P Amutha Vs Gunsekaran on 23 Dec 2022

Posted on December 1, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of High Court of Madras held that maintenance allowance granted to wife cannot be considered as debt as she is not a creditor.

From Para 9 (cites Bhagwant Narnawre Vs Radhika Narnawre and Ashokbhai Devsingbhai Chauhan Vs Taraben Ashokbhai Chauhan),

9. Further , some issue has been considered by the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in ‘Ashokbhai Devsingbhai Chauhan /vs/ Taraben Ashokbhai Chauhan’. In that case, the Principal Family Court, Ahamedabad directed the Bank of Baroda, Science City Branch, to deduct Rs.30,000/- per month from the pension account of the husband and credit to the account of the wife towards the maintenance amount in arrears. After considering the judgments, viz., (1) Om Prakash /vs/ Javitri Devi (Manu/PH/2052/2017 : 2018(1) DMC 462), (2) Vasanthi Devi /vs/ Vijaya Bank, Ashok Nagar Branch, Mangalore, (Manu/KE/0484/1997 : 1997(2) KarLJ 351, (3) Union of India /vs/ Wing Commander R.R.Hingorani (Retd.) (MANU/SC/0572/1987 : 1987 1 SCC 551) and also considering the above said Bombay High Court judgment, finally, held Section 11 of Pension Act 1871 cannot be attracted and as a wife cannot be treated as creditor as provided under the Pension Act and upheld the order of attachment of pension passed by the Family Court for collection of pension amount.

P Amutha Vs Gunsekaran on 23 Dec 2022

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index of Maintenance Judgments under Section 125 CrPC here.

Omprakash Sahni Vs Jai Shankar Chaudhary and Anr on 02 May 2023

Posted on November 26, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held that, Sentence can be suspended in appeal only if convict has fair chances of acquittal.

From Paras 33 to 36,

33. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles of law, the endeavour on the part of the Court, therefore, should be to see as to whether the case presented by the prosecution and accepted by the Trial Court can be said to be a case in which, ultimately the convict stands for fair chances of acquittal. If the answer to the above said question is to be in the affirmative, as a necessary corollary, we shall have to say that, if ultimately the convict appears to be entitled to have an acquittal at the hands of this Court, he should not be kept behind the bars for a pretty long time till the conclusion of the appeal, which usually take very long for decision and disposal. However, while undertaking the exercise to ascertain whether the convict has fair chances of acquittal, what is to be looked into is something palpable. To put it in other words, something which is very apparent or gross on the face of the record, on the basis of which, the Court can arrive at a prima facie satisfaction that the conviction may not be sustainable. The Appellate Court should not reappreciate the evidence at the stage of Section 389 of the CrPC and try to pick up few lacunas or loopholes here or there in the case of the prosecution. Such would not be a correct approach.
34. In the case on hand, what the High Court has done is something impermissible. High Court has gone into the issues like political rivalry, delay in lodging the FIR, some over-writings in the First Information Report etc. All these aspects, will have to be looked into at the time of the final hearing of the appeals filed by the convicts. Upon cursory scanning of the evidence on record, we are unable to agree with the contentions coming from the learned Senior Counsel for the convicts that, either there is absolutely no case against the convicts or that the evidence against them is so weak and feeble in nature, that, ultimately in all probabilities the proceedings would terminate in their favour. For the very same reason we are unable to accept the contention coming from the convicts through their learned Senior Counsel that, it would be meaningless, improper and unjust to keep them behind the bars for a pretty long time till they are found not to be guilty of the charges.
35. In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced that the High Court committed a serious error in suspending the substantive order of sentence of the convicts and their release on bail pending the final disposal of their criminal appeals.
36. In fact, it was expected of the State as the prosecuting agency to challenge the order passed by the High Court, but for some reason or the other, the State thought fit not to do anything further. Ultimately, it is the original first informant (brother of the deceased) who had to come before this Court.

