Based on State of Rajasthan Vs Smt. Kalki and Anr judgment here and Dalip Singh and Others Vs State of Punjab judgment here, High Court of Madhya Pradesh gave this judgment differentiating the related witness and interested witness.
Liyakatuddin Vs The State of M.P. on 21 August, 2018Reproduced in accordance with Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from judis.nic.in, lobis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court and District Court Websites such as ecourts.gov.in
Based on State of Rajasthan Vs Smt. Kalki and Anr judgment here, Justice N.V. Ramana gave this judgment differentiating the related witness and interested witness.
Ganapathi and Anr Vs The State of Tamil Nadu on 27 March, 2018Reproduced in accordance with Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from judis.nic.in, lobis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court and District Court Websites such as ecourts.gov.in
On the same lines as this Supreme Judgment here in Dalip Singh and Others Vs State of Punjab, in this case also a 3-judge bench addressed the issue “Whether the word “related” means “interested”?”
State of Rajasthan Vs Smt. Kalki and Anr on 15 April, 1981Reproduced in accordance with Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from judis.nic.in, lobis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court and District Court Websites such as ecourts.gov.in
Supreme Court has held that a related witness would ordinarily speak the truth, but in the case of an enmity there may be a tendency to drag in an innocent person as an accused—each case has to be considered on its own facts.
From Paras 25 and 26,
Dalip Singh and Others Vs State of Punjab on 15 May, 1953“25. We are unable to agree with the learned Judges of the High Court that the testimony of the two eyewitnesses requires corroboration. If the foundation for such an observation is based on the fact that the witnesses are women and that the fate of seven men hangs on their testimony, we know of no such rule. If it is grounded on the reason that they are closely related to the deceased we are unable to concur. This is a fallacy common to many criminal cases and one which another Bench of this Court endeavoured to dispel in Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan.”
In the said case, it has also been further observed: (AIR p. 366, para 26)
“26. A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. It is true, when feelings run high and there is personal cause for enmity, that there is a tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty, but foundation must be laid for such a criticism
and the mere fact of relationship far from being a foundation is often a sure guarantee of
truth.”
Reproduced in accordance with Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from judis.nic.in, lobis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court and District Court Websites such as ecourts.gov.in
A judgment from a magistrate from Dhule, in Maharastra. See the bullshitting of this judge,
From Para 13,
It is the defence of accused persons that there are contradictions and omissions in the evidence of witnesses. Whatever these witnesses have stated is on the information gathered from the informant. It is very natural considering the nature of the charge. In the circumstances, the evidence of the informant is pivotal and the evidence of relative witnesses which has corroborative value always revolves around her evidence. Hence, evidence of such relative witnesses cannot be discarded by branding them as hearsay. Aftermath I have no hesitation to conclude that there is reliable corroboration from these so called interested witnesses.
From Para 14,
Learned advocate for accused persons urged that no independent witness is examined by prosecution and the investigation officer is also not examined. The offence of cruelty generally occurs within the four boundaries of the house. Under these circumstances, non examination of any independent witness can certainly be spared.
Para 17 will give you vomiting,
In the case in hand, informant was ousted from her matrimonial house on 11-02-2009 and she has lodged complaint on 14-02-2009. But she has mentioned in her evidence that, after accused persons had ousted her, she went to railway station and waited their for whole night, in the morning, she went at her elder son’s school to meet him but as her husband and her mother-in-law had prevented her from meeting her son she came back at her parent’s house. Her matrimonial house is at Mumbai and her maternal house is at Dhule, she has lodged report against accused persons at Dhule City Police Station. In view of all the above explanation, in my opinion delay is satisfactorily explained by informant.
Never mind the jurisdiction. Supreme Court’s Yours truly has already destroyed the jurisdiction with weird illogic here.
