Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in this order has held that
In this particular case, admittedly the police have not seized the Passport during the course of investigation. But at the time of granting bail the court has secured the Passport and kept it in the safe custody of the court and it amounts to retention of the said document and virtually amounts to impounding of the said document, which is prohibited under the above said provision of law and also in view of the decision of the Apex Court.
Two questions of interpretation of law in regards to the DV Act are explained in this landmark Judgment of Hon’ble High Court of Bombay.
Q1. Whether or not the proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2008 are in the nature of criminal proceedings ?
Proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 are predominantly of civil nature and it is only when there is a breach of the protection order as is contemplated under Section 31 and failure or refusal to discharge duty without any sufficient cause by the protection officer as contemplated under Section 33, the proceedings assume the character of criminality. The first question is answered accordingly.
Q2. Whether or not the High Court can exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in respect of the proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 ?
the second question is answered in the affirmative.
Now, one incidental question would arise as to from what stage the provisions of the Cr.P.C. would become applicable and in our view, the answer could be found out from the provisions of Sections 12 and 13 of the D.V. Act.
A combined reading of these provisions shows that the commencement of the proceedings would take place the moment, the Magistrate applies his mind to the contents of the application and passes any judicial order including that of issuance of notice. Once, the proceeding commences, the procedure under Section 28 of the D.V. Act, subject to the exceptions provided in the Act and the rules framed thereunder, would apply. In other words, save as otherwise provided in the D.V. Act and the rules framed thereunder and subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 28, the provisions of the Cr.P.C. shall govern the proceedings under Sections 12 to 23 and also those relating to an offence under Section 31 of the D.V. Act on their commencement.
A key question is clarified by the 3-judge bench of Supreme Court in this landmark judgment.
Can the trial court at the time of framing of charge consider material filed by the accused?
The scope of Sections 227 and 228 and scope of Sections 239 and 240 are explained along with scope of Sections 482
At the end the following is the summary arrived at.
Legal point around application under/of CrPC 91
In so far as the accused is concerned, his entitlement to seek order under Section 91 would ordinarily not come till the stage of defence. When the section talks of the document beingnecessary and desirable, it is implicit that necessity and desirability is to be examined considering the stage when such a prayer for summoning andproduction is made and the party who makes it whether police or accused. If under Section 227 what is necessary and relevant is only the record produced in terms of Section 173 of the Code, the accused cannot at that stage invoke Section 91 to seek production of any document to show his innocence. Under Section 91 summons for production of document can beissued by Court and under a written order an officer in charge of policestation can also direct production thereof. Section 91 does not confer any right on the accused to produce document in his possession to prove his defence. Section 91 presupposes that when the document is not produced process may be initiated to compel production thereof.
Final conclusion: (from Para 29)
We are of the view that jurisdiction under Section 91 of the Code when invoked by accused the necessity and desirability would have to be seen by the Court in the context of the purpose investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceedings under the Code. It would also have to be borne in mind that law does not permit a roving or fishing inquiry. Regarding the argument of accused having to face the trial despite being in a position to produce material of unimpeachable character of sterling quality, the width of the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code and Article 226 of Constitution of India is unlimited whereunder in the interests of justice the High Court can make such orders as may be necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice within the parameters laid down in Bhajan Lal’s case.
Citations : [2005 AIR SC 359], [2005 ALT CRI 1 1198], [2005 CLT SC 99 348], [2005 GLH 1 312], [2004 JT SC 10 303], [2005 KLT SC 1 80], [2005 OLR SC 1 357], [2005 RLW SC 3 414], [2004 SCALE 10 50], [2005 SCC 1 568], [2005 SCC CRI 415], [2004 SLT 7 339], [2004 SUPREME 8 568], [2005 OCR 30 177], [2005 RCR CRI 1 297], [2005 CALCRILR 1 487], [2005 CRIMES SC 1 1], [2004 AIR SCW 6813], [2005 CTC SC 1 134]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/7496/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae0be4b0149711412c9f
Index of Quash judgments u/s 482 are here.
Relying on the landmark judgment of Apex Court in HIRAL P.HARSORA v. KUSUM NAROTTAMDAS HARSORA“, Andhra Pradesh High Court has delivered this wonderful quash judgment, confirming that as long as no domestic relationship exists between parties, Domestic Violence case can not be maintainable.
Citation:
Indiankanoon.org or Casemine link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/189636982/
The index page is here.
Nice judgment quashing order of Magistrate who took cognizance of case wherein the allegations in the complaint are vague and general in nature, which was filed after about nine years of the marriage!
From Para 4,
the complaint is against Rajesh in the sense that the accused Rajesh asked the complainant to hand over the ornaments and clothes to his parents lest they are lost in the way. On reaching to Delhi when the ornament were asked back by the complainant, they were not returned back.
There is undoubtedly some reference to the present appellants, but what strikes us is that there are no particulars given as to date on which the ornaments were handed over, as to the exact number of ornaments or their description and as to the date when the ornaments were asked back and were refused.
…
Even the weight of the ornaments is not mentioned in the complaint and it is a general and vague complaint that the ornaments were sometime given in the custody of the appellants and they were not returned. What strikes us more is that even in paragraph 10 of the complaint where the complainant says that she asked for her clothes and ornaments which were given to the accused and they refused to give these back, the date is significantly absent..
From Para 5,
In order to lodge a proper compliant, mere mention of the sections and the language of those sections is not be all and end of the matter. What is required to be brought to the notice of the court is the particulars of the offence committed by each and every accused and the role played by each and every accused in committing of that offence. When we see the complaint, the complaint is sadly vague. It does not show as to which accused has committed what offence and what is the exact role played by these appellants in the commission of offence.
Indiankanoon.org link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/339579/
Citations: [(2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 286], [2009] INSC 1632, [AIR 2009 SC(Supp) 2950]
In this judgment, Madhya Pradesh High Court has quashed the charge sheet and criminal proceedings on a relative who was falsely implicated in IPC 498A case.
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This is a Quash Judgment from Hon’ble AP high Court on grounds such as
Indiankanoon.org link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/159121592/
Citation:
This is a Quash Judgment of Allahabad High Court in which it was held that an Affidavit can be considered as a evidence, in regards to a Perjury petition under Section 340 Cr.P.C. for an offense punishable under Section 193 IPC.
The salient features of giving false evidence under Section 191 IPC are:-
(i) intentionally making a false statement, or
(ii) declaration by a person who is under a legal obligation to speak the truth.
But it must be remembered that the very essence of crimes of this kind is not how such statements may injure this or that party to litigation but how they may deceive and mislead the courts and thus produce mischievous consequences to the administration of justice.
Consequently, there cannot be any doubt that if a statement or averment in a pleading is false, it falls within the definition of offence under Section 191 IPC. It is not necessary that a person should have appeared in the witness box. The offence stands committed and completed by the filing of such pleading.
An affidavit is ‘evidence’ within the meaning of Section 191 IPC and a person swearing to a false affidavit is guilty of perjury. The definition of the offence of giving false evidence applies to the affidavits.
Read Baban Singh and another vs. Jagdish Singh and others here.
Read Ranjeet Singh vs. State of Pepsu AIR 1959 SC 843 here.
Read S.P.Kohli (Dr.) vs. High Court of Punjab and Haryana AIR 1978 SC 1753 here.
Read Asgar Ali Mulla Ibrahimji vs. Emperor AIR 1943 Nag 17(18) here.
Read Emperor vs. Padam Singh AIR 1930 All 490 here.
Read Parag Dutt vs Emperor AIR 1930 Oudh 62 (63) here.
The high-level work flow to win the false IPC498A Case is as follows:
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