In a rare act, Justice Satyanarayan Murthy has given a Quash order in a false 498A IPC case. He also invoked AP Dowry Prohibition Rule 1998 which are available here.
Citations:
Other Source Links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/114175976/
Tag: Catena of Landmark Judgments Referred/Cited to
Maintenance Judgments
Maintenance judgments by Enactment
Maintenance and Alimony Judgments under Hindu Marriage Act 1955 here.
Maintenance Judgments under Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act 1956 here.
Maintenance Judgments under Section 125 CrPC [Section 144 BNSS] here.
Maintenance Judgments under Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 here.
Maintenance for Limited Time Period here.
Maintenance after Mutual Consent Divorce here.
Agreements against Public Policy are Void here.
A SPECIAL FOCUS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF Rajnesh Vs Neha AFFIDAVIT
A 2-judge bench of Supreme Court passed guidelines in Rajnesh Vs Neha on how to handle multiple maintenance litigation here.
- Telangana High Court gave a wonderful order here, confirming that any order passed by Trial Courts, without calling for the Income affidavits is void ab initio and therefore is liable to set aside and matters will be remanded back to the same Trial Courts for fresh adjudication.
- Then another 2-judge bench of Apex Court has to Order re-circulation of above judgment in Aditi Sharma Vs Jitesh Sharma, because the Trial Court Judges stopped following Supreme Court judgement here. Exactly after 3 long years!!!
- There are other High Courts which set aside the trial Court orders for the singular reason that they did not follow Rajnesh Vs Neha. Check them out here.
- Calcutta HC in Nripendra Chandra Mahanta Vs Pramila Mahanta on 08 Feb 2023
- Allahabad HC in Parul Tyagi Vs Gaurav Tyagi on 04 Aug 2023
- Telangana HC in Chinta Vamshi Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 16 Oct 2023
- Kerala HC in Rijas MT Vs Hafseena M on 15 Nov 2023
- Patna HC in Gitanjali Devi Vs State of Bihar and Anr on 02 Dec 2023
- Karnataka HC in Darshanik M M Vs Poornima A on 04 Dec 2023
- MP HC in Balram Dixit Vs Kiran Dixit and Anr on 17 Jan 2024
- It seems AP High Court is hell bent not to follow Rajnesh Vs Neha… and passed this perverse order here with a trivial reason. Karma!
- AP HC following my success story in Sreekanth Vs Nalini in Meegada Venu Gopala Rao Vs Meegada Usha Rani and Ors on 10 Jul 2024. Happy!!!
- AP HC in Kalavakuru Srinivas Kumar Reddy Vs Kalavakuru @ Revuru Sujatha and Ors on 05 Feb 2025 [My client’s case]
- Orissa HC in Nabaghana Sahoo Vs Smruti Prava Sahoo and Anr on 11 Feb 2025 [neither of the parties has filed the disclosure affidavit as mandated in Rajnesh]
- Kerala HC in Ratheesh Vs Sreelakshmi and Ors on 14 Mar 2025 (Even to dispose Interim Maintenance Applications, call for affidavits)
- Patna HC in Ravi Prakash Saxena Vs Priyanka Rani on 04 Sep 2025 [Remanded case back to the same Trial Courts for fresh adjudication]
- Madras HC in N.Santhosh Kumar Vs S.Priyadarshini on 25 Oct 2025 [Lied on the Income Affidavit, so interim maintenance reduced]
A 2-judge bench of Supreme Court recorded the various observations of the Delhi High Court in Parvin Kumar Jain Vs Anju Jain here, where by Delhi High Court flagged the following tendencies of parties in filing their Income Affidavits.
- Instances of the appellant’s deliberate attempts to mislead the judicial process
- Withheld critical financial documents
- Selectively disclosed information to conceal the full extent of his wealth
- False representations by the appellant regarding his property and income
- Demonstrated a pattern of deliberate suppression of material facts and assets
- Allahabad HC in Atul Kumar Bajpai Vs State of UP and Anr on 17 Sep 2025 held that Perjury applications alleging false evidence/affidavit must be first Disposed
MASTER SITEMAP here.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) – Maintenance Law & Judgments in India
Maintenance refers to financial support provided by one person to another who is unable to maintain themselves, typically in matrimonial or family relationships. Under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), courts can order a person with sufficient means to provide maintenance to his wife, children, or parents if he neglects or refuses to support them.
