Kulvinder Singh Gehlot Vs Parmila on 22 Aug 2023

Posted on September 24, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Delhi High Court granted divorce to a couple who are separated for over 17 years…

From Para 17,

17. The divorce has been sought on the ground of cruelty. While “physical cruelty” is visible and easy to comprehend and determine, the more challenging aspect is “mental agony” which has been recognized as part of “cruelty” which once established, is a valid ground of divorce. The contours of “mental cruelty” were defined in case of V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat (1994) 1 SCC 337, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that mental cruelty in Section 13(1)(ia) of the Act, 1956 can broadly be defined as that conduct which inflicts upon the other party such mental pain and suffering as would make it not possible for that party to live with the other. In other words, mental cruelty must be of such a nature that the parties cannot reasonably be expected to live together. The situation must be such that the wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put-up with such conduct and continue to live with the other party. It is not necessary to prove that the mental cruelty is such as to cause injury to the health of the party.What is cruelty in one case may not amount to cruelty in another case. It is a matter to be determined in each case having regard to the facts and circumstances of that case.

From Paras 22 and 23,

22. During the trial, the allegations had not been established as held by the Order of Ld. Mahila Court, South District and amounts to a clear and categorical character assassination of the appellant as well as his family members.
23. It is not under challenge that the criminal proceedings under Section 107/151 Cr.P.C. were initiated against the parties. A Police Station is not the best of places for anyone to visit. It is a source of mental harassment and trauma each time he was required to visit the Police Station, like the “Damocles Sword” hanging over his head, not knowing when a case would be registered against him and he would be arrested. The respondent had done everything to get the appellant and his family entrapped in the criminal case. Such conduct of making false allegations and constant threat of being summoned to Police Station are the acts which severely impact the mental balance and all the acts of cruelty.

From Para 27,

27. A law of divorce based mainly on fault is inadequate to deal with a broken marriage. Under the “Fault theory”, guilt has to be proved; divorce courts are presented with concrete instances of human behaviour as they bring the institution of marriage into disrepute. We have been principally impressed by the consideration that once the marriage has broken down beyond repair, it would be unrealistic for the law not to take notice of the fact, and it would be harmful to society and injurious to the interests of the parties. Where there has been a long period continuous separation, it may be fairly surmised that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair. The marriage becomes a fiction, though supported by a legal tie. By refusing to sever that tie the law in such cases does not serve the sanctity of marriage; on the contrary, it shows scant regard for the feelings and emotions of the parties. The Family Court ought to have visualised that preservation of such a marriage is totally unworkable which has ceased to be effective and would be a greater source of misery for the parties. The Family Court ought to have considered that a human problem can be properly resolved by adopting a human approach. In the instant case, not to grant a decree of divorce would be disastrous for the parties. Otherwise, there may be a ray of hope for the parties that after a passage of time (after obtaining a decree of divorce) the parties may psychologically and emotionally settle down and start a new chapter in life.

Kulvinder Singh Gehlot Vs Parmila on 22 Aug 2023

Citations: [2023 SCC ONLINE DEL 5122]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/186009176/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/64e4d541d2752322a69ddb3d

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/high-courts/constant-threat-of-arrest-and-wifes-false-allegations-has-become-source-of-mental-cruelty-delhi-hc-grants-divorce-to-aggrieved-husband-1491232

Index of Divorce Judgments here.

Showkat Aziz Zargar Vs Nabeel Showkat and Anr on 02 Sep 2022

Posted on September 18, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench of J&K&L High Court held as follows, while declaring two judgments as per incuriam, relying on multiple Supreme Court decisions as Precedents.

