Krishnanand Mishra and Anr Vs State of Jharkhand on 09 Aug 2023

Posted on September 27, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A single bench judge of Jharkhand High Court quashed the false 498A IPC case against brother-in-law (Nandoi) and sister-in-law (Nanad).

From Paras 11 and 12,

11. Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code was inserted in the statute with pious view for punishing cruelty of the husband, however, nowadays, the said Section is being misused which has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar & another; [(2014) 8 SCC 273].
12. How the cases are lodged under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code at the heat of the moment, that was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Preeti Gupta & another v. State of Jharkhand & another; [(2010) 7 SCC 667].

From Para 16,

16. Coming back to the facts of the present case. The Court finds that there are general and omnibus allegations against the petitioners and in one of the earlier case, final form was submitted in favour of the petitioners and during pendency of that case, the present case has been filed, which further suggest that maliciously the case has been lodged against the petitioners, who happened to be brother-in-law (Nandoi) and sister-in-law (Nanad) of the informant and they are residing at different place.

Krishnanand Mishra and Anr Vs State of Jharkhand on 09 Aug 2023

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Dr. Pankaj Kumar Vs Prerna on 16 Dec 2020

Posted on September 27, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Jharkhand High Court granted divorce to the husband, not on the ground of cruelty by wife, but on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.

From Para 21,

21. We, therefore, proceed to answer this question as this issue has not yet been decided by this Court. We may not have to labour hard in this regard since the Full Bench of Bombay High Court has squarely dealt with the same issue concerning applicability of section 19(3) of the Family Courts’ Act, 1984 and section 28(4) of the Hindu Marriage Ac, 1955 on the period of limitation governing the filing of an appeal before the High Court from the suit s instituted under Hindu Marriage Act concerning the rights of the parties such as, dissolution of marriage, restitution of conjugal right, declaration of a marriage as null and void, judicial separation, etc.
This view has been further followed by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Smt. Gunjan v. Praveen ( Supra), Rajasthan High Court in the case of Kuldeep Yadav v. Anita Yadav ( and Delhi High Court in the cases of R.R.D. (Supra) and DC (Supra) cited by the learned counsel for the appellant. The
rationale behind taking such a view is that the Act of 1984 provides for a special forum relating to matrimonial dispute and for that, special procedure was devised for expeditious adjudication of the case. Provisions of section 20 thereof containing the obstante clause has to be construed in that context, whereas Parliament being conscious of the period of limitation of 30 days prescribed under section 19(3) of Family Courts’ Act, 1984 chose to make suitable amendment in section 39(4) of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 and section 28(4) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 by enlarging the period of limitation from 30 days to 90 days keeping into account the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of Savitri Pandey (supra) and
the rationale behind it. It is true that in a country like us where millions of people face financial hardship for litigating a matter and considerable time, money and energy have to be spent in pursuing the appeal given the difficult geographical condition, access to justice may become illusory in approaching the Court of Appeal within a small period of 30 day and amendment to section 28(4) introduced in 2003 to the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 being the later enactment in point of time compared to the provisions of section 19(3) under the Family Courts’ Act, 1984, the intention of the Legislature to provide a larger time period for preferring an appeal needs to be furthered in order to resolve this inconsistency by adopting the principles of harmonious construction. We are, therefore, inclined to follow the principles laid down by the Full Bench decision of Bombay High Court in this regard. The Hindu Marriage Act being a special legislation, the provisions governing the period of limitation for preferring an appeal arising out of the decisions of the Family Court under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 should be governed by larger period of limitation of 90 days prescribed under section 28(4) thereof. The second question posed for determination at the outset is also answered in the aforesaid manner in the affirmative. Having held so, the instant appeal does not suffer from any delay since the original petition was filed within a period of 90 days from the date of the impugned order i.e. 05.08.2015. As such, there is no delay in preferring the instant appeal. I.A. No. 539/2020 is disposed of.

