Bilal Ahmad Ganaie Vs Sweety Rashid and Ors on 11 May 2023

Posted on June 8, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court held as follows,

From Paras 12-14, (On the point that second revision can not be filed in guise of Quash petition)

12. Though, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajan Kumar Machananda v. State of Karnataka (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents has held that a subsequent Revision Petition cannot be filed under the garb of Section 482 of the Code, however, in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a later case titled ‘Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra‟, reported as ‘(2009) 2 SCC 370’, while considering the question as to whether an application filed under Section 482 of the Code can be dismissed only because the Revision Petition has been dismissed by the Sessions Court, observed that even in cases where a second revision before the High Court after dismissal of the first one by the Court of Sessions is barred under Section 397(2) of the Code, the inherent power of the Court has been held to be available. While relying upon an earlier decision rendered in case titled ‘Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai‟, reported as ‘(2003) 6 SCC 675’, the Hon’ble Apex Court further observed that the inherent power of the High Court is not barred by the Statute, but has merely been saved thereunder and it was difficult to concede that the jurisdiction of the High Court would be held to be barred only because the revisional jurisdiction could also be availed of. The same view was taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ‘Shakuntala Devi & Ors. v. Chamru Mahto & Anr.’, reported as ‘(2009) 3 SCC 310‟.
13. This Court had also taken a view in a case titled ‘Mushtaq Ahmad Mir &Ors. v. Mst. Khatija’, rendered in CRMC No. 197/2013, decided on 27th of June, 2022, that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code , is of wide amplitude and it cannot be excluded by the provisions of revision contained under Section 397 (3) of the Code and that merely because the Revision Petition, in the instant case, has been rejected by the learned Revisional Court, the High Court is not debarred from entertaining a Petition under Section 482 of the Code against the impugned Order passed by the learned Magistrate, if it finds that there has been miscarriage of justice or that the ends of justice would be secured by interfering in the Order passed by the learned trial Magistrate and that it would all depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case.
14. In view of above, though, the impugned Order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate had been assailed in a Revision Petition filed before the Sessions Court at Pulwama, however, this Court is not debarred from entertaining an application under Section 482 of the Code invoking the inherent jurisdiction for the limited purpose of looking at it as to whether there has been miscarriage of justice or that the ends of justice would be secured by interfering in the Order passed by the learned Magistrate. The objection raised by learned counsel for the respondents is thus turned down. It is, thus, held, for the aforesaid reasons, that the Petition filed under Section 482 of the Code is maintainable and cannot be said to be a subsequent Revision Petition.

From Para 15, (On overlapping jurisdiction)

15. Coming to the merits of the case, the impugned Orders have been challenged by the Petitioner, mainly, on the reasons that the learned Magistrate has not followed the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled Rajnesh v. Neha (supra), whereby certain mandatory guidelines have been laid for the guidance of the Courts while exercising the overlapping jurisdiction for grant of maintenance and to avoid conflicting orders being passed in different proceedings. On the issue of overlapping jurisdiction, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that successive claims for maintenance under different statutes are maintainable and the Court, while determining whether any further amount is to be awarded in the subsequent proceedings, has made it obligatory on the part of the applicant to disclose the previous proceedings and the order passed therein, in the subsequent proceedings and, if the order passed in such previous proceedings requires any variation or modification, it would be required to be done in the same proceedings.

From Para 19, (No evidence to be considered during Interim proceedings)

19. It is worthwhile to mention here that, at the time of granting of the interim maintenance, evidence is not available before the Court and the Court has to apply mind keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case in order to fix the quantum of maintenance.

From Para 25,

25. In so far as the directions passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajnesh v. Neha case (supra), it appears that both the Courts below have considered the case in the light of the directions passed by the Apex Court when successive claims for maintenance were made under overlapping jurisdiction of Section 125 of the Code and the D. V. Act. As regards the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the directions contained in Paragraph No. 128 (3) that, if the order passed in previous proceeding(s) requires any modification or variation, it would be required to be done in the same proceedings. It appears that this direction has been misunderstood as the order impugned passed by the Magistrate under any of the jurisdictions can be modified or varied by the same Court and not by any other Court. The only aspect of the case required to be addressed by the subsequent Court is that the maintenance granted earlier has to be kept in view to assess for further payment of maintenance, if any required for the sustenance of the destitute woman or children.

