Indian Oil Corporation Ltd and Ors Vs Subrata Borah Chowlek and Anr on 12 Nov 2010

Posted on February 4, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows with respect to granting exemption from limitation under Limitation Act 1963,

From Para 7,

7. Having heard the learned counsel, we are of the opinion that in the instant case a sufficient cause had been made out for condonation of delay in filing the appeal and therefore, the High Court erred in declining to condone the same. It is true that even upon showing a sufficient cause, a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay as a matter of right, yet it is trite that in construing sufficient cause, the Courts generally follow a liberal approach particularly when no negligence, inaction or mala fides can be imputed to the party.

From Para 11,

11.It is manifest that though Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 envisages the explanation of delay to the satisfaction of the Court, and makes no distinction between the State and the citizen, nonetheless adoption of a strict standard of proof in case of the Government, which is dependant on the actions of its officials, who often do not have any personal interest in its transactions, may lead to grave miscarriage of justice and therefore, certain amount of latitude is permissible in such cases.

Indian Oil Corporation Ltd and Ors Vs Subrata Borah Chowlek and Anr on 12 Nov 2010

Citations : [2010 SCC 14 419], [2011 AIR SC 0 269], [2011 LW 1 385], [2011 KCCR SC SN 1 44], [2011 MLJ 1 1010], [2011 LLN 2 43], [2011 CUTLT SUPPL 826], [2010 AIOL 787], [2010 ELT SC 262 3], [2010 SCALE 12 209], [2011 SCC L&S 2 581], [2012 SCC CIV 1 640], [2011 AIC 97 34], [2011 ALR 84 462], [2011 AIR SC SUPP 446], [2011 FLR 130 324], [2011 AIR SCW 269], [2011 JT SC 1 535], [2011 CAL LT 2 91]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/29521266/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609aee4e4b01497114150a9

State of Maharashtra Vs Dnyaneshwar Laxman Rao Wankhede on 29 Jul 2009

Posted on January 26, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court cited precedents holding that,

From Para 20,

20. Even in a case where the burden is on the accused, it is well-known, the prosecution must prove the foundational facts. [See Noor Aga v. State of Punjab 2008 (9) SCALE 691 and Jayendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. 2009 (7) SCALE 757]

From Para 21,

21. It is also a well-settled principle of law that where it is possible to have both the views, one in favour of the prosecution and the other in favour of the accused, the latter should prevail. [See Dilip and Another v. State of M.P. (2007) 1 SCC 450 and Gagan Kanojia and Another v. State of Punjab (2006) 13 SCC 516]

State of Maharashtra Vs Dnyaneshwar Laxman Rao Wankhede on 29 Jul 2009

Citations : [2009 RCR CRI 4 217], [2009 AIR SC 0 5411], [2009 SCC 15 200], [2009 ALL MR CRI 0 3127], [2009 SLT 6 439], [2009 JT 12 516], [2009 KHC 0 5865], [2009 CCR 3 700], [2009 OCR 44 425], [2009 AIOL 968], [2009 AIR BOMR 5 781], [2009 ANJ SC 2 180], [2010 BOMCR CRI SC 1 247], [2009 JT 12 515], [2009 SCALE 10 355], [2010 SCC CRI 2 385], [2009 SCR 11 513], [2009 ECRN SC 4 602], [2009 AIR SCW 5411], [2009 CRLJ SC 4425], [2009 TLPRE 0 871], [2009 MADLJ CRI 4 335]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/791070/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609aecbe4b0149711414cb2

Sabiya Begum Malka Vs State of U.P. and Ors on 18 May 2016

Posted on January 24, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) imposed costs on 5 identified police officers (@Rs.15,000/- per officer) to be paid to the Petitioner-Mother of the deceased minor girl who was allegedly raped and murdered, because these 5 people did not register FIR and investigate the case for 6 months despite an Order u/s 156(3) by a competent Magistrate to do so.