From Paras 13-15,

13) It is a settled principle of interpretation of Statutes that words and expressions used in a Statute have to be assigned their plain meaning. A court does not have power to add or subtract something from a Statute which is not there. If a court finds some ambiguity in a Statute which becomes an impediment in achieving the aim and object of the Statute, the court can give a purposive interpretation to the Statute but where the language of the Statute is clear and unambiguous, it is not open to the Court to add, alter or supply words to the said Statute and no need of interpretation would arise. The purpose of interpretation of Statutes is to help the Judge to ascertain the intention of the Legislature and not to control that intention or to confine it within the limits, which the Judge may deem reasonable or expedient.
14) The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has, in the case of A. R. Antulay vs. R. S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602, held that if the words of the Statute are clear and unambiguous, it is the plainest duty of the Court to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used in the provision. The Court observed that the question of interpretation arises only in the event of an ambiguity or if the plain meaning of the words used in the Statute would be self defeating.
15) Again, the Supreme in the case of Grasim Industries Ltd. vs. Collector of Customs, Bombay, (2002) 4 SCC 297, has followed the same principle and observed that where the words are clear and there is no obscurity or ambiguity, the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language used. The Court further observed that while doing so, what has been said in the statute as also what has not been said has to be noted. The construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words has to be avoided.

From Paras 22 and 24,

22) In a recent case of Abhilasha vs. Parkash & ors. (Criminal Appeal No.615 of 2020 decided on 15th September, 2020), a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court considered the question as to whether a Hindu unmarried daughter is entitled to claim maintenance from her father under Section 125 of the Cr. P. C only till she attains majority or she can claim maintenance till she remains unmarried. The Court observed that a bare perusal of Section 125(1) of the Cr. P. C indicates that it limits the claim of maintenance of a child until he or she attains majority.
24) From the foregoing analysis of the law on the subject, it is clear that the Supreme Court has taken a consistent view that a major son or daughter cannot be awarded maintenance by a Magistrate in exercise of his powers under Section 125 of the Central Cr. P. C/488 of the Jammu and Kashmir Cr. P. C but in an appropriate case, a Family Court has jurisdiction to grant maintenance to a major Hindu daughter on the basis of a combined reading of the provisions contained in Section 125 of the Cr. P. C and Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act.

Finally,

27) For what has been discussed hereinbefore, the petition is allowed and the impugned order passed by the trial Magistrate as upheld by the Revisional Court is set aside and it is held that the respondents are entitled to maintenance from their father i.e., the petitioner herein, only up to the age of their majority. If any amount of maintenance has been paid by the petitioner to the respondents after the attainment of their age of majority, the same, having regard to the relationship between the parties, shall not be recovered from them. The amount deposited in the Registry pursuant to the order dated 11.09.2019, shall be released in favour of the petitioner. The petition stands disposed of accordingly.

Showkat Aziz Zargar Vs Nabeel Showkat and Anr on 02 Sep 2022

Maintenance cases index here.

Mamta Vs Pradeep Kumar on 05 Sep 2023

Posted on September 5, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Delhi High Court held as follows,

From Para 12,

12. Marriages under old Hindu Law are considered as a sacrament and did not recognize the concept of divorce. Once this union of marriage was established, the ties were for the entire life of the spouses which could not be severed under any circumstances. Complete shift of paradigm from the social ethos happened with the enactment of the Act, 1955 which not only introduced the concept of ‘monogamy’ but also defined certain grounds on which alone divorce could be granted. Despite this phenomenal change in the social ethos, the Act, 1955 recognises the ground of divorce only on “Fault Theory”. Unless the opposite party was shown to be at fault, whether it was for ‘Adultery’, ‘Cruelty’, ‘Desertion’ or other grounds as specified under Section 13 of the Act, 1955, no divorce can be granted. With the passage of time, experience has shown that many a times, the marriages do not work because of incompatibility and temperamental differences, for which neither party can be blamed. However, since only Fault Theory prevails, these parties end up warring with each other for years to come only because they have no way of exiting this relationship. While many debates have been held to introduce “Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage” as a ground, it has not met the approval and consent of the legislation. We are bound by limits as defined under the Act, 1955 and unless the fault of the other spouse is shown, the parties are left to suffer acrimonious relationship with no way to exit. In this backdrop, the facts of the present case may be considered.

From Para 30,

30. We conclude that in the present case the parties are living separately for 15 years now; there is no chance of reconciliation between the parties and such long separation peppered which false allegations, police reports and criminal trial has become a source of mental cruelty and any insistence either to continue this relationship or modifying the Family Court’s order would only be inflicting further cruelty upon both the parties. Living together in a marriage is not an irreversible act. But marriage is a tie between two parties and if this tie is not working under any circumstances, we see no purpose in postponing the inevitability of the situation.

