In this judgment, Hon’ble Apex Court has directed the State of Kerala to pay a sum of Rs. 50 lakhs towards compensation to the appellant as he has suffered custody for forty five days in addition to the civil remedy Dr. S. Nambi Narayanan is already pursue for higher compensation.
In this judgment from Hon’ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh, it was held that before issuing Non bailable warrants, magistrate has to exhaust the options of summons and bailable warrants to secure the presence of accuse.
In this landmark quash judgment, Hon’ble Apex Court held that IPC 406 and IPC 498A is not made out on the parents of the husband and as such the case on them is quashed.
Highlights
Knife Name: Neetu
Husband Name: Ashutosh Misra
Law point from Para 10,
It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record. What needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence.
From Para 19,
Section 498A I.P.C. was introduced with the avowed object to combat the menace of dowry deaths and harassment to a woman at the hands of her husband or his relatives. Nevertheless, the provision should not be used as a device to achieve oblique motives.
Citations: [2007 SUPREME 8 405], [2008 SCC 2 561], [2008 CRLJ 0 1391], [2008 AIR SC 204], [2008 RCR CRI 1 336], [2008 SCC 1 65], [2007 STPL LE 0 39378], [2008 SCC CRI 1 507], [2008 AD SC 2 398], [2008 BLJR 56 753], [2008 MADLW CRL 2 955], [2008 ACC 60 694], [2008 SCC CRL 1 507], [2008 JT 1 20], [2008 LW CRL 2 955], [2008 ALL MR CRI 1360], [2008 ALT CRI 3 83], [2008 AIR SC 96], [2008 MAHLJ CRI 2 550], [2008 SCC CR 1 507], [2008 CRIMES 1 42], [2008 DRJ 100 3], [2008 UJ 1 107], [2008 MLJ CRI 2 686], [2008 SLT 1 329], [2007 AIOL 1302], [2008 ANJ SC 1 124], [2008 CRLJ SC 1351], [2007 SCALE 14 403], [2007 SCR 13 716], [2008 AIC SC 62 155], [2008 CRI LJ 1391]
Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1907093/ and https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae46e4b01497114135e4
Hon’ble High Court of Delhi has held in this Criminal Revision that the parents-in-law of the knife cannot be forced to undergo criminal trial as no specific allegations supported by evidence is available on record.
See the cunning nature of this knife. Got 15 lakhs as settlement amount even then tried to implicate in-laws!!
From Para 9,
The charge sheet which was filed by the police clearly discloses that the husband of the complainant was residing in Nigeria and he could not be traced. The charge sheet also took note of the fact that during the course of investigation, when the petitioners had prayed for bail, the dispute was settled between them and the complainant on deposit of Rs.15 lakhs by the order of the High Court. The complainant had accepted such amount towards settlement of her matrimonial disputes. Initially an amount of Rs.15 lakhs was deposited with the Registrar General of Delhi High Court but on the request of the complainant, the same was released in her favour. The complainant who is present in person admits of her having received the aforesaid amount.
From Para 28, 29,
The FIR clearly makes out a case of the husband of the complainant not treating her well. The complainant went to Nigeria, only to find that her husband was in the habit of drinking alcohol and watching pornographic films. The house in which the complainant was kept was shared by other relatives of the husband. There is no mention of the petitioners having gone to Nigeria to stay with their son or with the complainant. The averments made in the FIR further disclose that the tall claims of the family of the petitioners was found to be false during the period when the complainant had the opportunity to stay in the matrimonial family. Though it is stated that she was insinuated and taunted for bringing less dowry and was made to do household work as if she was a maid servant of the house, but no specific instance of such acts of cruelty have been listed by the complainant. A vague and general allegation has been raised that she was not treated well in her matrimonial home when she came back from Nigeria. The FIR also refers to the assessment of the complainant that the petitioners did not want her to come back to India.