Dr. Pankaj Kumar Vs Prerna on 16 Dec 2020

2023-Mar-31: The parties settled.
Learned counsel for the parties submit that since the parties have settled the matrimonial dispute in all respects and the disposal / withdrawal of two pending cases against each other is only a matter of time where both the parties are taking steps and joint compromise petition has been filed in one of them whereas in the other they would be filing the joint compromise petition, the appeal itself can be disposed of in terms of the settlement by dissolution of the marriage as they are living separately also.
Having regard to the aforesaid state of facts and that the parties have settled the matter amicably amongst themselves during course of mediation at JHALSA and have decided to live separately without any condition of permanent alimony, there is no point in keeping this appeal pending as no lis survives to be adjudicated upon. As such, the appeal is disposed of in terms of the settlement jointly signed by the parties on 7th November 2021 part of the mediation report dated 16th November 2021 bearing letter no.2513. As such, marriage between the parties is dissolved. Parties are at idem that the two pending cases shall be withdrawn or disposed of parties on the basis of the joint settlement between the parties. They have also agreed not to institute any future cases against each other. Parties should abide by the terms and conditions of the settlement. The settlement should form part of the decree. Decree accordingly.

Dr. Pankaj Kumar Vs Prerna on 31 Mar 2023

Index of judgements on Divorce Appeals is here.

N.Rajendran Vs S.Valli on 03 Feb 2022

Posted on September 26, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court granted divorce to the husband, not on the ground of cruelty by wife, but on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.

From Para 29,

29. Article 142 of the Constitution undoubtedly clothes this Court with a reservoir of power to pass orders as would reach complete justice to the parties. What comes to mind is the concept of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. Undoubtedly, though there have been reports of the Law Commission in this regard recommending changes in the law, as of today the statute does not provide for irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a ground. However, this Court has on a number of occasions exercised its power and granted dissolution of marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage based on Article 142. In this regard, learned counsel for respondent pointed out that this is not a case for exercising power under Article 142. He addressed this submission, reminding us of the conduct of the appellant throughout. He would submit that the respondent is completely without blame. She was always ready and willing. The findings as found by the High Court being confirmed, no occasion arises for this Court to exercise power under Article 142. We record this submission for as a prefatory remark to indicate that this is not a case where both parties are agreeable for a dissolution by way of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. But that then leads us to the question as to whether the consent of the parties is necessary to order dissolution of marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown. This again, is not res integra. We may notice that this Court has in a catena of decisions discussed this very aspect.

From Para 32,

32. Having found that consent of the parties is not necessary to declare a marriage dissolved, we cannot be unmindful of the facts as they exist in reality. There has been a marriage which took place on 31.10.2004. There is a child born in the said marriage. No doubt being in contravention of Section 15, it becomes a fait accompli but at the same time we do not reasonably perceive any possibility of the appellant and the respondent cohabiting as husband and wife. Whatever life was there in the marriage has been snuffed out by the passage of time, the appearance of new parties and vanishing of any bond between the parties. Not even the slightest possibility of rapprochement between the appellant and the respondent exists for reasons though which are entirely due to the actions of the appellant and for which the respondent cannot be blamed. The marriage between the appellant and the respondent has become dead. It can be described as a point of no return. There is no possibility of the appellant and the respondent stitching together any kind of a reasonable relationship as the tie between the parties has broken beyond repair and having regard to the facts of this case, we would think that it would be in the interest of justice and to do complete justice to the parties that we should pass an order dissolving the marriage between the appellant and the respondent.

From Para 34,

34. Accordingly, while we affirm the judgment of the High Court and refuse to grant a decree of dissolution on the ground of cruelty by the respondent, we in exercise of our power under Article 142 of the Constitution declare the marriage between the appellant and the respondent as dissolved. This will be on condition that the appellant will pay a sum of Rs.20,000,00/- (Rupees twenty lakhs) to the respondent by way of a demand draft within a period of eight weeks from today. We further make it clear that this will be without prejudice to all the rights available to the son who was born in the marriage between the appellant and the respondent under law in regard to property rights. Till the amount is paid as aforesaid, the appellant will continue to be liable to pay Rs.7000/- per month to the respondent.

N.Rajendran Vs S.Valli on 03 Feb 2022

Index of Divorce judgements is here.

Aarti Vs Kishan Meena on 22 Aug 2024

Posted on September 16, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court at Indore held as follows,

From Para 16,

16. It has also been held in Samar Ghosh (supra) where on facts there has been irretrievable breakdown of marriage, the party opposing the divorce and not letting go the other party free of the matrimonial bond, would be causing mental cruelty to the other party. This makes considerable sense in the Indian context where to reach finality by exhausting the remedy of appeals may take several years. In such situation the party opposing the grant of divorce may, in some cases, be doing so only out of spite, either to harass the other party or prevent it from remarrying or out of sheer cussedness. That may indeed also confirm the allegation that such party had been causing mental cruelty, and was now intent on causing further mental cruelty by opposing the divorce.

