Musin Babulal Thengade and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr on 29 Jan 2025

Posted on March 2 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Bombay High Court at Aurangabab held that

From Para 6,

6. Apart from this, the learned A.P.P. has also placed reliance on judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rupali Devi Vs. State of Uttar pradesh reported in AIR OnLine (2019) SC 394.

From Paras 9 and 10,

9. As regards Section 472 of the Cr. P. C, contention of the learned A.P.P. that offence under Section 498-A of the IPC is a continuing wrong will have to be accepted, but only with a rider. Although the offence under Section 498-A of the IPC is a continuing wrong, it would not mean that limitation would continue to run perennially.The correct interpretation of the provision is provided in the matter of Arun Vyas and another Vs. Anita Vyas (supra) which sates that in case of offence under Section 498-A, a new starting point of limitation is start on every occasion when the wrong is committed and the period of limitation needs to be computed from the last such wrong. We may profitably quote paragraph 13 of the said decision, which reads as under :-
“ The essence of the offence in Section 498-A is cruelty as defined in the explanation appended to that section. It is a continuing offence and on each occasion on which the respondent was subjected to cruelty, she would have a new starting point of limitation. The last act of cruelty was committed against the respondent, within the meaning of the explanation, on October 13, 1988 when, on the allegation made by the respondent in the complaint to Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, she was forced to leave the matrimonial home. Having regard to the provisions of Sections 469 and 472 the period of limitation commenced for offences under Sections 406 and 498-A from October 13, 1988 and ended on October 12, 1991. But the charge sheet was filed on December 22, 1995,therefore, it was clearly barred by limitation under Section 468(2)(c) Cr. P. C.’’
10. Thereafter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has further stated in paragraph No. 14 that in complaints under Section 498-A the wife will invariably be oppressed, who is subjected to cruelty and, therefore, Section 473 of the Cr. P.C should be construed liberally in favour of wife. However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also cautioned that the words interest of justice employed in Section 473 of the Cr. P. C. cannot mean in the interest of prosecution and the true object of the provision is to advance the cause of justice by protecting the oppressed and punishing the offender. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also referred to its earlier judgment in the matter of Onkar Radha Manohari (Smt) Vs. Venka Venkata Reddy reported in 1993 AIR SCW 3595 that while dealing with Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, the Court should not only examine as to whether delay is properly explained, but also as to whether it is necessary to entertain a time barred matter in the interest of justice.

From Paras 13 and 14,

13. These observations have been made in the context of territorial jurisdiction. The judgment does not deal with the aspect of limitation. Provisions of Sections 468, 472 and 473 of the Cr. P.C did not fall for consideration in this case. As against this in the cases of Arun Vyas and another Vs Anita Vyas (supra) and Ramesh and other Vs. state of Tamil Nadu (supra), the question of limitation was directly involved and the same is answered referring to the relevant statutory provisions. It is settled legal principle that judgments of the Courts have to be interpreted in the backdrop of facts of the particular case. Ratio of a case has to be understood and appreciated in the backdrop of the facts in which the judgment is delivered. The law laid down in the judgment cannot be divorced from the facts of the case in which it is delivered. A judgment cannot be interpreted like a statute. It cannot be applied uniformly every where like Euclid’s theorems of geometry. Therefore, while dealing with aforesaid three judgments cited during the course of hearing, we are of the considered opinion that the ratio laid down in the matters of Arun Vyas and Ramesh which directly deal with the question of limitation will have to be accepted. The judgment in the matter of Rupali Devi is relating to territorial jurisdiction of a Court to deal with offence under Section 498-A of the IPC.
14. In the light of above, we are of the opinion that limitation for offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC shall commence from the last act of cruelty. Offence under Section 498-A of the IPC is a continuing offence implies that each act of cruelty would offer new starting point of limitation. Limitation for prosecution under Section 498-A does not continue for indefinite period. Such interpretation will render Section 468 of the Cr. P.C. nugatory or otiose for the purpose of Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code which does not appear to be the intention of legislature. Had there been intention to exclude Section 498-A of the IPC from the sweep of Section 468 of the Cr. P.C express provision could have been made for the said purpose.