Omprakash Sahni Vs Jai Shankar Chaudhary and Anr on 02 May 2023

Citations:

Other Sources:

Nahar Singh Yadav and Anr Vs Union of India and Ors on 19 Nov 2010

Posted on November 13, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A Full Bench of the Apex Court passed these broad factors while considering transfer petitions u/s 406 Cr.P.C.

From Para 24,

24.Thus, although no rigid and inflexible rule or test could be laid down to decide whether or not power under Section 406 of the Cr.P.C. should be
exercised, it is manifest from a bare reading of sub-sections (2) and (3) of the said Section and on an analysis of the decisions of this Court that an order of transfer of trial is not to be passed as a matter of routine or merely because an interested party has expressed some apprehension about the proper conduct of a trial. This power has to be exercised cautiously and in exceptional situations, where it becomes necessary to do so to provide credibility to the trial. Some of the broad factors which could be kept in mind while considering an application for transfer of the trial are:-
(i) when it appears that the State machinery or prosecution is acting hand in glove with the accused, and there is likelihood of miscarriage of justice due to the lackadaisical attitude of the prosecution;
(ii) when there is material to show that the accused may influence the prosecution witnesses or cause physical harm to the complainant;
(iii) comparative inconvenience and hardships likely to be caused to the accused, the complainant/the prosecution and the witnesses, besides the burden to be borne by the State Exchequer in making payment of travelling and other expenses of the official and non-official witnesses;
(iv) a communally surcharged atmosphere, indicating some proof of inability of holding fair and impartial trial because of the accusations made and the nature of the crime committed by the accused; and
(v) existence of some material from which it can be inferred that the some persons are so hostile that they are interfering or are likely to interfere either directly or indirectly with the course of justice.

Nahar Singh Yadav and Anr Vs Union of India and Ors on 19 Nov 2010

Citations : [2011 AIR SC 1549], [2011 RCR CRIMINAL SC 1 120], [2011 SCC CRI 1 39], [2011 AIR SC 325], [2011 SCC 1 307], [2010 AIOL 798], [2010 SLT 9 322], [2010 JT 12 641], [2011 CRLJ SC 997], [2010 SCALE 12 199], [2010 SUPREME 7 729], [2010 AIC 96 1], [2011 ECRN 1 717], [2011 KCCR 2 845], [2011 AIR SCW 325], [201 OJ 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 851]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/668282/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609aedde4b0149711414eec

https://vlex.in/vid/nahar-singh-yadav-and-572148534

https://www.latestlaws.com/latest-caselaw/2010/november/2010-latest-caselaw-867-sc/

Index of Transfer Judgments is here.

Rakesh Rajput and Anr Vs State of Jharkhand and Anr on 31 Oct 2023

Posted on November 11, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Jharkhand High Court held the open secret of misuse of 498A IPC.

From Paras 8-12,

8. With the laudable object of punishing cruelty at the hands of husband or his relatives, Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code was inserted in the statute. There is a phenomenal increase in matrimonial disputes in recent years and it appears that in many cases, the object of Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code is being misused and the said Section is used as weapon rather than shield by disgruntled wives. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar , reported in [(2014) 8 SCC 273], certain guidelines have been issued how to arrest a person against whom matrimonial disputes are there.
9. Such type of cases are being filed in the heat of the moment over trivial issues without proper deliberations and this aspect of the matter has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand, reported in [(2010) 7 SCC 667].
10. Little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume erious proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of the family are falsely implicated by the wives. This aspect of the matter has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Geeta Mehrotra v. State of U.P. , reported in [(2012) 10 SCC 741].
11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of K. Subba Rao v. State of Telangana, reported in [(2018) 14 SCC 452] has observed that the Court should be careful in proceeding against the distant relatives in crimes pertaining to matrimonial disputes and dowry deaths.
12. The above line of judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court clearly suggest that how Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code is being misused nowadays.

Rakesh Rajput and Anr Vs State of Jharkhand and Anr on 31 Oct 2023

Index of Quash judgments here.