From Para 19,

19. Respondent by filing certified copy of impugned judgment and decree in Criminal Case No.2015/2017 under Section 498-A of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 has proved that criminal case was lodged at the behest of appellant / wife in which ultimately appellant, his sister and parents were acquitted by the parties. Learned Court below relying upon the judgment in the case of Vandana Gupta Vs. Ramesh Gupta reported in 2009 (2) MPLJ 214, Madhuri Aaswani Vs. Arjundas Aaswani reported in 2007 (3) MPLJ 550 and Vishwanath Agrawal Vs. Sarla Agrawal reported in AIR 2012 SC 2586 concluded that prosecution of husband and her relatives on the false allegation of demand of dowry comesunder mental cruelty. The findings recorded by the learned Court below are impregnable and infallible.

From Para 21,

21. Learned Court below has recorded the finding that termination of pregnancy without consent of husband also comes under the purview of cruelty. With regard to the aforesaid finding, this Court is of the view that termination of pregnancy may come under the term ‘cruelty’ depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case.

Aarti Vs Kishan Meena on 22 Aug 2024

Index of Divorce Judgments is here.

Mr xxxx Bhat Vs State of Karnataka and Ms xxxx Rao on 28 Jun 2024

Posted on September 4, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Karnataka High Court (Bengaluru Bench) held that the husband may initiate perjury proceedings against the knife, if he desires so.

From Para 7,

A perusal at the complaint would indicate that the complainant laid emphasis upon infections of the husband on his genital areas which resembled as STD. Therefore, the husband is guilty of mental harassment dishonestly concealing his mental condition and breaching the trust of the wife. Minute details of certain allegations are made which are found in the complaint. The crux of the complaint was STD on him, making her leave her job after marriage and therefore, she would be dependent upon him. There is not a single sentence about the petitioner demanding dowry and indulging in cruelty for the purpose of demand of dowry. All the harassments that the complainant narrates are minor skirmishes between the husband and the wife.
A perusal at the summary of the charge sheet would also not indicate any demand of dowry or cruelty on the part of the husband. Prior to filing of the charge sheet by the Police, statements were recorded of the family members of the complainant.
The mother herself in her statement speaks that at the time of discussions about the marriage, the parents of the petitioner and the petitioner had clearly indicated that they do not want any dowry and they are not demanding anything. The same goes with the statements of others.
What is given to the complainant, according to the complainant’s tradition, is 614 grams of silver and 160 grams of gold, not as demand but as a tradition of her family which at best be said to be ‘Stridhana’. Such statements galore. If the statements recorded of the mother and the brother of the complainant, the complaint, the charge sheet and summary of the charge sheet are red in tandem, what would unmistakably emerge is that, no demand for dowry was made and no cruelty that would become ingredients of Section 498A of the IPC would get attracted in the case at hand.
Section 498A has two circumstances, which can draw an accused into its web. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty which is likely to drive the woman to suicide or the harassment should be such that they would coerce the woman for meeting any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security, and on failure to fulfill the demand, indulge in cruelty. If the contents of the complaint, summary of the charge and the statements are considered on the bedrock of necessary ingredients of Section 498A of the IPC, the allegation of the offence would tumble down like a pack of cards, as, no where it is indicative, of the fact that there is dowry harassment and cruelty by the husband or the members of the family of the petitioner.

From Para 8,

8. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that every time the petitioner was accused of suffering from STD. In the aforesaid affidavit, it is clearly indicated by the wife that the petitioner is suffering from HPV infection as he has some rashes on his buttock. The petitioner gets himself tested at the Victoria Hospital and several hospitals.
The diagnostic centre at Columbus, USA observes that history and physical examination of the petitioner was done. He has no physical signs and no history of concern for HPV or any other infection in the body. Therefore, the bogey that is projected by the complainant/wife that the husband has some physical problem appears to be a white lie.