From Paras 21-24,

21. In the case in hand though order was passed by the Magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. on 3.9.2015 yet without any reason whatsoever, factual or legal, the F.I.R was not registered. Investigation was not under taken for over six months. The First Information Report has been registered after intervention of this court by way of seeking an explanation from the Station House Officer vide order dated 15.3.2016. The inaction of the concerned officers has interfered in administration of criminal justice delivery system.
22. As has been held in the inquiry report submitted by the Circle Officer concerned, the five Station House Officers named hereinabove, ignored the order passed by the Magistrate rendered under Section 156 Cr.P.C. and have also failed in discharging their statutory duty under Section 154 Cr.P.C. The petitioner, had to approach the Magistrate again. When no action was taken, the petitioner had to approach this Court with the grievance.
23. Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, we hereby impose costs in the sum of Rs.75,000/- to be collected from all the five police officers mentioned in the above portion of the judgment, to be paid to the petitioner.
24. The cost amount has been paid to the petitioner in court in cash today.

Sabiya Begum Malka Vs State of U.P. and Ors on 18 May 2016

Index here.

Sandeep Kumar Tekriwal Vs State of Bihar and Anr on 09 Sep 2008

Posted on December 28, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Patna High Court held as follows,

From Para 15,

15. Section 317, Cr. P.C provides for inquiries and trial being held in the absence of accused in certain cases. However, if the Magistrate finds that personal appearance of the accused is necessary, he would direct that accused would no longer be represented on the next date by a pleader under Section 317, Cr. P.C but would appear in person. If the accused in spite of such order does not appear in person, it would be open for the learned Magistrate to issue warrant of arrest and proceed in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Chapter-VI of the Cr. P.C and may also cancel bail and bail bond and proceed in accordance with Chapter XXXIII of the Cr. P.C It does not appear from the order of the preceding dates i.e 31-1-2008, 26-3-2008 that personal attendance of petitioner would no longer be dispensed with, and he is required to attend in person. The Magistrate in view of Section 317(1) Cr. P.C ought to have given an opportunity to an accused to appear in person who was being allowed to be represented through a pleader. The order of preceding dates in the case on the contrary shows that Magistrate in fact accepted the representation under Section 317, Cr. P.C The magistrate has to follow the procedure prescribed therein, if it does not dispenses with his personal attendance. A Magistrate while rejecting a representation under Section 317 Cr. P.C cannot at the same time cancel bail bond and issue non-bailable warrant of arrest, if on preceding dates has not clearly directed that personal attendance under Section 317, Cr. P.C will no longer be dispensed with. The Court ought to provide a reasonable opportunity to the accused to appear in person whose representation was earlier being allowed under Section 317, Cr. P.C In this case, it appears that trial lingered as a co-accused Prem Prakash was absconding. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that there have been no latches on his part.

Sandeep Kumar Tekriwal Vs State of Bihar and Anr on 09 Sep 2008

Citations : [2009 AIR JHAR R 2 203], [2009 PLJR 2 260], [2008 SCC ONLINE PAT 254], [2009 (2) PLJR 263], [2009 CRI LJ 523]

Other Sources :

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56b49331607dba348f00518d

State of Maharashtra Vs Dr. Praful B. Desai on 01 Apr 2003

Posted on December 16, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held as follows:

From Paras 11 and 12,

11. This argument found favour with the High Court. The High Court has relied on judgments of various High Courts which have held that Section 273 is mandatory and that evidence must be recorded in the presence of the accused. To this extant no fault can be found with the Judgment of the High Court. The High Court has then considered what Courts in foreign countries, including Courts in USA, have done. The High Court then based its decision on the meaning of the term “presence” in various dictionaries and held that the term “presence” in Section 273 means actual physical presence in Court. We are unable to agree with this. We have to consider whether evidence can be led by way of video-conferencing on the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and the Indian Evidence Act. Therefore, what view has been taken by Courts in other countries is irrelevant. However, it may only be mentioned that the Supreme Court of USA, in the case of Maryland vs. Santra Aun Craig [497 US 836], has held that recording of evidence by video-conferencing was not a violation of the Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause).
12. Considering the question on the basis of Criminal Procedure Code, we are of the view that the High Court has failed to read Section 273 properly. One does not have to consider dictionary meanings when a plain reading of the provision brings out what was intended.