From Para 18, more vomiting,
With due respect to Hon’ble High Court, in the present case in hand, the alleged ill-treatment was occurred to informant till year 2009 and witnesses deposed during the trial in year 2013 to 2017, it would be too pedantic to state the exact dates. Hence, in my opinion, non disclosure of such dates would not be that material in the peculiar circumstances of the case as witnesses have correctly mentioned all the incidents of physical and mental cruelty. As well as in respect of the earlier discussion, offences under Section 498A occurs within four corners of the house, hence it is not expected from any neighbour to narrate the ill treatment suffered by informant by her husband and in laws. . And if for the sake of argument we accept that, her neighbours knew about the ill treatment to her by her husband and in laws, but a prudent man can conclude that a neighbor will not come and give evidence against his neighbors for the lady who is not living with his neighbour from years together.
Here goes 212 CrPC down the drain… Ahh this is womenland…
From Para 19,
With due respect to Hon’ble High Court, the above mentioned case laws are not applicable to the case in hand. In present case, informant and her witnesses have specifically deposed about the physical and mental torture as well as unlawful demand of money by accused persons and furthermore her torture on non fulfilling the unlawful demands by accused persons with corroboration. Not a single witness has deposed contrary to prosecution story regarding it. Hence, it constrains me to believe the version of informant and her witnesses
More diarrhea in Para 20,
It is also the defence of accused persons that, she herself has left company of accused no.1. She has filed divorce petition in the Court. The informant also accepted the contention of divorce in her cross examination. But while considering the situation in the Indian culture, when a marriage was performed with zeal and enthusiasm and a bride had left her parental house, it would be difficult to believe that she would leave company of her husband without any reason. Even in todays so called modern society, thereturn of daughter from matrimonial house is treated as a stigma. Considering these general factors, whenever the allegations of cruelty is made, the conduct of the parties, motive intention and other circumstances of the case etc. always needs to be kept in mind because, what amounts of cruelty is nowhere defined. It needs to be waited considering the facts of each and every case differently. However, once the unlawful demands are proved, it materially strengthens the prosecution story. Merely by saying that the informant left company of her husband on her own would not give probability to the defence of husband. He has to offer some plausible explanation on this point. Moreover, when it has emerged on record that even after partying ways with accused no.1, the informant from last 9 years or so is still residing at her parental house. There appears no other reason for her to leave her matrimonial life only because she doesn’t want to cohabit with accused no.1. It is pertinent to note that her elder son was with accused persons and one daughter is with her at the time she left her matrimonial house. Having regard to the Indian culture again a mother cannot leave her son without any strong reason. Only filing petition for divorce in the court will not mean that she was not ill treated by accused persons. Therefore, in my view, additional onus lies on the shoulder of the husband who is accountable to certain extent when his wife leaves his company by contending alleged ill-treatment.
From Para 25, vomiting about 406 IPC (No entrustment, No list of jewelry, To whom, When)
It is pertinent to note that there is no bar of filing criminal case for embezzlement of her jewelery. It is the admitted position of law that the jewelery and ornaments wore by bride at the time if her marriage are her Stridhana. It is nowhere come on record that accused no.1 had returned the jewelery to informant during the pendency of this case. Hence, I came to the conclusion that prosecution has proved section 406 of Indian Penal Code, which accused no.1 cannot rebute.
And some liberal diarrhea gyan delivery from Para 30,
The incidents of cruelty to wives is increasing day by day all over the country. The greed of her husband and relatives is unending and due to this many women has to suffer a lot, many times the greed of her husband and in laws is satisfied at the cost of her life. It is necessary to eradicate such tendency of unlawful demand of money and cruelty to a married woman. Hence, deterrence is must to curb such tendency of society. Therefore, I am not inclined to extend the provision of Probation of Offenders Act, 1884 to him.
You can read the rest of junk below.
State of Maharashtra Vs Rajesh Laxman Kedar on 10 September, 2018
In this judgment delivered by Hon’ble Bombay High Court, it was held that the accused be given benefit of doubt in the criminal case of 498a IPC, as the depositions of the complainant and other prosecution witnesses is either hearsay or different from what is averred in the original complaint/FIR.
Sopan @ Dnyandeo Maruti Bawadkar Vs The State of Maharashtra on 05 November, 2012[related_posts_by_tax title=”5 Recently Updated Posts, Similar or Related To Above Post” orderby=”post_modified” posts_per_page=”5″ show_date=”true”]
Bad Behavior has blocked 697 access attempts in the last 7 days.
