or otherwise of the allegation is not fit to be gone into at this stage as it is always a matter of trial. Essential ceremonies of the Marriage were gone into or not is a matter of trial.
9. From what we have said above, we are of the opinion that the High Court erred in holding that the charge sheet does not reveal the ingredients constituting the offences under Sections 494 and 406 of the Indian Penal Code.

K Neelaveni Vs State Rep By Inspector of Police and Ors on 22 Mar 2010

Citations : [2010 SCJ 3 654], [2010 AIR SC 3191], [2010 SCC 11 607], [2011 KLJ NOC 2 10], [2010 SCALE 3 261], [2010 DMC 1 560], [2010 SLT 2 604], [2010 CUTLT SUPPL 947], [2010 AIOL 153], [2010 CRIMES SC 2 90], [2010 RCR CRIMINAL SC 2 547], [2011 SCC CRI 1 219], [2010 SUPREME 2 543], [2010 ECRN 2 541], [2010 AIR SC 2760], [2010 AIC 88 58], [2010 MLJ CRL 3 352], [2010 CRLJ SC 2819], [2010 JT SC 3 156], [2010 AIR SCW 2760]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1440610/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609aeece4b01497114152ae

https://www.legalauthority.in/judgement/k-neelaveni-vs-state-rep-by-insp-of-police-9855

https://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/Browse/Case?CaseId=000102622000

https://advocatespedia.com/Case_Study:_K_Neelaveni_Vs_State_Rep_By_Inspector_of_Police_%26_Ors_Case

Priya Bala Ghosh Vs Suresh Chandra Ghosh on 4 Mar 1971

Posted on April 12, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A Division Bench of Apex Court held that, the second marriage has to be proved by establishing the ceremonies constituting the same have been gone through for an offence of Bigamy to be made out.

As pointed out earlier, this Court in Kanwal Ram’s case has laid down that an admission is not evidence of the fact that the second marriage has taken place after the ceremonies constituting the same have been gone through.

Towards the end of Judgment:

Further as pointed out by this Court in Kawal Ram’s case, the admission in Ex. 2 cannot in law be treated as evidence of the second marriage having taken place in an adultery or bigamy case: and that in such cases it must be proved by the prosecution that the second marriage as a fact has taken place after the performance of the essential ceremonies. Mr. Majumdar relied on the decision of this Court in Bharat Singh and another vs. Bhagirathi(1) to the effect that the admissions made by a party are substantive evidence by themselves in view of ss. 17 and 21 of the Indian Evidence Act, and that if those admissions have been duly proved they can be relied on irrespective of the fact whether the party making them appear in the witness box or not or irrespective of the fact whether such a party had or had not been confronted with those admissions. We do not think that the said decision in any way supports the appellant with regard to prosecution for bigamy under s. 494 I.P.C. To conclude, we have already referred to the fact that both the learned Sessions Judge and the High Court have categorically found that the Homo and Saptapadi are the essential rites-for a marriage according to the law governing the parties and that there is no evidence that these two essential ceremonies have been performed when the respondent is stated to have married Sandhya Rani. No reliance can be placed on the admissions stated to be contained in Ex. 2.

Priya Bala Ghosh Vs Suresh Chandra Ghosh on 4 Mar 1971

Citations : [1972 CRI LJ 275], [1971 SCC 1 864], [1971 SCC CRI 362], [1971 SCR 3 961], [1971 AIR SC 1153], [1971 CRLJ SC 939]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/80924/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ab75e4b014971140c8aa

https://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/browse/Case?CaseId=001791071000&Title=PRIYA-BALA-GHOSH-Vs.-SURESH-CHANDRA-GHOSH

Saraswathi Vs Thirupathi and Anr on 24 Sep 2014

Posted on April 10, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

Madras High Court bench at Madurai spelt out this judgment, only applicable to marriage performed in Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry, regards to Bigamy in Hindus.