The following persons can seek maintenance under the law:
- Wife, including a divorced woman who has not remarried
- Minor children unable to maintain themselves
- Adult children suffering from disability or illness
- Parents who cannot support themselves
The objective of the provision is to prevent destitution and vagrancy by ensuring financial support for dependents.
To claim maintenance, the applicant generally needs to show:
- A valid marital or legal relationship
- Neglect or refusal to maintain by the respondent
- The applicant is unable to maintain themselves
- The respondent has sufficient financial means
Courts evaluate these factors based on evidence and circumstances of each case.
Yes. Courts have clarified that mere qualification or ability to earn is not enough to deny maintenance. What matters is whether the person is actually earning enough to maintain a reasonable standard of living comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage.
Courts determine the quantum of maintenance based on several factors, including:
- Income and financial capacity of the respondent
- Lifestyle and standard of living during marriage
- Needs of the claimant and dependents
- Educational and employment status of the parties
- Reasonable expenses for food, clothing, and shelter
The goal is to ensure the dependent spouse can maintain a dignified standard of living.
Yes. Courts can grant interim maintenance to provide immediate financial support during ongoing proceedings. Applications for interim maintenance are expected to be decided expeditiously, ensuring the claimant is not left without support while the case continues.
Maintenance may be refused if the wife:
- Is living in adultery
- Refuses to live with her husband without sufficient reason
- Lives separately by mutual consent
- Has sufficient independent income to maintain herself
These exceptions are provided under Section 125(4) CrPC.
Yes. Under Section 125 CrPC, parents who are unable to maintain themselves have the legal right to claim maintenance from their children. Courts treat this obligation as a moral and legal duty of children toward their parents.
Yes. A divorced wife who has not remarried can claim maintenance if she cannot support herself. Courts have repeatedly recognized that divorce does not extinguish the right to maintenance where financial dependence continues.
Courts increasingly require both parties to file affidavits disclosing income, assets, and liabilities, including bank statements, tax returns, and property details. This ensures fair determination of maintenance and prevents concealment of income.
Maintenance provisions are social welfare measures intended to prevent financial hardship and ensure that dependents such as spouses, children, and parents are not left destitute due to neglect or abandonment.
Yes. With the enactment of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, the provision corresponding to Section 125 CrPC has been incorporated as Section 144 BNSS, while retaining the same core principles governing maintenance claims.
Commissioner of Income-Tax Vs Thana Electricity Supply Ltd. on 22 April, 1993
This a very good judgment from High Court of Bombay talking about binding nature of judgments, specifically termed as stare decisis.
Citation: [(1994) 206 ITR 727 (Bom)]
Indiankanoon.org Link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/583752/
Ajay Singh Vs UOI and Ors on 27 August, 2019
In this order from Delhi High Court, it is held that the principle of “rounding off” has been recognised in law in a number of decisions to do substantial justice to folks who got border line marks less than the minimum marks set for the qualifying examination.
News: https://barandbench.com/delhi-hc-permits-rounding-off-petitioners-marks-in-ll-b-to-enable-him-to-apply-for-jag/
Reproduced in accordance with Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from judis.nic.in, lobis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court and District Court Websites such as ecourts.gov.in
Arjun Panditrao Khotkar Vs Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal on 14 Jul 2020
This is the order which cited Shafhi judgment here, to larger bench for reconsideration, since there was a conflicting precedent, in Anvar P,V.
Here is the last Order, wherein Arguments have concluded and the Judgment was reserved.
Here is the final Judgment authored by Justice R.F.Nariman.
Relevant portions:
From Para 52: Accused must be given copy of all documents that prosecution relies upon.