MS Godrej Sara Lee Limited Vs Excise and Taxation Officer cum AO and Ors on 01 Feb 2023

Posted on October 25, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held that, Not pursued the alternative remedy available to him/it cannot mechanically be construed as a ground for a Writ’s dismissal.

Further it was held that, A writ petition despite being maintainable may not be entertained by a high court for very many reasons or relief could even be refused to the petitioner, despite setting up a sound legal point, if grant of the claimed relief would not further public interest.

From Para 4,

4. Before answering the questions, we feel the urge to say a few words on the exercise of writ powers conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution having come across certain orders passed by the high courts holding writ petitions as “not maintainable” merely because the alternative remedy provided by the relevant statutes has not been pursued by the parties desirous of invocation of the writ jurisdiction. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 is plenary in nature. Any limitation on the exercise of such power must be traceable in the Constitution itself. Profitable reference in this regard may be made to Article 329 and ordainments of other similarly worded articles in the Constitution. Article 226 does not, in terms, impose any limitation or restraint on the exercise of power to issue writs. While it is true that exercise of writ powers despite availability of a remedy under the very statute which has been invoked and has given rise to the action impugned in the writ petition ought not to be made in a routine manner, yet, the mere fact that the petitioner before the high court, in a given case, has not pursued the alternative remedy available to him/it cannot mechanically be construed as a ground for its dismissal. It is axiomatic that the high courts (bearing in mind the facts of each particular case) have a discretion whether to entertain a writ petition or not. One of the self-imposed restrictions on the exercise of power under Article 226 that has evolved through judicial precedents is that the high courts should normally not entertain a writ petition, where an effective and efficacious alternative remedy is available. At the same time, it must be remembered that mere availability of an alternative remedy of appeal or revision, which the party invoking the jurisdiction of the high court under Article 226 has not pursued, would not oust the jurisdiction of the high court and render a writ petition “not maintainable”. In a long line of decisions, this Court has made it clear that availability of an alternative remedy does not operate as an absolute bar to the “maintainability” of a writ petition and that the rule, which requires a party to pursue the alternative remedy provided by a statute, is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. Though elementary, it needs to be restated that “entertainability” and “maintainability” of a writ petition are distinct concepts. The fine but real distinction between the two ought not to be lost sight of. The objection as to “maintainability” goes to the root of the matter and if such objection were found to be of substance, the courts would be rendered incapable of even receiving the lis for adjudication. On the other hand, the question of “entertainability” is entirely within the realm of discretion of the high courts, writ remedy being discretionary. A writ petition despite being maintainable may not be entertained by a high court for very many reasons or relief could even be refused to the petitioner, despite setting up a sound legal point, if grant of the claimed relief would not further public interest. Hence, dismissal of a writ petition by a high court on the ground that the petitioner has not availed the alternative remedy without, however, examining whether an exceptional case has been made out for such entertainment would not be proper.

MS Godrej Sara Lee Limited Vs Excise and Taxation Officer cum AO and Ors on 01 Feb 2023

Citations : [2023 INSC 92], [2023 SCC ONLINE SC 95]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/62928741/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/63dc0f95831db01604ba254b

https://www.courtkutchehry.com/Judgement/Search/AdvancedV2?docid=2368646

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/m-s-godrej-sara-lee-ltd-vs-the-excise-and-taxation-officer-cum-assessing-authority

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/supreme-court/godrej-taxation-alternative-remedy-not-absolute-writ-petition-maintainability-entertainability-apex-court-1460513

Godrej Sara Lee Limited Vs The Excise and Taxation officer-cum-Assessing Authority & Ors (Supreme Court)

Deepti Vs Anil Kumar on 19 Sep 2023

Posted on October 15, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Delhi High Court held that Family Courts cannot grant divorce on ground of Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage.

From Para 4,

4. The Respondent also alleged that from the very first day of marriage, Appellant created scenes at night hours and most of the times did not allow him to enjoy his conjugal rights. She refused him to have access to her and inflicted cruelty upon him. He further alleged that he was allowed by the Appellant only 30-35 times (approximately) to enjoy conjugal relations since their marriage.