From Para 19 (Important),

Recording of evidence by video conferencing also satisfies the object of providing, in Section 273, that evidence be recorded in the presence of the Accused. The Accused and his pleader can see the witness as clearly as if the witness was actually sitting before them. In fact the Accused may be able to see the witness better than he may have been able to if he was sitting in the dock in a crowded Court room. They can observe his or her demeanour. In fact the facility to play back would enable better observation of demeanour. They can hear and rehear the deposition of the witness. The Accused would be able to instruct his pleader immediately and thus cross- examination of the witness is as effective, if not better. The facility of play back would give an added advantage whilst cross-examining the witness. The witness can be confronted with documents or other material or statement in the same manner as if he/she was in Court. All these objects would be fully met when evidence is recorded by video conferencing. Thus no prejudice, of whatsoever nature, is caused to the Accused. Of course, as set out hereinafter, evidence by video conferencing has to be on some conditions.

State of Maharashtra Vs Dr. Praful B. Desai on 01 Apr 2003

Citations : [2003 SCALE 3 554], [2003 SCC 4 601], [2003 SCR 3 244], [2003 AIR SC 2053], [2003 AIR SC 1885], [2003 CRIMES SC 2 237], [2003 CRLJ SC 2033], [2003 SCC CRI 815], [2003 MHLJ SC 2 868], [2003 MPLJ SC 2 434], [2003 SUPREME 3 19], [2003 BOMCR CRI SC 1495], [2003 ALT CRI 2 118], [2003 RD 95 158], [2003 CTC 2 787], [2004 UD 2 60], [2003 UC 2 1011], [2003 ACR SC 2 1269], [2003 ALD CRI 1 848], [2003 ALR 51 436], [2003 CGLJ 2 86], [2003 UJ 2 769], [2003 RLW SC 2 268], [2003 GLH 2 447], [2003 RCR CRIMINAL 2 770], [2003 AIR SCW 1885], [2003 JT SC 3 382]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/560467/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ade4e4b0149711412786

XYZ Vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors on 05 Aug 2022

Posted on December 2, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court as follows, wrt a Magistrate directing Police to register a FIR u/s 156(3) CrPC.

From Paras 12 and 13,

12. By the above order, the JMFC came to the conclusion that, prima facie, “occurrence of the offence by the accused persons” was “shown”. Nonetheless, the JMFC held that the case could be decided without collecting evidence from the police and it did not appear just and proper to act on the case filed on behalf of the appellant under Section 156(3) CrPC. The JMFC proceeded to treat the complaint as a complaint case by granting liberty to the appellant to be present for the recording of her statements under Sections 200 and 202 CrPC.
13. The order of the JMFC was questioned by the appellant under Section 482 CrPC. By an order dated 6 January 2022, a Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the application. The High Court held that the JMFC was not under an obligation to direct the police to register the FIR and the use of the expression “may” in Section 156(3) CrPC indicated that the JMFC had the discretion to direct the complainant to examine witnesses under Sections 200 and 202 CrPC, instead of directing an investigation under Section 156(3). The High Court also held that if the JMFC decided to proceed by examining witnesses under Sections 200 and 202 of CrPC, she would still have the option of seeking an investigation by the police, at that stage, by directing an inquiry under Section 202.