52. It is pertinent to recollect that the stage of admitting documentary evidence in a criminal trial is the filing of the charge-sheet. When a criminal court summons the accused to stand trial, copies of all documents which are entered in the charge-sheet/final report have to be given to the accused. Section 207 of the CrPC, which reads as follows, is mandatory. Therefore, the electronic evidence, i.e. the computer output, has to be furnished at the latest before the trial begins. The reason is not far to seek; this gives the accused a fair chance to prepare and defend the charges levelled against him during the trial. The general principle in criminal proceedings therefore, is to supply to the accused all documents that the prosecution seeks to rely upon before the commencement of the trial. The requirement of such full disclosure is an extremely valuable right and an essential feature of the right to a fair trial as it enables the accused to prepare for the trial before its commencement.
From Para 54: When should the certificate u/s 65B be filed?
54. Therefore, in terms of general procedure, the prosecution is obligated to supply all documents upon which reliance may be placed to an accused before commencement of the trial. Thus, the exercise of power by the courts in criminal trials in permitting evidence to be filed at a later stage should not result in serious or irreversible prejudice to the accused. A balancing exercise in respect of the rights of parties has to be carried out by the court, in examining any application by the prosecution under Sections 91 or 311 of the CrPC or Section 165 of the Evidence Act.
Depending on the facts of each case, and the Court exercising discretion after seeing that the accused is not prejudiced by want of a fair trial, the Court may in appropriate cases allow the prosecution to produce such certificate at a later point in time. If it is the accused who desires to produce the requisite certificate as part of his defence, this again will depend upon the justice of the case – discretion to be exercised by the Court in accordance with law.
From Para 59,
59. We may reiterate, therefore, that the certificate required under Section 65B(4) is a condition precedent to the admissibility of evidence by way of electronic record, as correctly held in Anvar P.V. (supra), and incorrectly “clarified” in Shafhi Mohammed (supra). Oral evidence in the place of such certificate cannot possibly suffice as Section 65B(4) is a mandatory requirement of the law. Indeed, the hallowed principle in Taylor v. Taylor (1876) 1 Ch.D 426, which has been followed in a number of the judgments of this Court, can also be applied. Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act clearly states that secondary evidence is admissible only if lead in the manner stated and not otherwise. To hold otherwise would render Section 65B(4) otiose.
Para 17 of the separate concurring opinion penned by V. Ramasubramanian, J is as follows:
Following the above precedents, this Court also held in S. Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab (1964) 4 SCR 733, AIR 1964 SC 72, Yusufalli Esmail Nagree v. State Of Maharashtra . (1967) 3 SCR 720, AIR 1968 SC 147, 1968 Cri LJ 103, N. Sri Rama Reddy v. V.V. Giri (1970) 2 SCC 340, AIR 1971 SC 1162, R. M. Malkani v. State Of Maharashtra . (1973) 1 SCC 471, AIR 1973 SC 157, Ziyauddin Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdass Mehra (1976) 2 SCC 17, Ram Singh v. Ram Singh 1985 Supp SCC 611, AIR 1986 SC 3 and Tukaram S. Dighole v. Manikrao Shivaji Kokate . (2010) 4 SCC 32912, that tape records of conversations and speeches are admissible in evidence under the Evidence Act, subject to certain conditions. In Ziyauddin Burhanuddin Bukhari (1976) 2 SCC 17 and Tukaram S. Dighole (2010) 4 SCC 32912 this Court further held that tape records constitute “document” within the meaning of the expression under Section 3 of the Evidence Act. Thus, without looking up to the lawmakers to come up with necessary amendments from time to time, the courts themselves developed certain rules, over a period of time, to test the authenticity of these documents in analogue form and these rules have in fact, worked well.
Citations: [(2020) 3 SCC 216] [(2020) 7 SCC 1], [AIR 2020 SUPREME COURT 4908], [AIRONLINE 2020 SC 641]
Other Source links:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/172105947/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5f10bc933321bc1d0ef58d1d
https://lawbhoomi.com/arjun-panditrao-khotkar-v-kailash-kushanrao-gorantyal/
https://lawfyi.io/arjun-panditrao-khotkar-vs-kailash-kushanrao-gorantyal-on-14-july-2020-case-summary/
The Bombay High Court judgment which was challenged at Supreme Court is here.