Musin Babulal Thengade and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr on 29 Jan 2025

Citations: [2025:BHC-AUG:2858-DB]

Other Sources:

https://www.livelaw.in/high-court/bombay-high-court/bombay-high-court-cruelty-498a-ipc-limitation-283107

https://lawtrend.in/limitation-period-for-ipc-section-498-a-to-commence-from-last-act-of-cruelty-bombay-high-court/

Limitation for offence punishable under Section 498-A of IPC commences from the last act of cruelty: Bombay HC

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/high-courts/bombay-high-court/aurangabad-musin-babulal-thengade-v-the-state-of-maharashtra-2025-bhc-aug-2858-db-limitation-1567184

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Rajesh Pundkar and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr on 08 Jun 2022

Posted on June 12, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Bombay High Court said that, FIR cannot be quashed against relatives living in far away places just on that ground, when there are allegedly specific allegations in the Complaint/FIR.

From Paras 8-10,

8. On going through the allegations made in the First Information Report, we find that the allegations are not vague in nature. They are not general in nature either and that they specifically assign a role to each of the applicants which they had performed while subjecting the respondent No.2 to cruelty and harassment.
9. It appears to us that the entire story of woes of respondent No.2 began, going by the allegations made against applicant No.1, after the applicant No.1 established extra marital relations with applicant No.6 and even performed second marriage with her clandestinely. The respondent No.2 got married to applicant No.1 in the year 2007 and the respondent No.2 also bore three children from out of the wedlock. Out of three children, one is son and two are daughters. The eldest daughter of respondent No.2 is aged about 14 years, second daughter is aged about 7 years and the son, who is the youngest, is aged about 4 years. It is further seen that the year 2017 proved to be a disaster for respondent No.2 as it was from this year and on wards the marital discord began. From this year hence, the applicant No.1 started harassing the respondent No.2. It is alleged that he even used to subject her to severe beating. Soon thereafter, it is further seen, the respondent No.2 learnt about the extra marital affair that applicant No.1 was having with the applicant No.6 and when questioned by respondent No.2, applicant No.1 would further subject respondent No.2 to cruelty. The acts of cruelty and harassment have been specifically stated by respondent No.2 in the FIR as well as in police statement. The respondent No.2 has also alleged that when she brought all these facts to the notice of remaining applicants, they being her in-laws and probably in a position to control and regulate the conduct of applicant No.1, unexpected reaction came from the remaining applicants. The remaining applicants instead of exercising proper control over the applicant No.1, according to respondent No.2, started instigating applicant No.1 against respondent No.2. As alleged by respondent No.2, these applicants even raised illegal demand of Rs.50,000/- from respondent No.2 and upon her failure to meet that demand, the respondent No.2 was subjected by all these applicants to verbal abuses. They even instigated husband i.e. applicant to drive respondent No.2 out of his house.
10. The afore-stated allegations, we do not think, could be called as vague and general. These allegations have been made not only against the applicant-husband but also against all the in-laws i.e. remaining applicants and they are all specific in nature. They disclose sufficiently commission of cognizable offence cruelty, punishable under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. It also does not appear to us that they have been made with some hidden motive to just rope in all in-laws.

From Para 12,

12. This is a case wherein specific instances of involvement of not only the husband but also his relatives have been stated and therefore, with due respect, we would say that the case of Kahkashan Kausar would not assist the applicants in any manner. In the case of Kahkashan Kausar, it is also held that when there are general omnibus allegations made in the course of matrimonial dispute and if they are not checked, it would result in misuse of the process of law. As stated earlier, in this case, there are no general omnibus allegations made against all the applicants rather, these allegations make out a prima-facie case against all the applicants and therefore, on this count also the case of Kahkashan Kausar would not help the applicants.

Rajesh Pundkar and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr on 08 Jun 2022

TIP: Don’t waste money on Quash in such circumstances. Just file a 205 CrPC application on the EXACT same grounds and sit at home relax! Let the prosecution scrabble to prove their false allegations.

498A IPC Judgments

Posted on January 24, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Here I will list all judgments both from Supreme Court of India and Various High Courts that may be used in the false cases filed u/s 498A IPC

Once you get hold of your case documents on First date of appearance in Court, see if there are any possible grounds to come out of false cases. This is possible in 2 ways.

By filing a Discharge Petition u/s 239 CrPC at the Trial Court where this false 498A IPC case is filed.
By filing a Quash Petition u/s 482 CrPC at the High Court in that State, where this false 498A IPC case is filed.