From Para 16,

16. We cannot help but note that the police’s inaction in this case is most unfortunate. It is every police officer’s bounden duty to carry out his or her functions in a public-spirited manner. The police must be cognizant of the fact that they are usually the first point of contact for a victim of a crime or a complainant. They must abide by the law and enable the smooth registration of an FIR. Needless to say, they must treat all members of the public in a fair and impartial manner. This is all the more essential in cases of sexual harassment or violence, where victims (who are usually women) face great societal stigma when they attempt to file a complaint. It is no secret that women’s families often do not approve of initiating criminal proceedings in cases of sexual harassment. Various quarters of society attempt to persuade the survivor not to register a complaint or initiate other formal proceedings, and they often succeed. Finally, visiting the police station and interacting with police officers can be an intimidating experience for many. This discomfort is often compounded if the reason for visiting the police station is to complain of a sexual offence.

From Para 18,

18. Whether or not the offence complained of is made out is to be determined at the stage of investigation and / or trial. If, after conducting the investigation, the police find that no offence is made out, they may file a B Report under Section 173 CrPC. However, it is not open to them to decline to register an FIR. The law in this regard is clear – police officers cannot exercise any discretion when they receive a complaint which discloses the commission of a cognizable offence.

From Para 21 (bare reading of complaint)

21. It is clear from the above extract that the Magistrate has wide powers under Section 156(3) which ought to be exercised towards meeting the ends of justice. A two-judge Bench of this Court in Srinivas Gundluri v. SEPCO Electric Power Construction Corpn.,7 further clarified the powers of a Magistrate and held that whenever a cognizable offence is made out on the bare reading of complaint, the Magistrate may direct police to investigate.

From Paras 23 and 24,

23. It is true that the use of the word “may” implies that the Magistrate has discretion in directing the police to investigate or proceeding with the case as a complaint case. But this discretion cannot be exercised arbitrarily and must be guided by judicial reasoning. An important fact to take note of, which ought to have been, but has not been considered by either the Trial Court or the High Court, is that the appellant had sought the production of DVRs containing the audio-video recording of the CCTV footage of the then Vice-Chancellor’s (i.e., the second respondent) chamber. As a matter of fact, the Institute itself had addressed communications to the second respondent directing the production of the recordings, noting that these recordings had been handed over on his oral direction by the then Registrar of the Institute as he was the Vice-Chancellor. Due to the lack of response despite multiple attempts, the Institute had even filed a complaint with PS Gole Ka Mandir on 29 October 2021 for registering an FIR against the second respondent for theft of the DVRs.
24. Therefore, in such cases, where not only does the Magistrate find the commission of a cognizable offence alleged on a prima facie reading of the complaint but also such facts are brought to the Magistrate’s notice which clearly indicate the need for police investigation, the discretion granted in Section 156(3) can only be read as it being the Magistrate’s duty to order the police to investigate. In cases such as the present, wherein, there is alleged to be documentary or other evidence in the physical possession of the accused or other individuals which the police would be best placed to investigate and retrieve using its powers under the CrPC, the matter ought to be sent to the police for investigation.

XYZ Vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors on 05 Aug 2022

XXX Vs The State of Telangana on 09 Nov 2020

Posted on November 5, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Telangana High Court held as follows:

From Para 18, (When Seizure turns into Impounding – 4 weeks from Seizure)

18. Having given due consideration to the submissions made as above and also taking note of the precedents on which reliance is placed by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties, it is to be seen that retaining of passport by the police authorities after the same is seized beyond a period of four weeks would amount to impounding by the police authority, which power the said authority lacks, as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suresh Nanda V. C.B.I. (2008) 3 SCC 674. Further, this court having regard to the law laid down by the Apex Court and the provisions of the Cr.P.C. including Section 457 Cr.P.C., has by its order in I.A. No.1 of 2019 in W.P. No.22956 of 2019 held that retaining the seized property by the police after being reported to the Magistrate, would have to be considered only as a custodian and such retaining cannot be considered as impounding by the police authorities and passport holder has to make an application to the concerned Court for release of the passport.

From Para 19,

However, even after commencement of functioning of Courts, if the respondent police authority has failed or fails to take steps in depositing the passport within a period of four weeks, the same would amount to impounding, which power the authorities are not conferred with.