Bilal Ahmad Ganaie Vs Sweety Rashid and Ors on 11 May 2023

Ritesh Sinha Vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr on 2 Aug 2019

Posted on June 4, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A full bench of the Supreme Court answer the references before it in the following way…

From Paras 5 and 6,

5. Two principal questions arose for determination of the appeal which have been set out in the order of Justice Ranjana Prakash Desai dated 7th December, 2012 in the following terms.
“(1) Whether Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, which protects a person accused of an offence from being compelled to be a witness against himself, extends to protecting such an accused from being compelled to give his voice sample during the course of investigation into an offence?
(2) Assuming that there is no violation of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, whether in the absence of any provision in the Code, can a Magistrate authorize the investigating agency to record the voice sample of the person accused of an offence?”
6. While the first question was answered in the negative by both the learned Judges (Justice Ranjana Prakash Desai and Justice Aftab Alam) following the ratio of the law laid down in State of Bombay vs.Kathi Kalu Oghad1, difference of opinion has occurred insofar as second question is concerned.

From Para 10,

10. We may now proceed to answer the second question, namely, whether in the absence of any specific provision in the Cr.P.C. would a Court be competent to authorize the Investigating Agency to record the voice sample of a person accused of an offence. We are told that no authoritative pronouncement of this Court has been rendered by this Court.

From Para 12,

12. None of the said amendments specifically authorize or empower a Magistrate to direct an accused person or any other person to give his/her voice sample for the purposes of an inquiry or investigation under the Code. “Omission” of the Legislature to specifically so provide has led the learned judge (Justice Aftab Alam) on the two judge Bench to doubt as to whether legislative wisdom was in favour of a specific exclusion or omission so as to make a judicial exercise through a process of interpretation impermissible.

Finally, from Paras 24 and 25,

24. Would a judicial order compelling a person to give a sample of his voice violate the fundamental right to privacy under Article 20(3) of the Constitution, is the next question. The issue is interesting and debatable but not having been argued before us it will suffice to note that in view of the opinion rendered by this Court in Modern Dental College and Research Centre and others vs.State of Madhya Pradesh and others11, Gobind vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and another12 and the Nine Judge’s Bench of this Court in K.S. Puttaswamy and another vs. Union of India and others13 the fundamental right to privacy cannot be construed as absolute and but must bow down to compelling public interest. We refrain from any further discussion and consider it appropriate not to record any further observation on an issue not specifically raised before us.
25. In the light of the above discussions, we unhesitatingly take the view that until explicit provisions are engrafted in the Code of Criminal Procedure by Parliament, a Judicial Magistrate must be conceded the power to order a person to give a sample of his voice for the purpose of investigation of a crime. Such power has to be conferred on a Magistrate by a process of judicial interpretation and in exercise of jurisdiction vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. We order accordingly and consequently dispose the appeals in terms of the above.

Ritesh Sinha Vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr on 2 Aug 2019

Citations: [2019 INSC 855]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/18061439/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5d5259333321bc4b5e57ce07

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/ritesh-sinha-vs-the-state-of-uttar-pradesh-anr

https://www.nayalegal.com/ritesh-sinha-v-state-of-up-2019

Sanjay Kumar Shaw Vs Anjali Kumari Shaw on 07 Apr 2025

Posted on April 18, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Patna High Court held as follows,

From Para 13,

13. It appears from the petition that application for divorce has been filed by the appellant under Section 13 (1) (ia) & (ib) of the Act i.e. on the ground of cruelty and desertion. However, the main ground taken for divorce is that respondent-wife is suffering from mental disease or disorder
(schizophrenia) and permanent disability in her leg and due to her abnormal behavior the appellant-husband do not like to continue the matrimonial life with respondent. The learned Trial Court in para 12 of the impugned Judgment considered this aspect and held that appellant has failed to prove that respondent is suffering from the schizophrenia disease and her leg disability. From perusal of the record the question which this court has to decide is whether the respondent is suffering from schizophrenia or other mental disorder of such a kind and to such an extent that the appellant cannot reasonably be expected to live with respondent-wife or not?