From Para 7 and 8,

7. In respect of the ground of cruelty, the Family Court has held that “there was no normal and healthy sexual relationships between (Respondent) and his wife (Appellant) and same has resulted in striking at the very foundation of their marriage. It has been well settled that normal and healthy sexual Relationships between both spouse is one of the basic ingredients for happy and harmonious marriage as the marriage without sex is an anathema. Sex is foundation of marriage and without a vigorous and harmonious sexual activity it would be impossible for any marriage to continue.”
8. The Family Court after holding that there was denial of conjugal relations, noticed that parties had been living separately for more than 11 years and held that the marriage had broken down beyond repair and thus held that the Respondent had successfully established cruelty and thus granted a decree of divorce against the Appellant.

From Para 17,

17. Said ground is clearly not available to the Respondent and the Family Court has erred in returning a finding that there is denial of conjugal relationship by the Appellant. The allegations of the Respondent of denial of conjugal relationship are vague and without any specifics. He has alleged that he was allowed by the Appellant only 30-35 times (approximately) to enjoy conjugal relations since their marriage. This clearly shows that there was never any complete denial.

From Para 25,

25. In terms of the Judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Shilpa Sailesh (supra), the power to grant divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage is exercised by the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to do complete justice to both the parties. Such a power is not vested in the High Courts leave alone the Family Courts.
26. In the instant case, the Family Court has merely considered the fact that the parties have lived separately for 11 years and granted divorce on the ground of breakdown of marriage. Such an exercise of powers is not conferred on the Family Court. Family Courts have to restrict their considerations to the parameters of the provision of grant of divorce strictly in accordance with the Act. Irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not a ground in the Act.
27. Even the Supreme Court while considering exercise of discretionary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India takes into account several factors and longevity of period is only one of them. Reference may be had to Para 41 of Shilpa Sailesh (supra) extracted hereinabove. Supreme Court has placed a word of caution that “grant of divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage by this Court is not a matter of right, but a discretion which is to be exercised with great care and caution, keeping in mind several factors ensuring that ‘complete justice’ is done to both parties. It is obvious that this Court should be fully convinced and satisfied that the marriage is totally unworkable, emotionally dead and beyond salvation and, therefore, dissolution of marriage is the right solution and the only way forward. That the marriage has irretrievably broken down is to be factually determined and firmly established.”
28. In the present case, the Family Court has erred in travelling beyond the scope of its powers to grant divorce.

Deepti Vs Anil Kumar on 19 Sep 2023

Mohit Gupta and Ors vs Govt of NCT of Delhi and Anr on 16 Oct 2006

Posted on October 15, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single bench judge at Delhi High Court held that Shivcharan Lal Verma and Anr Vs State of Madhya Pradesh is the precedent that is binding and not the Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam And Others.