From Para 20,

20. Further, even after the seized material is deposited into Court under seizure report, when it comes to passport seized and deposited into Court, the Court is not empowered to impound the passport under Section 104 of Cr.P.C. upon such deposit. The power to impound a validly issued passport is specifically conferred on the passport authority under Section 10(3) of the Passports Act, 1967, being a special enactment would prevail over Cr.P.C. a general enactment. Thus, even after deposit of seized property into the Court, the respondent authority would be required to take further steps by approaching the passport authority under the Passports Act, 1967, and seek for impounding of passport. The said situation can arise only if any one of the condition enumerated in clause (a) to (h) of sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Passports Act, 1967 being attracted. At this stage, the judgement rendered by the Madras High Court in Jeyabalan case (supra) would be of aid to the case of the petitioner.

From Para 21 (Very Imp: Passport/Travel document can be cancelled by Passport Authority, even when the physical possession of passport is not there with them)

21. It is also to be seen that for impounding of passport by the passport authority on attracting any of the conditions specified in Sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Passports Act, 1967, having of physical custody of passport is neither mandatory nor specified. It is only the satisfaction of the passport authority that any of the conditions stipulated in (a) to (h) of Section 10(3) is attracted, the authority can impound the same, irrespective of where the passport holder is residing at. However, before passing of impounding order, the authority is required to give opportunity of hearing to the concerned. Thus, the claim of the respondent authorities that, if passport is released to the petitioner, it will be difficult to apprehend him again, does not appeal to this Court for being accepted for the aforesaid reasons and also having regard to the wide amplitude of powers, the passport authority enjoys, unless the petitioner escapes to countries with whom India does not have Extradition Treaties or Arrangements or seeks asylum in a country so permitting. Even otherwise, the said apprehension also appears to be without any basis for the reason, the petitioner claims to be working onsite/onshore with an Indian IT company and would be on employment visa and all his details would be available with the employer as to the onsite location of working and client details and at a call of the employer, the employee can be withdrawn and deported from wherever he is.

XXX Vs The State of Telangana on 09 Nov 2020

Note: Name of the Petitioner redacted upon his request email dt: 13 Jul 2023

Sangeeta Sekhri Vs Sharat Sekhri and Anr on 27 Sep 2022

Posted on October 5, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of PHHC held as follows, when a knife was in bed with non-husband but wants alimony from husband,

Learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to lead any evidence which could reverse the finding of extra-marital affairs of appellant-wife and respondent No.2. The enquiry report (Ex.P1) coupled with the evidence given by PW4-Rajbir Singh, PW5- Balwinder Singh and PW7-Mohammad Gulab, servant of the respondent-husband’s house consistently proved that appellant-wife was living in adultery.
The only question for consideration now is whether the appellant-wife is entitled for permanent alimony.

Sangeeta Sekhri Vs Sharat Sekhri and Anr on 27 Sep 2022

Ram Kumar Vs State of UP and Ors on 28 Sep 2022

Posted on October 2, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows:

From Para 15,

15. In this background, we find that the appellant was a necessary party to the proceedings before the High Court. The present appeal deserves to be allowed on this short ground. However, there is another more serious ground on which the present appeal deserves to be allowed.

From Para 21,

21. This Court, in the case of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) By LRs. Vs. Jagannath (Dead) by LRs and others8 has held that non-disclosure of the relevant and material documents with a view to obtain an undue advantage would amount to fraud. It has been held that the judgment or decree obtained by fraud is to be treated as a nullity. We find that respondent No.9 has not only suppressed a material fact but has also tried to mislead the High Court. On this ground also, the present appeal deserves to be allowed.

Ram Kumar Vs State of UP and Ors on 28 Sep 2022

Citations:

Other Sources:

A.C.Narayanan Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr on 13 Sep 2013

Posted on September 15, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A Full Bench of the Apex Court held as follows regarding a query, whether a PoA Holder can file a complaint u/s 200 CrPC in a NI Act case.