From Para 14,

14. Taking note of the evidence adduced by the appellant, it is clear that he has not proved the mental disease or disorder of the respondent-wife, as the doctor who is treating the respondent-wife has not been examined. The grounds claimed by the appellant-husband are that the respondent-wife is of unsound mind, aggressive and has deserted the appellant have not been proved from the material available on the record.

From Paras 20 and 21,

20. In view of the above pronouncement, it appears that the ground of a spouse suffering from schizophrenia, by itself is not sufficient for grant of divorce under Section 13 (1) (iii) of the Act as it may involve various degree of mental illness. The law provides that a spouse in order to prove a ground of divorce on the ground of mental illness, ought to prove that the spouse is suffering from a serious case of schizophrenia which must also be supported by medical reports and proved by cogent evidence before the Court that disease is of such a kind and degree that husband cannot reasonably be expected to live with wife.
21. Section 13(1)(iii) of the Act does not make mere existence of a mental disorder of any degree sufficient in law to justify dissolution of marriage. The contents in which the ideas of unsoundness of mind and mental disorder occur in section as ground for dissolution of a marriage, require assessment of degree of mental disorder and its degree must be such that spouse seeking relief cannot reasonable be expected to live with the other. All mental abnormalities are not recognized as grounds for grant of decree. The burden of proof of existence of requisite degree of mental disorder is on the spouse who bases his or her claim on such a medical condition.

Sanjay Kumar Shaw Vs Anjali Kumari Shaw on 07 Apr 2025

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/146315829/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/67f4c506bdfd43233228ae45

https://www.livelaw.in/high-court/patna-high-court/patna-high-court-wife-mental-disorder-divorce-schizophrenia-hindu-marriage-act-289016

https://www.indialaw.in/blog/civil/divorce-hc-schizophrenia-isnt-enough/

https://lawtrend.in/schizophrenia-allegation-alone-not-ground-for-divorce-without-proof-of-severity-affecting-marital-life-patna-high-court/

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/high-courts/patna-high-court/a-v-b-miscellaneous-appeal-no1152-of-2018-spouse-relief-mental-disorder-divorce-1573858

Mental Disorder Must Be Proven to Be of Severe Degree to Justify Divorce Under Hindu Marriage Act, Rules Patna High Court

Index of Divorce Judgments is here.

Analysis by Adv Talari Rajeswari

Mudireddy Divya Vs Sulkti Sivarama Reddy on 26 Mar 2025

Posted on April 2, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Telangana High Court held as follows,

On Limitation,

22. Moreover, it is a settled rule of construction that every effort should be made to iron the creases out in two conflicting enactments and the more liberal enactment should be adopted for resolving the conflict. Both the 1955 Act and the 1984 Act are special statutes designed to ensure efficient resolution of conflicts within the family without subjecting the parties to further procedural hiccups. We also take recourse to the principle of law that when two interpretations are found to be equally possible, the Court may reasonably accept that the Legislature intended to prescribe a larger period of limitation: Shivram Dodanna Shetty Vs. Sharmila Shivram Shetty2, Sonia Kunwar Singh Bedi Vs. Kunwar Singh Bedi3 and Chaudary Chetnaben Dilipbhai Vs. Chaudary Dilipbhai Lavjibhai4.

On Evidence for Divorce in first Marriage,

28. Admittedly, the respondent in the present case did not lead any evidence of the customary divorce between the respondent and his first wife. The impugned order dated 19.11.2024 reflects that despite conditional orders, the respondent neither appeared nor filed his evidence. This means that the respondent declined to lead evidence to prove customary divorce from his first wife or otherwise. Apart from a mere pleading that the respondent obtained divorce through customary practice, no other evidence of the existence of such a customary practice or a document showing that the divorce was indeed obtained through such a customary practice was produced by the respondent.

On impleadment of a co-respondent,

46. Further, Rule 8(3), which requires addition of a co-respondent in a petition under section 11 of the 1955 Act i.e., void marriages, cannot be equated to Rule 8(1) as the issue of whether the marriage is void is essentially a question of law rather than a question of fact. The presence or absence of a co-respondent, viewed from this angle, cannot be fatal to the outcome of the case.