This page here contains the provisions available under the above provisions along with Judgments.

MASTER SITEMAP here.

A.Subash Babu Vs State of A.P. and Anr on 21 Jul 2011

Posted on December 14, 2019 by ShadesOfKnife

Landmark Judgment to screw the perpetrators of 494 and 495 IPC Bigamy offences. This is specifically helpful to those who have cases in the State of Andhra Pradesh where these two crimes are made Cognizable and Non-bailable, due to a State amendment in 1992 whereas these are Non-cognizable and Bailable in the rest of the States in India.

13. In this regard, it would be, relevant to notice the provisions of Article 246 of the Constitution. Article 246 deals with subject matter of laws made by the Parliament and by the legislatures of State. Clause (1) of Article 246 inter alia provides that notwithstanding anything contained in Clauses (2) and (3) of Article 246, the Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the maters enumerated in List 1 in the Seventh Schedule. Sub-Clause 2 of the said Article provides that notwithstanding anything in Clause (3), Parliament and subject to Clause (1), the legislature of any State also have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List 3 in the Seventh Schedule, whereas, Clause (3) of Article 246 amongst other things provides that subject to Clauses (1) and (2), the legislature of any State has exclusive power to make laws for such State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List 2 in the Seventh Schedule. Entry 2 in List 3 i.e. Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule mentions “Criminal Procedure, including in matters included in the Code of “Criminal procedure, at the commencement of this Constitution”. Thus there is no manner of doubt that Parliament and subject to Clause (1), the legislature of any State also has power to make laws with respect to Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 2(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 defines the phrase “Cognizable Offence” to mean an offence for which and “Cognizable Case” means a case in which, a Police Officer may, in accordance with the First Schedule or under any other law for the time being in force arrest without warrant. Part I of the First Schedule to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 relating to offences under the Indian Penal Code inter alia mentions that Section 494 and 495 are non-cognizable. Section 154 of the Criminal Procedure Code relates to information in cognizable cases and provides inter alia that every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an Officer in charge of a Police Station, shall be reduced to writing by him and be read over to the informant. Section 156 of the Code provides that any Officer in charge of a Police Station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over a local area within the limits of such station would have power to enquire into or try under provisions of Chapter XIII of Criminal Procedure Code. As Sections 494 and 495 are made non-cognizable, a Police Officer would not have power to investigate those cases without the order of a Magistrate, having a power to try such cases or commit such cases for trial as provided under Section 155(2) of the Code.
However, this Court finds that the Legislative Assembly of the State of Andhra Pradesh enacted the Code of Criminal Procedure (Andhra Pradesh Second Amendment) Act, 1992. By the said Amending Act, the First Schedule to Central Act 2 of 1974 i.e. the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 came to be amended and against the entries relating to Section 494 in column 4 for the word “Ditto”, the word “Cognizable” and in column 5 for the word “Bailable” the word “Non-bailable” were substituted. Similarly, against the entries relating to Section 495 in column 4, for the word “Ditto” the word “Cognizable” and in column 5 for the word “Ditto”, the word “Non-bailable” were substituted. What is relevant to be noticed is that the Code of Criminal Procedure (Andhra Pradesh Second Amendment) Act, 1992 was reserved by the Governor of Andhra Pradesh on the 21st October, 1991 for consideration and assent of the President. The Presidential assent was received on 10th February, 1992 after which the Code of Criminal Procedure (Andhra Pradesh Second Amendment) Act, 1992 was published on the 15th February, 1992 in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette Part IV-B (Ext.). Thus there is no manner of doubt that Sections 494 and 495 IPC are cognizable offences so far as State of Andhra Pradesh is concerned.

