A single judge of Calcutta High Court held as follows, regarding an Ad-interim maintenance order granted to a Doctor-wife,

From Para 1.2,

1.2. The Petitioner assailed the impugned order primarily on the grounds of procedural irregularity, the material suppression of facts regarding the Wife’s independent professional income, and a fundamental violation of the principles of natural justice.

From Para 1.5,

1.5. Central to the Wife’s grievance is a socially sensitive allegation of a “grave breach of marital trust,” predicated upon an asserted incestuous proximity between the Husband and his first cousin. Conversely, the Petitioner characterizes these allegations as “bohemian fabrications,” contending that his involvement with the said relative was purely a discharge of familial guardianship during a period of financial exigency.

From Para 1.7,

1.7. The core of the Petitioner’s grievance lies in the “procedural haste” displayed by the Learned Court below. The impugned order was passed on the very day the Domestic Incident Report (DIR) was placed on record, without the Petitioner being afforded an opportunity to file his Affidavit of Assets and Liabilities, thereby bypassing the mandatory procedural architecture mandated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajnesh v. Neha.

From Para 6.1.6,

6.1.6. In the present case, the record reveals that the Learned Magistrate passed the ad-interim order on the very day the Domestic Incident Report (DIR) was filed, without even directing the parties to file their respective Affidavits of Assets and Liabilities. Where a subordinate court bypasses a
mandate issued by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution, such an order is not merely “erroneous,” but is passed in excess of jurisdiction. In such circumstances, relegating a party to a time-consuming appeal would amount to perpetuating a procedural illegality.

From 6.1.8 to 6.1.10,

6.1.8. If the Wife, being a high-earning specialist, suppressed her professional standing to fit the narrative of a “destitute” woman, the resulting order is tainted by a suppression of material facts. While an appellate court could examine this, the High Court under Section 482 is the appropriate forum to exercise its “supervisory-inherent” role when the integrity of the judicial process is at stake.
6.1.9. Distinguishing the present facts from cases where revisions are dismissed due to the availability of an appeal, this Court observes that in those instances, the challenge usually pertains to the appreciation of evidence. Here, the challenge is to the validity of the procedure itself. If the Learned Magistrate has bypassed the “due process” of financial disclosure, the order becomes an abuse of the process of the court.
6.1.10. Consequently, this Court holds that the Revisional Application is maintainable. The statutory bar of Section 29 of the P.W.D.V. Act does not fetter the inherent power of the High Court to strike down an order that is ex-facie violative of the mandates of the Apex Court and is predicated upon an evidentiary void created by material suppression. The jurisdictional gate is, therefore, open for an inquiry into the merits of the procedural and substantive challenges raised by the Petitioner.

From Para 6.2.2,

6.2.2. It is observed from the record that the impugned order was passed on 01.06.2022. A perusal of the order sheet reveals a striking “procedural leap”; the Learned Magistrate took cognizance of the DIR and, in the same breath, quantified the ad-interim maintenance at ₹20,000/- per month. While Section 23 of the P.W.D.V. Act undoubtedly empowers the Magistrate to pass such interim orders as are “just and proper,” this discretion is not a license for judicial arbitrariness. It must be exercised within the guardrails of procedural due process.

From Paras 6.2.4 to 6.2.8,

6.2.4. In the present case, the Learned Magistrate proceeded to fix the quantum before the Petitioner-Husband was even afforded an opportunity to file his Affidavit. This methodology fundamentally undermines the “Disclosure Regime.” While the Wife’s counsel argues that Section 23(2) permits ex-parte orders to prevent immediate starvation, such an argument must be reconciled with the fact that the parties here are not from a marginalized socio-economic background, but are an Engineer and a Doctor. In such high-stakes litigation involving professionals, the “emergency” must be weighed against the “accuracy” of the financial data.
6.2.5. Furthermore, the ratio in Rajnesh v. Neha emphasizes that the Court must consider the “standard of living,” the “essential expenditures,” and the “actual income” of both parties. By awarding ₹20,000/- without having the Petitioner’s salary certificate or the Wife’s disclosure of her specialized clinical income on record, the Learned Magistrate acted in a vacuum. This Court finds that such “rational guesswork” becomes “irrational” the moment it ignores a mandatory Supreme Court guideline.
6.2.6. Comparing the present facts with the spirit of the directions in Aditi alias Mithi v. Jitesh Sharma [2023 SCC OnLine SC 1451], the Supreme Court reiterated that the guidelines in Rajnesh are not mere “suggestions” but are “mandatory instructions” to be followed by all Courts. The failure to elicit the Affidavit of Assets and Liabilities before determining the quantum, even at the ad-interim stage, results in a failure of justice, as it saddles the husband with a liability based on the wife’s unilateral (and often inflated) assertions.
6.2.7. In this case, the Petitioner asserts a net income of ₹70,000/-, while the Wife alleges ₹2,10,000/-. Without the Affidavit, the Magistrate had no legal basis to choose one figure over the other. The “haste” shown by the Learned Magistrate in quantifying the amount on the very first day of the DIR filing, without waiting for the Petitioner’s financial disclosure, constitutes a patent procedural irregularity.
6.2.8. Accordingly, this Court holds that the Learned Magistrate committed a jurisdictional error by bypassing the mandatory requirement of exchanging Affidavits of Assets and Liabilities. While the Magistrate had the power to grant ad-interim relief, the quantification of that relief without following the Rajnesh v. Neha timeline renders the order procedurally fragile and unsustainable in law. The “emergency” power under Section 23 cannot be used to circumvent the “due process” of financial transparency.