Apart from this, admittedly, the complainant accepted Rs.15 lakhs towards settlement of her matrimonial dues. The husband of the complainant who is the son of the petitioners is untraceable.A protracted investigation in the matter also did not yield any definitive finding regarding the guilt of the petitioners. The petitioners were not sent up for trial.
In this revision filed by knife against the discharge of husband’s relatives, District Court of Delhi, held that not every cruelty attracts IPC 498A especially in the absence of a harassment/demand for same.
From Para 5,
Perusal of the file reveals that case was registered on the complaint given by the petitioner to the Joint Commissioner of Police. In this complaint it is no where mentioned that any of the respondents no. 2 to 6 had made any specific demand and the allegations are against her husband.
….
Perusal of the file further reveals that supplementary statements of petitioner were recorded on 29.03.2006 & 02.05.2004. In the complaint given to the Joint Commissioner of Police, there are no allegation of harassment and dowry demand against any of the respondents no. 2 to 6. There are allegation against respondent nos. 5 & 6 that they had thrown the gifts and they refused to accept them as the same were not as per their choice. There are allegation against the respondents no. 3 & 4 that they started fighting with the petitioner. They also stated to the petitioner that they are foreign returns and taunted the petitioner and further they demanded for change of gifts. I am of the view that these allegations cannot be construed as demand in view of Section 498A IPC. The Ld. MM has rightly came to conclusion that all the allegations are general in nature. The counsel for the petitioner is not able to make out any allegation of harassment or dowry demand against the respondents no. 2 to 6.
Para 6 further destroys the prosecution case,
It is admitted fact that marriage of the petitioner was solemnized on 20.06.2002 and complaint was filed on 11.11.2003. It is also admitted fact that the marriage between respondents no. 3 & 4 was solemnized in the year 1999 and marriage between respondents no. 5 & 6 were solemnized in the year 2000. It isalso admitted fact that respondents no. 3 to 6 are not residing in the matrimonial house of the petitioner and they are residing separately after the marriage of thepetitioner. It is true that no date, time and place has been given by the complainant when any demand was raised by the respondents no. 2 to 6.
From Para 8,
But, it is not harassment of every nature which is punishable under Section 498A of IPC. In order to attract criminal liability, there should be torture physical or mental, positive acts. Such acts should be aimed at persuading or compelling the woman or her relatives to meet an unlawful demand of any property or valuable security or it should be actuated by the failure of the woman or her relative to meet such a demand.
The landmark judgment of High Court of Bombay is available here.
Another authority from a division bench of the Supreme Court wherein it was held that,
From Para 24 and 26,
24. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 and of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary. Prerogative writs mentioned therein are issued for doing substantial justice. It is, therefore, of utmost necessity that the petitioner approaching the Writ Court must come with clean hands, put forward all the facts before the Court without concealing or suppressing anything and seek an appropriate relief. If there is no candid disclosure of relevant and material facts or the petitioner is guilty of misleading the Court, his petition may be dismissed at the threshold without considering the merits of the claim.
26. A prerogative remedy is not a matter of course. While exercising extraordinary power a Writ Court would certainly bear in mind the conduct of the party who invokes the jurisdiction of the Court. If the applicant makes a false statement or suppresses material fact or attempts to mislead the Court, the Court may dismiss the action on that ground alone and may refuse to enter into the merits of the case by stating “We will not listen to your application because of what you have done”. The rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of Court by deceiving it.
From Paras 28 and 29,
28. The above principles have been accepted in our legal system also. As per settled law, the party who invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 or of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is supposed to be truthful, frank and open. He must disclose all material facts without any reservation even if they are against him. He cannot be allowed to play `hide and seek’ or to `pick and choose’ the facts he likes to disclose and to suppress (keep back) or not to disclose (conceal) other facts. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true and complete (correct) facts. If material facts are suppressed or distorted, the very functioning of Writ Courts and exercise would become impossible. The petitioner must disclose all the facts having a bearing on the relief sought without any qualification. This is because, “the Court knows law but not facts”.