And… in Para 14

* * * * * *

In view of the above settled legal position, this Court has no doubt that the amendment made in the First Schedule to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Andhra Pradesh Second Amendment) Act, 1992, shall prevail in the State of Andhra Pradesh, notwithstanding the fact that in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 offences under Section 494 and 495 are treated as cognizable offences. The reasoning given by the Division Bench of High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Mavuri Rani Veera Bhadranna (supra) that though the State Legislation amended the Schedule making the offence under Section 494 IPC cognizable, the legislation made by the Parliament i.e. Section 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code remains and in the event of any repugnancy between the two legislations, the legislation made by the Parliament would prevail, because, Section 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code still holds the field despite the fact that the State Legislation made amendment to the Schedule of Criminal Procedure Code, with respect, is erroneous and contrary to all cannons of interpretation of statute. Once First Schedule to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 stands amended and offences punishable under Sections 494 and 495 IPC are made cognizable offences, those offences will have to be regarded as cognizable offences for all purposes of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 including for the purpose of Section 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Section 198(1)(c), after the Amendment made by the Code of Criminal Procedure(Andhra Pradesh Second Amendment) Act, 1992 cannot be interpreted in isolation without referring to the fact that offences under Sections 494 and 495 IPC have been made cognizable so far as the State of Andhra Pradesh is concerned. Therefore, the provision made in Section 198(1)(c) that no Court shall take cognizance of an offences punishable under Chapter XX of the IPC except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved will have to be read subject to the amendment made by the Legislative Assembly of the State of Andhra Pradesh in 1992. Once, it is held that the offences under Section 494 and 495 IPC are cognizable offences, the bar imposed by operative part of sub-section 1 of Section 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code beginning with the words “No Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Chapter XX of the Indian Penal Code except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence” gets lifted so far as offences punishable under Sections 494 and 495 IPC are concerned. As those offences have been made cognizable offences in the State of Andhra Pradesh since 1992, the same will have to be dealt with as provided in the Section 156 which inter alia provides that any officer in charge of a Police Station, may without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to enquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. Even without the authorization under Section 155(2) or Section 156(3) of Criminal Penal Code, offences under Sections 494, 495 and 496 having been rendered cognizable and non-bailable by virtue of the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment Act, 1992) can be investigated by the Police and no illegality is attached to the investigation of these offences by the police. If the Police Officer in charge of a Police Station is entitled to investigate offences punishable under Section 494 and 495 IPC, there is no manner of doubt that the competent Court would have all jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offences after receipt of report as contemplated under Section 173(2) of the Code. Thus, this Court finds that correct proposition of law was not laid down in Mavuri Rani Veera Bhadranna (supra) when the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the said case held that as Section 198 of Criminal Procedure Code still holds the field despite the amendment made by State Legislature, the Court would have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 494 IPC on the basis of report submitted by the Investigating Officer. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that in view of Section 198(1)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate is disentitled to take cognizance of the offences punishable under Sections 494 and 495 IPC despite the State amendment making those offences cognizable, this Court notices that in Mavuri Rani Veera Bhadranna (supra), the Division Bench has considered effect of Section 155(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code and thereafter held that the bar under Section 198 would not be applicable as complaint lodged before police for offence under Section 494 IPC also related to other cognizable offences and if police files a charge sheet, the Court can take cognizance also of offence under Section 494 along with other cognizable offences by virtue of Section 155 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Code.

And then in Para 15,

15. Section 155(4) of the Code inter alia provides that:-
“Where a case relates to two or more offences of which at least one is cognizable, the case shall be deemed to be a cognizable case, notwithstanding that the other offences are non-cognizable”
Here in this case in the charge sheet it is mentioned that the appellant has also committed offence punishable under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code which is cognizable and therefore this is a case which relates to two or more offences of which at least one is cognizable and therefore the case must be deemed to be cognizable case notwithstanding that the other offences are non- cognizable. This is not a case in which the FIR is exclusively filed for commission of offences under Sections 494 and 495 IPC. The case of the respondent no. 2 is that the appellant has committed offences punishable under Sections 417, 420, 494, 495 and 498A of the IPC. A question may arise as to what should be the procedure to be followed by a complainant when a case involves not only non-cognizable offence but one or more cognizable offences as well. It is somewhat anomalous that the aggrieved person by the alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections 494 and 495 IPC should file complaint before a Court and that the same aggrieved person should approach the police officer for alleged commission of offences under Sections 417, 420 and 498A of the Indian Penal Code. Where the case involves one cognizable offence also along with non-cognizable offences it should not be treated as a non-cognizable case for the purpose of sub-section 2 of Section 155 and that is the intention of legislation which is manifested in Section 155(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, the argument that the learned Magistrate could not have taken cognizance of the offences punishable under Sections 494 and 495 IPC on the basis of submission of charge sheet, cannot be accepted and is hereby rejected.