Mamta Vs Pradeep Kumar on 05 Sep 2023

Citations: [2023 DHC 6384-DB]

Other Sources:

Index of Divorce judgments here.

Om Prakash Sharma Vs State of MP on 25 Mar 2021

Posted on August 9, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench at Gwalior of Madhra Pradesh High Court held as follows,

From Para 5,

5. The aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court in Suresh Chand Jain & Sakiri Vasu (supra) have held the field till date which is evident from perusal of following subsequent verdict of Apex Court rendered after relying upon Sakiri Vasu with approval.
6. In the instant case, as informed by learned counsel for petitioner, no offence has yet been registered by the police. It is also informed that the concerned police station has not yet given any report to the learned Magistrate despite repeated reminders. It is also not denied that the learned Magistrate has not proceeded to record statement of the complainant u/S.200 Cr.P.C. Therefore, in sum and substance, the entire matter hangs fire and is in a state of suspended animation leaving the petitioner-complainant high and dry with no hope of justice coming his way.

From Para 9.1

9.1 Thus, it is incumbent upon the Magistrate u/S.156(3) Cr.P.C. to not only direct for registration of cognizable offence wherever it is found to be not registered by the Police but also to ensure that theinvestigation conducted by the police is fair, expeditious and without any element of prejudice towards anyone, with the sole object ofreaching the truth. The role of the Magistrate u/S.156(3) Cr.P.C. is thus of great significance. Prompt and appropriate exercise of poweru/S.156(3) Cr.P.C. can, not only bring succor to the victim but also to the society at large by bringing the delinquent to the book and in theprocess instilling enough fear in the mind of the miscreant so as to dissuade him from indulging in delinquency again.

From Paras 15-20

Law laid down:
(1) The guidelines laid down for the Magistrates for adjudication of application u/S.156(3) Cr.P.C. complaining about delayed/improper investigation filed along with complaint u/S.200 Cr.P.C.
(2) The complaint u/S.200 Cr.P.C. filed along with 156(3) application need not be kept pending owing to bar contained in Sec.210 Cr.P.C. for more than 60/90 days or any other longer period statutorily provided on expiry of which the police fails to file the final report u/S.173(1) Cr.P.C.
(3) On failure of police to file final report u/S.173(1) Cr.P.C. within 60/90 days or any other longer period statutorily provided, the Magistrate to prevent the complaint u/S.200 Cr.P.C. from suffering a state of stalemate, should proceed by invoking powers contained in Chapter XV and XVI Cr.P.C.
If during pendency of proceedings under Chapter XV and XVI Cr.P.C., invoked as above, Police files the final report then the final report and the complaint case both should proceed as if both have arisen out of police report.

Om Prakash Sharma Vs State of MP on 25 Mar 2021

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/55499395/

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/om-prakash-sharma-vs-state-of-m-p-and-another

Vipin Kumar Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 25 Feb 2022

Posted on August 6, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single Judge of Allahabad High Court held as follows,

On a plain reading of sub-section (3) of Section 125 Cr.P.C., it is apparently clear that in the event of any failure on the part of any person to comply with an order to pay maintenance allowance, without sufficient cause, the Magistrate is empowered to issue warrant for levying the amount due in manner provided for levying of fines for every breach of the order. Section 421Cr.P.C. prescribes the manner for levying fine and clause (a) of sub-Section (1) of Section 421 provides for issuance of warrant for levy of the amount by attachment and sale of any movable property belonging to the offender. In other words, in the event of any failure without sufficient cause to comply with the order for maintenance allowance, the Magistrate is empowered to issue distress warrant for the purpose of realization of the amount, in respect of which default has been made, by attachment and sale of any movable property, that may seized in execution of such warrant. Sub-section (3) of Section 125 Cr.P.C. makes it further clear that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate for sentencing such person to imprisonment would arise only after the maintenance allowance, in whole or in part, remains unpaid after the maintenance allowance, in warrant. It is only after the sentence of imprisonment is awarded by the Magistrate under sub-section (3) of Section 125 that the occasion may arise for issuance of warrant of arrest for bringing the person concerned to Court for his committal to prison to serve out the sentence.
It is further apparent that the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to issue warrant of arrest straight way against the person liable for payment of maintenance allowance in the event of non-payment of maintenance allowance within the time fixed by the court without first levying the amount due as fine and without making any attempt for realization that fine in one or both the modes for recovery of that fine as provided for in clauses (a) or (b) of sub-Section (1) of Section 421 Cr.P.C. say by issuance of distress warrant for attachment and sale of movable property belonging to the defaulter as contemplated under Section 421 (1) (a) and without first sentencing the defaulter to imprisonment after the execution of the distress warrant.