29. If the primary object as highlighted in Kensington Income Tax Commissioners is kept in mind, an applicant who does not come with candid facts and `clean breast’ cannot hold a writ of the Court with `soiled hands’. Suppression or concealment of material facts is not an advocacy. It is a jugglery, manipulation, maneuvering or misrepresentation, which has no place in equitable and prerogative jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose all the material facts fairly and truly but states them in a distorted manner and misleads the Court, the Court has inherent power in order to protect itself and to prevent an abuse of its process to discharge the rule nisi and refuse to proceed further with the examination of the case on merits. If the Court does not reject the petition on that ground, the Court would be failing in its duty. In fact, such an applicant requires to be dealt with for contempt of Court for abusing the process of the Court.
From final para,
the appellant has not come forward with all the facts. He has chosen to state facts in the manner suited to him by giving an impression to the Writ Court that an instrumentality of State (SAIL) has not followed doctrine of natural justice and fundamental principles of fair procedure. This is not proper. Hence, on that ground alone, the appellant cannot claim equitable relief.
Citations : [2008 SUPREME 5 287], [2008 AIOL 783], [2008 SCC 12 481], [2008 JT SC 8 57]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1007946/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae87e4b01497114140b2
This is the landmark judgment regarding the inherent powers of High Court
Powers of Court under CrPC 482
Inherent power under section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised:
(i) to give effect to an order under the Code;
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and
(iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice.
Reference made to available here R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866.
In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866, this court summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings:
(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the proceedings;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly
Reference made to Perjury
The court noticed that the tendency of perjury is very much on the increase. Unless the courts come down heavily upon such persons, the whole judicial process would come to ridicule. The court also observed that chagrined and frustrated litigants should not be permitted to give vent to their frustration by cheaply invoking jurisdiction of the criminal court.
And law is explained in regards to IPC 415 and 420 Cheating case.
On a reading of the aforesaid section, it is manifest that in the definition there are two separate classes of acts which the person deceived may be induced to do. In the first class of acts he may be induced fraudulently or dishonestly to deliver property to any person. The second class of acts is the doing or omitting to do anything which the person deceived would not do or omit to do if he were not so deceived. In the first class of cases, the inducing must be fraudulent or dishonest. In the second class of acts, the inducing must be intentional but need not be fraudulent or dishonest. Therefore, it is the intention which is the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that he had a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. From his mere failure to subsequently keep a promise, one cannot presume that he all along had a culpable intention to break the promise from the beginning.
And the forgery
The following ingredients are essential for commission of the offence under section 467 IPC:
1. the document in question so forged;
2. the accused who forged it.
3. the document is one of the kinds enumerated in the aforementioned section.
when to issue non-bailable warrants for arresting an individual.
Before parting with this appeal, we would like to discuss an issue which is of great public importance, i.e., how and when warrants should be issued by the Court? It has come to our notice that in many cases that bailable and non-bailable warrants are issued casually and mechanically. In the instant case, the court without properly comprehending the nature of controversy involved and without exhausting the available remedies issued non-bailable warrants.
And… When non-bailable warrants should be issued,
Non-bailable warrant should be issued to bring a person to court when summons of bailable warrants would be unlikely to have the desired result. This could be when:
* it is reasonable to believe that the person will not voluntarily appear in court; or
* the police authorities are unable to find the person to serve him with a summon; or
* it is considered that the person could harm someone if not placed into custody immediately.As far as possible, if the court is of the opinion that a summon will suffice in getting the appearance of the accused in the court, the summon or the bailable warrants should be preferred. The warrants either bailable or non-bailable should never be issued without proper scrutiny of facts and complete application of mind, due to the extremely serious consequences and ramifications which ensue on issuance of warrants. The court must very carefully examine whether the Criminal Complaint or FIR has not been filed with an oblique motive.
In complaint cases, at the first instance, the court should direct serving of the summons along with the copy of the complaint. If the accused seem to be avoiding the summons, the court, in the second instance should issue bailable warrant. In the third instance, when the court is fully satisfied that the accused is avoiding the court\022s proceeding intentionally, the process of issuance of the non-bailable warrant should be resorted to. Personal liberty is paramount, therefore, we caution courts at the first and second instance to refrain from issuing non-bailable warrants.