A.Subash Babu Vs State of A.P. and Anr on 21 July, 2011

Citations: [2011 SCALE 7 671], [2011 RCR CRIMINAL SC 3 674], [2011 RCR CIVIL SC 3 840], [2011 SCC 7 616], [2011 SLT 5 727], [2011 AIOL 509], [2011 ALLMR CRI SC 2931], [2011 ANJ SC 2 202], [2012 BOMCR CRI SC 1 379], [2011 JCC SC 3 2189], [2011 AIR SC 3031], [2011 SCC CRI 3 267], [2011 SCC CIV 3 851], [2011 AIR SC 4702], [2011 ULJ 3 139], [2011 AIC 107 51], [2011 SHIMLC 3 551], [2011 DMC SC 3 50], [2011 ALT CRI 3 242], [2012 BLJ 1 260], [2011 ACR SC 3 3182], [2011 DMC 2 827], [2011 KCCR SN 4 472], [2011 UC 2 1509], [2012 ALD CRI 1 210], [2011 SCR 9 453], [2011 JT SC 8 483], [2011 CRI LJ 4373], [2011 AIR SCW 4702]

Indiankanoon.org link:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1342950/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609aeefe4b0149711415347

Here is the Andhra Pradesh HC judgement here from 2010.

AP High Court had passed similar judgment here in 2014.

For a similar adjudication from State of Odisha, go here.

Index of 494 and 495 IPC judgments is here.

Rani Narasimha Sastry Vs Rani Suneela Rani on 19 November, 2019

Posted on December 9, 2019 by ShadesOfKnife

Apex Court has held that after acquittal from IPC 498A case, husband can file for divorce under the ground of Cruelty.

Telangana High Court said that,

14…..

Merely because the respondent has sought for maintenance or has filed a complaint against the petitioner for the offence punishable under Section 498-A of IPC, they cannot be said to be valid grounds for holding that such a recourse adopted by the respondent amounts to cruelty.”

The Supreme Court disapproved of this view.

The above observation of the High Court cannot be approved. It is true that it is open for anyone to file complaint or lodge prosecution for redressal for his or her grievances and lodge a first information report for an offence also and mere lodging of complaint or FIR cannot ipso facto be treated as cruelty. But when a person undergoes a trial in which he is acquitted of the allegation of offence under Section 498-A of IPC, levelled by the wife against the husband, it cannot be accepted that no cruelty has meted on the husband. As per pleadings before us, after parties having been married on 14.08.2005, they lived together only 18 months and thereafter they are separately living for more than a decade now.

Rani Narasimha Sastry Vs Rani Suneela Rani on 19 November, 2019

Citations : [2019 SCC ONLINE SC 1595], [2019 (6) CTC 587]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/60266171/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5e01d7a18ef1524a1e205ef8

The High Court of Telangana decision that got set aside is here.

Index of all Domestic Violence Judgments is here.

Shanti And Anr Vs State of Haryana on 13 November, 1990

Posted on July 12, 2019 by ShadesOfKnife

This is a landmark judgment from Supreme Court of India which clarified the legal position around sections 304B and 498A IPC.

From Para 6,

Now we shall consider the question as to whether the acquittal of the appellants of the offence punishable under Section 498-A makes any difference. The submission of the learned counsel is that the acquittal under Section 498-A IPC would lead to the effect that the cruelty on the part of the accused is not established. We see no force in this submission. The High Court only held that Section 304-B and Section 498-A IPC are mutually exclusive and that when once the cruelty envisaged in Section 498-A IPC culminates in dowry death of the victim, Section 304-B alone is attracted and in that view of the matter the appellants were acquitted under Section 498-A IPC. It can therefore be seen that the High Court did not hold that the prosecution has not established cruelty on the part of the appellants but on the other hand the High Court considered the entire evidence and held that the element of cruelty which is also an essential of Section 304-B IPC has been established. Therefore the mere acquittal of the appellants under Section 498-A IPC in these circumstances makes no difference for the purpose of this case. However, we want to point out that this view of the High Court is not correct and Sections 304-B and 498-A cannot be held to be mutually exclusive. These provisions deal with two distinct offences. It is true that “cruelty” is a common essential to both the sections and that has to be proved. The Explanation to Section 498-A gives the meaning of “cruelty”. In Section 304-B there is no such explanation about the meaning of “cruelty” but having regard to the common background to these offences we have to take that the meaning of “cruelty or harassment” will be the same as we find in the explanation to Section 498-A under which “cruelty” by itself amounts to an offence and is punishable. Under Section 304-B as already noted, it is the “dowry death” that is punishable and such death should have occurred within seven years of the marriage. No such period is mentioned in Section 498-A and the husband or his relative would be liable for subjecting the woman to “cruelty” any time after the marriage. Further it must also be borne in mind that a person charged and acquitted under Section 304-B can be convicted under Section 498-A without charge being there, if such a case is made out. But from the point of view of practice and procedure and to avoid technical defects it is necessary in such cases to frame charges under both the sections and if the case is established they can be convicted under both the sections but no separate sentence need be awarded under Section 498-A in view of the substantive sentence being awarded for the major offence under Section 304-B.