From Para 8,

8. These are undoubtedly strong words and clearly show that a person who ostensibly contracts a marriage with a woman and lives with her as husband and wife would also be covered within the meaning of the expression “husband” used in Section 498-A IPC. But the matter does not stop here. The Supreme Court, in the case of Shivcharan Lal Verma (supra), which is a decision of a three-judge bench, was of the contrary view. The facts in that case were that during the lifetime of the first wife, Shivcharan married for the second time. But after the marriage both the first wife and Shivcharan tortured the second wife as a result of which she ultimately committed suicide by burning herself. The incident occurred inside the house while Shivcharan and his first wife were in one room and the second wife was in the other. One of the questions which arose before the Supreme Court was whether the provisions under Section 498-A can at all be attracted since the marriage with the second wife itself was null and void, the same having been performed during the lifetime of the first wife. In answer to this question the Supreme Court observed that there was considerable force in the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant that so far as conviction under Section 498-A was concerned, inasmuch as the alleged marriage with the second wife, during the subsistence of a valid marriage with the first wife, was null and void, the same cannot be sustained. The Supreme Court therefore set aside the conviction and sentence under Section 498-A IPC. Going by this a decision, it is clear that the Supreme Court was of the view that as the second marriage was null and void, Shivcharan could not be regarded as a “husband” within the meaning ascribed to it under Section 498-A IPC. Although the learned Counsel for the respondent had, as noted above, made submissions to the effect that this was not a binding precedent, I don’t see as to how this is would not constitute a binding precedent. The point in issue arose out of the facts of the case. It was specifically raised and specifically answered. The ratio of the decision is that a male partner to a null marriage cannot be covered by the expression “husband” as appearing in Section 498-A IPC. It is another thing that the Supreme Court in the case of Shivcharan Lal Verma (supra) did not discuss this question with the same degree of elaboration as in the case of Reema Aggarwal (supra). But, this by itself cannot be construed to mean that in Shivcharan lal Verma (supra), the Supreme Court did not consider the entire scope and ambit of the provisions of Section 498-A IPC. It must also be pointed out that the decision in Shivcharan Lal Verma (supra) has not been noticed in Reema Aggarwal (supra) although the latter decision is later in point of time. So, the decision in Reema Aggarwal (supra) has to be regarded as per incuriam. The second point that has to be kept in mind is that the decision in Shivcharan Lal Verma (supra) has been rendered by a bench of three honourable judges whereas the decision in the case of Reema Aggarwal (supra) is by a bench of two honourable judges. Clearly, the decision in Shivcharan Lal Verma (supra) would be binding. In this context it would be pertinent to note the observations of a Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in the case of P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka (2002) 5 SCC 578 wherein the Supreme Court observed [at para 28]:
The well settled principle of precedents which has crystallised into a rule of law is that the bench of lesser strength is bound by the view expressed by a bench of larger strength and cannot take a view in departure or in conflict there from.
Therefore the decision in Shivcharan Lal Verma (supra) will clearly take precedence over the decision in Reema Aggarwal (supra).

Indiankanoon version:

Mohit Gupta and Ors vs Govt of NCT of Delhi and Anr on 16 Oct 2006 (IK ver)

Casemine version:

Mohit Gupta and Ors vs Govt of NCT of Delhi and Anr on 16 Oct 2006 (CM ver)

Citations: [2007 AD DEL 1 503], [2007 DRJ 93 606], [2006 DLT 135 390], [2007 DMC 1 47], [2006 SCC ONLINE DEL 1256], [2006 JCC 3 1923], [2007 JCC 3 1923]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/338837/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56090c14e4b0149711176259

Mohit Gupta And Ors. vs State Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi And Anr. on 16 October, 2006

Index of Quash judgements is here and HMA Judgments is here.

Kulvinder Singh Gehlot Vs Parmila on 22 Aug 2023

Posted on September 24, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Delhi High Court granted divorce to a couple who are separated for over 17 years…

From Para 17,

17. The divorce has been sought on the ground of cruelty. While “physical cruelty” is visible and easy to comprehend and determine, the more challenging aspect is “mental agony” which has been recognized as part of “cruelty” which once established, is a valid ground of divorce. The contours of “mental cruelty” were defined in case of V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat (1994) 1 SCC 337, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that mental cruelty in Section 13(1)(ia) of the Act, 1956 can broadly be defined as that conduct which inflicts upon the other party such mental pain and suffering as would make it not possible for that party to live with the other. In other words, mental cruelty must be of such a nature that the parties cannot reasonably be expected to live together. The situation must be such that the wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put-up with such conduct and continue to live with the other party. It is not necessary to prove that the mental cruelty is such as to cause injury to the health of the party.What is cruelty in one case may not amount to cruelty in another case. It is a matter to be determined in each case having regard to the facts and circumstances of that case.