Indiakanoon.org link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/855018/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae56e4b01497114137d5
Citation: [2008 AIR 251], [2007 (10) SCR 847], [2007 (11) JT 499], [2007 (12) SCALE 15], [2007 JT 11 499], [2008 SCC CRI 1 259], [2007 AIOL 1021], [2007 SCR 10 847], [2007 SCC 12 1], [2008 AIR SC 251], [2007 DLT 144 257], [2007 AIC SC 59 30], [2008 ALLLJ 1 40]
Index here.
Correcting few directions given in Rajesh Sharma judgment here, a Full Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court has issued this judgment.
Shutter Down of Family Welfare Committees
From Para 18,
18. It was submitted by the learned Amicus Curiae that the decision in Rajesh Sharma (supra) requires reconsideration, for the said judgment confers powers on the Family Welfare Committee to be constituted by the District Legal Services Authority which is an extra-judicial committee of para legal volunteers/social workers/retired persons/wives of working officers/other citizens to look into the criminal complaints under Sections 498-A IPC in the first instance and further, there has been a direction that till such time a report of the committee is received, no arrest should be made. It is urged that the constitution of FWC to look into the criminal complaints under Section 498-A IPC is contrary to the procedure prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
From Para 33,
33. On a perusal of the aforesaid paragraphs, we find that the Court has taken recourse to fair procedure and workability of a provision so Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited v. Securities and Exchange Board of India : (2012) 10 SCC 603, Para 52; SCBA v. Union of India : (1998) 4 SCC 409, Para 47; Union of India v. Raghubir Singh (d) by Lrs. : (1989) 2 SCC 754, Para 7; Dayaram v. Sudhir Batham : (2012) 1 SCC 333 State of Punjab v. Dalbir Singh : (2012) 3 SCC 346, Paras 46, 52 & 85 Gian Singh v. State of Punjab : (2012) 10 SCC 303, Para 61 that there will be no unfairness and unreasonableness in implementation and for the said purpose, it has taken recourse to the path of interpretation. The core issue is whether the Court in Rajesh Sharma (supra) could, by the method of interpretation, have issued such directions. On a perusal of the directions, we find that the Court has directed constitution of the Family Welfare Committees by the District Legal Services Authorities and prescribed the duties of the Committees. The prescription of duties of the Committees and further action therefor, as we find, are beyond the Code and the same does not really flow from any provision of the Code. There can be no denial that there has to be just, fair and reasonable working of a provision. The legislature in its wisdom has made the offence under Section 498-A IPC cognizable and non-bailable. The fault lies with the investigating agency which sometimes jumps into action without application of mind. The directions issued in Arnesh Kumar (supra) are in consonance with the provisions contained in Section 41 CrPC and Section 41-A CrPC. Similarly, the guidelines stated in Joginder Kumar (supra) and D.K. Basu (supra) are within the framework of the Code and the power of superintendence of the authorities in the hierarchical system of the investigating agency. The purpose has been to see that the investigating agency does not abuse the power and arrest people at its whim and fancy.
From Para 35,
However, the directions pertaining to Red Corner Notice, clubbing of cases and postulating that recovery of disputed dowry items may not by itself be a ground for denial of bail would stand on a different footing. They are protective in nature and do not sound a discordant note with the Code. When an application for bail is entertained, proper conditions have to be imposed but recovery of disputed dowry items may not by itself be a ground while rejecting an application for grant of bail under Section 498-A IPC. That cannot be considered at that stage. Therefore, we do not find anything erroneous in direction Nos. 19(iv) and (v). So far as direction No. 19(vi) and 19(vii) are concerned, an application has to be filed either under Section 205 CrPC or Section 317 CrPC depending upon the stage at which the exemption is sought.