51. We have considered the relevant Rules regulating the proceedings initiated under the 1955 Act and the decisions placed on the point of impleadment of a co-respondent in specific cases. We accept the contentions made on behalf of the appellant in favour of giving a comprehensive construction to the Rule. We are of the view that the presence of the respondent’s first wife as a co-respondent to the lis before us is not necessary since this is not a case where the respondent’s first wife would be required to be heard for preserving the principles of natural justice. This is also not a case where the adjudication would entail questions regarding her character, integrity or reputation. We must also take a practical view of the situation, since admittedly, the respondent’s first wife has been in a state of coma for a while.
52. The requirement of impleading the respondent’s first wife is hence dispensed with under an extended meaning given to the proviso to Rule 8(1) of the 1955 Rules. In other words, we do not find non-impleadment of the respondent’s first wife to be fatal to the petition under sections 11, 5 and 25 of the 1955 Act or in the Appeal before us.

On Desertion,

60. Moreover, the respondent has remained unrepresented in the present Appeal and the whereabouts of the respondent is not known to the appellant for over 4 years. As stated above, the notice addressed to the respondent in the present Appeal was returned with an endorsement “no such person in the address”. To put it simply, the respondent has made no effort to contest the Appeal or pursue the proceedings for restitution of conjugal rights filed before the Additional Family Court at Visakhapatnam.

Most importantly, On status of previous marriage,

67. There is a patent contradiction in the findings and reasons given by the Family Court. While the Court denied alimony to the appellant on the basis of the appellant being the second wife, the Court refused to come to any finding with regard to the status of the marriage between the respondent and his first wife. A finding on this was necessary in the context of the appellant’s petition seeking annulment of marriage under section 11 of the Act i.e., on the ground that the respondent had a surviving spouse on the date of his marriage with the appellant. To put it simply, the Trial Court failed to consider that the marriage between the appellant and the respondent, both Hindus, could not have been legally solemnized if the respondent had a spouse living at the time of the marriage.

On Income Affidavits,

69. Another unsubstantiated finding is that the appellant obtained divorce from her first husband with an alimony of Rs.50.00 Lakhs and is now claiming permanent alimony of Rs.1 Crore from the respondent. The Trial Court utterly failed to consider that the respondent was equally accountable to disclose his assets in order to resist the claim of alimony. The impugned order does not disclose any direction on the parties to file their affidavits disclosing their respective assets

Mudireddy Divya Vs Sulkti Sivarama Reddy on 26 Mar 2025

Index of Divorce/Nullity judgments is here.

Musin Babulal Thengade and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr on 29 Jan 2025

Posted on March 2, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Bombay High Court at Aurangabab held that

From Para 6,

6. Apart from this, the learned A.P.P. has also placed reliance on judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rupali Devi Vs. State of Uttar pradesh reported in AIR OnLine (2019) SC 394.

From Paras 9 and 10,

9. As regards Section 472 of the Cr. P. C, contention of the learned A.P.P. that offence under Section 498-A of the IPC is a continuing wrong will have to be accepted, but only with a rider. Although the offence under Section 498-A of the IPC is a continuing wrong, it would not mean that limitation would continue to run perennially.The correct interpretation of the provision is provided in the matter of Arun Vyas and another Vs. Anita Vyas (supra) which sates that in case of offence under Section 498-A, a new starting point of limitation is start on every occasion when the wrong is committed and the period of limitation needs to be computed from the last such wrong. We may profitably quote paragraph 13 of the said decision, which reads as under :-
“ The essence of the offence in Section 498-A is cruelty as defined in the explanation appended to that section. It is a continuing offence and on each occasion on which the respondent was subjected to cruelty, she would have a new starting point of limitation. The last act of cruelty was committed against the respondent, within the meaning of the explanation, on October 13, 1988 when, on the allegation made by the respondent in the complaint to Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, she was forced to leave the matrimonial home. Having regard to the provisions of Sections 469 and 472 the period of limitation commenced for offences under Sections 406 and 498-A from October 13, 1988 and ended on October 12, 1991. But the charge sheet was filed on December 22, 1995,therefore, it was clearly barred by limitation under Section 468(2)(c) Cr. P. C.’’
10. Thereafter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has further stated in paragraph No. 14 that in complaints under Section 498-A the wife will invariably be oppressed, who is subjected to cruelty and, therefore, Section 473 of the Cr. P.C should be construed liberally in favour of wife. However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also cautioned that the words interest of justice employed in Section 473 of the Cr. P. C. cannot mean in the interest of prosecution and the true object of the provision is to advance the cause of justice by protecting the oppressed and punishing the offender. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also referred to its earlier judgment in the matter of Onkar Radha Manohari (Smt) Vs. Venka Venkata Reddy reported in 1993 AIR SCW 3595 that while dealing with Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, the Court should not only examine as to whether delay is properly explained, but also as to whether it is necessary to entertain a time barred matter in the interest of justice.