From Para 26,

26) While holding that there is no serious conflict between the decisions in MMTC (supra) and Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani (supra), we clarify the position and answer the questions in the following manner:
(i) Filing of complaint petition under Section 138 of N.I Act through power of attorney is perfectly legal and competent.
(ii) The Power of Attorney holder can depose and verify on oath before the Court in order to prove the contents of the complaint.
However, the power of attorney holder must have witnessed the transaction as an agent of the payee/holder in due course or possess due knowledge regarding the said transactions.
(iii) It is required by the complainant to make specific assertion as to the knowledge of the power of attorney holder in the said transaction explicitly in the complaint and the power of attorney holder who has no knowledge regarding the transactions cannot be examined as a witness in the case.
(iv) In the light of section 145 of N.I Act, it is open to the Magistrate to rely upon the verification in the form of affidavit filed by the complainant in support of the complaint under Section 138 of the N.I Act and the Magistrate is neither mandatorily obliged to call upon the complainant to remain present before the Court, nor to examine the complainant of his witness upon oath for taking the decision whether or not to issue process on the complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act.
(v) The functions under the general power of attorney cannot be delegated to another person without specific clause permitting the same in the power of attorney. Nevertheless, the general power of attorney itself can be cancelled and be given to another person.

A.C.Narayanan Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr on 13 Sep 2013

Citations: [2014 ALT CRL AP 1 44], [2013 SCALE 11 360], [2013 KERLT 4 21], [2014 AIR SC 630], [2014 CALLT SC 1 53], [2014 PLJR 1 216], [2013 OLR 2 884], [2013 BC 4 212], [2013 CTC 5 560], [2014 SCC 11 790], [2013 CLA SC 117 4], [2013 COMPCAS SC 180 258], [2014 AKR 1 314], [2013 KLJ 4 279], [2014 LW 1 698], [2013 PLR 4 733], [2013 NCC 2 854], [2014 ALD CRL SC 1 649], [2013 KHC 3 885], [2013 WLN SC 4 25], [2013 ALLCC 83 583], [2014 LW CRL 1 154], [2014 SCC CIV 4 343], [2013 SUPREME 6 705], [2014 CRLJ SC 576], [2013 AIOL 611], [2013 JT 12 524], [2013 SLT 8 133], [2014 DCR SC 1 135], [2013 SCC ONLINE SC 839], [2013 AIC 131 160], [2014 ECRN 1 486], [2013 BOMCR CRI SC 4 307], [2013 JCC NI SC 4 214], [2013 RCR CIVIL SC 4 382], [2014 JLJR SC 1 48], [2013 BOMCR SC 6 424], [2013 RCR CRIMINAL SC 4 306], [2013 ALLMR CRI SC 4048], [2013 MLJ CRL 4 213]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/47858029/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af2ae4b0149711415b31

https://www.legalauthority.in/judgement/a-c-narayanan-vs-state-of-maharashtra-4779

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Catena of Landmark Judgments Referred/Cited to

Indian Oil Corporation Ltd and Ors Vs Subrata Borah Chowlek and Anr on 12 Nov 2010

State of Maharashtra Vs Dnyaneshwar Laxman Rao Wankhede on 29 Jul 2009

Sabiya Begum Malka Vs State of U.P. and Ors on 18 May 2016

Sandeep Kumar Tekriwal Vs State of Bihar and Anr on 09 Sep 2008

State of Maharashtra Vs Dr. Praful B. Desai on 01 Apr 2003

XYZ Vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors on 05 Aug 2022

XXX Vs The State of Telangana on 09 Nov 2020

Sangeeta Sekhri Vs Sharat Sekhri and Anr on 27 Sep 2022

Ram Kumar Vs State of UP and Ors on 28 Sep 2022

A.C.Narayanan Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr on 13 Sep 2013