From Para 22,

22.A reading of the said Section will make it clear that for the validity of a marriage between two Hindus, no specific form is necessary. Either by acknowledging in the language known to eachparties that each of them takes the other as husband or wife, as the case may be, in the presence of elders and relatives or friends orother persons, or by symbolic representation of such declaration by exchanging rings, exchanging garlands or tying thali will be sufficientobservance of the formality to make a Hindu Marriage among the two Hindus in Tamil Nadu to be valid. The very fact that the sectionemployees the conjunction ‘or’ and not ‘and’ while describing formalities to be observed is very significant. It is brought to the notice of the Court by the Bar that at the time of drafting of the Bill, the conjunction ‘and’ was used and when it was placed before the reformer in Dravidar Movement namely, E.Vera.Ramasamy Periyar, for his opinion, he alone suggested the correction of the conjunction ‘and’ into ‘or’ to make it clear that the symbolic representation ‘in any one of the forms’ shall be sufficient. The section also provides for validation of marriages performed prior to the introduction of Section 7-A of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and several such marriages were saved from being held void for non observance of any of the customary rituals provided the conditions found in Section 7-A were present. After the amendment in Tamil Nadu, for convicting a person professing Hindu religion for bigamy, it shall be enough to show that the underwent a form of marriage which complies with the above condition namely, acknowledgment by words or symbolic representation of acknowledgement by exchanging garlands or exchanging of rings or tying of thali provided the marriage is with a woman professing Hindu religion. What the appellant/complainant has to prove is that but for the subsistence of the first marriage, the second marriage would have been valid.

From Para 26, Crucial Piece of Law:

26. A perusal of the said provision will make it clear that thesaid Section can be pressed into service against the first respondent alone, who contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of his marriage with the appellant/complainant. It is not the case of the appellant/complainant that the second respondent was having a husband and she married the first respondent as her second husband during the subsistence of her marriage with her first husband, in which event alone she can be roped in as an accused under Section 494 IPC. But, if it is established that she married the first respondent with the knowledge that the first respondent was already married and his first wife namely, the appellant/complainant was living and that their marriage was subsisting, she shall not be liable for the substantive offence punishable under Section 494 IPC, but shall be liable to be punished under Section 494 IPC read with Section 109 IPC for having abetted the commission of the said offence. Of course, as per Section 109 IPC when no express provision is made in the Code for the punishment of abetment of a particular offence, if the act abetted is committed in consequence of the abetment, then such abettor shall be punishable with the punishment provided for the offence. Here is a case in which the marriage has taken place and hence, if the second respondent is proved to have got the knowledge of the first marriage of the first respondent with the appellant/ complainant, then she shall be liable to be punished with the punishment prescribed under Section 494 IPC. However, when a person is to be punished for abetment of an offence, separate charge stating that she is prosecuted for abetting such an offence and that the act abetted has been committed should have been framed. The charge against the second respondent ought to have been framed as one for an offence punishable under Section 494 IPC read with Section 109 IPC. The learned trial Judge committed an error in not framing such a specific charge against the second respondent and convicting the second respondent under the substantive provision alone namely under Section 494 IPC. Even forargument sake if it is assumed that the absence of framing of such a specific charge is only an irregularity not vitiating the proceedings,unless she is proved to have agreed for the marriage with the knowledge of the subsistence of the marriage between the appellant/complainant and the first respondent, she cannot beconvicted for the offence punishable under Section 494 IPC read with Section 109 IPC. In this regard, there is absence of clear evidence,imputing direct knowledge to the second respondent regarding the subsistence of first marriage of the first respondent with theappellant/complainant.

From Para 28, Sentencing:

28. Regarding the sentence, the submissions made on both sides are also taken into consideration. The maximum punishment prescribed under the said penal provision, namely 494 IPC is imprisonment of either description for 7 years and also fine. The trial Judge seems to have imposed a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for three years and a fine of Rs.100/- with a default sentence of rigorous imprisonment for one week. So far as the fine amount is concerned, the trial Court seems to have shown leniency. Substantive sentence awarded by the trial Court, as contended by the learned counsel for the first respondent, is some what harsh and the same needs reduction. This Court is of the view that reducing the substantive sentence to two years rigorous imprisonment and increasing fine to Rs.1000/- from Rs.100/- with a default sentence of one month simple imprisonment shall meet the ends of justice.