From Paras 13 and 14,

13. These observations have been made in the context of territorial jurisdiction. The judgment does not deal with the aspect of limitation. Provisions of Sections 468, 472 and 473 of the Cr. P.C did not fall for consideration in this case. As against this in the cases of Arun Vyas and another Vs Anita Vyas (supra) and Ramesh and other Vs. state of Tamil Nadu (supra), the question of limitation was directly involved and the same is answered referring to the relevant statutory provisions. It is settled legal principle that judgments of the Courts have to be interpreted in the backdrop of facts of the particular case. Ratio of a case has to be understood and appreciated in the backdrop of the facts in which the judgment is delivered. The law laid down in the judgment cannot be divorced from the facts of the case in which it is delivered. A judgment cannot be interpreted like a statute. It cannot be applied uniformly every where like Euclid’s theorems of geometry. Therefore, while dealing with aforesaid three judgments cited during the course of hearing, we are of the considered opinion that the ratio laid down in the matters of Arun Vyas and Ramesh which directly deal with the question of limitation will have to be accepted. The judgment in the matter of Rupali Devi is relating to territorial jurisdiction of a Court to deal with offence under Section 498-A of the IPC.
14. In the light of above, we are of the opinion that limitation for offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC shall commence from the last act of cruelty. Offence under Section 498-A of the IPC is a continuing offence implies that each act of cruelty would offer new starting point of limitation. Limitation for prosecution under Section 498-A does not continue for indefinite period. Such interpretation will render Section 468 of the Cr. P.C. nugatory or otiose for the purpose of Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code which does not appear to be the intention of legislature. Had there been intention to exclude Section 498-A of the IPC from the sweep of Section 468 of the Cr. P.C express provision could have been made for the said purpose.

Musin Babulal Thengade and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr on 29 Jan 2025

Citations: [2025:BHC-AUG:2858-DB]

Other Sources:

https://www.livelaw.in/high-court/bombay-high-court/bombay-high-court-cruelty-498a-ipc-limitation-283107

https://lawtrend.in/limitation-period-for-ipc-section-498-a-to-commence-from-last-act-of-cruelty-bombay-high-court/

Limitation for offence punishable under Section 498-A of IPC commences from the last act of cruelty: Bombay HC

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/high-courts/bombay-high-court/aurangabad-musin-babulal-thengade-v-the-state-of-maharashtra-2025-bhc-aug-2858-db-limitation-1567184

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Vishal Shah Vs Monalisha Gupta and Ors on 20 Feb 2025

Posted on February 22, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court passed this judgment whereby the marriage of parties is severed and Rs.25 Lakhs alimony was ordered to be paid to wife. Also since DV cases are quasi-criminal in nature, thus, there cannot be any justification to require the personal presence/appearance of the appellant in these proceedings.

From Para 18,

18. In the afore-mentioned complaint case, an application10 was filed by the respondent under Section 26 of the DV Act against the appellant, her mother-in-law, and their five other relatives. A notice was issued to the appellant vide order dated 21st July 2022. Subsequently, on 11th August 2022, the learned JMFC passed an interim order in favour of the respondent, prohibiting her eviction from the matrimonial home and directing the personal appearance of the appellant (respondent therein) and other respondents on the next hearing date. However, when the matter was listed again, the Court noticed that the appellant had not returned to India, and the concerned authorities were directed to initiate the extradition process against him.
We may observe that as the proceedings under the DV Act are quasi-criminal in nature, thus, there cannot be any justification to require the personal presence of the appellant in these proceedings. Thus, the learned Magistrate grossly erred while directing the appellant to remain personally present in the Court.

