A two-Judge bench of the Supreme Court held as follows,
From Para 46,
46. Therefore, when the police has indisputably conducted a preliminary enquiry of this kind, examined the complainant and the proposed accused, scrutinised the documents, and reported that no cognizable offence is disclosed, the report constitutes relevant material. The Magistrate may disagree. The ATR does not, as the complainants rightly say, take precedence over a judicial order. But if the Magistrate himself has called for the report, he must apply judicial mind to it and the consequential order must speak why he does not accept it. The duty to give reasons is at its highest where a judicial authority reaches a conclusion contrary to the material collected by the agency charged by law with the investigation of offences, and where the final order will trigger criminal investigation against the persons concerned. Such reasons need not be elaborate. But they must exist, and they must relate to the material.
From Para 47,
47. For the same reason, we are unable to accept the view of the High Court that reasons for not concurring with the ATR are merely “desirable”. Reasons are the means by which the superior court tests whether the discretion was exercised judicially. An order that rejects the conclusion of the police on a mere ipse dixit cannot be tested. It is, in substance, an order without application of mind.
From Para 86(i) (Conclusion),
(i) The order of the CJM dated 15th January, 2025, insofar as it directs registration of an FIR against L&T and EARC, does not reflect the application of judicial mind required of a Magistrate exercising power under Section 156(3) CrPC. It overrides, without assigning any reason, the conclusion of the investigating agency in the ATR that no cognizable offence was disclosed. Where a Magistrate has called for an ATR and the police, after a preliminary enquiry, reported that no cognizable offence is made out, the Magistrate is not bound by that report. But if he disagrees, his order must indicate, however briefly, the reasons for the same. That is a requirement of law, not merely a matter of desirability.
From Para 58,
58. Since entrustment is absent, Sections 406 and 409 IPC are not attracted. The additional ingredient of Section 409, entrustment “in the way of [the accused’s] business as a banker”, is a fortiori absent. A lender advancing a loan against security does not receive the security “in trust”. The relationship between a lender and a borrower, or between a lender and a third-party security provider, is that of creditor and debtor, not of trustee and beneficiary. There is another reason why Section 409 IPC cannot be invoked. The aggravation in that provision rests on entrustment received “in the way of his business as a banker”, that is, property placed with the banker in that capacity, such as a deposit or property held for a customer. A lender that takes a mortgage to secure repayment of its own loan does not receive the mortgaged property in that capacity; it holds the security for itself. Moreover, while a company can be prosecuted for offences requiring mens rea, the guilty mind is attributed to it through the individuals who control its affairs. The complaint does not identify any officer of L&T or EARC to whom any property was entrusted or who dishonestly dealt with it. It charges Section 409 IPC against two corporate lenders on the strength of a generic allegation of collusion. Section 409 IPC is, therefore, not attracted against either appellant.
From Para 86(ii) and (iii) (Conclusion),
(ii) The allegations in the complaint and the FIR, taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not disclose against L&T or EARC the essential ingredients of the offences of criminal breach of trust (Sections 405, 406 and 409 IPC), cheating (Sections 415 and 420 IPC), or of criminal conspiracy (Section 120B IPC). There is no entrustment of the complainant’s property to either appellant, no misrepresentation, fraud or deception by either appellant inducing the complainants to deliver property or to act to their detriment, and no fact from which an agreement to commit an offence could be inferred. EARC, which entered the picture only on 30th December, 2019, was a stranger to every transaction complained of.
(iii) Alleged contraventions of RERA, which are primarily obligations of the promoter enforceable through the regulatory machinery of that Act and prosecutable only on a complaint by the Authority under Section 80, by themselves neither give rise to nor can they sustain prosecution for offences under the IPC. In particular, they cannot be made the foundation of a prosecution of a lender who is not the regulated entity, in the absence of the specific ingredients of the offence/s defined in IPC. The alleged breaches of the MoU and the BSA are civil wrongs, if at all, to the extent of the appellants.
Conclusions: The appeals were allowed. The Delhi High Court judgment dated 4 August 2025 and the CJM order dated 15 January 2025 (insofar as it directs registration of an FIR and investigation against the appellants) were set aside, and FIR No. 0005 of 2025 dated 16 January 2025 (Police Station Economic Offences Wing, New Delhi) and all proceedings arising from it were quashed insofar as they relate to the appellants, their officers and employees (Para 87). The judgment is confined to the appellants and expresses no opinion on the other accused (Para 88(a)).
Citations: 2026 INSC 1236; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 1178.
Other Sources:
LiveLaw: https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/lender-does-not-hold-mortgage-security-in-trust-for-borrower-supreme-court-quashes-fir-over-alleged-use-of-land-as-cross-collateral-559185
Verdictum: https://www.verdictum.in/supreme-court/edelweiss-asset-reconstruction-company-limited-v-state-of-nct-of-delhi-ors-2026-insc-1236-1626100
24Law: https://www.24law.in/story/lender-does-not-hold-mortgaged-property-in-trust-for-borrower-or-third-party-security-provider
LawChakra: https://lawchakra.in/supreme-court/lender-mortgage-security/