From Para 38,
38. In the aforesaid analysis, while declaring the directions pertaining to Family Welfare Committee and its constitution by the District Legal Services Authority and the power conferred on the Committee is impermissible. Therefore, we think it appropriate to direct that the investigating officers be careful and be guided by the principles stated in Joginder Kumar (supra), D.K. Basu (supra), Lalita Kumari (supra) and Arnesh Kumar (supra). It will also be appropriate to direct the Director General of Police of each State to ensure that investigating officers who are in charge of investigation of cases of offences under Section 498-A IPC should be imparted rigorous training with regard to the principles stated by this Court relating to arrest.
39. In view of the aforesaid premises, the direction contained in paragraph 19(i) as a whole is not in accord with the statutory framework and the direction issued in paragraph 19(ii) shall be read in conjunction with the direction given hereinabove.
40. Direction No. 19(iii) is modified to the extent that if a settlement is arrived at, the parties can approach the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the High Court, keeping in view the law laid down in Gian Singh (supra), shall dispose of the same.
41. As far as direction Nos. 19(iv), 19(v) and 19(vi) and 19(vii) are concerned, they shall be governed by what we have stated in paragraph 35.
So, in summary, the following are the currently active guidelines from SC modified from Rajesh Sharma, apart from Arnesh Kumar.
From Para 19 of Rajesh Sharma Judgment:
iv) If a bail application is filed with at least one clear day’s notice to the Public Prosecutor/ complainant, the same may be decided as far as possible on the same day. Recovery of disputed dowry items may not by itself be a ground for denial of bail if maintenance or other rights of wife/minor children can otherwise be protected. Needless to say that in dealing with bail matters, individual roles, prima facie truth of the allegations, requirement of further arrest/ custody and interest of justice must be carefully weighed;
v) In respect of persons ordinarily residing out of India impounding of passports or issuance of Red Corner Notice should not be a routine;
vi) It will be open to the District Judge or a designated senior judicial officer nominated by the District Judge to club all connected cases between the parties arising out of matrimonial disputes so that a holistic view is taken by the Court to whom all such cases are entrusted; and
vii) Personal appearance of all family members and particularly outstation members may not be required and the trial court ought to grant exemption from personal appearance or permit appearance by video conferencing without adversely affecting progress of the trial. (On filing an application u/s 205 CrPC or 317 CrPC;Judgments here)
Citations : [2018 SCC 10 443], [2019 SCC CRI 1 276], [2018 SCC ONLINE SC 1501], [2018 AIR SC 4273], [2018 DLT 252 175], [2018 CRIMES 3 503], [2018 GUJ LH 3 140]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/81618143/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5b9d5e5d9eff431109ed3e71
https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/social-action-forum-for-manav-adhikar-and-another-versus-union-of-india-ministry-of-law-and
Source: https://www.livelaw.in/sec-498a-ipc-only-hc-can-quash-cases-on-settlement-a-third-agency-created-by-courts-cant-exercise-statutory-functionssc/
In Shivangi Bansal Vs Sahib Bansal on 22 Jul 2025, Division Bench of Apex Court restored the Family Welfare Committees.
Hon’ble Apex Court has in this judgment, held that giving repeated threats of suicide to husband and making suicide attempts for no reason, or even one such event was sufficient for the Appellant husband to get a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty. It is needless to add that such threats or acts constitute cruelty. And the knife also wanted the Appellant to get separated from his family.
The division bench of the Supreme Court destroyed the arguments of respondent, piece-by-piece.