Saraswathi Vs Thirupathi and Anr on 24 Sep 2014

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/83802447/

https://www.lawyerservices.in/Saraswathi-Versus-Thirupathi-and-Another-2014-09-24

M.A Khaliq and Ors Vs Ashok Kumar and Anr on 15 Sep 2021

Posted on March 5, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A three-judge full bench of Apex Court held as follows.

The report of the Metropolitan Sessions Judge, after due inquiry into the matter sets out the factual details of the matter. The report indicates that the contempt petitioner was not only summoned to Akividu Police Station in the name of counseling but was also detained. In the circumstances, there was clear violation of the directions issued by this Court not only in Arnesh Kumar but also in the case in D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal.
The mere fact that no crime was registered, could not be a defence, nor would it be an escape from the rigour of the decisions rendered by this Court. As a matter of fact, summoning the person without there being any crime registered against him and detaining him would itself be violative of basic principles.
In the circumstances, the Division Bench was not right and justified in setting aside the view taken by the Single Judge of the High Court. We, therefore, allow this appeal. While setting aside the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court, we restore the decision of the Single Judge.
However, considering the facts and circumstances on record, the substantive sentence of three months as recorded in paragraph 32 of the decision of the Single Judge is modified to 15 days leaving rest of the incidents of sentence completely intact.
The contemnor shall surrender himself before the Registrar of the High Court within two weeks from today.

M.A Khaliq and Ors Vs Ashok Kumar and Anr on 15 Sep 2021

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/136109957/

https://www.legitquest.com/case/ma-khaliq-ors-v-ashok-kumar-anr/1FCF45

https://legiteye.com/detaining-any-person-without-there-being-any-crime-registered-against-him-is-violation-of-basic-principles-supreme-court/

Division Bench decision is here.

Ashok Kumar Vs M.A.Khaliq on 18 Jul 2019

Single Judge decision is here.

M.A Khaliq and 2 Ors Vs Bhaskar Bhushan and Anr on 20 Nov 2018

Final Forum:

Review petition was filed but withdrawn by the contemnor himself.

Ashok Kumar Vs M.A.Khaliq on 30 Mar 2022

V.Bharath Kumar Vs State of Telangana

Posted on March 5, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A single bench decision from Telangana High Court passed these guidelines.

Hence, this Court feels that an alternative mechanism shall be evolved to address the plight of these under-trial prisoners / accused:

Parties Advocates shall download the order copy from the High Court’s Website along with case details which are available in the case status information

While filing the memo on behalf of accused for furnishing sureties, the Advocate shall state in the Memo that he / she has downloaded the order copy from the High Court’s Website. The Administrative Officer Chief Ministerial Officer of the Court concerned shall verify the order from the High Court’s Website and make an endorsement to that effect and then shall place the same before the Court.

The Public Prosecutor shall also obtain necessary instructions in this regard and assist the Court.

The Presiding Officer, on the same day, shall dispose of the same and dispatch the release order to the jail authorities concerned forthwith through e-mail or any other electronic mode.

In cases of anticipatory bail, the burden to verify the authenticity of the copy is on the Station House Officer concerned and if necessary, he should obtain necessary instructions from the Public Prosecutor’s Office and complete the process on the same day expeditiously as per law.

The jail authorities on receipt of the release order shall release the accused forthwith.

Registrar (Judicial) shall communicate copy of this order to:

The Principal Secretary for Home Affairs, State of Telangana,

The Director General of Police, State of Telangana,

The Director of Prosecution, who, in turn, shall sensitize the police officers Station House Officers / Public Prosecutors and ensure implementation of this order

Registrar (Judicial) shall communicate copy of this order to all the Principal District Judges in the State, who, in turn, shall sensitize all the Presiding Officers and ensure implementation of this order.

Registrar (Judicial) is further directed to circulate the copy of this order to all the Bar Associations in the State through the Principal District Judges, so that they can effectively address their client’s cause.

Registrar (Judicial) shall also issue a separate notification in this regard and the same shall be displayed in the High Court’s Website.

These directions will apply to all bail application including bails in Criminal Revision as well as Criminal Appeals.
This order shall come into force from 22.11.2021.