Vipin Kumar Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 25 Feb 2022

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/139127943/

Moina Khosla Vs Amardeep Singh Khosla on 31 Jan 1986

Posted on July 26, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Delhi High Court held as follows,

From Paras 18 to 26,

18. Under Section 12 (1) (a), therefore, the requisite is that ordinary and complete sexual intercourse has not taken place between the parties owing to the impotence of the respondent. The words ‘impotence of the respondent’ would, to my mind, mean incapacity of the respondent to have sexual intercourse. The Supreme Court has said in Digvijay Singh v. Pratap Kumari, AIR 1970 SC 137, that “A party is impotent if his or her mental or physical condition makes consummation of the marriage a practical impossibility”.
19. As stated above, consummation means capacity to have ‘ordinary and complete sexual intercourse’. The above stated observation of the Supreme Court in AIR 1970 SC 137, therefore, must mean that a party is impotent if his or her mental or physical condition is such, that practically speaking, it is impossible for him or her to have ordinary and complete sexual intercourse. In the instant case it is instant case it is stated by the appellant in her deposition that the respondent was unable to have any, even a partial or incipient, sexual intercourse with the appellant.
20. Respondent has himself written in his diary Ex. PW1/2, that the is a Homosexual. The appellant has stated in her deposition that the respondent told her that he was a homosexual, that he was unable “to perform sexual intercourse with me and with females in general”. In other words, the respondent was incapable of having Hetrosexual intercourse with any woman.
21. As sexual intercourse essentially has two participants, it must be ordinary and complete for both the participants, individually, and together as a marital unit. For the man participant sexual intercourse is complete when he has an orgasm and for a woman participant sexual intercourse is complete when she has an orgasm (See Encyclopaedia Brittanica: 15th Ed: 1968; Macropaedia, Vol. 16, p. 594: Sexual Response).
22. No sexual intercourse has been taken place between the parties, there is no question is this case whether sexual intercourse was ordinary any complete.
23. In this case there is unrebutted evidence of the petitioner that no sexual intercourse has taken place between the parties. As no sexual intercourse has taken place between the parties, in this case, the requirements of Section 12(1) (a) of the Act are satisfied.
24. In the above view of the matter no purpose would be served by remitting the case back to the District Judge, as in my view, there is no reason why the statement given by the wife ought not to be accepted.
25. I am of the view that in view of her statement recorded in the court, the wife is entitled to a decree of nullity of marriage on the ground mentioned under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act and the judgment of the Additional District Judge needs to be set aside which is hereby set aside.
26. A decree of nullity of marriage is granted to the wife under section 12(1)(a) of the Hindu Marriage Act.

Indian Kanoon Version:

Moina Khosla Vs Amardeep Singh Khosla on 31 Jan 1986 (IK Version)

Casemine Version:

Moina Khosla Vs Amardeep Singh Khosla on 31 Jan 1986 (CM Version)

Supreme Today Version:

Moina Khosla Vs Amardeep Singh Khosla on 31 Jan 1986 (ST Version)

Legal Data Version:

Moina Khosla Vs Amardeep Singh Khosla on 31 Jan 1986 (LD Version)

Citations: [1986 DMC 2 65], [1986 DRJ 10 286], [1986 SCC ONLINE DEL 42], [1987 PLR DEL 91 12], [1986 AIR DELHI 399], [1986 ILR DELHI 2 659]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/913344/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/560909b5e4b01497111707b8

https://legaldata.in/court/read/6288

Deoki Panjhiyara Vs Shashi Bhushan Narayan Azad and Anr on 12 Dec 2012

Posted on July 24, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held that, Unless there is a declaration of nullity by a competent Court or authority, a aggrieved person can take advantage of benefits under DV Act.