From Paras 22 and 23,

22. During the trial, the allegations had not been established as held by the Order of Ld. Mahila Court, South District and amounts to a clear and categorical character assassination of the appellant as well as his family members.
23. It is not under challenge that the criminal proceedings under Section 107/151 Cr.P.C. were initiated against the parties. A Police Station is not the best of places for anyone to visit. It is a source of mental harassment and trauma each time he was required to visit the Police Station, like the “Damocles Sword” hanging over his head, not knowing when a case would be registered against him and he would be arrested. The respondent had done everything to get the appellant and his family entrapped in the criminal case. Such conduct of making false allegations and constant threat of being summoned to Police Station are the acts which severely impact the mental balance and all the acts of cruelty.

From Para 27,

27. A law of divorce based mainly on fault is inadequate to deal with a broken marriage. Under the “Fault theory”, guilt has to be proved; divorce courts are presented with concrete instances of human behaviour as they bring the institution of marriage into disrepute. We have been principally impressed by the consideration that once the marriage has broken down beyond repair, it would be unrealistic for the law not to take notice of the fact, and it would be harmful to society and injurious to the interests of the parties. Where there has been a long period continuous separation, it may be fairly surmised that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair. The marriage becomes a fiction, though supported by a legal tie. By refusing to sever that tie the law in such cases does not serve the sanctity of marriage; on the contrary, it shows scant regard for the feelings and emotions of the parties. The Family Court ought to have visualised that preservation of such a marriage is totally unworkable which has ceased to be effective and would be a greater source of misery for the parties. The Family Court ought to have considered that a human problem can be properly resolved by adopting a human approach. In the instant case, not to grant a decree of divorce would be disastrous for the parties. Otherwise, there may be a ray of hope for the parties that after a passage of time (after obtaining a decree of divorce) the parties may psychologically and emotionally settle down and start a new chapter in life.

Kulvinder Singh Gehlot Vs Parmila on 22 Aug 2023

Citations: [2023 SCC ONLINE DEL 5122]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/186009176/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/64e4d541d2752322a69ddb3d

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/high-courts/constant-threat-of-arrest-and-wifes-false-allegations-has-become-source-of-mental-cruelty-delhi-hc-grants-divorce-to-aggrieved-husband-1491232

Index of Divorce Judgments here.

Showkat Aziz Zargar Vs Nabeel Showkat and Anr on 02 Sep 2022

Posted on September 18, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench of J&K&L High Court held as follows, while declaring two judgments as per incuriam, relying on multiple Supreme Court decisions as Precedents.

From Paras 13-15,

13) It is a settled principle of interpretation of Statutes that words and expressions used in a Statute have to be assigned their plain meaning. A court does not have power to add or subtract something from a Statute which is not there. If a court finds some ambiguity in a Statute which becomes an impediment in achieving the aim and object of the Statute, the court can give a purposive interpretation to the Statute but where the language of the Statute is clear and unambiguous, it is not open to the Court to add, alter or supply words to the said Statute and no need of interpretation would arise. The purpose of interpretation of Statutes is to help the Judge to ascertain the intention of the Legislature and not to control that intention or to confine it within the limits, which the Judge may deem reasonable or expedient.
14) The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has, in the case of A. R. Antulay vs. R. S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602, held that if the words of the Statute are clear and unambiguous, it is the plainest duty of the Court to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used in the provision. The Court observed that the question of interpretation arises only in the event of an ambiguity or if the plain meaning of the words used in the Statute would be self defeating.
15) Again, the Supreme in the case of Grasim Industries Ltd. vs. Collector of Customs, Bombay, (2002) 4 SCC 297, has followed the same principle and observed that where the words are clear and there is no obscurity or ambiguity, the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language used. The Court further observed that while doing so, what has been said in the statute as also what has not been said has to be noted. The construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words has to be avoided.