From Para 9,

9. The other bogey projected by the wife is that the petitioner has closed all channels of communications and had never shown any interest in getting the complainant to the USA, this is completely belied by the documents appended to the petition itself, as not one but four appointments were taken by the petitioner for VISA purposes of the wife. The first appointment after the petitioner left to the USA was on 13-10-2020. There are four appointments, confirmation acknowledgments of which are produced by the petitioner as annexures to the petition. They are dated 13-10-2020, 02-03-2021, 07-05-2021 and 24-05-2021;
It is on the 5th appointment, the complainant goes before the visa office and Visa is granted to the complainant, which is also appended as document to the petition. These are documents which speak for themselves. A mail communication on 05-12-2021 is quoted hereinabove. The complainant seeks confirmation regarding her travel to USA. Therefore, it is clearly a bogey projected by the complainant that the petitioner was not interested in getting her to the USA and had blocked all channels; but the documents speak otherwise. The attitude of the complainant also speaks for itself.
Therefore, it is not a case where there is an iota of ingredient against the petitioner/husband for the offences punishable under Section 498A of the IPC or Sections 3 and 4 of the Act. It is misuse and abuse of criminal justice system by the complainant right from the word go.

Para 10,

10. This Court has completely considered the complaint, summary of the charge sheet, the statements recorded and the law as laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment. All this exercise is undertaken only to arrive at a conclusion as to any of the ingredients of the offences are met or otherwise. The unmistakable conclusion is that, the complainant in gross misuse and abuse of law has set the criminal law into motion. Such frivolous cases registered by the wife have taken enormous judicial time, be it before the concerned Court or before this Court, and has led to enormous civil unrest, destruction of harmony and happiness in the society. It may not be that these would be the facts in every given case. The Court is only concerned about frivolous and vexatious litigations clogging the criminal justice delivery system, where genuine cases lie in cold storage. If the facts narrated hereinabove are noticed and as observed, the complainant has, in gross misuse and abuse of the process of the law, has set the criminal law into motion. Therefore, it becomes a fit case where the husband must be given liberty to initiate proceedings for malicious prosecution or initiate proceedings under Section 211 of the IPC. Liberty is thus reserved to the husband, for such action to be initiated in accordance with law, if he so desires.

Mr xxxx Bhat Vs State of Karnataka and Ms xxxx Rao on 28 Jun 2024

List of Quash judgments is here and List of Perjury judgments is here.

James Kunjwal Vs State of Uttarakhand and Anr on 13 Aug 2024

Posted on August 14, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A full bench of Apex Court passed guidelines to follow, When perjury proceedings can be initiated.

From Paras 16-20,

16. What we may conclude from a perusal of the above-noticed judicial pronouncements is that:-
(i) The Court should be of the prima facie opinion that there exists sufficient and reasonable ground to initiate proceedings against the person who has allegedly made a false statement(s);
(ii) Such proceedings should be initiated when doing the same is “expedient in the interests of justice to punish the delinquent” and not merely because of inaccuracy in statements that may be innocent/immaterial;
(iii) There should be “deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance”;
(iv) The Court should be satisfied that there is a reasonable foundation for the charge, with distinct evidence and not mere suspicion;
(v) Proceedings should be initiated in exceptional circumstances, for instance, when a party has perjured themselves to beneficial orders from the Court.
17. The statement made by the appellant, that has been deemed to be befitting the offence of giving false evidence before the Court, which is known commonly as perjury, was more in the nature of denial of the statements made in the affidavits of the complainant herein.
18. We are of the view that, in the present facts, a denial simpliciter cannot meet the threshold, as described in the judgments above, particularly when no malafide intention/deliberate attempt can be understood from the statement made by the appellant in the affidavit. As has already been observed, mere suspicion or inaccurate statements do not attract the offence under the Section. It cannot be disputed that the statements made in the affidavit were only to state his version of events and/or deny the version put forth by the complainant.
19. We are also of the firm opinion that such statements do not make it expedient in the interest of justice, nor constitute exceptional circumstances in which such Sections may be invoked. Given that these proceedings would constitute an offence, independent of the one for which the appellant is already facing trial, it cannot be unequivocally held that there was deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance.
20. We find that at least three of the possible scenarios, as discussed supra, in which a court would be justified in invoking these powers on the face of it appear to be unmet, prosecution, therefore, would be unjust. We say so for the reason that the respondent in her counter affidavit filed before this Court makes no particular allegation nor does she provide any of the material that was allegedly placed before the competent prosecuting authorities or the Court. She only alleges untruth on the part of the appellant 8/12/2024 stating that the Court was correct in initiating proceedings against him for making the false statement. She further makes certain statements that fall outside the scope of the present adjudication and pertain to the trial of the main offence pending before the court of competent jurisdiction.