From Para 19,

19. In the present case, if according to the respondent, the marriage between him and the appellant was void on account of the previous marriage between the appellant and Rohit Kumar Mishra the respondent ought to have obtained the necessary declaration from the competent court in view of the highly contentious questions raised by the appellant on the aforesaid score. It is only upon a declaration of nullity or annulment of the marriage between the parties by a competent court that any consideration of the question whether the parties had lived in a “relationship in the nature of marriage” would be justified. In the absence of any valid decree of nullity or the necessary declaration the court will have to proceed on the footing
that the relationship between the parties is one of marriage and not in the nature of marriage. We would also like to emphasise that any determination of the validity of the marriage between the parties could have been made only by a competent court in an appropriate proceeding by and between the parties and in compliance with all other requirements of law. Mere production of a marriage certificate issued under Section 13 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 in support of the claimed first marriage of the appellant with Rohit Kumar Mishra was not sufficient for any of the courts, including the High Court, to render a complete and effective decision with regard to the marital status of the parties and that too in a collateral proceeding for maintenance. Consequently, we hold that in the present case until the invalidation of the marriage between the appellant and the respondent is made by a competent court it would only be correct to proceed on the basis that the appellant continues to be the wife of the respondent so as to entitle her to claim all benefits and protection available under the DV Act, 2005.

Deoki Panjhiyara Vs Shashi Bhushan Narayan Azad and Anr on 12 Dec 2012

Citations: [2013 ALLMR CRI SC 1099], [2013 AIR SC 168], [2013 RCR CIVIL SC 2 400], [2013 AIR SC 346], [2013 SCC 2 137], [2013 RCR CRIMINAL SC 1 338], [2012 SCALE 12 282], [2013 CRLJ SC 684], [2012 AIOL 584], [2013 BOMCR CRI SC 1 333], [2012 SLT 9 266], [2013 SCC CIV 1 1019], [2012 SCC ONLINE SC 1035], [2013 GUJ LH 1 208], [2013 CTC 2 232], [2013 ECRN 1 913], [2013 ACR 1 1089], [2013 AD SC 3 59], [2013 AJR 2 133], [2013 AKR 1 615], [2013 ALD CRI 1 469], [2013 ALT CRI 3 70], [2013 ALT CRI 1 472], [2013 DMC SC 1 18], [2013 JLJR 1 198], [2012 JCC 1 502], [2013 JCC 1 508], [2012 JT SC 12 575], [2013 LW 2 60], [2013 LW CRL 1 330], [2013 NCC 1 322], [2013 OLR 1 891], [2013 PLJR 1 172], [2013 MLJ CRL 1 137]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/154350889/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af10e4b0149711415804

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/deoki-panjhiyara-vs-shashi-bhushan-narayan-azad-anr

K.Ramaiah Vs R.Sudhakara Naidu on 04 Jul 2006

Posted on July 16, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench of Madras High Court held as follows,

From Para 4,

4. Rule 339 of the Criminal Rules of Practice provides for issuance of copies to parties and it stipulates that copies of any portion of the record of a criminal case must be furnished to the parties concerned on payment of the proper stamp and the authorised fee for copying.

K.Ramaiah Vs R.Sudhakara Naidu on 04 Jul 2006 (CK Ver)

The Index is here.

Rajendra Kumar Vs Rukhmani Bisen on 02 Feb 2023

Posted on May 16, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single bench judge of MP High Court at Jabalpur held as follows,

From Paras 5 and 6, (What is an interlocutory order?)

5. Now question remains for consideration is whether the order of interim maintenance passed under Section 125 of Cr.P.C is an interlocutory order? Consequently, whether criminal revision petition is lie against that order?
6. Term ‘Interlocutory Order’ has not been defined in the Cr.P.C. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of V.C. Shukla vs State, reported in AIR 1980 (SC) 962, has given following observation in para No.23 regarding the nature of interlocutory order:-
“Thus, summing up the natural and logical meaning of an interlocutory order, the conclusion is inescapable that an order which does not terminate the proceedings or finally decides the rights of the parties is only an interlocutory order. In other words, in the ordinary sense of the term, an interlocutory order is one which only decides a particular aspect or a particular issue or a particular matter in a proceeding, suit or trial but which does not however conclude the trial at all. This would be the result if the term interlocutory order is interpreted in its natural and logical sense without having to resort to Criminal Procedure Code or any other statute. ‘That is to say, if we construe interlocutory order in ordinary parlance it would indicate the attributes, mentioned above, and this is what the term interlocutory order means when used in s. 11(1) of the Act.”