From Paras 22 and 24,

22) In a recent case of Abhilasha vs. Parkash & ors. (Criminal Appeal No.615 of 2020 decided on 15th September, 2020), a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court considered the question as to whether a Hindu unmarried daughter is entitled to claim maintenance from her father under Section 125 of the Cr. P. C only till she attains majority or she can claim maintenance till she remains unmarried. The Court observed that a bare perusal of Section 125(1) of the Cr. P. C indicates that it limits the claim of maintenance of a child until he or she attains majority.
24) From the foregoing analysis of the law on the subject, it is clear that the Supreme Court has taken a consistent view that a major son or daughter cannot be awarded maintenance by a Magistrate in exercise of his powers under Section 125 of the Central Cr. P. C/488 of the Jammu and Kashmir Cr. P. C but in an appropriate case, a Family Court has jurisdiction to grant maintenance to a major Hindu daughter on the basis of a combined reading of the provisions contained in Section 125 of the Cr. P. C and Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act.

Finally,

27) For what has been discussed hereinbefore, the petition is allowed and the impugned order passed by the trial Magistrate as upheld by the Revisional Court is set aside and it is held that the respondents are entitled to maintenance from their father i.e., the petitioner herein, only up to the age of their majority. If any amount of maintenance has been paid by the petitioner to the respondents after the attainment of their age of majority, the same, having regard to the relationship between the parties, shall not be recovered from them. The amount deposited in the Registry pursuant to the order dated 11.09.2019, shall be released in favour of the petitioner. The petition stands disposed of accordingly.

Showkat Aziz Zargar Vs Nabeel Showkat and Anr on 02 Sep 2022

Maintenance cases index here.

Mamta Vs Pradeep Kumar on 05 Sep 2023

Posted on September 5, 2023 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Delhi High Court held as follows,

From Para 12,

12. Marriages under old Hindu Law are considered as a sacrament and did not recognize the concept of divorce. Once this union of marriage was established, the ties were for the entire life of the spouses which could not be severed under any circumstances. Complete shift of paradigm from the social ethos happened with the enactment of the Act, 1955 which not only introduced the concept of ‘monogamy’ but also defined certain grounds on which alone divorce could be granted. Despite this phenomenal change in the social ethos, the Act, 1955 recognises the ground of divorce only on “Fault Theory”. Unless the opposite party was shown to be at fault, whether it was for ‘Adultery’, ‘Cruelty’, ‘Desertion’ or other grounds as specified under Section 13 of the Act, 1955, no divorce can be granted. With the passage of time, experience has shown that many a times, the marriages do not work because of incompatibility and temperamental differences, for which neither party can be blamed. However, since only Fault Theory prevails, these parties end up warring with each other for years to come only because they have no way of exiting this relationship. While many debates have been held to introduce “Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage” as a ground, it has not met the approval and consent of the legislation. We are bound by limits as defined under the Act, 1955 and unless the fault of the other spouse is shown, the parties are left to suffer acrimonious relationship with no way to exit. In this backdrop, the facts of the present case may be considered.

From Para 30,

30. We conclude that in the present case the parties are living separately for 15 years now; there is no chance of reconciliation between the parties and such long separation peppered which false allegations, police reports and criminal trial has become a source of mental cruelty and any insistence either to continue this relationship or modifying the Family Court’s order would only be inflicting further cruelty upon both the parties. Living together in a marriage is not an irreversible act. But marriage is a tie between two parties and if this tie is not working under any circumstances, we see no purpose in postponing the inevitability of the situation.

Mamta Vs Pradeep Kumar on 05 Sep 2023

Citations: [2023 DHC 6384-DB]

Other Sources:

Index of Divorce judgments here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Catena of Landmark Judgments Referred/Cited to

P Amutha Vs Gunsekaran on 23 Dec 2022

Omprakash Sahni Vs Jai Shankar Chaudhary and Anr on 02 May 2023

Nahar Singh Yadav and Anr Vs Union of India and Ors on 19 Nov 2010

Rakesh Rajput and Anr Vs State of Jharkhand and Anr on 31 Oct 2023

MS Godrej Sara Lee Limited Vs Excise and Taxation Officer cum AO and Ors on 01 Feb 2023

Deepti Vs Anil Kumar on 19 Sep 2023

Mohit Gupta and Ors vs Govt of NCT of Delhi and Anr on 16 Oct 2006

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