James Kunjwal Vs State of Uttarakhand and Anr on 13 Aug 2024

Citations: [2024 INSC 601], [2024 Latest Caselaw 508 SC]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/84159018/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/66beef2337d7e5445370dff1

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/james-kunjwal-versus-state-of-uttarakhand

https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/s-193-ipc-when-can-perjury-proceedings-be-initiated-against-a-litigant-supreme-court-explains-266668

https://www.latestlaws.com/latest-caselaw/2024/august/2024-latest-caselaw-508-sc/

https://www.lawtext.in/judgement.php?bid=442

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/supreme-court/james-kunjwal-v-state-of-uttarakhand-2024-insc-601-mere-denial-of-averments-in-pleadings-not-perjury-no-malafide-intention-1547820

https://www.advocatekhoj.com/library/judgments/announcement.php?WID=17806

https://lawtrend.in/mere-denial-in-affidavit-doesnt-constitute-offence-under-section-193-ipc-supreme-court-quashed-perjury-charges/

Index of perjury judgments is here.

Samad Habib Mithani and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr on 25 Jul 2024

Posted on August 13, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division (women!) bench of Bombay High Court at Bombay quashed a fake case on in-laws.

From Para 10,

10…
Hence, from the above mentioned statements of the relatives of the Respondent No.2, it is obvious that there are no serious allegations as such against the present Applicants. These are merely omnibus allegations which are not supported by any evidence, as regards the ill-treatment and cruelty meted to the Respondent No.2. The allegations in the complaint are general and vague without specific examples of cruelty and harassment. The record and the statements do not support the allegations made against the present Applicants. The complaint against the present Applicants is not supported by any documents, letter, e-mails, message to support the allegation of cruelty and harassment.

From Para 16,

16. In our opinion, the case of the present Applicants would fall under the category (ii) from the above referred three categories, where the allegations in the FIR or the complaint taken to its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged. Merely, remarks in the complaint about the supporting the accused No.1 while narrating some of the incidents would not perse amount to committing the offences which they have been alleged of. It would be unfair to continue the prosecution against the present Applicants for the conduct of the accused No.1, in which they have been unfortunately dragged. From the various incidents which have been narrated by the Respondent No.2 as well as the witnesses, who are her near relatives, there does not appear to be complicity of the present Applicants. The continuation of present proceedings against the Applicants would cause injustice and hardship to the Applicants. Even otherwise, the material collected during the investigation does not support the charges levelled against the present Applicants. The malafide proceedings initiated against the present Applicants needs to be curbed at this stage itself, in order to prevent abuse or process of law and miscarriage of justice, since it is obvious that the allegations are not supported by any other cogent material and have been made with a view to wreak vengeance against the present Applicants.

Samad Habib Mithani and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr on 25 Jul 2024

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Dinesh Kumar Yadav Vs State of U.P and Anr on 27 Oct 2016

Posted on August 5, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A full bench of Allahabad High Court (at Lucknow) held as follows:

From Para 23,

23. Under Section 397 of Cr P C “the High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court…”. That the Court of Sessions is as an inferior Court to the High Court, cannot be disputed. Thus, the Court of Sessions before which an appeal has been prescribed under Section 29 of the Act, 2005 is a Criminal Court inferior to the High Court and, therefore, a revision against its order passed under Section 29 will lie to the High Court under Section 397 Cr P C. Section 401 Cr P C is supplementary to Section 397 Cr P C.

From Para 25,

25. In the result, we answer the first question in the affirmative holding that the decisions in Nishant Krishna Yadav (supra) and Manju Shree Robinson (supra) do not lay down the law correctly. In other words, we hold that a revision under Section 397/401 of Cr P C against a judgment and order passed by the Court of Sessions under Section 29 of the Act, 2005 is maintainable and that the decisions in Nishant Krishna Yadav (supra) and Manju Shree Robinson (supra) do not lay down the law correctly.

Dinesh Kumar Yadav Vs State of U.P and Anr on 27 Oct 2016

Index of all DV cases is here.