V.Bharath Kumar Vs State of Telangana

Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt Ltd Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 13 Apr 2021

Posted on November 10, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

This is a landmark judgment from the 3-judge full-bench of Supreme Court of India.

From Para 23,

23. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, our final conclusions on the principal/core issue, whether the High Court would be justified in passing an interim order of stay of investigation and/or “no coercive steps to be adopted”, during the pendency of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in what circumstances and whether the High Court would be justified in passing the order of not to arrest the accused or “no coercive steps to be adopted” during the investigation or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, our final conclusions are as under:
i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable offence;
ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences;
iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on;
iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the ‘rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty).
v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint;
vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage;
vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule;
viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere;
ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping;
x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences;
xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice;
xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure;
xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court;
xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint;
xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR;
xvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should not require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or “no coercive steps to be adopted” and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The High Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of not to arrest and/or “no coercive steps” either during the investigation or till the investigation is completed and/or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
xvii) Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim stay of further investigation, after considering the broad parameters while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India referred to hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is required to be passed so that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the Court and the higher forum can consider what was weighed with the High Court while passing such an interim order.
xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of “no coercive steps to be adopted” within the aforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by “no coercive steps to be adopted” as the term “no coercive steps to be adopted” can be said to be too vague and/or broad which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied.

Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt Ltd Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 13 Apr 2021

Citations : [2021 SCC ONLINE SC 315]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/199473647/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/607d22efba0bb01cbed0c0a7

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/m-s-neeharika-infrastructure-pvt-ltd-versus-state-of-maharashtra-and-others

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Japani Sahoo Vs Chandra Sekhar Mohanty on 27 Jul 2007

Posted on October 16, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court declared that, Limitation u/s 468 starts from the date of making the complaint and not on the date the cognizance was taken.

Reasoning

52. The matter can be looked at from different angle also. Once it is accepted (and there is no dispute about it) that it is not within the domain of the complainant or prosecuting agency to take cognizance of an offence or to issue process and the only thing the former can do is to file a complaint or initiate proceedings in accordance with law. If that action of initiation of proceedings has been taken within the period of limitation, the complainant is not responsible for any delay on the part of the Court or Magistrate in issuing process or taking cognizance of an offence. Now, if he is sought to be penalized because of the omission, default or inaction on the part of the Court or Magistrate, the provision of law may have to be tested on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. It can possibly be urged that such a provision is totally arbitrary, irrational and unreasonable. It is settled law that a Court of Law would interpret a provision which would help sustaining the validity of law by applying the doctrine of reasonable construction rather than making it vulnerable and unconstitutional by adopting rule of ‘litera legis’. Connecting the provision of limitation in Section 468 of the Code with issuing of process or taking of cognizance by the Court may make it unsustainable and ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution.

Conclusion

53. In view of the above, we hold that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation, the relevant date must be considered as the date of filing of complaint or initiating criminal proceedings and not the date of taking cognizance by a Magistrate or issuance of process by a Court. We, therefore, overrule all decisions in which it has been held that the crucial date for computing the period of limitation is taking of cognizance by the Magistrate/Court and not of filing of complaint or initiation of criminal proceedings.

Japani Sahoo Vs Chandra Sekhar Mohanty on 27 Jul 2007

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1432851/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae4ae4b0149711413706

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Landmark Case

Dr. Rini Johar and Anr Vs State of MP and Ors on 03 Jun 2016

Bar Council of Kerala Vs Raju Y and Anr on 04 Jan 2019

Kamatchi Vs Lakshmi Narayanan on 13 Apr 2022

K Neelaveni Vs State Rep By Inspector of Police and Ors on 22 Mar 2010

Priya Bala Ghosh Vs Suresh Chandra Ghosh on 4 Mar 1971

Saraswathi Vs Thirupathi and Anr on 24 Sep 2014

M.A Khaliq and Ors Vs Ashok Kumar and Anr on 15 Sep 2021

V.Bharath Kumar Vs State of Telangana

Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt Ltd Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 13 Apr 2021

Japani Sahoo Vs Chandra Sekhar Mohanty on 27 Jul 2007