Naveen Kohli Vs Neelu Kohli on 21 March, 2006
Landmark judgment from Justice Shri Dalveer Bhandari regarding Law around Mental cruelty and irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a ground for Divorce under Hindu Marriage Act 1955.
Citations : [2006 BOMCR SC 5 240], [2006 SUPREME 2 627], [2006 SCALE 3 252], [2006 AIR SC 1550], [2006 JT 3 491], [2006 ALLMR SC 4 190], [2006 MHLJ SC 4 242], [2006 SCR 3 53], [2006 MPLJ SC 3 1], [2006 AIOL 157], [2006 AIR SC 1675], [2006 SCC 4 558], [2006 DLT 128 360], [2006 AIR SCW 1550]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1643829/
https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/naveen-kohli-vs-neelu-kohli
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae31e4b0149711413211
https://www.legitquest.com/case/naveen-kohli-v-neelu-kohli/26101
Other cases wherein Divorce was granted to Husband here.
State of Maharashtra Vs Rajesh Laxman Kedar on 10 September, 2018
A judgment from a magistrate from Dhule, in Maharastra. See the bullshitting of this judge,
From Para 13,
It is the defence of accused persons that there are contradictions and omissions in the evidence of witnesses. Whatever these witnesses have stated is on the information gathered from the informant. It is very natural considering the nature of the charge. In the circumstances, the evidence of the informant is pivotal and the evidence of relative witnesses which has corroborative value always revolves around her evidence. Hence, evidence of such relative witnesses cannot be discarded by branding them as hearsay. Aftermath I have no hesitation to conclude that there is reliable corroboration from these so called interested witnesses.
From Para 14,
Learned advocate for accused persons urged that no independent witness is examined by prosecution and the investigation officer is also not examined. The offence of cruelty generally occurs within the four boundaries of the house. Under these circumstances, non examination of any independent witness can certainly be spared.
Para 17 will give you vomiting,
In the case in hand, informant was ousted from her matrimonial house on 11-02-2009 and she has lodged complaint on 14-02-2009. But she has mentioned in her evidence that, after accused persons had ousted her, she went to railway station and waited their for whole night, in the morning, she went at her elder son’s school to meet him but as her husband and her mother-in-law had prevented her from meeting her son she came back at her parent’s house. Her matrimonial house is at Mumbai and her maternal house is at Dhule, she has lodged report against accused persons at Dhule City Police Station. In view of all the above explanation, in my opinion delay is satisfactorily explained by informant.
Never mind the jurisdiction. Supreme Court’s Yours truly has already destroyed the jurisdiction with weird illogic here.
From Para 18, more vomiting,
With due respect to Hon’ble High Court, in the present case in hand, the alleged ill-treatment was occurred to informant till year 2009 and witnesses deposed during the trial in year 2013 to 2017, it would be too pedantic to state the exact dates. Hence, in my opinion, non disclosure of such dates would not be that material in the peculiar circumstances of the case as witnesses have correctly mentioned all the incidents of physical and mental cruelty. As well as in respect of the earlier discussion, offences under Section 498A occurs within four corners of the house, hence it is not expected from any neighbour to narrate the ill treatment suffered by informant by her husband and in laws. . And if for the sake of argument we accept that, her neighbours knew about the ill treatment to her by her husband and in laws, but a prudent man can conclude that a neighbor will not come and give evidence against his neighbors for the lady who is not living with his neighbour from years together.