From Para 20,

20. It is apparent that the appellant’s inability to travel to India and appear in Miscellaneous Case No. 440 of 2022, filed by the respondent under Section 26 of the DV Act, stemmed from the impoundment of his passport, a circumstance beyond his control. Consequently, the order of the learned JMFC directing the initiation of extradition proceedings against the appellant as a consequence of his non-appearance, despite being aware of the fact of impounding of the passport of the appellant, is untenable and unsustainable in the eyes of the law. Otherwise also, as noted above, there is no requirement for the personal presence of any party in the proceedings under the DV Act, because they are quasi-criminal in nature and do not entail any penal consequences except when there is a breach of a protection order, which is the only offence provided under Section 31 of the DV Act.

From Para 26,

26. On the issue as to grant of divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India, this Court, in a very recent judgment of Rinku Baheti v Sandesh Sharda13, held that the factual analysis has to be undertaken in each case to determine as to what constitutes an ‘irretrievable breakdown’ while keeping in mind the non-exhaustive factors laid down in Shilpa Sailesh (supra).

From Para 31,

31. The filing of the aforesaid cases by the respondent-wife reflects her vindictive attitude towards the appellant and his family members and unambiguously reflects the bitterness that has seeped into the marital relationship. The tumultuous state of the marital relationship between the parties is quite evident, irrespective of the fate of the criminal complaints and the imputations made by the parties against each other. The passport of the appellant was also impounded by the concerned authorities, pursuant to the pending cases filed by the respondent.

From Paras 35-37,

35. Whatever may be the justification for the spouses living separately, with so much time having passed by any marital love or affection that may have developedbetween the parties seems to have evanesced. This is a classic case of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. The admitted long-standing separation, nature of differences, prolonged and multiple litigations pending adjudication, and the unwillingness of the parties to reconcile are evidence enough to establish beyond all manner of doubt that the marriage between the parties has broken down irretrievably and that there is no scope whatsoever for marriage to survive. Thus, no useful purpose, emotional or practical, would be served by continuing the soured relationship. On the basis ofthe above factual matrix, the present appears to be a case of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.
36. Apart from the irreconcilable status of the relationship between the parties, in the present case, another factor that has weighed with this Court in favour of the exercise of the power under Article 142(1)of the Constitution of India is that there is no child born from the wedlock and therefore, any direction to allowthe parties to part ways would only affect the parties themselves and not any innocent child.
37. Thus, this is a fit case warranting the exercise of the discretion conferred under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India to dissolve the marriage between the parties on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.

From Paras 42-43,

42. Before we conclude our discussion, we must note that the act of impounding the passport of the appellant by the concerned authorities of the Government of India was ex-facie illegal in the eyes of the law. In the present case, the appellant’s passport was impounded on the mere premise that the respondent has filed numerous cases before the various courts in India.
43. The law regarding the impounding of a passport of an individual has been settled by this Court in the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and Anr.16, wherein it was held that the rules of natural justice must be followed before impounding a passport under Section 10(3) of the Passports Act, 1967.

From Paras 45-46,

45. Further, this Court, in Rajesh Sharma v. State of U.P.17, while dealing with the question of arrest and fair investigation in a case alleging the offence of cruelty under Section 498A IPC, was of the view that in respect of persons ordinarily residing out of India impounding of passports or issuance of ‘Red Corner Notice’ should not be a routine.
46. Applying the afore-mentioned legal principles to the present case, we find that the act of impounding the appellant’s passport under Section 10 of the Passport Act, 1967, was carried out without granting the appellant an opportunity to be heard. This clear violation of the principles of natural justice renders the act of impounding the passport ex-facie illegal. Consequently, we hold that the concerned authorities should release the appellant’s passport within a period of one week from today.

