From Paras from 13 to 17,

13. From the affidavit of income, assets and liabilities filed by the petitioner-wife before the learned Trial Court in November 2020, it is evident that she did not disclose the income earned during her period of employment between April 2020 and July 2020. In the said affidavit, she asserted that she had worked only for ten months during the entire eight years of marriage. However, she later admitted having worked for a few months in 2020 also, only after the learned Trial Court specifically directed her to file her bank account statements for the period April 2020 to November 2020 – statements which she had not annexed with her affidavit despite filing it in November 2020.
14. It is further noted that although an updated income affidavit was filed by the petitioner in April 2021 in compliance with the directions of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Rajnish v. Neha: (2021) 2 SCC 324, she still did not file her income tax returns for the preceding three years, claiming that the husband had been filing them on her behalf. The learned Trial Court observed that ITRs could nevertheless be accessed using her PAN details and granted her a final opportunity to file them, while imposing costs of ₹1,000/-. The relevant bank statements were eventually filed in July 2021, but legible copies were not furnished to the respondent-husband. In view of the petitioner‟s repeated non-compliance and withholding of material documents, the learned Trial Court was constrained to stay the operation of the ad-interim maintenance order. When bank statements were eventually produced, the salary of about ₹18,000/- per month, admittedly earned by the petitioner during those three months as stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner before the Court, was not reflected in the bank account statements, nor was any termination letter filed contemporaneously. These omissions led the learned Trial Court to conclude that the petitioner did have a source of income, which she attempted to suppress.
15. The learned Trial Court also took note of the petitioner‟s earlier ITRs which showed that, contrary to her claim of having no source of income, she had declared substantial earnings in the years immediately preceding the filing of the complaint. Her ITR for the FY 2017–2018 reflected a gross income exceeding ₹3,00,000/-, comprising rental income and income from other sources. Similarly, her ITR for the FY 2018–2019 showed a gross income of more than ₹3,50,000/-, again arising from rent and deposits. These disclosures were inconsistent with her submission that she was unemployed and that whatever she earned was taken away by her husband.Her bank account statements also reflected electronic transfers, credit entries and investments, none of which were satisfactorily explained by her. These circumstances, at the interim stage, provided sufficient basis for the learned Trial Court to draw a prima facie inference that the petitioner had additional sources of income which she had not disclosed in her income affidavit, and thus, suppressed material facts relating to her financial capacity.
16. The learned Sessions Court, after independently examining the Trial Court record, affirmed these findings and held that the petitioner had not approached the Court with clean hands. It noted that the petitioner had produced the relevant records only when confronted with the documents filed by the respondent-husband and only after specific and repeated directions were passed by the learned Trial Court. The learned Sessions Court also observed that her explanations for the credit entries in her bank accounts were merely oral and unsupported by documents.
17. The record further reflects that the petitioner had received substantial amounts towards maturity of LIC policies and recurring deposits upon the demise of both her parents. Her own explanation is that these amounts were reinvested for the benefit of herself and the child. However, the fact remains that such reinvestments would reasonably generate returns in the form of interest, which constitute a source of income that was never disclosed. The respondent-husband has also placed on record the ITR Acknowledgement for AY 2025–2026, of the petitioner-wife, showing an income of ₹2,04,730/-.

The beauty in this judgment is as follows:

20. However, this Court finds merit in the submission of the petitioner regarding her right to secure adequate residence. It is undisputed that after the parties vacated the rented premises, the petitioner and the minor child have been residing at her brother‟s house. The petitioner is not paying any rent and is residing there purely out of goodwill.
21. Section 19(1)(f) of the PWDV Act empowers the Court to direct the respondent to secure for the aggrieved woman the same level of alternate accommodation as enjoyed by her in the shared household, or to pay rent for the same. The husband also owes a statutory duty to provide residence for his minor child, who resides with the petitioner. The fact that the petitioner may not be entitled to monetary maintenance due to concealment of income does not, ipso facto, in the interregnum, disentitle her to a residence order under Section 19 of the PWDV Act.
22. Accordingly, this Court is of the view that the petitioner-wife is entitled to a sum of Rs. 10,000/- per month, as expenses towards securing a rented accommodation for herself and the minor child, which shall be paid by the respondent herein. The directions qua payment of interim maintenance of Rs. 15,000/- per month to the minor child, as directed by the learned Trial Court and upheld by the Sessions Court, have not been challenged before this Court, and the same are accordingly not interfered with.

The mere fact that the case is only at a Stage where there is challenge to the Interim Orders, this Order sustains. Otherwise, no relief may be granted under DV Act unless DV is established by way of evidence. One should not forget that, as per Section 19(1)(f) of DV Act, ONLY on being satisfied that DV actually happened (obviously by way of evidence), the relief in sub-section can be granted, that to in Main petition

19. Residence orders.—(1) While disposing of an application under sub-section (1) of section12, the Magistrate may, on being satisfied that domestic violence has taken place, pass a residence order—
(a) xxxx;
(b) xxxx;
(c) xxxx;
(d) xxxx;
(e) xxxx; or
(f) directing the respondent to secure same level of alternate accommodation for the aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the shared household or to pay rent for the same, if the circumstances so require:
Provided that no order under clause (b) shall be passed against any person who is a woman.

Frankly, why is interim maintenance granted to the child, when DV was not held to be prima facie established?

Citations: [2025:DHC:11064]

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