From Para 9,

9. In the case of Sumerchand vs Sandhuran Rani and Others, reported in 1987 Cr.L.J. 1396, Sunil Kumar Sabharwal vs Neelam Sabharwal, reported in 1991 Cr.L.J. 2056 High Court of Haryana and a order dated 15.11.18 passed by the High Court of Uttarakhand in the case of Ashu Dhiman vs Smt Jyoti Dhiman, Cr. Misc. Application (C-482) No.434/2018, it has been held that an order passed for interim maintenance under provisions of Section 125 of Cr.P.C is not an interlocutory order, hence, criminal revision petition is maintainable against such order.

Citations:

Other Sources:

Shilpa Sailesh Vs Varun Sreenivasan on 01 May 2023

Posted on May 6, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A Constitution Bench of 5 judges held as follows,

From Para 40,

40. In view of our findings recorded above, we are of the opinion that the decisions of this Court in Manish Goel (supra), Neelam Kumar (supra), Darshan Gupta (supra), Hitesh Bhatnagar (supra), Savitri Pandey (supra) and others have to be read down in the context of the power of this Court given by the Constitution of India to do ‘complete justice’ in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India. In consonance with our findings on the scope and ambit of the power under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India, in the context of matrimonial disputes arising out of the Hindu Marriage Act, we hold that the power to do‘complete justice’ is not fettered by the doctrine of fault and blame, applicable to petitions for divorce under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act. As held above, this Court’s power to dissolve marriage on settlement by passing a decree of divorce by mutual consent, as well as quash and set aside other proceedings, including criminal proceedings, remains and can be exercised.

From Para 41,

41. Lastly, we must express our opinion on whether a party can directly canvass before this Court the ground of irretrievable breakdown by filing a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. In Poonam v. Sumit Tanwar65, a two judges’ bench of this Court has rightly held that any such attempt must be spurned and not accepted, as the parties should not be permitted to file a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, or for that matter under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the High Court, and seek divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. The reason is that the remedy of a person aggrieved by the decision of the competent judicial forum is to approach the superior tribunal/forum for redressal of his/her grievance. The parties should not be permitted to circumvent the procedure by resorting to the writ jurisdiction under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution of India, as the case may be. Secondly, and more importantly, relief under Article 32 of the Constitution of India can be sought to enforce the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution of India, and on the proof of infringement thereof. Judicial orders passed by the court in, or in relation to, the proceedings pending before it, are not amenable to correction under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.66 Therefore, a party cannot file a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India and seek relief of dissolution of marriage directly from this Court. While we accept the said view, we also clarify that reference in Poonam (supra) to Manish Goel (supra) and the observation that it is questionable whether the period of six months for moving the second motion can be waived has not been approved by us.

Shilpa Sailesh Vs Varun Sreenivasan on 01 May 2023

Citations: [2023 SCC OnLine SC 544]

Other Sources:

Earlier Matter is here.

Index of Divorce judgments is here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Catena of Landmark Judgments Referred/Cited to

Kulvinder Singh Gehlot Vs Parmila on 22 Aug 2023

Showkat Aziz Zargar Vs Nabeel Showkat and Anr on 02 Sep 2022

Mamta Vs Pradeep Kumar on 05 Sep 2023

Om Prakash Sharma Vs State of MP on 25 Mar 2021

Vipin Kumar Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 25 Feb 2022

Moina Khosla Vs Amardeep Singh Khosla on 31 Jan 1986

Deoki Panjhiyara Vs Shashi Bhushan Narayan Azad and Anr on 12 Dec 2012

K.Ramaiah Vs R.Sudhakara Naidu on 04 Jul 2006

Rajendra Kumar Vs Rukhmani Bisen on 02 Feb 2023

Shilpa Sailesh Vs Varun Sreenivasan on 01 May 2023