Here goes 212 CrPC down the drain… Ahh this is womenland…
From Para 19,
With due respect to Hon’ble High Court, the above mentioned case laws are not applicable to the case in hand. In present case, informant and her witnesses have specifically deposed about the physical and mental torture as well as unlawful demand of money by accused persons and furthermore her torture on non fulfilling the unlawful demands by accused persons with corroboration. Not a single witness has deposed contrary to prosecution story regarding it. Hence, it constrains me to believe the version of informant and her witnesses
More diarrhea in Para 20,
It is also the defence of accused persons that, she herself has left company of accused no.1. She has filed divorce petition in the Court. The informant also accepted the contention of divorce in her cross examination. But while considering the situation in the Indian culture, when a marriage was performed with zeal and enthusiasm and a bride had left her parental house, it would be difficult to believe that she would leave company of her husband without any reason. Even in todays so called modern society, thereturn of daughter from matrimonial house is treated as a stigma. Considering these general factors, whenever the allegations of cruelty is made, the conduct of the parties, motive intention and other circumstances of the case etc. always needs to be kept in mind because, what amounts of cruelty is nowhere defined. It needs to be waited considering the facts of each and every case differently. However, once the unlawful demands are proved, it materially strengthens the prosecution story. Merely by saying that the informant left company of her husband on her own would not give probability to the defence of husband. He has to offer some plausible explanation on this point. Moreover, when it has emerged on record that even after partying ways with accused no.1, the informant from last 9 years or so is still residing at her parental house. There appears no other reason for her to leave her matrimonial life only because she doesn’t want to cohabit with accused no.1. It is pertinent to note that her elder son was with accused persons and one daughter is with her at the time she left her matrimonial house. Having regard to the Indian culture again a mother cannot leave her son without any strong reason. Only filing petition for divorce in the court will not mean that she was not ill treated by accused persons. Therefore, in my view, additional onus lies on the shoulder of the husband who is accountable to certain extent when his wife leaves his company by contending alleged ill-treatment.
From Para 25, vomiting about 406 IPC (No entrustment, No list of jewelry, To whom, When)
It is pertinent to note that there is no bar of filing criminal case for embezzlement of her jewelery. It is the admitted position of law that the jewelery and ornaments wore by bride at the time if her marriage are her Stridhana. It is nowhere come on record that accused no.1 had returned the jewelery to informant during the pendency of this case. Hence, I came to the conclusion that prosecution has proved section 406 of Indian Penal Code, which accused no.1 cannot rebute.
And some liberal diarrhea gyan delivery from Para 30,
The incidents of cruelty to wives is increasing day by day all over the country. The greed of her husband and relatives is unending and due to this many women has to suffer a lot, many times the greed of her husband and in laws is satisfied at the cost of her life. It is necessary to eradicate such tendency of unlawful demand of money and cruelty to a married woman. Hence, deterrence is must to curb such tendency of society. Therefore, I am not inclined to extend the provision of Probation of Offenders Act, 1884 to him.
You can read the rest of junk below.
Kirti Nagpal Vs Rohit Girdhar on 12 February, 2019
The cunning knife tried to extort money from husband saying he earns in dollars and hence he should pay her interim maintenance under HMA 24 as she just earns in rupees. Hon’ble Delhi High Court has shown the door to the knife.
PS: The husband is working as Vice President in Infineon Technologies at Singapore.
Index of this couple’s cases is here.
Index of Section 24 HMA judgments is here.
Bhriguram De Vs State of West Bengal and others on 20 September, 2018
In this order from Calcutta High Court(appellate side),
Para 15,
According to the Law Lexicon, Third Edition (2012), the Latin Maxim “Suppressio veri, suggestio falsi” defines that the suppression of the truth is equivalent to the suggestion of falsehood. The suppression or failure to disclose what one party is bound to disclose to another, may amount to fraud. Where a person is found to be guilty of suppressio veri suggestio falsi for having concealed material information from scrutiny of the Court, he is not entitled for any equitable relief under order 39 of CPC (5 of 1908). [Arbind Kumar Pal v. Hazi Md. Faizullah Khan, AIR 2007 (NOC) 1035 (Pat) : (2006) 1 BLJR 430].