Baba Natarajan Prasad Vs M. Revathi on 15 Jul 2024

Posted on July 16, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held as follows,

From Paras 10 and 11,

10. The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant herein would submit that a scanning of the judgment of the trial Court would reveal that the Court had appropriately appreciated the evidence on record and convicted accused Nos.1 and 2 upon satisfying itself that the ingredients to attract the offence punishable under Section 494 I.P.C., have been made out by the appellant. Furthermore, it is submitted that a bare perusal of the impugned judgment would reveal that the High Court had rightly considered the contentions of the appellant herein against the reversal of their conviction by the First Appellate Court that it was founded on surmises and conjectures. We are of the considered view that no more narrative on the correctness of the reversal of the judgment of the First Appellate Court by the High Court under the impugned judgment is required as the indisputable and undisputed position is that its reversal was accepted by accused Nos.1 and 2 and they had undergone the sentence imposed by the High Court consequent to the reversal of the First Appellate Court’s judgment. We may note here that the learned senior counsel for the appellant would submit that the appellant had not accepted any compensation and in the same breath, would further submit that the appellant did not want any such compensation.
11. In the aforesaid circumstances, the sole question surviving for consideration is whether the High Court was right in not restoring the sentence imposed for the conviction under Section 494 I.P.C., by the trial Court when it accepted the contentions of the appellant and reversed the acquittal of accused Nos.1 and 2 and restored the conviction entered on them by the trial Court. In other words, the question is whether the High Court had shown undeserving leniency and sympathy to accused Nos.1 and 2 even after finding that they have committed the serious offence of bigamy punishable under Section 494 I.P.C., and whether they were let off with a flea-bite sentence and whether an enhancement of sentence is invited?

From Paras 14 and 15,

14. A reading of Sections 494 and 495 I.P.C., would reveal that the legislature viewed the offence of bigamy as a serious offence. Though no minimum sentence is prescribed under Section 494 I.P.C., the maximum sentence of imprisonment prescribed thereunder for a conviction thereunder is seven years of imprisonment of either description. It is also to be noted that the said offence is compoundable only by the husband or wife of the person so marrying with the permission of the Court. The same offence under Section 494 I.P.C., with concealment of former marriage from person with whom subsequent marriage is contracted would visit the offender with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and with fine. This offence, which is an aggravated form of bigamy, is non-compoundable. The decision in Gopal Lal’s case (supra), and the prescription of maximum corporeal sentence imposable under Sections 494 and 495 I.P.C.,would undoubtedly suggest that the offence under Section 494 I.P.C., has to be treated as a serious offence.
15. When once it is found that an offence under Section494 I.P.C., is a serious offence, the circumstances obtaining in this case would constrain us to hold that the imposition of ‘imprisonment till the rising of the court’ is not a proper sentence falling in tune with the rule of proportionality in providing punishment as mentioned hereinbefore.

From Para 20, (Alteration of the imprisonment and fine)

20. Certain circumstances revealed from the evidence on record cannot go unnoticed while deciding the question of proper sentence. Earlier, the appellant herein filed HMOP 515/2012 before the Family Court, Coimbatore, seeking divorce. In the judgment of the trial Court, taking note of the evidence adduced, it was noted that the first accused had filed a petition seeking interim maintenance in the above HMOP and based on a petition in that regard the Court had ordered the appellant to pay Rs. 5,000/- per month to the first accused and she had received the maintenance till 13.07.2017. The evidence would further show that a child was born to the first and second accused in their wedlock in November, 2017. The evidence on record would reveal that on 22.01.2019, the first accused herself filed HMOP No.84 of 2019 seeking dissolution of her marriage with the appellant. In such circumstances, it is evident that the first accused married the second accused while the marriage between the appellant and the first accused was subsisting and not only that, during its subsistence, she had also begotten a child through the second accused. Taking into account all the circumstances, it can be said that undeserving leniency was shown in the case on hand. But then, taking into account the fact that the child born to the first and second accused was aged less than two years when the trial Court passed the sentence and that no minimum term of imprisonment is prescribed for the conviction under Section 494 I.P.C., and that the maximum sentence imposable for conviction thereunder is seven years, we are of the considered view that the trial Court had virtually struck a balance in fixing the term of one year as the corporeal sentence. But then, taking note of the fact that the said child is now aged only about six years and the sentence for the conviction under Section 494 I.P.C., can be of both descriptions. We think it appropriate to use our judicial discretion to modify the sentence imposed under the impugned judgment. Accordingly, we modify the term of the sentence awarded to accused Nos.1 and 2 for the conviction under Section 494 I.P.C., to six months each, making the nature of the sentence as simple imprisonment for the said period. We further modify the fine imposed by reducing the same from Rs. 20,000/- each to Rs. 2,000/- each, as originally awarded by the trial Court. Needless to say, that the default sentence therefor, awarded by the trial Court i.e., to undergo simple imprisonment for three months is also restored. If in terms of the impugned judgment, accused Nos.1 and 2 had already deposited Rs. 20,000/-, after making deduction in terms of the sentence of fine mentioned hereinbefore, the balance amount shall be refunded to them in accordance with the law. In the said circumstances, accused Nos.1 and 2 shall surrender before the trial Court so as to serve out the unserved period of sentence imposed on them by this judgment. Taking note of the fact that the child of accused Nos.1 and 2 is now aged only about 6 years, we further order that firstly the second accused shall surrender before the trial Court, within a period of 3 weeks from today to serve out the rest of the sentence. Upon his release from the jail, on suffering the sentence, the first accused shall surrender before the Court to serve her remaining period of sentence and such surrender shall be made by the first accused within a period of 2 weeks from the release of the second accused from the jail. This arrangement shall not be treated as a precedent as it was ordered in these special circumstances. In case the accused Nos.1 and 2 do not surrender in terms of this judgment on their own, the trial Court shall resort to appropriate steps in accordance with law to place them in custody and make them suffer the sentence as mentioned hereinbefore. The appeals are allowed as above.