Vishal Shah Vs Monalisha Gupta and Ors on 20 Feb 2025

Citations: [2025 INSC 254], [2025 LiveLaw (SC) 240]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/97306350/

https://www.caseciter.com/vishal-shah-vs-monalisha-gupta-2025-insc-254-domestic-violence-act-passport-impounding-irretrievable-breakdown-of-marriage-permanent-alimony/

Index of Domestic Violence Judgments is here. Divorce Judgments are here. Passport judgements are here.

Mohd. Ghouse Khan Vs State of Telangana on 15 Oct 2019

Posted on February 19, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

Relying on one Apex Court decision here and two High Court decisions here and here, a single judge bench of Telangana High Court pass this short Order.

This Criminal Petition, under Section 482 Cr.P.C., is filed to direct the lower Court i.e., Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Nampally Criminal Court, Hyderabad, to dispose of Crl.M.P.No.2956 of 2019 in C.C.No.505 of 2016 at an early date in the light of judgment reported in 2002 (1) Supreme Court Cases 253 and unreported Judgment of the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court rendered in the case of Syed Nazim Husain v. Additional Principal Judge in (W.P No. 56 of 2002) and the Judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in Civil Application No.2939 of 2017 in W.P.No.14039 of 2017, dated 26.04.2018.
2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record.
3. An innocuous prayer has been sought for by the learned counsel for the petitioner to issue a direction to the Court below to dispose of the aforesaid Crl.M.P.No.2956 of 2019 in C.C.No.505 of 2016 at an early date.
4. Having regard to the same, the Criminal Petition is disposed of directing the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Nampally Criminal Court, Hyderabad, to dispose of Crl.M.P.No.2956 of 2019 in C.C.No.505 of 2016, within a period of two (2) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, without granting any adjournment.

Mohd. Ghouse Khan Vs State of Telangana on 15 Oct 2019

Index of Perjury judgments is here.

Sukhdev Singh Vs Sukhbir Kaur on 12 Feb 2025

Posted on February 12, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A full bench of Supreme Court passed this order to a reference from a division bench.

From Para 6,

6. The following questions arise for our consideration:
(i)Whether a spouse of a marriage declared as void by a competent Court under Section 11 of the 1955 Act is entitled to claim permanent alimony and maintenance under Section 25 of the 1955 Act?
(ii)Whether in a petition filed seeking a declaration under Section 11 of the 1955 Act, a spouse is entitled to seek maintenance pendente lite under Section 24 of the 1955 Act?

From Para 26,

26. An apprehension is the expression by the learned counsel for the appellant that if it is held that Section 25 of the 1955 Act also applies to void marriages, it will lead to a ridiculous result. He gave an example of a wife whose first marriage is subsisting, inducing another man to marry her. He also gave an example of a daughter getting married to her father. We must note that Sub-Section 1 of Section 25 uses the word “may”. A grant of a decree under Section 25 of the 1955 Act is discretionary. If the conduct of the spouse who applies for maintenance is such that the said spouse is not entitled to discretionary relief, the Court can always turn down the prayer for the grant of permanent alimony under Section 25 of the 1955 Act. Equitable considerations do apply when the Court considers the prayer for maintenance under Section 25. The reason is that Section 25 lays down that while considering the prayer for granting relief under Section 25, the conduct of the parties must be considered.

From Paras 27 and 28,

27. Section 24 confers a power on a matrimonial Court to grant interim maintenance in pending proceedings seeking a decree contemplated under the 1955 Act. The power is to be exercised pending the proceedings for a grant of a decree under Sections 9 to 13 of the 1955 Act. The conditions for applicability of Section 24 are:
(i) There must be a proceeding under the 1955 Act pending and
(ii) the court must come to a conclusion that either the wife or the husband, as the case may be, has no independent income sufficient for her or his support and the necessary expenses of the proceeding.
26. Even if, prima facie, the matrimonial court finds the marriage between the parties is void or voidable, the court is not precluded from granting maintenance pendente lite provided the conditions mentioned above are satisfied. The grant of relief under Section 24 is discretionary as the Section uses the word ‘may’. While deciding the prayer for interim relief under Section 24, the Court will always consider the conduct of the party seeking the relief. It provides for issuing a direction to pay a reasonable amount.