From Para 10, attempts/threats to commit suicide
10. With regard to the allegations of cruelty levelled by the Appellant, we are in agreement with the findings of the trial Court. First of all, let us look at the incident with regard to an attempt to commit suicide by the Respondent. Upon perusal of the evidence of the witnesses, the findings arrived at by the trial Court to the effect that the Respondent wife had locked herself in the bathroom and had poured kerosene on herself so as to commit suicide, are not in dispute. Fortunately for the Appellant, because of the noise and disturbance, even the neighbours of the Appellant rushed to help and the door of the bathroom was broken open and the Respondent was saved. Had she been successful in her attempt to commit suicide, then one can foresee the consequences and the plight of the Appellant because in that event the Appellant would have been put to immense difficulties because of the legal provisions. We feel that there was no fault on the part of the Appellant nor was there any reason for the Respondent wife to make an attempt to commit suicide. No husband would ever be comfortable with or tolerate such an act by his wife and if the wife succeeds in committing suicide, then one can imagine how a poor husband would get entangled into the clutches of law, which would virtually ruin his sanity, peace of mind, career and probably his entire life. The mere idea with regard to facing legal consequences would put a husband under tremendous stress. The thought itself is distressing. Such a mental cruelty could not have been taken lightly by the High Court. In our opinion, only this one event was sufficient for the Appellant husband to get a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty. It is needless to add that such threats or acts constitute cruelty. Our aforesaid view is fortified by a decision of this Court in the case of Pankaj Mahajan v. Dimple @ Kajal (2011) 12 SCC 1, wherein it has been held that giving repeated threats to commit suicide amounts to cruelty.mental
From Para 11, wanted/attempting to get her husband separated from his family
11. The Respondent wife wanted the Appellant to get separated from his family. The evidence shows that the family was virtually maintained from the income of the Appellant husband. It is not a common practice or desirable culture for a Hindu son in India to get separated from the parents upon getting married at the instance of the wife, especially when the son is the only earning member in the family. A son, brought up and given education by his parents, has a moral and legal obligation to take care and maintain the parents, when they become old and when they have either no income or have a meagre income. In India, generally people do not subscribe to the western thought, where, upon getting married or attaining majority, the son gets separated from the family. In normal circumstances, a wife is expected to be with the family of the husband after the marriage. She becomes integral to and forms part of the family of the husband and normally without any justifiable strong reason, she would never insist that her husband should get separated from the family and live only with her. In the instant case, upon appreciation of the evidence, the trial Court came to the conclusion that merely for monetary considerations, the Respondent wife wanted to get her husband separated from his family. The averment of the Respondent was to the effect that the income of the Appellant was also spent for maintaining his family. The said grievance of the Respondent is absolutely unjustified. A son maintaining his parents is absolutely normal in Indian culture and ethos. There is no other reason for which the Respondent wanted the Appellant to be separated from the family – the sole reason was to enjoy the income of the Appellant. Unfortunately, the High Court considered this to be a justifiable reason. In the opinion of the High Court, the wife had a legitimate expectation to see that the income of her husband is used for her and not for the family members of the Respondent husband. We do not see any reason to justify the said view of the High Court. As stated hereinabove, in a Hindu society, it is a pious obligation of the son to maintain the parents. If a wife makes an attempt to deviate from the normal practice and normal custom of the society, she must have some justifiable reason for that and in this case, we do not find any justifiable reason, except monetary consideration of the Respondent wife. In our opinion, normally, no husband would tolerate this and no son would like to be separated from his old parents and other family members, who are also dependent upon his income. The persistent effort of the Respondent wife to constrain the Appellant to be separated from the family would be torturous for the husband and in our opinion, the trial Court was right when it came to the conclusion that this constitutes an act of ‘cruelty’.
From Para 12, allegations of extra-marital affair with maid Kamla
12. With regard to the allegations about an extra-marital affair with maid named Kamla, the re-appreciation of the evidence by the High Court does not appear to be correct. There is sufficient evidence to the effect that there was no maid named Kamla working at the residence of the Appellant. Some averment with regard to some relative has been relied upon by the High Court to come to a conclusion that there was a lady named Kamla but the High Court has ignored the fact that the Respondent wife had levelled allegations with regard to an extra-marital affair of the Appellant with the maid and not with someone else. Even if there was some relative named Kamla, who might have visited the Appellant, there is nothing to substantiate the allegations levelled by the Respondent with regard to an extra-marital affair. True, it is very difficult to establish such allegations but at the same time, it is equally true that to suffer an allegation pertaining to one’s character of having an extra-marital affair is quite torturous for any person – be it a husband or a wife.