Baba Natarajan Prasad Vs M. Revathi on 15 Jul 2024

Other Sources:

https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/punishment-must-be-in-proportion-to-gravity-of-offence-supreme-court-enhances-sentence-bigamous-marriage-263490

https://www.legiteye.com/supreme-court-modifies-sentence-in-bigamy-case-orders-staggered-jail-terms-for-couple-justices-ct-ravikumar-sanjay-kumar-15-07-2024/

https://www.latestlaws.com/latest-caselaw/2024/july/2024-latest-caselaw-433-sc/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/6696638231ed747732bfccdc

https://citecase.in/baba-natarajan-prasad-vs-m-revathi-2024-insc-523-s-494-ipc-bigamy-sentencing/

https://www.advocatekhoj.com/library/judgments/announcement.php?WID=17724

https://x.com/SCJudgments/status/1813118439701057835

https://lawyerenews.com/supreme-court-enhances-sentence-in-bigamy-case/

https://www.freelaw.in/legalnews/Punishment-of-imprisonment-till-the-rising-of-the-court-is-a-flea-bite-sentence-for-those-convicted-for-an-offence-of-bigamy-Supreme-Court-

https://www.the-laws.com/encyclopedia/browse/case?caseId=004202345000&title=baba-natarajan-prasad-vs-m-revathi

Flea-Bite

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/supreme-court/baba-natarajan-prasad-v-m-revathi-2024-insc-523-bigamy-494-ipc-serious-offence-1544100

The decision of the District Court is here.

Baba Natarajan Prasad Vs M. Revathi on 21 Apr 2019

Index of Bigamy Judgments is here.

Inderjeet Kaur Kalsi Vs NCT of Delhi and Anr on 27 Nov 2013

Posted on July 9, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Delhi High Court held as follows,

From Paras 21.1 and 21.2,

21. Findings
21.1 At the outset, this Court is of the view that having availed the remedy of revision before the Sessions Court under Section 397 Cr.P.C., the petitioner cannot be allowed to re-agitate the same point before this Court in a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. as it would amount to a second revision which is specifically barred by Section 397(3) Cr.P.C. This petition amounts to a second revision petition in the garb of Section 482 Cr.P.C.
21.2 Although the power of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, it has to be used sparingly and cautiously to prevent the abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The petitioner has also not been able to make out any case of abuse of process of Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. This Court is, therefore, not inclined to exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

Inderjeet Kaur Kalsi Vs NCT of Delhi and Anr on 27 Nov 2013

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Catena of Landmark Judgments Referred/Cited to

Krishnanand Mishra and Anr Vs State of Jharkhand on 09 Aug 2023

Dr. Pankaj Kumar Vs Prerna on 16 Dec 2020

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Aarti Vs Kishan Meena on 22 Aug 2024

Mr xxxx Bhat Vs State of Karnataka and Ms xxxx Rao on 28 Jun 2024

James Kunjwal Vs State of Uttarakhand and Anr on 13 Aug 2024

Samad Habib Mithani and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr on 25 Jul 2024

Dinesh Kumar Yadav Vs State of U.P and Anr on 27 Oct 2016

Baba Natarajan Prasad Vs M. Revathi on 15 Jul 2024

Inderjeet Kaur Kalsi Vs NCT of Delhi and Anr on 27 Nov 2013