Final conclusions:

29. Accordingly, we answer the questions as follows:
a. A spouse whose marriage has been declared void under Section 11 of the 1955 Act is entitled to seek permanent alimony or maintenance from the other spouse by invoking Section 25 of the 1955 Act. Whether such a relief of permanent alimony can be granted or not always depends on the facts of each case and the conduct of the parties. The grant of relief under Section 25 is always discretionary; and
b. Even if a court comes to a prima facie conclusion that the marriage between the parties is void or voidable, pending the final disposal of the proceeding under the 1955 Act, the court is not precluded from granting maintenance pendente lite provided the conditions mentioned in Section 24 are satisfied. While deciding the prayer for interim relief under Section 24, the Court will always take into consideration the conduct of the party seeking the relief, as the grant of relief under Section 24 is always discretionary.

Sukhdev Singh Vs Sukhbir Kaur on 12 Feb 2025

Citations: [2025 INSC 197]

Other Sources:

https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/permanent-alimony-interim-maintenance-can-be-granted-even-when-marriage-is-void-under-hindu-marriage-act-supreme-court-283751

https://www.barandbench.com/news/litigation/spouse-of-void-marriage-under-hindu-marriage-act-entitled-to-permanent-alimonymaintenance-supreme-court

https://www.advocatekhoj.com/library/judgments/announcement.php?WID=18508

https://lawtrend.in/hindu-marriage-act-alimony-and-maintenance-granted-even-if-marriage-is-void-supreme-court/

Index of Maintenance Judgements under HMA here.

Roopa Soni Vs Kamal Narayan Soni on 06 Sep 2023

Posted on February 7, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held as follows, while relying on landmark judgments like

From Para 10,

10. On the question of burden in a petition for divorce, burden of proof lies on the petitioner. However, the degree of probability is not one beyond reasonable doubt, but of preponderance.

From Para 17,

17. For a decade and half, the parties have been living separately. As fairly stated at the Bar, the marriage does not survive any longer, and the relationship was terminated otherwise except by a formal decree of divorce. The status quo continues, awaiting an approval from this Court.

From Para 19,

19. The Trial Court and the High Court adopted a hyper-technical and pedantic approach in declining the decree of divorce. It is not as if the respondent-Husband is willing to live with the appellant–Wife. The allegations made by him against her are as serious as the allegations made by her against him. Both the parties have moved away and settled in their respective lives. There is no need to continue the agony of a mere status without them living together.

Roopa Soni Vs Kamal Narayan Soni on 06 Sep 2023

Index of Divorce judgments is here.

Srinivas Raghavendrarao Desai (Dead) By Lrs. Vs V.Kumar Vamanrao and Ors on 04 Mar 2024

Posted on December 23, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court reiterated that no evidence could be led beyond pleadings.

From Para 15,

15. There is no quarrel with the proposition of law that no evidence could be led beyond pleadings. It is not a case in which there was any error in the pleadings and the parties knowing their case fully well had led evidence to enable the Court to deal with that evidence. In the case in hand, specific amendment in the pleadings was sought by the plaintiffs with reference to 1965 partition but the same was rejected. In such a situation, the evidence with reference to 1965 partition cannot be considered.

Srinivas Raghavendrarao Desai (Dead) By Lrs. Vs V.Kumar Vamanrao and Ors on 04 Mar 2024

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Tag: Catena of Landmark Judgments Referred/Cited to

Bilal Ahmad Ganaie Vs Sweety Rashid and Ors on 11 May 2023

Ritesh Sinha Vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr on 2 Aug 2019

Sanjay Kumar Shaw Vs Anjali Kumari Shaw on 07 Apr 2025

Mudireddy Divya Vs Sulkti Sivarama Reddy on 26 Mar 2025

Musin Babulal Thengade and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr on 29 Jan 2025

Vishal Shah Vs Monalisha Gupta and Ors on 20 Feb 2025

Mohd. Ghouse Khan Vs State of Telangana on 15 Oct 2019

Sukhdev Singh Vs Sukhbir Kaur on 12 Feb 2025

Roopa Soni Vs Kamal Narayan Soni on 06 Sep 2023

Srinivas Raghavendrarao Desai (Dead) By Lrs. Vs V.Kumar Vamanrao and Ors on 04 Mar 2024