From Para 25,
I have no hesitation in saying that the doors of justice would be closed for a litigant whose case is based on falsehood or suppression of material facts. Fraud and justice never dwell together. They are alien to each other. Fraud pollutes the sanctity, regularity, orderliness and solemnity of the judicial proceedings. It is the bounden duty of the Court to keep the stream of justice absolutely clean.
Finally, from Para 29,
Before finally pronouncing my decision, I must state that this court, in all fairness gave an opportunity, after hearing and going through the documents produced by the respondents, to the petitioner to withdraw the writ petition (with liberty to file afresh with better particulars). However, Mr. Saktipada Jana appearing on behalf of the petitioner, refused and pressed the writ petition unabated. One is reminded of the saying, “you can take a horse to the well, but cannot force it to drink”. In view of the same, I dismiss the writ petition in limine. I am of the view that exemplary costs should be awarded. However, on a compassionate plea made by Mr. Jana, the order as to costs is limited to Rs.5,000/- only, payable to the West Bengal State Legal Services Authority, Kolkata, within two weeks from date.
Reproduced in accordance with Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from judis.nic.in, lobis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court and District Court Websites such as ecourts.gov.in
A.Shanmugam Vs Ariya K.R.K.M.N.P.Sangam on 27 April, 2012
My Favorite Mr Justice Dalveer Bhandari of Supreme Court of India delivered this judgment. He elaborately destroyed the false pleadings and false pleas made by the Appellate solely for the purpose of dragging on the case. Observe how he cites all his past landmark, reported judgments in this one and sets the stage to expose the appellate thoroughly.
From Para 21,
This case demonstrates widely prevalent state of affairs where litigants raise disputes and cause litigation and then obstruct the progress of the case only because they stand to gain by doing so. It is a matter of common experience that the Court’s otherwise scarce resources are spent in dealing with non-deserving cases and unfortunately those who were waiting in the queue for justice in genuine cases usually suffer. This case is a typical example of delayed administration of civil justice in our Courts. A small suit, where the appellant was directed to be evicted from the premises in 1994, took 17 years before the matter was decided by the High Court. Unscrupulous litigants are encouraged to file frivolous cases to take undue advantage of the judicial system.
From Para 35,
Experience also reveals that our Courts have been very reluctant to grant the actual or realistic costs. We would like to explain this by giving this illustration. When a litigant is compelled to spend Rs.1 lac on a frivolous litigation there is hardly any justification in awarding Rs. 1,000/- as costs unless there are special circumstances of that case.We need to decide cases while keeping pragmatic realities in view. We have to ensure that unscrupulous litigant is not permitted to derive any benefit by abusing the judicial process.
From Para 42,
On the facts of the present case, following principles emerge:
1. It is the bounden duty of the Court to uphold the truth and do justice.
2. Every litigant is expected to state truth before the law court whether it is pleadings, affidavits or evidence. Dishonest and unscrupulous litigants have no place in law courts.
3. The ultimate object of the judicial proceedings is to discern the truth and do justice. It is imperative that pleadings and all other presentations before the court should be truthful.
4. Once the court discovers falsehood, concealment, distortion, obstruction or confusion in pleadings and documents, the court should in addition to full restitution impose appropriate costs. The court must ensure that there is no incentive for wrong doer in the temple of justice. Truth is the foundation of justice and it has to be the common endeavour of all to uphold the truth and no one should be permitted to pollute the stream of justice.
5. It is the bounden obligation of the Court to neutralize any unjust and/or undeserved benefit or advantage obtained
by abusing the judicial process.
6. Watchman, caretaker or a servant employed to look after the property can never acquire interest in the property
irrespective of his long possession. The watchman, caretaker or a servant is under an obligation to hand over the possession forthwith on demand. According to the principles of justice, equity and good conscience, Courts are not justified in protecting the possession of a watchman, caretaker or servant who was only allowed to live into the premises to look after the same.
7. The watchman, caretaker or agent holds the property of the principal only on behalf the principal. He acquires no right or interest whatsoever in such property irrespective of his long stay or possession.
8. The protection of the Court can be granted or extended to the person who has valid subsisting rent agreement, lease agreement or licence agreement in his favour.