Finally from Para 15, desertion of husband for over 20 years
15. Taking an overall view of the entire evidence and the judgment delivered by the trial Court, we firmly believe that there was no need to take a different view than the one taken by the trial Court. The behaviour of the Respondent wife appears to be terrifying and horrible. One would find it difficult to live with such a person with tranquility and peace of mind. Such torture would adversely affect the life of the husband. It is also not in dispute that the Respondent wife had left the matrimonial house on 12th July, 1995 i.e. more than 20 years back. Though not on record, the learned counsel submitted that till today, the Respondent wife is not staying with the Appellant. The daughter of the Appellant and Respondent has also grown up and according to the learned counsel, she is working in an IT company. We have no reason to disbelieve the aforestated facts because with the passage of time, the daughter must have grown up and the separation of the Appellant and the wife must have also become normal for her and therefore, at this juncture it would not be proper to bring them together, especially when the Appellant husband was treated so cruelly by the Respondent wife.
Citations : [2016 SCC ONLINE SC 1114], [2016 SCC 9 455], [2016 SCC CIV 4 519], [2016 DLT 233 149], [2016 KLJ 4 287], [AIR 2016 SUPREME COURT 4599], [2016 (6) ADR 421], [2016 (4) AKR 822], [AIR 2017 SC (CIVIL) 379], [(2016) 4 CIVILCOURTC 414], [(2016) 7 MAD LJ 726], [(2016) 4 JCR 213 (SC)], [(2017) 1 CIVLJ 748], [(2016) 9 SCALE 681], [(2017) 2 MAD LW 610], [(2016) 6 ALL WC 5441], [(2016) 3 HINDULR 604], [(2016) 3 DMC 429], [(2016) 119 ALL LR 494], [(2016) 4 ICC 746], [(2016) 4 PAT LJR 317], [(2017) 1 MAH LJ 754], [(2017) 1 MPLJ 306], [(2016) 4 JLJR 194], [(2017) 1 CGLJ 425], [(2016) 3 ALL RENTCAS 876], [(2016) 5 CAL HN 1], [(2016) 167 ALLINDCAS 217 (SC)], [(2016) 2 CLR 947 (SC)], [(2016) 10 ADJ 275 (SC)], [(2016) 4 CURCC 157], [(2017) 1 RAJ LW 624], [(2017) 1 MARRILJ 453], [(2016) 2 ORISSA LR 928], [(2017) 1 MARRILJ 475], [(2016) 3 CAL LJ 135], [(2016) 2 WLC(SC)CVL 762], [(2016) 3 GUJ LH 441], [(2016) 4 RECCIVR 706], [(2016) 6 BOM CR 553]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/130314186/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/57f6804ebc41680a2ba53b77
Forcing the husband to leave his parents, who are dependent on his income, amounts to cruelty
Index of all Divorce Judgments is here.
In this very good divorce judgment from Hon’ble High Court of Bombay, it is held that the knife caused metal cruelty on husband and his parents for the following reason,
the Appellant established that the Respondent could not substantiate the allegations of cruelty in the criminal case. Even the allegations of cruelty made by the Respondent in the written statement in the present case could not be established by her;
The Appellant and his family members were required to attend Criminal Court on 56 different dates from the year 2001 to 2004. Considering the manner in which the criminal case proceeded, the Appellant and his family members were subjected to humiliation, trauma and agony as set out in the deposition of the Appellant;
The Respondent made a very serious defamatory allegation against the Appellant, both in the written statement and in her evidence, that due to ill treatment by the Appellant, she started suffering from arthritis. The Respondent made no efforts to substantiate the said allegation. Thus, the Respondent made unfounded defamatory allegation against the Appellant;
Not only that the Respondent did not substantiate the said allegation, even the cause of death of her father was not brought on record. Even this allegation is an unfounded defamatory allegation;
Citations:
Other Source links:
The Index for Defamation Judgments is here.
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