From 6.3.2,

6.3.2. It is a settled principle that the phrase “unable to maintain herself” does not contemplate a state of absolute destitution or beggary. However, judicial interpretation has evolved to distinguish between a spouse who cannot work and one who chooses not to work despite being highly qualified. In the instant case, the Petitioner has produced prima facie evidence of the Wife’s professional credentials, which the Wife does not deny; rather, she masks them under the shroud of current “unemployment.”

From Para 6.3.6,

6.3.6. Furthermore, we must address the Wife’s silence regarding her professional status in her initial application. A litigant who seeks equity must come with clean hands. By identifying herself simply as a “Doctor” without disclosing her specialized rank and previous lucrative emoluments, the Wife engaged in what this Court terms “strategic suppression.” Such suppression vitiates the claim for discretionary ad-interim relief, as it prevents the Magistrate from balancing the equities properly.

From Para 6.4.2

6.4.2. In the traditional paradigm of maintenance, Courts were often reluctant to investigate the “earning potential” of a spouse at the threshold stage, focusing primarily on the “actual income” of the husband. However, the modern judicial trend, as articulated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, has moved toward a more symmetrical and realistic assessment of financial status.

From Para 6.4.4,

6.4.4. The use of the word “shall” in the context of these criteria makes it mandatory for the Magistrate to weigh these factors even at the ad-interim stage. If a spouse is a Specialist Doctor, her potential to earn is not a distant possibility but a present reality. To ignore this potential while saddling the husband with a substantial financial liability is to tilt the scales of justice unfairly. The P.W.D.V. Act is a protectionist measure for the vulnerable, not a mechanism for a professional to withdraw from their social and financial responsibilities to become a “pensioner” of the other spouse.

From Paras 6.4.6 to 6.4.9,

6.4.6. In the present factual matrix, the Opposite Party No. 2 has served as a Senior Registrar in Critical Care. This is a niche field of medicine where demand is perennial and remuneration is high. By awarding ₹12,000/- for the Wife’s personal maintenance without evaluating why a Critical Care Specialist is “incapable” of earning even a fraction of her previous salary, the Learned Magistrate failed to apply the “balancing test” of earning capacity.
6.4.7. While the Wife argues that she has to care for a minor child, this Court observes that in contemporary professional circles, especially among the “Engineer-Doctor” class, childcare is frequently managed through professional assistance or family support to allow both parents to maintain their career trajectories. A total professional abdication, coupled with a demand for maintenance, must be justified by something more substantial than a mere statement of current unemployment.
6.4.8. Furthermore, the principle of “Equitable Distribution of Responsibility” suggests that when both spouses are highly qualified, the burden of maintenance cannot be placed solely on the husband’s shoulders. The “earning capacity” is not merely an academic factor; it is a substantive check against the abuse of the court’s process by a spouse who suppresses their potential to secure an inflated maintenance order.
6.4.9. Therefore, this Court holds that “Earning Capacity” is a mandatory material consideration at the ad-interim stage. The failure of the Learned Magistrate to calibrate the quantum of maintenance against the Wife’s specialized professional status constitutes a failure to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the principles of equity and the mandates of the Apex Court. The “earning potential” of a Specialist Doctor must be set off against her claim for maintenance to arrive at a “just and fair” figure.

Note: That part where the Judge says claim of child in a DVC is isolated from parents litigation, is bullshit, in my opinion, and hopefully be set aside by Supreme Court (or another bench of Calcutta High Court) in a future case.

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/85220504/

https://www.shoneekapoor.com/legal-news/qualified-woman-maintenance-hc

Index of DV Judgments is here.