And the benevolence of the judges overflows for women like juices… yakkk thuuu

From Para 8,

Further both the appellants are women. Under these circumstances, a minimum sentence of seven years’ rigorous imprisonment would serve the ends of justice. Accordingly the convictions are confirmed but the sentence of imprisonment for life under Section 304-B IPC of each of the accused appellant is set aside and instead each of them is sentenced to undergo seven years’ rigorous imprisonment.

Shanti And Anr Vs State of Haryana on 13 November, 1990

Reproduced in accordance with Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from judis.nic.in, lobis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court and District Court Websites such as ecourts.gov.in

Arun Vyas and Anr Vs Anita Vyas on 14 May 1999

Posted on June 30, 2019 by ShadesOfKnife

In this landmark judgment, Apex Court held that offence under Section 498-A of the I.P.C. is a continuing offence and that there would be a new starting point of limitation on each occasion on which the victim was subjected to cruelty. It was specifically held that the last act of cruelty was committed when the victim was forced to leave matrimonial home.

Arun Vyas & Anr vs Anita Vyas on 14 May, 1999

Citation: [1999 ACR SC 2 1456], [1999 CRI LJ 3479], [1999 CRIMES SC 3 90], [1999 DMC SC 2 247], [1999 JT SC 4 421], [1999 OLR 2 364], [1999 RCR CRIMINAL 2 828], [1999 SCALE 3 724], [1999 SCC 4 690], [1999 SCR 3 719], [1999 UJ 2 968], [1999 SCC CRI 629], [1999 AIR SC 0 2071], [1999 SCC CR 0 629], [1999 AIR SC 207], [1999 RCR CRI 2 828], [1999 CRLJ 0 3479], [1999 CALCRILR 0 297], [1999 AIR SC 0 1793], [1999 SCC 4 691], [2000 BOMCR SC 1 233], [1999 SUPREME 5 458]

Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1494464/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad5de4b0149711411319 or https://mynation.net/judgments/arun-vyas-anr-vs-anita-vyas-on-14-may-1999/

Orissa High Court passed a similar judgment here.

IPC 498A – Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty

Posted on January 17, 2019 by ShadesOfKnife

CHAPTER XXA OF CRUELTY BY HUSBAND OR RELATIVES OF HUSBAND

498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.—Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “cruelty” means—
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman;
or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.

What is all the nonsense about it? Go here. A General Life cycle is here.

Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, 1983

Posted on January 2, 2019 by ShadesOfKnife

The once-draconian-considered IPC 498A was introduced via this amendment in 1983.

Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, 1983

All the amendments made to the CrPC are available here.

Journey through the years – Section 498A IPC

Posted on December 31, 2018 by ShadesOfKnife

This is to chronicle the journey of the Section 498A IPC through the years from its enactment.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: IPC 498A – Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty

Musin Babulal Thengade and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr on 29 Jan 2025

Rajesh Pundkar and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr on 08 Jun 2022

498A IPC Judgments

A.Subash Babu Vs State of A.P. and Anr on 21 Jul 2011

Rani Narasimha Sastry Vs Rani Suneela Rani on 19 November, 2019

Shanti And Anr Vs State of Haryana on 13 November, 1990

Arun Vyas and Anr Vs Anita Vyas on 14 May 1999

IPC 498A – Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty

Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, 1983

Journey through the years – Section 498A IPC